JANUARY 29, 1998

MODERATOR’S REMARKS

GEN(R) WILLIAM R. RICHARDSON

I AM PLEASED TO BE YOUR MODERATOR FOR THIS NEXT PANEL WHOSE TITLE IS "TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS".

WE HAVE TWO VERY QUALIFIED SPEAKERS ON THIS SUBJECT. LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICH HOOKER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND DR. JONATHAN SHAY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS IN BOSTON.

PRIOR TO INTRODUCING OUR TWO SPEAKERS PERMIT ME TO MAKE A FEW REMARKS OF MY OWN ON THE SUBJECT OF TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS. IN DOING SO I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THE DIFFERENCES IN MOTIVATING MEN TO FIGHT IN OUR WARS IN THE 20TH CENTURY AS COMPARED TO THE MAJOR ONE OF THE 19TH CENTURY -- THE CIVIL WAR.

IN HIS RECENT BOOK ENTITLED "FOR CAUSE & COMRADES", ON WHY MEN FOUGHT IN THE CIVIL WAR, JAMES McPHERSON OBSERVED THAT, FOR CIVIL WAR SOLDIERS, GROUP COHESION AND PEER PRESSURE WERE POWERFUL FACTORS IN COMBAT MOTIVATION. BUT HE BELIEVED THAT OTHER FACTORS, WHICH PROMPTED THEM TO ENLIST IN THE FIRST PLACE, HAD SOME CARRYOVER INTO THEIR MOTIVATION TO FIGHT FOR THEIR COUNTRY, BE IT THE NORTH OR THE SOUTH. McPHERSON GOES ON TO EXPLAIN FROM DIARIES, THAT THESE WERE A COMPLEX MIXTURE OF PATRIOTISM, IDEOLOGY, DUTY, HONOR, MANHOOD, AND COMMUNITY PRESSURE.

BE THAT AS IT MAY, ONE NEED ONLY TAKE A STAFF RIDE AT ANTIETAM OR GETTYSBURG TO REALIZE THAT WHATEVER MOTIVATION THEY POSSESSED BROUGHT ENORMOUS CASUALTIES TO BOTH SIDES. AS JAY LUVAS, THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE’S HISTORIAN EXPLAINED AT ANTIETAM, THE REASON WHY THE INFANTRY UNITS ATTACKED IN MASS AS OPPOSED TO USING THE TECHNIQUE OF FIRE AND MOVEMENT WAS THAT THE ONLY WAY TO KEEP MANY OF THE TROOPS FROM HEADING TO THE REAR IN THE FACE OF FIRE WAS TO VIRTUALLY LINK THEM ARM IN ARM IN AN ASSAULT WITH THE PLATOON LEADER BEHIND THE FORMATION THREATENING TO SHOOT ANYONE WHO ATTEMPTED TO BOLT TO THE REAR.

NOW FAST FORWARD TO 1917 AND WE SEE THE AEF DOING MUCH BETTER THAN THAT BUT STILL BEDEVILED BY FRONTAL ATTACKS FROM TRENCH LINE TO TRENCH LINE IN SPITE OF THE ADVENT OF THE MACHINE GUN. MOTIVATIONS WERE A BIT DIFFERENT THEN, BUT I SUSPECT THAT THE U.S. HAD ITS NORMAL COMPLEMENT OF HEROES -- AND LIKELY A FEW COWARDS BY THE TIME OF THE ARMISTICE.

WHAT WORLD WAR II TAUGHT US WAS THAT UNIT COHESION MADE A BIG DIFFERENCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OUR FIGHTING FORCES. BUT OF EVEN GREATER SIGNIFICANCE WAS THE COMPETENCE LEVEL OF OUR LEADERS AND THE QUALITY OF THE TRAINING OF OUR UNITS, BE THEY ACTIVE ARMY OR RESERVE COMPONENTS. INDEED, THE HIGH DEGREE OF CASUALTIES WHICH THEN LTC BILL DePUY WITNESSED IN BATTALION LEVEL COMBAT CONVINCED HIM THAT UNLESS WE PROPERLY TRAINED OUR UNITS AND ADEQUATELY TAUGHT OUR OFFICERS AND NCOS HOW TO BE COMPETENT IN THE ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR, WE COULD NEVER BE SUCCESSFUL ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

THE KOREAN WAR TAUGHT US THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED FOR COMBAT IN JUNE 1950. WE DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT FORCES AND EQUIPMENT READY TO GO TO WAR, AND THE TRAINING OF THE UNITS THAT BEGAN THE WAR WAS INADEQUATE.

THE VIETNAM WAR TAUGHT US MANY LESSONS ABOUT WHEN WE SHOULD GO TO WAR, WHY WE SHOULD GO TO WAR, AND HOW WE SHOULD GO TO WAR. MANY OF US IN THIS ROOM EXPERIENCED THE FRUSTRATIONS OF THAT CONFLICT, BE IT THE PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT SYSTEM, INAPPROPRIATE TACTICS, OR UNTRAINED UNITS AND LEADERS IN JUNGLE COMBAT. TALK ABOUT TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS IN THAT WAR. I SUBMIT THAT IT WAS WRIT LARGE DURING AND AFTERWARDS, AT ALL LEVELS.

THE GULF WAR BROUGHT A NEW DIMENSION IN THE HISTORY OF OUR ARMED FORCES. THE RESULTS REFLECTED QUITE WELL ON THE PREPARATION OF OUR FORCES. BARRY MCCAFFREY EXPRESSED IT BEST WHEN HE WAS ASKED AFTER OPERATION DESERT STORM HOW LONG IT TOOK TO PREPARE FOR THE "100 HOUR WAR". HIS RESPONSE WAS "15 YEARS". WHAT BARRY IMPLIED WAS THAT IT TOOK THE INSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARMY 15 YEARS TO DEVELOP ITS DOCTRINE FOR WARFIGHTING IN THE MODERN ERA, TO REORGANIZE ITS UNITS AROUND A MODERNIZED SET OF EQUIPMENT, AND THEN TO TRAIN ITS LEADERS AND ITS SOLDIERS HOW TO FIGHT. THE DICTUM IN THE ARMY WAS TO "TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT" AND TO MAKE THAT TRAINING AS CLOSE TO STRESSFUL COMBAT AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO GET THE LEADERS AND THE LED TO KNOW EXACTLY HOW TO EMPLOY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES TO WIN ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

NOW, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE DIFFERENCES IN BATTLEFIELD PERFORMANCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL WAR AND THE GULF WAR, PLUS THE INTERVENING WARS MIGHT BOIL DOWN TO TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP. WHERE COMPETENT LEADERSHIP PREVAILED WE COULD GENERALLY SEE AN EFFECTIVELY TRAINED FORCE. THOSE WHO WERE LED HAD GREAT CONFIDENCE IN BOTH THEIR LEADERS AND THEMSELVES. CLEARLY, WE SAW THIS IN THE SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT IN THE GULF WAR. THAT WAS TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS AT ITS BEST.

THE U.S. ARMY HAS LEARNED SOME IMPORTANT LESSONS FROM 1861 TO 1991. ARE WE GOING TO CARRY THEM FORWARD WITH TODAY’S ARMED FORCES SO THAT WHENEVER WE HAVE TO ENTER A CONFLICT WE ARE READY? CAN OUR SOLDIERS TRUST THEIR LEADERS TO TRAIN THEM WELL AND TO CARE FOR THEIR WELFARE? AND WILL THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF THIS COUNTRY SHOW THE CARE AND CONCERN, THE TRUSTWORTHINESS, DURING THEIR STEWARDSHIP SO THAT OUR FORCES ARE FULLY MANNED, PROPERLY EQUIPPED, ADEQUATELY TRAINED, AND COMPETENTLY LED?

OUR TWO SPEAKERS WILL TOUCH ON SOME OF THIS IN THEIR PRESENTATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO SHOW WHAT WE COULD DO BETTER IN THE PREPARATION OF OUR FORCES FOR COMBAT. BUT THE REAL QUESTION THAT WE WILL ALWAYS FACE IS WHETHER THE LEADERSHIP OF THIS COUNTRY IS WILLING TO PAY THE PRICE TO ENSURE THAT WE GO TO WAR PREPARED. THIS IS THE TRUST WE PLACE IN OUR LEADERS. IT IS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE ARMED FORCES OF THIS COUNTRY.

LET ME NOW INTRODUCE OUR FIRST PRESENTER, LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICH HOOKER. COLONEL HOOKER GREW UP IN THE ARMY AS THE SON OF AN ARMY OFFICER. HE SERVED TWO YEARS AS AN ENLISTED SOLDIER PRIOR TO ENTERING WEST POINT THROUGH A PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT. HE GRADUATED IN 1981 AND WAS COMMISSIONED IN THE INFANTRY. HIS FIRST TROOP DUTY WAS WITH THE 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A TEACHING TOUR AT WEST POINT, AFTER WHICH HE BECAME A WHITE HOUSE FELLOW, SERVING WITH THE NSC STAFF AS ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE POLICY.

COLONEL HOOKER RETURNED TO TROOP DUTY IN 1994 WITH THE 3D BATTALION, 325TH INFANTRY REGIMENT AS DEPUTY COMMANDER AND LATER THE LION BRIGADE OPERATIONS OFFICER IN VICENZA, ITALY. HIS OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCES INCLUDE GRENADA IN OPERATION URGENT FURY, SOMALIA IN OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, ZAIRE IN OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE, AND BOSNIA IN OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR.

A RECENT GRADUATE OF THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, COLONEL HOOKER HOLDS M.A. AND PH.D. DEGREES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA. HE HAS LECTURED AT THE ARMY, NAVY AND NATIONAL WAR COLLEGES, THE U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND THE ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE. HE HAS PUBLISHED 18 ARTICLES IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNALS AND IS EDITOR AND CO-AUTHOR OF MANEUVER WARFARE: AN ANTHOLOGY, PUBLISHED IN 1994. HIS SECOND BOOK, BY THEIR DEEDS ALONE: ESSAYS IN DOMINANT MANEUVER IS FORTHCOMING. THE TITLE OF COLONEL HOOKER’S PRESENTATION IS "BUILDING UNBREAKABLE UNITS". LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, PLEASE JOIN ME IN WELCOMING COLONEL RICH HOOKER TO THE PODIUM.

(LTC HOOKER’S PRESENTATION)

THE SECOND SPEAKER ON THIS PANEL IS DR. JONATHAN SHAY. BORN IN PHILADELPHIA, DR. SHAY ATTENDED LAWRENCEVILLE SCHOOL BEFORE ENTERING HARVARD COLLEGE WHEN HE GRADUATED MAGNA CUM LAUDE IN 1963. HE LATER RECEIVED AN A.B.D. AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, FOLLOWED BY AN M.D. AND THEN A PH.D. IN NEUROPATHOLOGY FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

FROM 1972 TO 1977 HE SERVED AS AN ASSISTANT IN NEUROPATHOLOGY IN NEUROSURGERY AT THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL IN BOSTON, FOLLOWED BY A RESIDENCY IN PSYCHIATRY AT THE NEW ENGLAND MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL IN BOSTON. FROM 1987 TO THE PRESENT HE HAS SERVED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRY AT TUFTS MEDICAL SCHOOL AND AT THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION OUTPATIENT CLINIC IN BOSTON.

DR. SHAY HAS RECEIVED NUMEROUS AWARDS AND HONORS AND HAS BEEN AN EXTENSIVE AUTHOR IN MEDICAL SCIENCE AND IN COMBAT STRESS AND TRAUMA. HIS SUPERB BOOK ENTITLED ACHILLES IN VIETNAM WAS CHOSEN AS AN OUTSTANDING ACADEMIC BOOK OF THE YEAR IN THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS BOOK LIST.

THE TITLE OF DR. SHAY’S PRESENTATION IS "COHESION, CONFIDENCE, COMMAND CLIMATE: KEYS TO PREVENTING PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MORAL INJURY IN MILITARY SERVICES". LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, PLEASE JOIN ME IN WELCOMING DR. JONATHAN SHAY TO THE PODIUM.

(DR. SHAY’S PRESENTATION)

COLONEL HOOKER HAS TOLD US THAT MORALE, COHESION AND ESPRIT ARE CRUCIAL COMPONENTS OF COMBAT POWER. HE WALKED US THROUGH THE HISTORY OF THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM OF THE 1980s AND THEIR TWO COMPLEMENTARY PROGRAMS -- COHORT AND THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM. THEIR FAILURES DID NOT LEAVE HIM UNDAUNTED. HE HAS OFFERED A SUGGESTION FOR WORKING THESE TWO EFFORTS AGAIN IN ORDER TO ENSURE OUR FORCES ARE BOTH WILLING AND ABLE TO FIGHT.

DR. SHAY HAS SUGGESTED THAT THERE ARE THREE WAYS TO PREVENT PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MORAL INJURY IN MILITARY SERVICE, NAMELY, COHESION WITH SMALL UNITS, JUST AS COLONEL HOOKER HAS ESPOUSED, TRAINING THAT IS REALISTIC, AND COMPETENT AND ETHICAL LEADERSHIP.

BOTH OF THESE GENTLEMEN HAVE GIVEN US SOME FOOD FOR THOUGHT. SO, LET’S TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS AT THIS TIME. PLEASE STAND, STATE YOUR NAME, AND THEN DIRECT YOUR QUESTION TO ONE OF THE PRESENTERS.