Few ideas have captured more attention in the defense community than the notion that we are in the midst of a worldwide "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) (3). The genesis of the RMA is the microchip, and RMA proponents contend that victory in future conflicts will go to those forces that most aggressively apply it to military uses. Nowhere has the RMA been embraced more enthusiastically than in the gadgetry-obsessed United States (4). The astonishing proliferation of precision-guided munitions, sophisticated intelligence-gathering capabilities, advanced command and control systems, and ingenious information warfare processes are evidence of the RMA’s impact.

The RMA’s technological focus is apparent in today’s military thinking. Joint Vision 2010 (5), the "operationally based template" (6) as to how America will fight future wars, centers on the problem of how to "leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting." (7) The RMA, however, is about more than simply grafting the latest technologies onto existing forces. Most analysts insist that for a true RMA to occur, doctrinal and organizational change must accompany the new war-fighting technologies (8). Nevertheless, although the RMA carries a wide range of implications for doctrine and organization, examination of those aspects has not garnered nearly as much interest as the technologies themselves.

Even less effort has been directed to the new questions of professional ethics created by RMA-induced organizational changes, despite the fact that ethical frailties would seem to be one of the human failings Huntington suggests military organizations aim to overcome. This essay attempts to address that deficiency. It will contend that 21^st century officers will confront a range of issues requiring, in some instances, a fundamental reexamination of the military’s ethos. It will argue that one of the most important ethical questions will be the degree to which a military officer’s organizational loyalty must yield to a broadened concept of national defense interests.

The paper will explore other issues of professional ethics raised by the effect of technological developments on military organizations. However, it will seek more to catalog the myriad of themes deserving of further study, than to provide definitive solutions. In essence, the purpose of this paper is to reconnoiter the terrain of organizational change occasioned by the RMA’s new technologies of war. Be warned, however, it is intentionally provocative in the hopes of stimulating a vigorous discussion of these vitally important issues.

Analyzing an officer’s professional responsibilities during this period of organizational change - technology-driven or otherwise - can be complex and at times paradoxical. Consider the dynamics of service loyalty. On one hand, most officers are imbued with it during their initial training, and this is carefully reinforced during subsequent assignments. The reason is obvious: an officer needs a firm grounding in the philosophy of his or her service in order to fully appreciate how its unique attributes can best be applied during armed conflicts and other operations. On the other hand, a heavy emphasis on "jointness" (i.e., the pooling of the individual service resources into a single, warfighting team) has emerged in recent years (9). Today jointness is too often viewed as not only an unqualified virtue, but also a politically correct one. Some advocates of jointness consider almost any expression of service loyalty to be a troubling indicator of inefficient parochialism.

This is wrong; differing service perspectives, even when expressed belligerently, have a pragmatic, almost Machiavellian, usefulness that goes far beyond their self-serving veneer. For instance, they provide an invaluable competitive analysis of military doctrine and planning. The pressure of competition underpins America’s unmatched success in military matters just as it does in economics, athletics, the arts, and so many other areas. The outcome of what some superficially analyze as petty interservice bickering may actually be the most effective approach to framing military strategy and defense policy. Thus, service loyalty is an important and productive element of an officer’s ethos.

That said, there remains the danger that service loyalty might obscure the revolutionary changes RMA technology brings about, especially when such changes challenge an organization’s raison d’être. This can raise difficult questions of duty for military professionals today, as has occurred in the past. For example, once military applications of the internal combustion engine began to dominate the battlefield, did cavalrymen have an ethical and professional responsibility - in the interest of an efficient defense establishment - to hasten the demise of their own organization? As we shall see, the heart of that "cavalryman’s dilemma" still resonates today.

However technologically-oriented the American military may be in general, the Air Force is the most technologically focused. It operates in mediums where man cannot venture, even for the briefest period, without technological assistance. As a result, the military service likely to be most radically affected by the RMA’s technological change is the Air Force.

In considering the effect of RMA on the Air Force, the premises that underpinned its creation as a separate organization are relevant. A key factor was the belief that only those who actually flew the machines had sufficient appreciation for the uniqueness of the medium to properly understand and employ airpower effectively. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the service always centered on its elite cadre of aviators and defined itself accordingly.

General Billy Mitchell, one of the service’s most revered icons, argued that the "work of an air force depends on men that fly the planes, not primarily on those that remain on the ground." (10) Even General Hap Arnold, an airman who elsewhere enthusiastically acknowledged the importance of non-aviators, declared that:

Today, however, the importance of pilots has been dramatically affected by the application of the new technologies of war. Some of these fundamentally recast the utility of aviators. The November 1997 issue of Popular Science asserts, for example, that the "F-117 stealth fighter, the most automated aircraft in service, can perform an entire mission, from wheels-up to wheels down, with no action by the pilot except a single button-push that authorizes bomb release." (12)

Along similar lines, no development carries more potential to challenge the Air Force’s aviator-centered organizational structure - even its very existence - than the rise of increasingly sophisticated uninhabited combat vehicles or UCVs. Once considered the stuff of science fiction, the possibility now exists that pilots will be rendered superfluous in the not so distant future.

Recent articles touting headlines like "Do we really need fighter pilots?" contend that UCVs can perform as well or better than manned aircraft, and do so at less cost - a critical element in an era of austere resources. (13) In fact, Popular Science argues that "[r]emotely controlled combat planes are now being designed that fly better than any pilot." (14) Some Air Force officers also recognize the profound implications of UCVs life-preserving features. Lt General George Muellner, a fighter pilot himself, admits that "[i]f I can do the same mission as well, and not have to put people at risk, then it is kind of hard to argue that we have to keep man in the cockpit." (15)

Additionally, decisions by the service leaders suggest - albeit unwittingly - that the pilot is no longer the irreplaceable "man in the loop" of airpower theory and legend. The determination following the "friendly-fire" shootdown of two U.S. helicopters in Iraq in 1994 is but one illustration: the Air Force court-martialed not the pilots who actually did the shooting, but rather a captain in a far-removed AWACS (16) airplane. Professor Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University observed that the captain’s job was not to launch weapons but only "the proper interpretation of symbols appearing on a computer screen." (17) Cohen maintains that the decision to court-martial the captain "shattered a fundamental assumption of combat, that a warrior is responsible for the injury his weapons inflict." (18) Actions that focus on the officer in a distant information center as opposed to the warplane’s cockpit "steadily erode the presumed superior knowledge of ‘the man on the spot.’" (19)

Furthermore, thoughtful analysts like Carl Builder argue that the Air Force has lost its strategic focus, the heritage of Douhet and the main justification for its existence as an independent service (20). Builder contends that the service’s leadership (and, hence, its organizational culture) has been captured by officers from the fighter community who are more infatuated with the means (i.e., the aircraft) than they are concerned with the mission (21). At the same time the service’s conventional strategic capabilities have been reduced mainly to an aging fleet of B-52s and the problematic B-1s.

The Air Force does have a another heavy strategic bomber, the B-2. But the very limited inventory of the airplanes, along with their enormous cost (22), makes them virtually unusable as an instrument of national power in all but the most extreme circumstances (23). The anticipated political fallout from the loss of such a fantastically expensive weapon is sure to discourage its deployment, let alone its use. Moreover, despite the entreaties of analysts (24), the Air Force is not even considering the procurement of more B-2s or the development of a follow-on manned bomber (25). Instead, the Air Force has poured its procurement resources into the high-priced F-22 (26), principally an air superiority fighter whose main rivals, critics charge, are other U.S. aircraft. Besides, analysts contend that existing missiles systems can perform most of the air-to-ground missions contemplated for the F-22 (27).

Consequently, with the bulk of the strategic strike and air superiority missions assumed by UCVs (and missiles), little remains of the traditional combat role of manned aircraft. Close air support (CAS), which never has had much of constituency within the Air Force (28), was not a principle justification for the service’s independence. In any event, rotary-winged aircraft operated by the land components, along with other existing and planned artillery and missile systems, may well fulfill CAS requirements without Air Force fixed-winged assets. In any event, as the Marine Corps has demonstrated, even fixed-wing aircraft can quite effectively perform CAS without the necessity of being organized as a separate service.

It does appear that air transportation and air refueling assets will require manned aircraft for the foreseeable future. Is there a rationale for a separate service based principally on transport and tanker pilots? Probably not. An organization whose mission does not ordinarily require its members to personally confront the enemy in battle, to go directly into "harms way" so to speak, would not seem to warrant the same status as those that do. For example, no separate armed service exists for merchant marines. Nor does it seem likely that a service composed primarily of officers pushing buttons in secure command centers far from the terror of battle would require independent service status for either practical or philosophical reasons. In short, if combat pilots are made obsolete by the new technologies of war, then the Air Force’s organizational rationale is severely undermined.

Nevertheless, some in the Air Force believe the service has a bright future, though not a future in the air at all; rather, they see the service’s fortune as dependent upon the militarization of a new medium – space.

Future-thinking airmen may have considered the demise of the manned aircraft in drafting Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21^st Century Air Force (29). Issued over the signature of former Chief of Staff Ronald Fogleman, it asserts that the Air Force is "transitioning from an air force to an air and space force to a space and air force, with the distinct emphasis on `space’." (30)

Air Force leaders believe that space is critical to the future of warfighting. General Charles A. Horner, the architect of the Air Force’s Gulf War triumph and the former Commander in Chief of U.S. Space Command, insists that space systems are "fundamental to modern warfare." (31) As just one example, precision guided munitions, the centerpiece of RMA weaponry, very often require satellite-derived information for guidance (32). Because of its importance to high-tech operations, war in space is considered inevitable (33). To that end several steps have been taken, including testing the effects of laser weapons on satellites (34).

Does the extension of military operations into space assure the future of the Air Force as a separate service, providing it reinvents itself as being principally focused there? Not necessarily. Given that there is little or no prospect of significant numbers of space-based combatants anytime soon, and given that the independent Air Force was premised on the notion that only those elite that actually functioned in the medium could acquire the specialized insights necessary to properly employ the assets, the nexus that supports a separate service does not immediately emerge.

If space warfare - like many aspects of future land and sea warfare - is conducted essentially by earthbound ‘console-warriors,’ need they wear Air Force blue? Despite what many airmen seem to assume, the physical properties of space are hardly similar enough to the earth’s atmosphere so as to make the former an intuitively obvious extension of the latter. More importantly, there is certainly no consensus outside of the Air Force that space is principally a blue-suit domain. A case in point is the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ recent observations concerning popular conceptualizations of space forces. Using the television program Star Trek as an illustration, he noted that naval – not aviation - terminology is typically used. Arguing that the vastness of space is just another sea on which to put a fleet, the Commandant asserts that if the Air Force "is saying [space] is theirs, [he is] saying ‘you’re not taking it’." (35)

Besides the professional issues of whether a separate service is necessary to effectively conduct space warfare, there is the more basic question as to whether combat operations ought to be conducted there at all. The nature of space systems create legal and ethical reasons that weigh against doing so. Specifically, a basic principle of the law of armed conflict is the obligation of belligerents to separate military targets from civilians and their property (36). Nevertheless, since the beginning of space exploration military and civilian developments have been commingled to a such a degree that "the separation of military from civilian...space technology [is] meaningless." (37) While today there are some purely military systems (38), the United States itself relies heavily on civilian satellites, many of which are owned by international consortiums.

Future opponents will likewise depend upon commercial surveillance and communications systems (39). Thus, space presents the classic legal and moral conundrum of multiuser systems: how do you attack them without causing disproportionate injury to noncombatants and their property, especially when the same system is used by nations not involved in the conflict? As a practical matter, it is difficult to foresee many scenarios where a proportionality analysis (40) would justify attacks on multiuser space systems. This is especially true as noncombatants in a growing number of countries become ever more reliant on space-based technologies for a whole range of essential communications and other services.

Nonetheless, U.S. Space Command is seeking to have "space" declared its area of operations so as to facilitate planning for conflict there (41). Little international appetite exists for the notion of militarizing space, however. Virtually every treaty related to space asserts that it is to be used only for "peaceful purposes." (42) (The U.S. interprets these provisions to prohibit only aggressive military actions.(43)) Is it wise, therefore, for the United States to take organizational actions – such as declaring space as an area of operations for one of its combatant commands - that suggest that space is simply another field of battle (44)? Should officers advocate a course of action that might stimulate a space arms race, akin to the nuclear arms race, as many fear (45)?

It may be more prudent to pursue a legal regime that declares space a ‘sanctuary’ similar to that afforded communications facilities located in neutral territory (46). This would permit any nation to use space for communications, surveillance, and comparable activities - even during armed conflicts - with the systems not being subject to attack. Arguably, this strategy would renew the U.S.’s original policy toward space. President Eisenhower established a "self-imposed space sanctuary policy…[in order to] establish the principle of freedom of space, to protect US satellites from interference, and to avoid an arms race in space…" (47). ‘Neutralizing’ space would not appear to degrade America’s warfighting capability if U.S. space systems were therefore protected and, in any event, existing legal and ethical norms already limit or preclude attack on the multiuser international systems that might be employed by adversaries.

This proposal would not preclude sub-space systems that selectively deny adversaries’ military forces the use of signals from space platforms. However, the development of lasers and other space weapons would be prohibited although passive defensive measures would be allowed. Accordingly, it would not be inconsistent with current U.S. space policy, which advocates diplomatic and legal "measures to preclude an adversary’s hostile use of space systems and services." (48) Some may argue that the movement of weaponry into space is inevitable and cannot be effectively banned (49). But the remarkable history of nuclear arms control (as well as the success of the international prohibitions on biological and chemical weapons) during which many of the same arguments were made, leaves room for optimism - especially if action is taken soon.

In short, space may never become the medium for conflict that Air Force advocates expect. Without a space force into which to evolve, and with technology rapidly eroding the relevance of its combat-pilot centered culture, the Air Force may be on the eve of very dramatic organizational change as it moves into the 21^st century.

The Air Force is not the only organization that will face technology-induced quandaries that could directly challenge an officer’s organizational loyalty. High-tech surveillance systems and long-range precision munitions, for example, are reducing the need for the "direct action" missions which are the forte of the special operations community’s capabilities. In the future, technology may make it rarely necessary to risk elite troops on hazardous missions to conduct reconnaissance or sabotage.

Consequently, with the primary warfighting missions of special operations personnel superseded by technology, it is not clear that it is necessary to maintain their service-like existence as a separate combatant command (50). As the U.S. Marines have proven with their special operations capable units, whatever residual requirement that may exist to secrete troops deep behind enemy lines (e.g., rescue missions) can be effectively accomplished within the organizational framework of traditional military formations.

Special operators rightly point with pride to the accomplishments of their civil affairs units in post-war Kuwait, Haiti (51), Bosnia (52), and elsewhere. However, it may be that such missions are better accomplished by civilian, not military organizations. Countries recovering from war, failed government, and particularly military rule, should not be imprinted with the idea that the military is the solution to civil woes. Likewise, special operations personnel frequently conduct "training" missions around the globe (53). These missions are popular with many ambassadors, especially those assigned to less-developed countries, because the dearth of available foreign aid leaves them with few assistance options. Again, the danger of providing assistance via military channels is that it could confuse people as to the proper role of the armed forces in a free society. Furthermore, rather than using DoD funds under the aegis of "training," it may be more appropriate to obtain what is de facto foreign assistance through the normal legislative process.

Some experts believe that psychological operations were the special operations community’s most important contribution to the Gulf War (54). It is not evident, however, that this capability could not effectively reside within conventional military organizations. More importantly, new psychological warfare technology raises the question as to whether any military organization ought to control it. Powerful techniques are becoming available that can radically affect public perceptions of their leaders. As just one example, Thomas Czerwinski, a professor in the School of Information Warfare at the National Defense University, asks: "What would happen if you took Saddam Hussein’s image, altered it, and projected it back to Iraq showing him voicing doubts about his own Baath Party?" (55)

This is hardly science fiction. As anyone who has seen the film Forrest Gump can attest, technology now permits the creation of images that are extraordinarily convincing but false (56). Quite obviously, they could deceive any population about its leaders as Professor Czerwinski indicates. Because of the enormous potential of these technologies to affect political processes, it may be wise – in the interest of civil-military relations – to place the organizational responsibility for their employment under the control of a civilian entity. There is precedent for this in the control of nuclear weapons by the Department of Energy as provided by the Atomic Energy Act (57).

The Marine Corps is another organization whose raison d’être seems to be challenged by technology. Actually, the challenge comes from the combination of technology and the growing perception that the American people are casualty-averse (58). Historically, the core competency of the Marine Corps has been amphibious assault. But that extremely difficult and dangerous mission is vulnerable to an increasing range of technologies. During the Gulf War, for example, Iraq succeeded in deterring just such an attack by deploying relatively unsophisticated sea mines. (Following damage by mines to the U.S.S Tripoli and the U.S.S. Princeton (59), the notion of an amphibious assault was shelved.)

With the advent of even more sophisticated mine technology, it is difficult to conceive of any future situations where responsible decisionmakers would order a large scale amphibious assault against a defended location. And, as with the UCVs discussed earlier, as well as with vivid memories of horrific numbers of Marine deaths during island campaigns during World War II, would we send Marines in when we could send machines?

Nevertheless, despite the erosion of its traditional role, the Marine Corps is hardly folding its tent; rather, it is undergoing organizational change and is aggressively acquiring new capabilities. Besides the organic special operations capability previously mentioned (and demonstrated so well in the Scott O’Grady rescue), they have recently fielded a chemical and biological response team available for use in domestic situations. In another well-advertised move, Corps personnel are working to develop themselves as urban warfare experts (60). (The Marine Corps, ever conscious of its image, has a ferociously potent public relations machine.)

The question in this instance is the propriety of the Marine Corps’ actions in relation to other services. Historically, biological and chemical warfare defense, as well as urban warfare expertise, has been a core competency of the Army. Whether the Marine Corps’ new ventures make organizational sense is beyond the scope of this paper. The incidents do, however, illustrate the challenge for military professionals to ensure that organizational changes most efficiently serve defense needs in a macro sense. Cannibalizing the missions of other services out of a misguided sense of organizational loyalty must not, of course, be permitted.

Another phenomena affecting the armed forces mentioned previously requires further discussion: the growing phenomenon of casualty aversion that is seemly so influential in U.S. political and military (61). There are many reasons for this trend, some external to the military. JV2010 recognizes this issue by noting that the "American people will...expect us to be more efficient in protecting lives and resources while accomplishing our mission successfully." (62)

Some of the impetus for casualty aversion arises from within the armed forces and originates in the military’s Vietnam legacy (63). Many in uniform believe that lives were needlessly lost in the war in Southeast Asia and are determined to avoid putting military personnel at risk unless absolutely necessary. This has led to conflicts with civilian policymakers, as illustrated by a much-reported episode between Madeline Albright, then ambassador to the UN, and General Colin Powell, who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time. Frustrated over the military’s reluctance to become involved in Bosnia, Ambassador Albright asked General Powell "What is the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it? (64) Powell reported that he nearly had "an aneurysm," and explained to Ambassador Albright about the need for clear political goals before a military intervention. Powell (and others) have been roundly criticized in some quarters for his reluctance to support the use of force in various circumstances. (65)

Without question, military leaders should be wary of involvement in situations where troops are put at risk. At the same time, it is imperative that military organizations avoid creating the perception that the U.S. armed services is unwilling to take on hazardous missions. The comments of columnist William Pfaff should be of concern to military professionals:

Moreover, from an organizational perspective, it is interesting to note that Dr. Charles Moskos, the nation’s foremost military sociologist, observes that casualty aversion did not arise until the advent of the all-volunteer force (67). Uniformed professionals need to ask themselves whether the military’s altruistic ethos, axiomatic to its organizational culture, is being replaced by an occupationalism that places - perhaps unconsciously - undue weight on self-preservation over mission accomplishment. This tendency may be exacerbated by the treatment of Brig General Terry Schwalier. General Schwalier’s promotion to major general was quashed following the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia during his tour as commander. Schwalier was punished not because he failed to accomplish his mission of enforcing the no-fly zone in Southern Iraq, but because he had allegedly failed to take sufficient steps to protect his forces against terrorism. (68)

There are technological manifestations as well. In their book, The Future of War, authors George and Meredith Friedman argue that weapons systems become "senile" when their "primary strategic function" is "obscured by the need to construct expensive defenses against threats to the platforms." (69) An inward-looking military organization too focused on risk-avoidance may make excessive demands on the society it serves. For example, in justifying the procurement of the F-22, one of its advocates contended that "we must protect our sons and daughters with the best aircraft we can afford – like the F-22." (70) The problem with the sentiment expressed is the understanding of the term of "afford."

No one disagrees with the vital importance of equipping the military with the technology it needs to win. It is something of a different question to demand technology that will win with minimum losses to U.S. forces. If the aim is to preserve American lives, then the cost of protecting military personnel must be considered in the broader context of competing demands for limited government resources. Even for wealthy countries like the United States, budgets are a zero-sum game, i.e., each dollar spent for defense forecloses some other desirable use. President Dwight Eisenhower captured this quandary in a 1953 speech when he pointed out that:

Thus, as military professionals wrestle with incorporating RMA technology into new organizational structures, it should be kept in mind that it is the armed forces, not the society it serves, that should be called upon to assume the greatest risk (72). A technological improvement may, indeed, save military lives, but how many civilian Americans must be denied, for example, life-sustaining health services, to pay for it? In the final analysis, the military is, after all, an organization that requires "extraordinary sacrifice under the most adverse conditions." (73) That warrior ethic must not be allowed to be diminished.

Not all of the organizational changes that will raise issues of professional ethics and leadership are confined to those in uniform. In recent years there has been a determined effort to convert as many military billets as possible to less costly civilian positions (74). Likewise, other efforts have attempted to privatize and outsource many functions traditionally performed by uniformed personnel. This effort has resulted in thousands of civilians filling what were once military jobs not just at stateside bases, but increasingly on foreign deployments. (75)

While these actions are principally motivated by a desire to save scarce defense dollars, they are also a tacit recognition that the increasingly sophisticated technologies of war require the armed forces to tap the civilian-sector expertise. Armed Forces Journal reports, for example, that in fiscal year 1997, 70 percent of the Department of Defense’s information technology transactions were outsourced to private vendors. (76)

This trend exacerbates the long-held fear that new technology requiring ever-greater civilian involvement will cloud the combatant/noncombatant distinction key to the law of armed conflict (77). One of its earliest tenets was the requirement to distinguish between combatants who could be legitimately attacked, and noncombatants who could not. Current international law, moreover, requires belligerents to exercise "care to separate individual civilians and the civilian population as such from the vicinity of military objectives." (78)

International law does, however, recognize that civilian technicians and contractors are necessary for modern militaries. It holds that they are subject to attack only when actually performing tasks in support of the armed forces. Unlike military personnel, they would not ordinarily be targeted when they are away from their jobs. If captured, they are entitled to treatment as prisoners of war. (79) Nonetheless, the law has always held that noncombatants’ "immunity from damage and harm was predicated upon their obligation to abstain from hostile acts. If they took action against a party’s armed forces, they automatically lost immunity." (80)

Unfortunately, that appears to be exactly the direction we are heading. The operation of high-technology systems is moving civilian technicians and contractors from traditional support functions to what are arguably "hostile" activities. A civilian technician, for example, who helps execute a computerized offensive information operation against an enemy force may well have gone beyond mere support. Defense News characterized the significant numbers of civilian technicians required for the Army’s digitized battlefield as "surrogate warriors." ⁽⁸¹⁾

Likewise the Air Force, probably unaware of the implications of its statement, has openly announced its intention to use civilians operationally. In Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21^st Century Air Force the service states that "combat operations in the 21^st Century" will broaden "the definition of the future operator." It goes on to state that: "In the future, any military or civilian member who is experienced in the employment and doctrine of air and space power will be considered an operator." (82)

Once civilian technicians or contractors become involved in operations in a way that exceeds what was traditionally understood as mere support of the fighting forces, they risk being characterized as "unlawful combatants" under international law (83). Among other things, if captured unlawful combatants can be tried and punished for their hostile actions, even for the same things for which a uniformed combatant would be immune (84). It is very doubtful that many of these "surrogate warriors" are cognizant of their new status or comprehend the ramifications of it.

Since it is unlikely that military dependence on civilian expertise will diminish any time soon, several writers suggest establishing a new type of part-time military (85). It would consist of engineers, information specialists, and other technical experts who could be called into military service when necessary. Endowing civilians with military status would support recognition as lawful combatants under international law, and would also be a step toward solving another problem with civilianizing military functions: the fact that civilians cannot be compelled to stay on the job in times of crisis (86). Only those subject to military discipline have a legal or moral responsibility to remain at their posts.

What makes these proposals different from ordinary Guard and reserve membership is that the military affiliation contemplated would not require the technical experts to undergo all the rigors of military training (87). In describing such an organization composed of information specialists, Brig Gen Bruce M. Lawlor, ARNG, argues that the well-paid "innovators, intellectuals, and highly-skilled technicians" most needed would "not likely be impressed by the opportunity to wear hair ‘high and tight’ or do pushups and two-mile runs." (88) Accordingly, he recommends that "much of the military regimen" be discarded. (89)

Military leaders need to be cautious, however, about abandoning "much of the military regimen" simply to indulge the predilections of civilian technical experts. Military personnel are not just people in uniforms. There are instead, as Stephen Crane, the author of Red Badge of Courage, put it, "a mysterious fraternity born out of smoke and the danger of death." (90) In his book, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle, Richard Holmes explains:

Similarly, John Keegan, perhaps the greatest living military historian, warns that his study of warriors over many years leads him to conclude that "soldiers are not as other men," and to "view with extreme suspicion all theories and representations of war that equate it with any other activity in human affairs." (92)

Importantly, Holmes argues that much of the military’s regimen, even including such things as haircuts, has importance beyond its obvious practical value. Many military requirements and rituals serve to acculturate the individual to the armed forces and to build the kind of unit cohesion and esprit de corps necessary to endure the enormous pressures and discomforts of military service. Furthermore, the uncertainties and unpredictable dynamics of future conflicts militate against assuming that technical experts will never find themselves in situations that render unnecessary the kind of bonding and psychological preparation that has sustained winning military organizations in the crucible of war for centuries.

Still, meeting the manpower needs of RMA technologies may necessitate adjustments to some of the military’s traditional means of developing and maintaining its unique culture. The "push-button" aspect of RMA warfare, for example, may allow a modification of the physical requirements for military service. In fact, journalist and author Tom Ricks recently predicted:

While this organizational change may have merit (94), other revisions to the military’s regimen may not. Consequently, the challenge for military professionals is to carefully identify and delineate those critical factors that must be retained to avoid eroding the ethos necessary for an effective and successful military organization.

One of the most radical impacts of the new technologies of war relates to the vast improvement in communications capabilities. JV 2010 (95) indicates that technology is becoming available that will provide individual soldiers with unprecedented access to all kinds of information (96).This technology is expected to influence organizational structures in a number of ways. Specifically, it will allow the elimination of various levels of command and supervision resulting in a "flattening" of traditionally hierarchical military organizations. Furthermore, the Marine Corps is experimenting with a new concept made possible by RMA technologies. Called "infestation tactics," (97) the technique relies on advanced communications systems to coordinate large numbers of small infantry teams assaulting the same objective. While greater efficiencies may result from such innovations, these and similar technology-generated organizational changes may create a number of new and unprecedented challenges for military leaders.

In his book, The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies, David S. Alberts warns that when subordinates are provided with the "larger picture" that new data transfer capabilities allow, they are "likely to second-guess decisions made at higher levels and…have the information required to undertake initiatives their superiors may find inappropriate." (98) Not the least of the many difficulties that can arise when subordinates take initiatives that "superiors may find inappropriate", are those related to compliance with the law of war.

The My Lai massacre occurred during the Vietnam War when inadequately trained and poorly led troops acted on their own initiative (99). Sadly, atrocities seem to be an enduring feature of war. Stephen Ambrose notes that:

What is worrisome about the new technology of war is the access to vastly greater firepower it will put into the hands of the young troops Ambrose describes. The new battlefield organization that infestation tactics produces is illustrative. Analysts say that the "most revolutionary aspect" of the new concept is that the infantryman does not rely on his personal weapon to engage the enemy, but will instead call in external fire support (101). In short, the experts say, "[r]ather than a ‘shooter,’ the infantryman becomes a ‘spotter.’" (102) They further observe:

Quite obviously, whatever havoc troops were able to wreak with their personal weapons at places like My Lai, that terrible potential will be greatly increased in the future by the new technologies of war, particularly where the command and supervisory structure that might intervene is, by design, less robust.

By empowering junior personnel, the new technologies of war create other problems as well. Aviation Week & Space Technology reports that senior American officials are concerned about the effect of the absence of clear rules concerning information warfare (104). They believe that "Once soldiers and airmen start dying in a war, the young computer-literate officers and enlisted men are going to start making their own efforts to crack enemy computer systems." Such free-lance efforts can create serious problems. For example, a computer virus loosed on an enemy might have "unintended consequences and come back and cripple friendly computers."

Still, the solution is not to deny lower echelons the benefits of the technology. Rather, the challenge for military professionals is to ensure that junior personnel are fully prepared, both technically and psychologically, to handle the greater legal and moral responsibilities that the capabilities produce. Unquestionably, maintaining discipline and professionalism under the new combat conditions is more essential than ever - yet ever more difficult to guarantee.

This essay has briefly examined some, but clearly not all, of the dilemmas of professional ethics and leadership posed by the organizational implications of the new technologies of war. Hopefully, a number of general propositions might be gleaned from this discussion:

a. Technological change is forcing organizational change on the armed forces. Its impact is magnified since it coincides with an increasingly austere funding environment that perhaps itself would mandate organizational change. The challenge for military professionals is to ensure that the change produced is the outgrowth of reasoned, dispassionate analysis, as opposed to organizational parochialism.

b. At an ever-greater pace, technology is pushing human activity into space. As nations - to include their military forces - become dependent upon space systems, the threat of conflict arises. Understandably, U.S. forces are preparing to organize for conflict in space. The challenge for military professionals is to aggressively investigate every avenue to avoid the costly militarization of space. This is especially critical as existing legal and ethical norms may limit, in any event, U.S. options for space warfare.

c. As technology erodes the traditional missions of military organizations, some might properly seek to reinvent themselves into entities with new capabilities and a different orientation. The challenge for military professionals is to ensure that such organizational change efficiently serves a bona fide defense interest. In the scramble for diminishing resources, the services must not cannibalize each other for parochial purposes.

d. Technology - as well as budget constraints - are infusing civilians into military organizations in ways that are new and, in some instances, unprecedented. The challenge for military professionals is to ensure that this effort avoids unintended and unwanted consequences, including such things as putting civilians in situations that undermines their noncombatant status under international law.

e. A form of the contemporary phenomenon of casualty-aversion exists within the all-volunteer professional military. While concern about putting personnel in dangerous situations is desirable, it should not be allowed to erode the altruism that is - and must be - central to a military organization. Likewise, military formations must be equipped with technology necessary to win, but military professionals must appreciate that government has limited resources and that if there is risk to be assumed, it must be by the armed forces, not the society it serves.

f. In a shrinking active duty military organization, it is wise to explore using the Guard and reserves in new and innovative ways, especially since so much of the expertise in RMA technologies resides in the civilian sector. Organizational changes that encourages participation by such experts should be thoroughly considered. The challenge for military professionals is to ensure that such changes do not compromise regimens and rituals essential to the development and sustainment of those aspects of the military’s unique ethos necessary for success in war.

g. The new technologies of war will empower ever lower levels of military organizations. In some cases, it will enable relatively junior personnel to have access to enormous destructive capabilities. The challenge for military professionals is to ensure that such personnel are properly selected and trained commensurate with the considerable legal and ethical responsibilities the new capabilities place upon them.

A final note: military professionals concerned about ethics and leadership in an era of organizational change may find that their views are unwelcome. Militaries are inherently conservative entities wary of proposals for organizational changes that are not battle tested. Professor Richard K. Betts of Columbia University insists that "[t]he American military loves organizational tradition and technological progress." Accordingly, he says, "[m]ilitary leadership is usually enthusiastic about technological innovation, as long as it is an add-on for which they do not have to give up other cherished formations."

The resistance to change intrinsic to the armed forces may extend to innovative approaches to the ethical and leadership challenges the new technologies of war generate. Even under ideal circumstances, innovators - especially blunt speaking ones - are not always embraced despite the power and significance of their ideas. Nevertheless, the new technologies of war make it all the more important that military professionals be forthright in their concerns. Sometimes this means "rocking the boat" in a way that fails to breed popularity and career progression.

It cannot be overemphasized how important it is that action be taken now to resolve the many issues of professional ethics and leadership that are arising. There is no time for measured approaches. On more than one occasion the American military has entered conflicts unprepared for the new realities of war. Historically, the U.S. armed forces has had enough time to overcome any early organizational deficiencies and prevail. However, because of the emerging RMA technologies, future wars are likely to be short and extremely violent - without the luxury of time to resolve complicated issues of professional ethics. Like so many other aspects of modern war, the degree of success U.S. forces will enjoy in such conflicts may well depend upon how well those issues were previously anticipated and addressed.

1. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (1957) as quoted in the Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Robert D. Heinl, Jr., ed., 1984), at 227.

2. The author has discussed elements of this essay in a paper entitled Technology and the Twenty-first Century Battlefield: Re-complicating Moral Life for the Statesman and the Soldier presented to the "Ethics and the Future of Conflict" Working Group sponsored by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs on 13 November 1997 in Washington, D.C.

3. For a discussion of "the revolution in military affairs" see generally, Select Enemy. Delete., The Economist, March 8, 1997, at 21; Eliot A. Cohen, A Revolution in Warfare, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1996, at 37; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Cavalry to Computers: The Pattern of Military Revolutions, The National Interest, Fall 1994, at 30; and James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, Revolutions in Military Affairs, Joint Force Quarterly, Spring, 1994, at 24.

4. The author discusses this phenomena in a paper entitled Asymmetrical Threats and the Western Mindset presented on 20 Nov 1997 in Cambridge, MA, to "The Role of Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations" conference sponsored by the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts University, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy.

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (1996).

6. General John M. Shalikashvili, id., at ii.

7. Id., at 1.

8. See e.g., Krepinevich, supra note 3.

9. See generally, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (1995).

10. William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Developments of the Possibilities of Modern Air Power - Economic and Military (1925), at 6, as quoted in Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome (1994), at 56.

11. As quoted by Builder, id., at 101.

12. Fighters Without Pilots, Popular Science, November, 1997, at 97, 98.

13. David Wood, Do we really need fighter pilots?, Staten Island Advance, November 3, 1997, at 1.

14. Fighters Without Pilots, note 12, supra, at 97 (emphasis added).

15. Id.

16. AWACS is the acronym for Airborne Warning and Control System. It contains radar surveillance equipment and command and control facilities. See The Dictionary of Modern War (Edward Luttwak and Stuart A. Kohl, eds., 1991), at 70.

17. Eliot A. Cohen, Come the Revolution, The National Review, July 31, 1995, at 26.

18. Id.

19. Id.

20. Builder, supra note 10. See also Builder, Keeping the Strategic Flame Alive, Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, at 76, and Gene Myers, Air Force has 'lost its ideological way', Air Force Times, October 14, 1996, at 36.

21. Builder, Icarus Syndrome, id.

22. The flyaway cost of each of the planned force of 21 bombers is $997 million in FY 1996 dollars. See John A. Tirpak, Snapshots of Force Modernization, Air Force Magazine, February 1997, at 20, 23.

23. In any event, the B-2s are principally tasked with the nuclear deterrence mission.

24. See e.g., Charles M. Perry, Lawrence E. Rothenberg, and Jacquelyn K. Davis, Airpower Synergies in the New Strategic Era: The Complementary Roles of Long-Range Bombers & Carrier-Based Aircraft (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1997); and Jim Courter and Loren Thompson, We need the bat-winged bomber, The Washington Times, January 2, 1997, at 13.

25. See John A. Tirpak, The B-2s Are Ready, Air Force Magazine, January 1998, at 24, 30.

26. The flyaway cost of each of the planned force of 432 planes is $71 million in FY 1996 dollars. See Tirpak, Snapshots of Force Modernization, note 22 supra, at 21.

27. See William Mathews, Meet the Raptor, Air Force Times, April 14, 1997, at 12, 14 (quoting analyst and F-22 critique Norman Polmar).

28. See Major Peter A. Costello III, USAF, A Matter of Trust: Close Air Support Apportionment and the Allocation for Operational Level Effects, (Air University Press, 1997), at 3.

29. United States Air Force, Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force (1997), at 7.

30. Id.

31. As quoted by George Wilson. See George C. Wilson, Like It or Not, Space Warfare is Way of Future - and Past, Air Force Times, 28 June 1994, at 70.

32. See generally, Myron Hura and Gary McCleod, Intelligence Support and Mission Planning for Autonomous Precision-Guided Weapons, Rand Corporation (1992).

33. See Jennifer Heroema, A.F. Space Chief Calls War in Space Inevitable, Space News, August 1-18, 1996, at 4.

34. See William Broad, Military Hoping to Test-Fire Laser Against Satellite, New York Times, September 1, 1997, at 1.

35. General Charles C. Krulak, The Role of Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations, Conference co-sponsored by the International Security Studies Program of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.; the Office of the Commandant, United States Marine Corps; and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, November 19, 1997 (luncheon address). Partial transcript provided by the Commandant's Staff Group (copy on file with the author).

36. W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 168 (1990).

37. William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (1982), at 369. This is also true with respect to much of the actual technology aboard the spacecraft. See Craig Covault, NRO Radar, Sigint Launches Readied, Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 1, 1997, at 22 ("The same technology employed by [the military] satellites will increasingly be applied to the commercial sector.)

38. See e.g., U.S. Space Command, Guardians of the High Frontier 16 (1996) (describing military satellite systems).

39. Jeffrey R. Barnett, Future War: An Assessment of Aerospace Campaigns in 2010 xix (1996).

40. Essentially, the concept of proportionality requires that commanders refrain from attacks when it "may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated." See Department of the Air Force, Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 110-31, International Law - The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, 19 November 1976, at paragraph 5-3c(1)(b)(I)(c).

41. See U.S. Space Command Vision for 2020 (1997), at 6.

42. See e.g., Article I, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explorations and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2411, I.I.A.S. 6347; 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (the "Outer Space Treaty").

43. See e.g., Naval War College, Department of Oceans Law and Policy, Annotated Supplement to the Commander's handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, paragraph 2.9.2, note 114 (1997).

44. Among the problems with declaring space as an area of operations is the fact that there is no universally accepted definition of exactly where national sovereignty ends and "space" begins. See AFP 110-31, supra note 14, at para. 2-1h.

45. See Jonathan S. Landay, The Next Arms Race? Drawing Battle Lines in Space? Christian Science Monitor, December 17, 1997, at 1.

46. See e.g., Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in the case of War on Land (1907) (Communications facilities on neutral territory are inviolate from attack so long as they are made available to all belligerents).

47. See Michael R. Mantz, The New Sword: A Theory of Space Combat Power (Air University Press, May 1995), at 12.

48. National Science and Technology Council, National Space Policy (White House Press Release, September 19, 1996), at 6.

49. See e.g., Ben Bova, Laser foes forget crossbow's history, USA Today, January 7, 1998, at 15.

50. Special operations forces are established as a separate unified command by 10 U.S.C. § 167. This command differs from other unified commands in that it has specific statutory authorization as well as its own budgetary authority. Requirements for the other unified commands are budgeted through the supporting services. The various unique statutory authorities give U.S. Special Operations Command its "service-like" status.

51. See e.g., David Lawsky, Special Forces strive for lasting influence, Washington Times, November 8, 1994, at 13.

52. See e.g., George C. Wilson, Special Ops: Bosnia's best hope, Army Times, January 8, 1996, at 31 and Dennis Steel, The Human Touch: Civil Affairs in Bosnia, Army, April 1997, at 21.

53. U.S. Special Operations Command has specific statutory authority to conduct training in foreign areas. See 10 U.S.C § 2011. Some of these missions are "medical capability" exercises that essentially provide basic medical services in less-developed nations. See also 10 U.S.C § 401 et seq. (humanitarian and civic assistance funding authority).

54. See Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare (1997), at 239.

55. As quoted by Peter Grier, Information Warfare, Air Force Magazine, March 1995, at 35.

56. See Dennis Brack, Do Photos Lie? U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1996, at 47.

57. See e.g. 42 U.S.C § 2121 et seq.

58. See note 62 supra, and accompanying text.

59. Although the absence of an amphibious assault during the Gulf War was later characterized as a deception operation, General Schwarzkopf's memoirs make it clear that concerns about mines were key. See General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero (1992), at 446. See also, Rick Atkinson, Crusade (1993), at 239-240.

60. See e.g., George I. Seffers, Marines Develop Concepts for Urban Battle Techniques, Defense News, January 12-18, 1998, at 13.

61. See generally, Thomas L. Friedman, `No-Dead War' Poses Problem for U.S., Omaha World-Herald, August 25, 1995, at 24; and Edward Luttwak, Post-Heroic Armies, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996, at 33.

62. JV2010, note 5 supra, at 8.

63. See Chris Black, US Options Seen Fewer as Military Avoids Risk, Boston Globe, July 23, 1995, at 12.

64. As quoted by Colin Powell in My American Journey (with Joseph E. Persico, 1995), at 576. Powell reported his response:

65. I thought I would have an aneurysm. American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board. I patiently explained that we had used our armed forces more than two dozen times in the preceding three years for war, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. But in every one of those cases we had had a clear goal and had matched our military commitment to the goal. I told Ambassador Albright that the U.S. military would carry out any mission it was handed, but my advice would always be that the tough political goals had to be set first. Then we would accomplish the mission.

66. Id., at 576-577.

67. See e.g., Richard H. Kohn, Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, The National Interest, Spring 1994, at 3.

68. William Pfaff, America's peace strategy lets others pay the price, Baltimore Sun, July 17, 1997, at 11.

69. Conversation with the author, October 1997, Baltimore, MD.

70. Nineteen airmen were killed and scores injured by the blast, the perpetrators of which are still not yet publicly identified. The most comprehensive public study (albeit opinionated) is the report by journalist Matt Labash. See Matt Labash, The Scapegoat, The Weekly Standard, November 24, 1997, at 20.

71. George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War (1996), at 25.

72. Lt Col Charles Lyons, The F-22 is the best we can afford, Air Force Times, February 24, 1997 (emphasis added). This raises the issue previously discussed as to whether the F-22 mission can be more inexpensively accomplished via advanced missile systems or UCVs.

73. As quoted by David Shukman, Tomorrow's War: The Threat of High-Technology Weapons, 233 (1996).

74. Compare, Sidney Axinn, A Moral Military 163-166 (1989) (arguing that combatants are expected to assume risks, noncombatants are not).

75. JV 2010, supra note 6, at 28.

76. The GAO found that 45% of military personnel performed support functions that could be done by civilians for an average of $15,000 less. See Tom Bowman, Drift Military Support Jobs to Civilians, Close Inefficient Facilities, GAO Urges, Baltimore Sun, April 5, 1997, at 4.

77. Katherine M. Peters, Civilians at War, Government Executive, July 1996, at 23.

78. David Silverberg, Crossing Computing's Cultural Chasm, Armed Forces Journal International, February 1997, at 38, 39.

79. AFP 110-31, supra note 40, at paragraph 3-5.

80. Parks, supra note 36.

81. Id., at paragraph 3-3.

82. Paul Kennedy and George J. Andreopoulos, The Laws of War: Some Concluding Reflections, in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World 215 (Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark L. Shulman, eds., 1994).

83. See Bryan Bender, Defense Contractors Quickly Becoming Surrogate Warriors, Defense Daily, March 28, 1997, at 490.

84. See Global Engagement, supra note 29, at 19.

85. AFP 110-31, supra note 40, paragraph 3-3 provides:

86. An unlawful combatant is an individual who is not authorized to take a direct part in hostilities but does. The term is frequently used also to refer to otherwise privileged combatants who do not comply with requirements of mode of dress, or noncombatants in the armed forces who improperly use their protected status as a shield to engage in hostilities….Unlawful combatants are a proper object of attack while engaging as combatants….If captured, they may be tried and punished.

87. Id., See also Lt Colonel Robert W. Gehring, Loss of Civilian Protections Under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I, 90 Mil. L. Rev. 49 (1980).

88. "Unlawful combatants" are not ordinarily considered "war criminals." Rather, they would be subject to prosecution under the domestic law of capturing belligerent, much as out-of-uniform saboteurs would be. During World War II, for example, the United States captured eight German saboteurs and executed six. See American Heritage New History of World War II (Rev. and updated by Stephen E. Ambrose based on the original text by C. L. Sulzberger, 1997), at 276.

89. See Stephen Bryen, New Era of Warfare Demands Technology Reserve Force, Defense News, March 17-23, 1997, at 27; and Brig Gen Bruce M. Lawlor, ARNG, Information Corps, Armed Forces Journal International, January 1998, at 26, 28.

90. Lou Marano, Perils of Privatization, Washington Post, May 27, 1997, at 15.

91. Id.

92. Lawlor, Id.

93. Id.

94. As quoted in Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Combat (1985), at 31.

95. Id.

96. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (1993), at xvi.

97. Thomas E. Ricks as quoted by Jonathan Broder, Army of the right, Salon, January 6, 1998 (Salon is an Internet magazine found at <http://www.salonmagazine.com/news/1998/ 01/06 news.html>).

98. During a trip to South Africa in August, 1997, the author learned that it is the practice of the South African Air Force to ordinarily retain in uniform and on active duty disabled persons, including those confined to wheel chairs.

99. JV 2010, supra note 5, at 18.

100. Compare, George I. Seffers, U.S. Army Puts Tactical Internet to Test, Defense News, March 17-23, 1997, at 3 (describing a battlefield information/communication system currently being tested).

101. See Captain Michael R. Lwin, USA, and Captain Mark R. Lwin, USMC, The Future of Land Power, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1997, at 82, 83.

102. David S. Alberts, The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies, 36 (National Defense University, 1996).

103. U.S. v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (C.M.A. 1973).

104. Stephen E. Ambrose, Americans at War (1997), at 152.

105. See Lwin and Lwin, supra note 97.

106. Id.

107. Id.

108. David A. Fulgham, Computer Combat Rules Frustrate the Pentagon, Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 15, 1997, at 67.

109. Id.

110. See Pat Cooper and Frank Oliveri, Air Force Carves Operational Edge In Info Warfare, Defense News, August 21-27, 1995.

111. Richard K. Betts, The Two Edges of the Cutting Edge: Risky Side Effects of an RMA, paper delivered to Senior Conference XXXIII, "Faces of Battle: Contending Visions of Future Warfare," United States Military Academy West Point, June 8, 1996 (copy on file with the author) (emphasis added).

112. Id.

113. See e.g., Richard J. Newman, Renegades finish last: A colonel's innovative ideas don't sit well with the brass, U.S. News & World Report, July 28, 1997.

114. See Jay R. Avella, Somebody, PLEASE, Rock the Boat!, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1997, at 12.