SREBRENICA:
Problems of participation in UN/NATO operations

On July 6, 1995, the Bosnian-Serb Army (BSA) launched its final offensive against the Bosnian city of Srebrenica. The 3rd Dutch Air Mobile Battalion (Dutchbat) consisting of about 450 Dutch soldiers and 27 armored personnel carriers (APC's) under the command of LTCOL Ton Karremans stood ready to protect 35,000 Bosnian-Muslim refugees in Srebrenica, including 25,000 in the Dutch Potocari compound¹. When Bosnian-Serb General Mladic met with LTCOL Karremans late on July 11, Mladic slit the throat of a pig and told Karremans that it was how Mladic would treat the Bosnian-Muslims. An agreement was reached that night concerning the fate of Srebrenica². The next morning, July 12, Dutch forces allowed the Bosnian-Serb Army to disarm them and occupy the Potocari compound. Refuges and Dutch soldiers reported that Bosnian-Serb forces separated Bosnian-Muslim men from women and began beatings and executions. Dutch forces witnessed some of the executions, but did nothing to protect the refugees³. Within forty-eight hours, Bosnian-Serbs forcibly deported some 25,000 Bosnian-Muslims. Of the 10,000 remaining Bosnian-Muslims, the United Nations (UN) estimates that as many as 8,000 were executed and buried in mass graves around Srebrenica or hunted down by the Bosnian-Serb army and killed as they walked sixty miles through Bosnian-Serb controlled territory to other refugee camps.⁴

How could the United Nations and NATO permit this kind of mass-execution to occur? How could the commander of a modern NATO force fail to safeguard refugees under his protection—a failure that resulted in the murder of 8,000 non-combatants?

This paper will review a chronology of the events leading to the Srebrenica tragedy, discuss the factors leading to the tragedy and draw lessons learned. The implications of the Srebrenica tragedy are important: the incident contributed significantly to the US decision to deploy American soldiers to Bosnia in late 1995 and created a serious crisis in the Dutch government.

Ethnic conflicts of the kind that exists in Bosnia occur throughout the world including Rwanda, Burundi, northern Iraq, Cambodia and Chechnya. The hate that fuels many of these conflicts is deep-seated and especially intolerant, often resulting in the mass executions of thousands of civilians. While forces may be deployed into an area under the auspices of NATO or the UN, the nations sending the forces may have different, often conflicting interests in the region. The leaders of units as small as battalions, companies, platoons and even squads may find themselves in extremely demanding, complex situations that require independent action and carry very serious moral and far-reaching international political implications. All of this conducted under the watchful eye of world media.

Chronology

During the summer of 1993, when the fall of the Bosnian city of Gorazde to Bosnian-Serbs seemed inevitable, the United Nations Security Council declared six Bosnian cities—Gorazde, Sarajevo, Zepa, Tuzla, Bihac and Srebrenica—safe havens for Bosnian citizens fleeing Bosnian-Serb aggression. In February 1994, the Dutch 11th Air Mobile Battalion relieved the Canadian battalion safeguarding Srebrenica. Dutchbat consisted of two infantry companies and one headquarters company totaling about 750 personnel with 27 armored personnel carriers armed with .50cal machine guns. Because some of the Dutchbat soldiers were deployed near Tuzla and others were on leave (and not allowed to return by the Bosnian-Serbs), Dutchbat had an effective strength in Srebrenica of about 450 personnel. UN rules did not allow UNPROFOR/NATO forces to deploy with mortars, 25mm cannon or other "heavy" weapons.⁵

A brief chronology of the events in 1995 leading to the Bosnian-Serb army attack on Srebrenica includes:⁶

• 31 January Bosnian-Muslim militias block Dutchbat patrols and OP's
• 8 March After a blockade of several weeks, Bosnian-Serb forces allow UNPROFOR convoys to reach Srebrenica with food
• 9 March Dutch private killed by Bosnian-Serb mortar fire
• 25-26 May Dutch forces shelled late May NATO launches two air strikes against Bosnian-Serb ammunition depot. Bosnian-Serb forces take 270 UN/NATO personnel hostage
• 3 June Dutch forces abandon an OP as Bosnian-Serb forces approach with heavy weapons
• 4 June Bosnian-Serb leader Mladic and UN agree to exchange hostages for assurance that peace- keeping rules will be kept (no more UN/NATO air strikes)
• 22 June After four weeks of Bosnian-Serb blockade, convoys allowed into Srebrenica
• 5 July Bosnian-Serb offensive against Srebrenica launched

A chronology of the Bosnian-Serb attack on Srebrenica:

• 6 July Dutch soldier killed while falling back by Bosnian-Muslim forces (this incident severely undermines Dutch feelings towards Bosnian-Muslims)
• 8-9 July Four of thirteen OP's abandoned by Dutch: 30 Dutch taken prisoner
• 10 July Dutch forces drive off Bosnian-Serb forces in fire fight. Some southern OP's abandoned. Dutch requests for NATO CAS repeatedly denied by UNPROFOR
• 11 July Bosnian-Serb Army gives Dutch and Bosnian-Muslims 48 hours to leave Srebrenica 0800—Dutch request NATO CAS 1200—UN/NATO agree to CAS request 1430—2 Dutch F-16's make an attack on two Bosnian-Serb tanks 1500—Netherlands cancels additional air strikes due to hostage threats and darkness. At evening meeting between Dutch commander and Bosnian-Serbs, Bosnian-Serb Mladic slashes throat of a live pig and threatens the Bosnian-Muslims with the same treatment
• 12 July Bosnian-Serb forces surround Potocari compound (HQ, Dutch forces) Bosnian-Serb forces enter the compound, disarm Dutch forces and begin to forcibly separate and deport 35,000 Bosnian-Muslim civilians 8,000 Bosnian-Muslim executed around Srebrenica in following days. Reports later made that Dutch forces observed some executions
• 13 July Only 2 Dutch OP's still manned. 55 Dutch taken prisoner in Bratunac Less than 330 Dutch soldiers remain in Srebrenica
• 15 July Last Dutch OP falls Total of sixty-four Dutch held prisoner by Bosnian-Serb forces. Only 10,000 of 25,000 Bosnian-Muslim refugees will succeed in 60 mile walk to Tuzla
• 17 July Dutch Deputy Commander signs agreement with Bosnian-Serb forces stating that evacuation of refugees occurred "correctly"
• 19 July Bosnian-Serb leader Mladic signs agreement with UN-General Rupert Smith for UN/NATO to evacuate Srebrenica
• 21 July Dutch forces abandon Srebrenica leaving 14 APC's, 18 vehicles and anti-tank weapons to Bosnian-Serb forces

Prior to the fall of Srebrenica, the Dutch commander received the following order from General Janvier (UNPROFOR):

SUBJECT: ORDERS FOR DEFENSE OF DUTCHBAT AND PROTECTION OF REFUGEES IN SREBRENICA
Message: In view of the new situation in Srebrenica the following are the orders of Acting Commander UNPROFOR for the defense of Dutchbat and the protection of refugees in Srebrenica.
a. Enter into local negotiations with BSA forces for immediate ceasefire. Giving up any weapons and military equipment is not authorized and is not a point of discussion.
b. Concentrate your forces into the Potocari camp, including the withdrawal of your OP's. Take all reasonable measures to protect refugees and civilians in your care.
c. Continue all possible means to defend your forces and installations from attack. This is to include the use of close air support if necessary…. ⁷

Discussion

National-International

Several interrelated factors contributed to the incident at Srebrenica. In May 1995, NATO launched several air strikes against Bosnian-Serb positions in Bosnia. In response, Bosnian-Serb forces took 270 UNPROFOR/NATO personnel hostage, confining many of them at sites expected to be targeted by NATO aircraft. UNPROFOR General Janvier (France) and UN Ambassador Akashi (from Japan) reached an agreement with Bosnian-Serb General Mladic that further operations would be conducted by "peaceful means". Essentially, the deal meant that the UNPROFOR personnel would be released and that UNPROFOR/NATO would not conduct any more air strikes.⁸ The agreement gave Bosnian-Serb forces free rein to attack Bosnian-Muslim refugee safe-havens like Srebrenica without worrying about NATO air strikes.

UNPROFOR forces entered Bosnia without heavy weapons: no mortars, no 25mm or larger cannon, no artillery, no tanks. Without these heavy weapons, UNPROFOR forces depended upon the availability of NATO air strikes to maintain a credible defense. In order to receive air strikes, requests had to be approved by both NATO and the UN (General Janvier and Ambassador Akashi had to both agree) in a "dual-key" process. With very few exceptions, all requests for air strikes were denied because either General Janvier or Ambassador Akashi refused approval.⁹

Without a credible threat of air strikes, due to the agreement made between the Bosnian-Serbs and UNPROFOR and the inefficiency of the dual-key approval process, UNPROFOR lacked defensive credibility. Bosnian-Serb forces exploited that lack of defensive credibility in their attack on Srebrenica and other safe-havens.

The soldiers of Dutchbat were positively inclined towards the Bosnian-Serbs. Even though Bosnian-Serbs blockaded Dutchbat for several weeks early in 1995, they allowed Dutchbat soldiers to shop at local Bosnian-Serb stores and allowed them transition through their lines for purposes of leave. On the other hand, many Dutch soldiers held the negative feelings towards the Bosnian-Muslims, considered them weak and unwilling to defend themselves, and resented being fired upon by Bosnian-Muslim militiamen. Several accounts described Dutch soldiers giving Bosnian-Muslim children "asbestos" sandwiches and heat tabs disguised as sugar cubes to eat.¹⁰

Finally, different nations, organizations and individuals participated in UNPROFOR and NATO with different, potentially conflicting interests and objectives. The primary interest of UN Ambassador Akashi was the success of diplomatic negotiations that he was conducting with the Bosnian-Serbs. Any military action by UNPROFOR—especially air strikes—seriously threatened the success of those negotiations. As the UNPROFOR commander, General Janvier had responsibility for all UNPROFOR personnel—including the Dutch battalion at Srebrenica. At the same time, General Janvier was the senior French commander and had personal responsibility for all French forces in Yugoslavia. Air strikes approved in support of Dutch forces at Srebrenica had the high probability of resulting in French soldiers being taken hostage in other parts of Bosnia by Bosnian-Serb forces. In order for UNPROFOR forces to receive air strikes, consensus had to be reached on two separate levels: first among participating nations within both the UN and NATO and then between the UN and NATO. Both Akashi and Janvier were faced with conflicting interests. Ambassador Akashi had a personal interest in denying Dutch air strike requests in order to avoid jeopardizing his diplomatic negotiations, while several reports stated that General Janvier might have denied the Dutch air strike requests under pressure from his government in order to ensure that French soldiers were not taken hostage in retaliation.

From the events of the incident several factors can be easily identified:¹¹

1. NATO/UN forces were committed to Bosnia without the firepower required to defend themselves or the Bosnian cities they were supposed to safeguard. Dutch troops in Srebrenica in June 1995 had only 16% of their requested ammunition supply and did not possess any artillery or other heavy weapons.
2. Because UN/NATO forces did not possess the firepower or UN mandate to adequately defend themselves, nations with forces on the ground in Bosnia were extremely sensitive to the use of any tactic—especially air strikes--which might provoke Bosnian-Serbs or Bosnian-Muslims to attack them or take hostages.
3. The UN/NATO "dual key" process for authorizing air strikes severely undermined UN/NATO credibility and effectiveness. The only air strike approved for Srebrenica took more than six hours to process and execute. Without heavy weapons and with an unreliable and slow CAS process, UN/NATO commanders on the ground had little effective firepower available and little military credibility.
4. UN Ambassador Akashi unilaterally denied several requests for air strikes by UN/NATO forces because he believed that the strikes would undermine ongoing negotiations. Bosnian-Serb leaders interpreted this as a sign that NATO and the UN would be reluctant to use air power no matter what threat was posed to UN/NATO personnel or Bosnian safe-havens.
5. The combat principle of unity of command was violated in every respect, severely undermining UN/NATO credibility and effectiveness. Not only did the "dual key" process require agreement by two different organizations, NATO and the UN, but the organizations themselves were internally divided. Consensus was required among all participating UN and NATO nations before action could be taken by either organization. This frequently led to indecisiveness, the denial of air strikes and the deployment of UN/NATO forces in dangerous circumstances without the ability to defend themselves.
6. Operations conducted by the UN violated the principle combining authority and responsibility. The UN had the authority to deny air strikes requested by forces on the ground, but had no real responsibility to/for the safety of those forces. When the objectives of the UN ambassador (to keep negotiations active no matter what the cost) conflicted with Dutch forces extreme need for defensive air strikes, the Dutch forces were denied.
7. Dutch friendliness with Bosnian-Serbs and antipathy towards Bosnian-Muslims probably contributed to an increased willingness by the Dutch commander to trust that the Bosnian-Serbs would conduct a "decent" deportation and a potential reluctance to defend the Bosnian-Muslims.

Institutional-Individual

The Dutch Department of Defense report on the Srebrenica incident found that "Dutchbat cannot be blamed for its role during and after the fall of the muslim enclave Srebrenica." Nevertheless, Dutchbat, LTCOL Karremans and the Dutch Department of Defense received serious criticism for their actions and failures during the Srebrenica incident. On institutional and personal levels, the Srebrenica incident raises some very serious questions:

1. While the UNPROFOR order clearly tells the Dutchbat commander to protect refugees and forbids him to surrender weapons, given the lack of defensive firepower, what kinds of reasonable measures were available to the Dutchbat commander?
2. To whom is the Dutchbat commander responsible for his failure to carry out the order—to UNPROFOR or to the Dutch government?
3. Should the Dutchbat commander have defended Srebrenica and the Bosnian-Muslim refugees?

a. Should the Dutchbat commander have defended the Bosnian-Muslims if it meant possible annihilation of Dutchbat?
b. Was it reasonable for the Dutch commander to expect that the Bosnian-Serbs, given the opportunity, would commit atrocities against Bosnian-Muslims?
c. If Dutchbat had fought to defend Srebrenica, would "bloodying the nose" of the Bosnian-Serbs been enough to cause them to stop their attack?


4. Did the UNPROFOR commander issue the defensive order to Dutchbat in order to play both sides of the game—issuing a noble order for the forces of another nation to protect refugees in an impossible situation while denying them the defensive capability that might cause soldiers of his own nation to be taken hostage?
5. If the Dutch government holds the Dutchbat commander responsible for failing to carry out an order from a senior commander from a different nation with potentially conflicting interests, who will hold that senior commander responsible?
6. If the Dutchbat commander was wrong in allowing the Bosnian-Serbs to enter Srebrenica, were their institutional factors in the Dutch military that contributed to this poor decision? What institutional actions might be taken to prevent such an tragedy in the future?

Lessons Learned

A number of clear lessons can be drawn from the Srebrenica incident.

• Forces should never be deployed without the ability to both a) adequately defend themselves and b) accomplish the mission assigned. Forces committed to a contingency must have military credibility. While this principle may seem obvious, it can be tempting to violate it in the particular circumstances of a particular contingency.
• Forces should not be committed to a contingency unless the objectives of the operation are clear. The objectives are clear if success or failure of the operation can be defined in measurable terms. Lack of quantifiable objectives puts force commanders in the very poor position of not knowing how to translate political goals into military action. Without clear objectives, military leaders lack a measurement against which they can evaluate the success or failure of forces under their command.
• Forces should not be committed unless the international, political and military objectives of the operation are consistent. International, national and diplomatic objectives and the ability of forces to defend themselves and achieve their mission must not conflict. Even though the Bosnian crisis was being handled by allied western nations experienced working together, different nations and individuals in both organizations had objectives that conflicted with the ability of Dutch forces to defend themselves and safeguard Bosnian-Muslims.
• Forces should not be committed unless there is a unified chain of command that not only possesses the authority to command but also possesses responsibility for the forces under command.
• Military personnel must be trained to act rightfully and decisively in extremely complex situations which have significant moral, humanitarian and international implications. Military units as small as companies, platoons and even squads may find themselves in these situations while under media scrutiny. The Srebrenica incident demonstrates that failure to handle these situations can undermine trust, lead to questions of honor and threaten governments.

The greatest lesson—and potentially the greatest victim—of Srebrenica concerns trust. Few things make a military force more effective than the existence of deep inherent trust up and down the chain of command. Even fewer things undermine the effectiveness of a military force than a lack of trust within the chain of command. Peace-keeping operations often take place in an environment of extreme hate, intolerance and mutual suspicion and make great demands on small unit leaders dispersed widely throughout a region. Add real-time media coverage and the different and potentially conflicting interests of a multinational peacekeeping effort and the situation is ripe for disaster. Senior leaders must have confidence—have trust—that the orders they give will be followed. Junior leaders must be able to trust that the orders received were given in good faith—that they have not been compromised by conflicting interests.

The greatest tragedy of Srebrenica is that the murder of thousands of innocent, non-combatant Bosnian-Muslims could have been prevented. Without even laying blame on anyone or any institution, the greatest danger of Srebrenica is that trust up and down multinational chains of command has been undermined by the incident and may be in doubt in future operations. Whether or not General Janvier or Ambassador Akashi actually compromised the safety of Dutch forces and Bosnian-Muslims in Srebrenica by pursuing conflicting interests, the question itself—a legitimate question—has undermined trust in the future.

Multinational peacekeeping operations have a very troublesome, potentially fatal weakness. If the conflicting interests of governments participating in multinational peacekeeping efforts compromise the orders given by senior leaders or the execution of orders by junior leaders, then the essential element of trust and the military effectiveness of the multinational force will be severely—if not fatally—undermined. This undermining of trust, loss of effectiveness and vulnerability to tragedy is less likely when the interests of nations participating in multinational operations coincide and more likely as those interests conflict or differ. US interests are more likely to coincide with other nations within organizations like NATO—but the Srebrenica incident demonstrates that interest conflicts can exist even among allied western European nations. National interests are far more likely to conflict within organizations like the United Nations where the member nations not only have widely varying and conflicting interests, but the organization itself has interests that often conflict with those of its member nations.

If we are to continue participating in multinational peacekeeping operations around the world, then we must be extremely careful about putting forces under the cognizance of multinational commands. Failure to heed the lessons of Srebrenica leaves us vulnerable to unnecessary loss of life, dishonor and ignominy.

Much of the research for the paper was conducted on the Internet World Wide Web (WWW). Several sites have collections of valuable documents, news stories, chronologies and information concerning the incident at Srebrenica including:

• http://mediaport.org/~rattle/homesreb.html
• http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/homes/ross/public_html
• http://www.christusrex.org/www1/icons/survivors.html

¹Online at http://mediaport.org/~rattle/chr1sreb.html also "Dutch ‘peacekeepers’ helped Bosnian Genocide" Boston Sunday Globe April 12, 1996

²"Dutch Conscience Is Stung Troop’s Failure to Protect Bosnia Muslims", Stephen Kinzer, New York Times News Service, Oct 8, 1995 online at http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/homes/ross/public_html/bosnia_/sreb5.txt

³"Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1019 (1995) on violations of international humanitarian law in the areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most", United Nations Security Council, online at http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/homes/ross/public_html/bosnia_/sreb14.txt

⁴ibid. Also, see "UN’s Deadly Deal, How troop-hostage talks led to slaughter at Srebrenica", Roy Gutman, Newsday, May 29, 1996

⁵"Watch on Dutchbat, Chronology" online at http://mediaport.org/~rattle/chr1sreb.html. Also "Dutch ‘peacekeepers’ helped Bosnian Genocide"

⁶"Watch on Dutchbat, Chronology". Chronology cross-checked with other articles listed above.

⁷"U.N. TROOPS DIDN'T PROTECT REFUGEES, SURVIVORS REPORT", Elizabeth Neuffler, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct 30, 1995 online at http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/homes/ross/public_html/bosnia_/sreb8.txt

⁸"UN’s Deadly Deal" and "Dutch Conscience Is Stung Troop’s Failure to Protect Bosnia Muslims"

⁹Ibid. Also "Dutch ‘peacekeepers’ helped Bosnian Genocide"

¹⁰"Dutch ‘peacekeepers’ helped Bosnian Genocide" and "Dutch Conscience Is Stung Troop’s Failure to Protect Bosnia Muslims"

¹¹ While there doesn’t seem to be any direct evidence that the French government pressured General Janvier to deny the Dutch requests for air strikes, almost all the articles cited make reference to General Janvier’s reluctance to approve the air strikes in spite of the dangerous situation and the unanimous recommendations of staff. The implication is that General Janvier had an ulterior motive for denying the air strikes: he feared that French soldiers would be taken hostage in retaliation or there was a secret plan to let the Bosnian-Serbs capture Srebrenica in order to have pretext for US intervention. The Dutch government formally stated that they believed that there were no ulterior motives for General Janvier’s decisions to deny air strikes. Also see the Die Tageszeitung story "Did Chirac Prevent NATO Air Raids in Srebrenica" Nov 1, 1995, also "UN’s Deadly Deal, How troop-hostage talks led to slaughter at Srebrenica" and "This Week in Bosnia", AP Report, Nov 2, 1995 at http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/homes/ross/public_html/bosnia_/sreb9.txt