From the great classical philosophers we can gain a fruitful perspective on many of the questions laid out for this conference concerning the interaction of societal values and military ethics, such as "is the military the standard bearer of values?" "is the military culture different from the culture of the society?" and "to what degree should the military indoctrinate new members?" As a society closely tied to its origins in warrior tribes, yet struggling to achieve high forms of civilized life, the city of Athens contained the seeds of a tension that gave birth to the first and arguably the most reasoned articulation of ethical standards.¹ The close memory of great military triumph and disaster, the presence of many vigorous and spirited men, and the forum for political and philosophical debate gave Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle an unrivaled opportunity to probe these questions very deeply. From them we can draw a number of lessons for the theory and practice of military ethics today. In this paper I shall first, explore the account of courage given by Plato and Aristotle; second, consider how this constitutes a challenge to the standard political philosophy of the day; and third, draw some lessons about the teaching of military ethics today.

One finds in the writings of Plato and Aristotle a high regard for military excellence.² In fact, over the many years that I have taught these texts, I have found students often perplexed or even angry at this regard. Numerous arguments turn on a proper regard for military things, such as the extended account of guardians in the Republic. It is the training of the guardians which shall be our first item for comment. As any reader knows, Socrates suggest that we consider justice in the city as a way to find justice in the soul -- the city is the soul writ large. Socrates and Adiemantus and Glaucon build up three cities in "speech" in order to find justice, and its accompanying virtues. They begin with a city based upon simple and limited needs and they assume a perfect harmony of exchange. Upon learning that the denizens of the first city eat no meat, Glaucon exclaims that such would be a city fit for pigs and not for humans. Socrates agrees therefore to make the city more human by introducing greater opportunity for human desire, including meat-producers, beauticians, artists, and doctors to deal with such a feverish city. It turns out that this second city rests upon unlimited desire and requires expansion beyond the borders of the city. Soldiers are therefore needed to acquire territory and to defend the city from the like expansion of others. As what first appears to be a sub-sub plot of the Republic, there follows extended development of a scheme for educating guardians; Socrates goes into a lengthy discussion of the poets and the gods and heroes, the role of beauty and imitation, the nature of athletics, testing the guardian, housing and feeding and recompense of guardians. This section seems to hold a disproportionate lengthy place in the Republic if we only look at the need to discover justice in the state and thereby understand justice in the soul. But there are deeper reasons why Socrates dwells so much on educating guardians. Socrates tells Glaucon and Adiemantus that they have "purged" the luxurious city through the scheme of education(415d); by purging the city of unlimited desire, self-assertion and greed, they have established the grounds for citizenship.³ The luxurious city came into existence to fulfill human desires for more wealth and pleasure, for self-interest at the expense of others. But no society can exist if each man pursues his own unbridled desires and self-interest. Even Hobbes sees this and the social contract is put forward as an enlightened means of attaining peace and civility. The Hobbesean solution is of course quite similar to Glaucon's account of justice. Such a solution though evades the fundamental challenge of Thrasymachus as to whether justice is good for itself or merely useful. Plato sees the need for education to overcome the selfish and acquisitive side of human nature. The education entails physical and cultural education to produce a well balanced soul which loves what is noble and desires to imitate what is noble. Finally, the guardian must seek above all to identify with the common good. The conditions necessary for making guardians are in some way the very same conditions necessary for making citizens. The guardians, the soldiers, are therefore the "proto-citizens" or even "meta-citizens," as colleague Karl Walling has suggested to me.⁴ Now the extreme conditions required for guardianship, however, require a separate camp at a distance from the society which it serves. The guardians set a standard that society at large cannot fully emulate or imitate.

There is an additional reason for the importance of educating guardians in the Republic: to develop a better understanding of spiritedness and courage. In the fascinating moral psychology of the Greeks, Spiritedness is a third part of the soul between desire and reason. It is the key to moral education and the key to citizenship as such, and obviously the metal of the soldier.⁵ Again, the soldier is the standard bearer. The Socratic definition of courage provides us with much food for thought: courage is the preservation of the opinions established by law and education about what is to be feared (429c). Courage depends upon education by a regime about what is most important, and it is said to be right opinion, not knowledge. Courage is primarily a matter of conviction; that is, without conviction, there is no courage. The elaborate testing of the guardians to find who is most suitable all involve a determination as to whether the guardian can hold on to the right convictions in the face of "robbery, bewitchment and force" (413b) which are the various internal and external inducements such as pleasure and pain to abandon one's convictions. It is doxa, or dogma, that must be preserved at all cost! A guardian cannot give a full account as a man of knowledge, but must hold on to right opinion.⁶ Further, the education requires a noble lie. The lie may simply indicate the presence of a likely story or myth, not knowledge, which leads the guardian (and any citizen as such) to "care more for the city and for one another" (415d). In any case, it is an opinion that must be inculcated through education.

Here we reach a great quandary, for Plato as for us, about guardianship, and indirectly about citizenship. The challenges come spilling out: are the guardians happy in light of their sacrifice, is it possible to produce and maintain such communal beings, and how much must be covered over about the city and about death and who does the covering? These are great challenges to the Athenian Socrates, but all the more do they challenge us Americans. Give up property and family, surrender individual ambition and desire, and become indoctrinated? If this be the guardian camp, is it not further from Washington than from Athens? And yet these are remarkably constant demands upon the military profession, to some degree.⁷ Did Plato mean to say that an actual city should try such extreme measures; this is doubtful. But that debate need not concern us now. The following can be learned at this point in the dialogue. First, the discovery and understanding of justice depends upon understanding the functional diversities in the city and the soul; justice is primarily an ordering of the city and the soul; that is, it is an inner harmony of the parts, not a matter of following rules or minding "external business."⁸ Neither is justice for the guardians a procedural matter or a schema for mutual rights. It is an ordering of good; it requires an answer to such questions as is there a noble good, what is it that makes life worth living. In short, justice requires a metaphysics or a "world view," if you will. Indeed, justice presupposes a hierarchy of value within the city and the soul; this requirement is problematic for a democratic society and therefore makes the military, as a hierarchical presence, somewhat suspect to its egalitarian sentiments.⁹ Second, justice, by way of courage, requires the formation of the soul and inculcation of opinion concerning the good. This is true for guardian and citizen. Third, the soldier at arms is the standard bearer for the value of courage, justice and citizenship as such. Finally, it must be mentioned that Plato's solution requires a further element - in addition to soldier and citizen, we must discover the scholar, the philosopher.¹⁰ Wisdom is higher than courage and justice. And action after all requires deliberation and reflection; the education of the guardian requires an educator. I will circle back to this quandary, after a consideration of Aristotle's account of courage.

As is well known, Aristotle defines virtue as a state of character involving choice aimed a mean between extremes. It is an acquired habit, requiring proper education and inculcation: "Moral excellence is concerned with pleasure and pain . . . For that reason, as Plato says, men must be brought up from childhood to feel pleasure and pain at the proper things" (1104b10). He explores a least ten virtues and corresponding vices in light of this general definition. It is interesting to note that he devotes great attention to the virtue of courage; I believe that we have many lessons to learn on our theme from this section of the Ethics.¹¹ Courage pertains to fear and confidence, and primarily fear and painful things (1117a30). Courage is a mean between rashness and cowardice. To feel no fear at all is dismissed by Aristotle as the state of a madman, lacking in thought. The rash man is characterized by an excess of confidence. He is impetuous and rushes into battle. But in fact, he is a boastful person, who wishes to appear courageous. But the deeds do not match the words; the rash man often fails to endure. The coward feels too much fear and too little confidence. He is easily discouraged; he is motivated by pain, and not a noble good; ultimately the coward lacks self-respect and a sense of greatness. In contrast to the extremes, courageous man feels fear and confidence, but in the right amount, at the right objects and circumstances, always motivated by the desire to perform nobly. He is patient and perseveres in the face of difficulties and threats to protect or achieve an arduous good. As is the case with a virtue ethic, much is left to good judgment. And good judgment often requires the orientation to outstanding models or mature instance of such virtue, the spoudaois.

Military history can be so helpful to ethical reflection. The theme of rashness v. cowardice is conspicuous throughout military actions. For example, Lincoln wrote to Hooker: "And now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy, and sleepless vigilance, go forward, and give us victories."¹² Unfortunately, Lincoln had identified one of Hooker's flaws, as events in May would soon prove. The case of General Lee has come to public attention with the recent movie Gettysburg; unfortunately that movie portrays him as some combination of a rash man or a dreamy thoughtless man and Longstreet as a man of right judgment. It is a fascinating debate that has been going on for a century and a quarter. Douglass Southall Freeman makes the best case for Lee:

I will decline to repeat what Freeman has to say of Longstreet; I will leave the specifics to the historians and return to Aristotle's Ethics.

It is with very good reason that Aristotle identifies the paradigm case of virtue in the soldier who faces death in battle. He does this surely for the fact that the issue of courage is so conspicuous in the case of the soldier. In addition, there are philosophical reasons for seeing the solder as the prime instance of this virtue:

It is worth considering the many reasons Aristotle gives for making soldierly courage a paradigm case:¹⁴

Fear is the expectation of some evil or pain: "fear is caused by whatever we feel has great power of destroying us, or of harming us in ways that tend to cause great pain" (Rhetoric, 1382a20-30). There are many things which we may fear - poverty, sickness, disgrace, rejection. Death involves the greatest harm or loss insofar as the other goods are not possible without life;¹⁵ and these lessor evils all herald or point to death as a culmination. A soldier must endure many hardships, deprivations and threats. Death is the culmination of all loss and fears. But is it really the ultimate evil. The soldier's activity reveals again the question of a hierarchy of value; for in another sense death is not the greatest evil. That is, some things are estimated to be worth dying for. A great or noble good may inspire sacrifice of life. Are there things worth the risk of human life? Jacques Maritain, in an article on immortality, concludes that true civilization "knows the price of human life . . . but it does not fear death, it confronts death, it accepts risk, it requires self-sacrifice - but for aims which are worthy of human life."¹⁶ Such goods are justice, honor, and truth, and brotherly love. The decision to endure war reveals a nation's values. Lincoln, in his second inaugural address stated that: "both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish." Lincoln's Gettysburg Address is an attempt to establish the worth of the struggle: the dead shall not have died in vain if there is a rebirth of freedom. Such idealism does not exclude national interest as a factor in war, nor does it exclude the loyalty to immediate comrades in arms as a reason for sacrifice. Aristotle simply emphasizes that courage requires a motivation by the noble good (not simply the useful or pleasant).¹⁷ Courage makes sense only within a hierarchy of good, a metaphysics, or "world view."

Finally, Aristotle explores the connection of courage to friendship and loyalty to comrades. The man of good character, according to Aristotle, "does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth and honors and in general the goods that are objects competition, gaining for himself nobility."¹⁸. Aristotle sees in the soldier's courage an active risk taking for the sake of the good. Action and choice are distinguishing marks of good character.

As with Plato, then, for Aristotle, the soldier is the model for courage. And yet Aristotle says that such virtue maybe a qualified excellence insofar as it is motivated solely by honor and shame or even by fear of punishment. He calls this "citizen courage." Military discipline at times requires coercion and externals such as honor.¹⁹ There are many lessons to be learned here about the possible distortions of courage posed by anger, technical superiority,²⁰ and ignorance/stupor (1116a20-1117a25). True courage is linked to magnanimity, or greatness of soul, as Aquinas later discovered. And greatness of soul in turn depends upon liberal education and philosophy. So according to Aristotle, the citizen and his city must expand the horizons to become liberally educated, appreciating the priority of limit over expansion, mind over body, and the noble over the useful pursuits and studies.²¹ Aristotle’s account comes close to Plato's; the guardian must eventually transcend the cave and seek for knowledge of the eternal forms. Professional military education, as inculcation of courage, must be liberal education to some degree to cultivate authentic courage. Examples from military history seem to confirm much of Aristotle's account: we may consider incidents from the lives of Stockdale,²² MacArthur, Churchill, Lee,²³ Nimitz²⁴ et al.

Clearly in Aristotle, the military is a standard bearer for the virtue of courage and this virtue requires a special kind of education. Aristotle does not emphasize the difference between military and society as did Plato. But still we find that at least for courage, a special kind of disposition is required, and it is a higher standard that the citizen may not often meet, nor does a mere professional who excels only in equipment and training.

The education of guardians and the development courage poses a challenge to society at large, and to modern societies in particular. The formation of soul, the attachment to a particular country, the demand for personal sacrifice run counter to the principles and hopes of liberal enlightenment. Individual rights and desire for material satisfaction are overriding political goals; skepticism and doubt in the service of free thinking predominate in our education; we expect perpetual peace or a withering of the state. George Grant poses a very stark problematic:

At first look, these considerations may lead us to consider that a military ethic is anachronistic. The modern account of justice seeks precisely to avoid the questions of metaphysics and hierarchy of good.²⁶ In Hobbes and Locke there is an explicit denial of the existence of a noble good over and above the useful and pleasant.²⁷ The contemporary account, while following a Hobbesian or Lockean contractualist account of justice remains silent about the good life. It posits a "thin theory of the good": life, liberty and property are goods that anyone needs whatever their plan of life. Justice is viewed as a formal, procedural matter; it is minimalist and universal in scope. It presupposes an individualistic or atomistic view of man and society.²⁸ The focus of such contemporary theories of justice is the autonomous or unencumbered self; its philosophical orientation is finally existentialist or therapeutic insofar as commitment is viewed as repressive. A distinction between a noble and base way of life, or between a better and best, is either declared unintelligible or judgmental. The point of all of this is that military ethics and courage cannot flourish in such a climate.

Some may say, so much the worse for military ethos; but this dilemma also points to the contradictions or shortcomings of the modern liberal moral position. As MacIntyre points out in his lecture "Is Patriotism a Virtue?:"

Military ethics in practice requires spirited souls with particular commitments. R. E. Lee, for example, praises duty, not out of abstract regard for Kantian principles, but by way of a concrete admiration for a Puritan legislator and through an appeal to filial respect. All freshman at USAFA memorize an edited version of Lee's letter on duty because the reference to Puritanism is too particular (and religious). Of course, Lincoln also appealed to "mystic chords of memory," particularities of American experience, and he made a striking use of Biblical and Christian imagery. In some way then, military ethics is anachronistic with reference to a neutral and minimal universal liberal morality; but it is not so with respect to the functional needs of a liberal state. Perhaps this is a fundamental tension or conflict in modern society and the reason that military ethos will often conflict with society's mores. Plato first put his finger on the fundamental paradoxes of any military way of life in relation to the society which sponsors it. We have not overcome them in any significant way. But rather than seeing this as a bad thing, if we follow Plato, the military life is the source of positive virtues: the guardian is the proto-citizen. Important virtues which the liberal society may neglect are kept alive and nourished in the military life; virtues such as loyalty, sacrifice, and courage. Sir Hackett expresses a Platonic approach when he says that "military institutions thus form a repository of moral resource that should always be a source of strength within the state."³⁰ This takes on a double meaning in light of contemporary political philosophy. In addition to courage, integrity, and honor -- we should also find a respect for the noble good, patriotism and piety if indeed these are essential to the guardian's soul. The military life may guard against the leveling and homogeneity of liberal culture. The hunting down of all settled convictions and the lack of dialectical finesse which characterizes the politically correct movement drives many questions and convictions underground. Socrates may find a home in military education if nowhere else. We must find a deep irony if it be military ethics that keeps a way open to the highest questions and the first things.³¹ As Alan Bloom observed about contemporary education, there is a distressing closing of the mind to the deeper questions about human existence. The presence of the military keeps alive the big questions - what is justice, is anything worth an ultimate sacrifice of life, what or whom shall I serve, is killing ever permitted, does it violate the law of God? The neutrality of liberal theory must founder on the ancient questions.

There are a number of lessons which we may then draw concerning military ethics and teaching it today. These are first, we must acknowledge the centrality of an ethics of virtue for military ethics in specific, and perhaps for ethics in general; second, we must deal with the need to form the spirited part of the soul; and third, we must find some way to tie military ethics to the questions concerning the first things. As for the first, it seems that what makes military ethics distinct is first of all the type of character it must foster. Also, it most directly raises the questions about what is the human good and what is a good life. Utility may direct our attention to certain end results which the military profession may produce; contract theory may help us to understand certain forms of mutuality and rights; and duty ethics outlines important elements of actions which must be done. But none of them seem capable of answering the fundamental questions - what is a good life, is the life of a soldier a good life, a noble profession? The liberalisms of Hobbes, Locke, Kant and Mill seem too thin to provide substantive answers. Also the purported neutrality and proceduralism of contemporary liberal theory may mask the important questions and yet replace one dogma for another. A Kolhberg or Bellah simply import an unexamined ideology that may well turn out to be hostile to true military ethics. We should surely not rush headlong into the embrace of contemporary liberal theory without a consideration of such philosophical critics as MacIntyre, Sandel, or Taylor.³²

An ethics of virtue, and an ethic that looks to heroic virtues, requires more than rational deduction and strict rational analysis. It requires stories and traditional accounts of outstanding examples of virtue.³³ Military ethics needs to keep close contact with military history and law. This in turn also reminds us that chief task in teaching military ethics is formation of the spirited part of the soul; reason has its part to play, but so does the imagination. The forming of conviction is a central goal for the development of courage, if Plato is right. The vital role of the chaplain should also not be neglected. The synergistic effect of military traditions, religious belief, and philosophy is beneficial to all parties. Of course an American officer must receive an education that is open to a higher rational inquiry. Tocqueville distinguishes between instinctive and well considered patriotism.³⁴ The oath to defend the constitution does indeed require some appreciation for its meaning.³⁵ The foundation of American political tradition bears up under philosophic scrutiny.³⁶ And this should lead us upwards towards the ultimate questions. We must be prepared to answer questions about what is a good life, what is a just society, and the existence and nature of God. Military ethics, as seen from the ancient Greek perspective, is a very full and challenging discipline indeed.

1. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), chapters 2-8.

2. See the remarkable book by Leon Harold Craig, The War Lover: A Study of Plato's Republic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).

3. See the commentary by Allan Bloom, in The Republic of Plato, (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 355, 374ff.

4. President Clinton, in his 1995 state of the union address, recognized a WWII veteran for his courage with the following description: "Fifty years ago in the sands of Iwo Jima, Jack Lucas taught and learned the lessons of citzenship. On February the 20th, 1945, he and three of his buddies encountered the enemy and two grenades that fell at his feet. Jack Lucas threw himself on both of them."

5. For a popular, contemporary appreciation of the middle part of the soul, see C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Macmillan, 1947), chap. 1, "Men without Chests."

6. Consider Admiral Stockdale's account of the types who best withstood interrogation as POWs, in "The World of Epictetus," in Wakin, War, Morality and the Military Profession, 2nd edition (Boulder: Westview, 1986), chap. 1.

7. "The military man must forgo personal advantage, lucre, and prosperity." in Samuel P. Huntington, "Military Mind," In M. Wakin, War, Morality and the Military Profession, 2nd edition (Boulder: Westview, 1986), p. 40. On the training of a good Marine, see the novel by Edwin McDowell, To Keep Our Honor Clean, (New York: Vanguard Press, 1980).

8. See Republic, 443a-444a. As George Grant observes, "Justice is not a certain set of external political arrangements which are a useful means of the realization of our self-interests; it is the very inward harmony of human beings in terms of which they alone are able to calculate their self-interest properly." This is a different approach than the modern contract accounts of justice. George Parkin Grant, English-Speaking Justice, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), p. 44.

9. See Republic, 538c-e; 557b-562. Cf. Anthony E. Hartle, Moral Issues in Military Decision Making (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989): the exigencies of the profession requires "Conservativism (emphasis on order, hierarchy, and social stability); Authoritarianism (stereotyped obedience given and expected)" p. 35.

10. See Republic 486b, 500c; Apology 29b.

11. I benefited greatly from a graduate course on Aristotle's Ethics by Professor Robert Sokolowski at Catholic University in the Fall 1975, and in particular from a course paper by M. R. Calderon, "An Analysis of Aristotle's Discussion of Courage in the Nicomachean Ethics III, 6-9" unpublished. Also Yves R. Simon, The Definition of Moral Virtue (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989) proves very useful in understanding elements of Aristotle's definition in contrast with modern distortions of basic concepts.

12. January 26, 1863; in Complete Works, VIII, 206-207.

13. "Lee as a Leader," in Douglas Southall Freeman on Leadership, edited by Stuart W. Smith (Naval War College Press, 1990), p. 169.

14. Col. Anthony E. Hartle similarly notes that "While self-discipline would apply to most profesions, it is of fundamental significance to the military professional, for the demands of duty can be particularly heavy. It may require the sacrifice of one’s own life and the lives of others -- an aspect of daily existence in a combat environment. The professional commitment is of ‘ultimate liability.’ The requirements for both physical courage and the courage to make difficult decision is implicit." Moral Issues in Military Decision Making (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), p. 47.

15. "The most fearful thing of all is death; for it is the end, and once a man is dead it seems that there is no longer anything good or evil for him." (1115a25)

16. See Jacques Maritain, "The Immortality of Man," in A Maritain Reader, ed. Donald and Idella Gallagher (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 212-213.

17. 1104b30; 1115b14; 1116a12.

18. ". . . since he would prefer a short period of intense pleasure to a long one of mild enjoyment, a twelve month of noble life to many years of humdrum existence. and one great and noble action to many trivial ones." (1169a19ff)

19. See Harry Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotleanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 53-56. Crane's Red Badge Courage has many examples of the qualities similar to courage.

20. Perhaps a special temptation to American war making during Vietnam War and cold war reliance on nuclear deterrence.

21. See Aristotle's Politics, Bk. VII, 1-3 (1332; 1338b29). In criticizing the Spartan form of education, Aristotle says "what is noble, not what is brutal, should have the first place; no wolf or other wild animal will face really noble danger; such dangers are for the brave man" (1338b30).

22. James Stockdale, A Vietnam Experience (Stanford: Stanford University, 1984).

23. See Richard Weaver, "Lee the Philosopher," in The Southern Essays of Richard M. Weaver, ed. George M. Curtis, III (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1987), pp. 171-182.

24. See Douglas Southall Freeman, "Leadership," op cit., p. 207.

25. English-Speaking Justice, pp. 61-62.

26. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, articulates this better than any contemporary writer. See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1982); and Christopher Wolfe and John Hittinger, editors, Liberalism at the Crossroads: An Introduction to Contemporary Liberal Theory and its Critics (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994).

27. See my "Why Locke Rejected an Ethics of Virtue and Turned to an Ethic of Utility," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 64, 1990, pp. 267-76 and "Three Philosophies of Human Rights: Locke, Richards, and Maritain," in In Search of a National Morality, edited by William Ball, (Grand Rapids: Baker Press, 1992), pp. 246-257.

28. See MacIntyre's After Virtue or Charles Taylor, "Atomism" in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1985); a nice anthology of key articles may be found in What is Justice: Classic and Contemporary Readings edited by Robert C. Solomon and Mark C. Murphy (New York: Oxford Univ Press, 1990).

29. "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" (1984 University of Kansas Philosophy Lecture); cf. Samuel P. Huntington, "Military Mind," In M. Wakin, War, Morality and the Military Profession, 2nd edition (Boulder: Westview, 1986), pp. 35-56.

30. John Winthrop Hackett, "The Military in the Service of the State," in Wakin, op cit, p. 119.

31. On the importance of religion in military character, see Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., 19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership (Presidio, 1991), pp. 308-320; see also, Jimmy Doolittle's last statement on values include "Spirituality; a realization that a universe as orderly as it is must be ruled by a Divine Purpose and not by the mind of man." in Carroll V. Glines, Jimmy Doolittle: Master of Calculated Risk (New York: Van Nostrand, 1980), p. 195; also Douglass Southall Freeman, op cit, on Lee and Lincoln, passim; and finally Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America , translated by George Lawrence, edited by J. P. Mayer (Anchor Doubleday, 1969) volume II, part 1, chapter 7 and part 2, chapter 15 [pp. 448, 451, 543].

32. See Wolfe and Hittinger, Liberalism at the Crossroads, op cit. See note 24 above.

33. A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 114 ff.

34. Democracy in America, pp. 235ff.

35. Col. Hartle rightly builds this concept into the American Professional Military Ethic, Moral Issues, pp. 40-44; D.A.J. Richards interpretation is probably not adequate to the task; see my article on Richards in Wolfe and Hittinger, Liberalism at the Crossroads. A study of the American founding is always helpful for understanding this commitment to the constitution (see books listed in the next note).

36. See for example, Robert H. Horwitz, The Moral Foundations of the American Republic, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977), Edward J. Erler, The American Polity (Crane Russak, 1991), Morton Frisch and Richard Stevens American Political Thought, (E.E. Peacocke Publishers, 1983).