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The Military Virtues: From Aristotle to Skinner

Dr. Manuel M. DAVENPORT

In recent years, many concerned citizens have argued that the American military organization has lost its capacity to promote and defend our national interests.¹ As Philip Gold puts it, we have "... a military establishment which (Grenada notwithstanding) has known nothing but defeat for a generation."² Explanations offered to account for this loss of "... competence in the art of war"³ include reliance upon all-volunteer recruitment, the use of improper training methods and adoption of the structures of big business. Such explanations, however, are superficial. Why have we, civilian and military leaders alike, accepted modes of recruitment, training and management which make difficult, if not impossible, the realization of the military's proper objectives? The answer, implicit in the writings of most critics of the military establishment and made explicit by Gold, is that America has lost "the quality of civic virtue...the willingness to value the common life, the republic, so highly as to hazard one's own existence on behalf of it and its values."⁴ Restore and renew our civic virtue, Gold argues, and proper recruitment, training and management will follow.⁵

Gold distinguishes civic virtue from patriotism and traces its origin back through our founding fathers to Aristotle.⁶ It is clear, therefore, that Gold and other critics who implicitly endorse his argument share the ancient belief that ethical behavior presupposes the possession of virtue and that in particular excellence in the exercise of the military profession requires the acquisition of military virtues. In order to provide an historical account of this belief, we shall follow MacIntyre and define, "a virtue" as "an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable

us to...sustain practices and...achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us...in seeking the good life."⁷ A military virtue, is, thus, an acquired human quality which allows us to practice the military profession, achieve the goods internal to that practice and engage in the pursuit of the good life. To make more clear this definition of military virtue, the concepts of "an acquired human quality," "a practice and its internal goods," and "the good life" must be considered more closely.

Human qualities may be acquired by either biological inheritance or conditioning. The ancient Greeks did not restrict the virtues to those acquired by conditioning. Homer, for example, included physical aptitude among the military virtues,⁸ and Aristotle believed that some persons because of their inherited nature were incapable of acquiring military virtues.⁹ Protagoras, in his famous encounter with Socrates, argued that virtues are not "innate," but only "acquired by instruction." Socrates, however, asked why, if this is so, the children of good men often lack virtue. Protagoras replied that instruction in the virtues produces good results only if children have a natural talent for virtue, thereby endorsing the view that virtues, or at very least the capacity for virtues, may be acquired by biological inheritance as well as by conditioning.¹⁰ B. F. Skinner and other contemporary psychologists, although they would prefer to talk of "reinforced behavior" rather than "virtues," would agree. Skinner claims that reinforced behavior may be the product of either "natural selection" or "operant conditioning."¹¹

What MacIntyre means by "a practice" is "any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized."¹² Certainly all professions are

practices, although many practices are not professions. The "internal goods" of a practice are those that cannot be obtained except by engaging in that particular practice or one closely related to it.¹³ Certain goods are obtained, for example, by engaging in the military profession that cannot be obtained in any other way except, perhaps, by being a police officer. Receiving money or status for being a military or police officer is an external good, which can be obtained by engaging in many other, dissimilar activities. J. Glenn Gray in his classic work, The Warriors, describes most vividly the internal goods of the practice of military combat, delight in the spectacle of war and the fellowship of violence;¹⁴ goods sufficiently unique that most veterans would agree that their time in war was, "the great one lyric passage in their lives."¹⁵

While the internal goods of a particular practice may be unique to it, the virtues that make possible the achievement of such goods may also make possible the quest for the good life. "The good life," however, is a goal not unique to any particular practice, but one common to all humans. There is little agreement concerning what the good life is, but philosophers and psychologists, ancient and contemporary, agree that as a goal the good life is what gives our daily actions and chosen practices meaning and purpose.¹⁶

In broad terms, the nature of a military virtue has been described, and next it must be asked what specific virtues if any are military virtues. The view of Aristotle will be examined first and be compared then with contemporary views, including those of Gold and Skinner. All citizens, according to Aristotle, should be educated so they can serve as warriors in their youth, rulers in their maturity and priests in their old age.¹⁷ Further, because the good life that virtues make possible is the same for all and because war is

properly only a means for peace¹⁸ it follows that education should not aim at inculcating only a specific set of virtues such as only those necessary for the practice of war, but should aim at producing citizens who can be warriors if necessary but whose primary goal is to pursue the good life in times of peace.

The good life, for Aristotle, is a life in which we develop and realize our rational capacities. Such a life will provide us with the greatest happiness and such a life requires the development and exercise of the virtues.¹⁹ It may be said, in fact, that it is the rational development and exercise of the virtues that is the good life. As McIntyre says, "The good life...is the life spent in seeking for the good life...and the virtues...enable us to understand what...the good life...is."²⁰

There is, however, one virtue that for Aristotle can be most closely identified with the practice of war and, thus may be viewed, although not exclusively, as a military virtue. This virtue is courage. Like all the moral virtues, courage is a behavioral disposition which is moderate relative to two vices; in this instance, to rashness and cowardice. The rash person acts because too ignorant to fear anything and the cowardly person fears everything and cannot act at all. The courageous person acts in the face of fearing what is known to be that which rationally should be feared. Such courage is most clearly and nobly exhibited in the face of "the greatest danger," death in battle.²¹

Because courage requires for its exercise knowledge of what should be feared, the warrior must possess, in addition to courage and other moral virtues,

intellectual virtues. The irrational element of human nature, which today we could describe as the primary drives, is for Aristotle subject to rational control only to the extent that its behavior is voluntary.²² The growth of my hair and fingernails is involuntary behavior on the part of my body, cannot be modified by taking thought and, so, is not an activity that can be called either morally right or wrong.²³ My desires for sex, food or wine, however, can be moderated by habituation and if the natural impulses to engage in such pleasures of the flesh are moderated, the resultant state of character, called "temperance," is a moral virtue.²⁴ To be temperate is to avoid both too much and too little but this requires us to know not only what is too much and too little but also what is the proper, moderate degree of indulgence.²⁵ Proper behavior, then, requires that we have the capacity to know what actions are appropriate for various kinds of human activity. Such a capacity to know is what Aristotle calls an intellectual virtue. To know the path of moderation requires the virtue of practical wisdom; to know what extremes of behavior are self-destructive requires both the virtues of philosophic wisdom and scientific knowledge, or as we would say today, theoretical and factual knowledge.²⁶

While moral virtues are produced by habituation, the intellectual virtues are the result of teaching and experience. Those, therefore, who are immature or unteachable will not possess intellectual virtues but may possess moral virtues inasmuch as others give their behavior rational direction. The raw recruit, for example, may be told by his superiors what to fear and what not to fear in battle and by means of basic training may be conditioned to act in the face of fear. In actual combat, such a military novice may act, indeed, courageously and thereby exercise a moral virtue without possessing intellectual virtues. Such a person, however, will not be living

the best possible life, one in which the rational capacities are fully exercised, but may be living the best life possible at that time or if suffering from permanent mental defects, the best life possible at any time.²⁷

Because the immature in general and military recruits in particular often require rational guidance provided by others it would seem to follow that obedience is a necessary social and military virtue. Samuel P. Huntington argues that, "The military ethic...exalts obedience as the highest virtue."²⁸ Even those who would not list obedience as the highest military virtue would insist along with Malham M. Wakin that, "Loyalty and obedience...are among the moral virtues critical to the military function."²⁹ Aristotle's views concerning obedience are complicated by his insistence that a behavioral disposition is a virtue only if exercised "...according to choice and voluntary."³⁰ Thus, obedience can be a military virtue only if exercised because citizens choose to obey because they know that if they "...would learn to command well," they must "...first of all learn to obey."³¹ In Aristotle's ideal society each citizen could expect to be a ruler and could choose as a warrior to obey present rulers as a means of preparation for command, but in a society in which citizen soldiers are not expected to become future political leaders, such obedience however useful could not be a military virtue.³²

Many contemporary authorities claim that the basic military virtue, upon which all others depend, is integrity. Integrity is described as adherence to a moral position so complete and undivided that it will not be compromised for the sake of expediency. Integrity inspires trust in both superiors, who can expect truthful responses, and subordinates, who obey knowing their best

interests will be respected.³³ Integrity, so described, is certainly highly praised by the Bible³⁴ and Kant,³⁵ but Aristotle would find such praise most puzzling. For Aristotle, commitment to a moral position is praiseworthy only if the moral position is known to be that which promotes the good life. Intelligence and good intentions cannot be separated. What transforms a behavioral disposition into a virtue is the exercise of practical wisdom. The key virtue, therefore, cannot be a tendency to constantly will the same moral position, but must be the capacity to know what is good and to know how what is good varies in particular situations.³⁶ Because what is good is an activity experienced as happiness knowledge of what is good depends upon being good, which is to say that the exercise of intelligence and the possession of moral virtues are interdependent.³⁷ To claim that integrity is the basic military virtue is to suggest, in contrast, that one may be a morally good warrior and lack practical intelligence. It is to suggest also that a warrior whose integrity requires him to sacrifice personal happiness is thereby morally good. Aristotle would concede that such a warrior may be useful to the state, but he is not a morally good man.³⁸

Aristotle would not deny that truthful reports are essential to successful military operations, but he would argue that truthfulness is related, not to integrity, but to the desire for reputation or honor. To gain reputation some persons tell lies about themselves and their actions; others in a pretence of modesty conceal their good qualities and actions. Truthfulness is the middle path and as such it is a virtue the exercise of which will bring the lasting reputation and honor that persons seek by being truthful.³⁹

Although Gold claims that civic virtue is an Aristotelian concept it

should be clear, given Aristotle's insistence that virtue cannot be separated from the individual's intelligence and personal happiness, that Aristotle could not call the willingness to risk one's life for the common good a virtue without qualification. It must be remembered also that when accused, like Socrates, of offending the Athenians, Aristotle, unlike Socrates, fled the city, not wanting to give his fellow citizens "...a second chance of sinning against philosophy."⁴⁰ At the same time, Aristotle's virtue of justice does bear a significant resemblance to Gold's civic virtue. The just man, Aristotle says is law-abiding, but is obligated only to obey those laws "...that tend to produce and preserve happiness...for the political society."⁴¹ Political justice, to put the same point another way, requires that "...we do not allow a man to rule, but rational principle" because "...justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are governed by law," provided that law makes possible the good life.⁴² Aristotle, then, could justify self-sacrifice in service of the state, but only to the extent necessary for self-realization. To risk life for the sake of the common good could be a virtue for Aristotle if, and only if, the preservation of the common good were required for the personal pursuit of the good life.

Gold and Aristotle, thus, both value civic virtue but disagree concerning the priority of personal and common goods. Because he gives top priority to the common good and believes individuals are selfish Gold argues that we must be compelled to restore our civic virtue.⁴³ Aristotle, because he gives top priority to personal good and believes that although individuals are selfish, they are, in most cases, rational, argues that persons cannot be made virtuous as a result of compulsion.⁴⁴

This distinction is not, however, as sharp as it seems. Aristotle defines

actions to be compulsory "...when the cause is in the external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing."⁴⁵ Gold, as he insists that civic virtue must be compelled, argues that this "...will require the full participation of the American people, as well as their tacit consent."⁴⁶ The agents, then, must compel themselves or, at least, allow themselves to be compelled to be virtuous. The critical difference between Gold and Aristotle, then, is not that Gold would force us to be virtuous and Aristotle would not, but has to do with the relation between service to the state and self-realization.

Gold seeks to persuade the American people to revise military strategy, reform the military structure and renew conscription in order to be prepared to use conventional forces against the Soviet Union in areas of vital interest and, thereby, offer the world alternatives to either "nuclear catastrophe or a...Marxist New Dark Age."⁴⁷ To do so will require that we "...practice a prudent civic virtue on a planetary scale,"⁴⁸ that we are willing to sacrifice personal goods for the sake of humanity. Can humans be motivated to consent to making such a sacrifice? Certainly Aristotle would judge a request for such sacrifice to be both unreasonable and immoral. Aristotle could persuade himself to risk self-realization for only his own city-state and then only as necessary to preserve and promote his own personal happiness. If Aristotle is right, then in the inculcation of military virtues it would be both impractical and immoral to violate the individual's rational and selfish interests. If Gold is right, however, such a limitation may make it impossible to avoid the enslavement or destruction of the human race because civic virtue, for Gold, is not justified by any individual benefit it makes possible, but only because it is the only possible way to save the world⁴⁹. It is necessary, then, to consider the problem of inculcating virtues or, in Skinner's terms, the problem of operant conditioning.⁵⁰

Although Skinner rejects the use of the term, "virtue," his notion of "operant conditioning" closely resembles Aristotle's "habituation." A person Skinner argues, "behaves bravely when environmental circumstances induce him to do so,"⁵¹ not because we have implanted in him a virtue. Thus, if we want to change behavior, we must change the environmental circumstances. One way to do this is by means of "operant conditioning." "Operant" refers to the kind of response we want to "strengthen" by causing it to occur more frequently in the future. We strengthen by means of "reinforcement," which may be "positive" or "negative."⁵² "Conditioning" refers to the use of reinforcement. In using reinforcement, when a person "...behaves as we want...we simply create a situation he likes," which is to use positive reinforcement or we "...remove one he doesn't like," which is to use negative reinforcement. Behavior may be changed also by "punishment," that is, when a person doesn't behave the way we want, by creating a situation he doesn't like or removing one he does.⁵³

Like Aristotle, who claimed that persons could not be made virtuous as a result of compulsion, Skinner believes that in changing behavior we should avoid force and the threat of force as "...incompatible with permanent happiness."⁵⁴ Furthermore, the use of aversive consequences doesn't work; "...in the long run punishment doesn't reduce the probability that an act will occur."⁵⁵ Even tyrants will discover that "...the only effective technique of control is unselfish."⁵⁶ This is quite consistent, if not identical, with Aristotle's contention that the demands of the political society must not violate the individual's pursuit of self-realization.

For Aristotle behavior is subject to rational control only to the extent that it is voluntary and, again, Skinner is in basic agreement. Behavior, for

Skinner, that can be modified by operant conditioning is voluntary; behavior that cannot be so modified is involuntary.⁵⁷ Aristotle, of course, believed that humans may possess a power of choice and Skinner would object if what is meant is an internal capacity which seeks to exercise itself. We do seek to be free, "...not due to a will to be free, but to escape from so-called 'aversive' features of the environment."⁵⁸ To be free, however, is not to be free of all control because freedom requires self-control and self-control is the result of conditioning.⁵⁹ It is not control itself, then, that restricts freedom, but control that relies upon force. As long as the control used is positive reinforcement, which allows people to do what they want to do, feelings of freedom will be increased but, because there are no physical or mental restraints, "...the question of freedom never arises."⁶⁰

Those who rule, which is to say those who control behavior, for both Aristotle and Skinner must be both technically proficient and morally unselfish. Both believe that all citizens can be educated to become rulers eventually. This would require that those who rule should seek to produce behavior which is positively reinforcing to the individual and is approved by his social group.⁶¹ Such behavior will make possible the survival of the social group but will not allow for continual growth and improvement. In addition, then, Skinner argues, the social group, rulers and ordinary members alike, must seek to create "...a society in which there is no failure, no boredom, no duplication of effort."⁶² The pursuit of such a goal will make possible continual, dynamic growth. Skinner's view of the good life, then, is quite similar to that of Aristotle, who argues that it should be a life requiring constant self-realization.

Skinner in giving priority to social rather than individual values and in his lack of trust in the goodness and rationality of ordinary citizens is closer to Gold than Aristotle and thus Skinner's approach to motivation should cast more light on Gold's problem of how to inculcate civic virtue than Aristotle's. Gold, it will be recalled believes that the world cannot be saved from either slavery or holocaust unless Americans as they prepare to confront the Soviet Union are willing to sacrifice personal goods for the sake of humanity, but he does not tell us how such desired behavior can be produced.

Skinner would respond that there is no difficulty in producing any desired kind of behavior, "Operant conditioning shapes behavior as a sculptor shapes a lump of clay."⁶³ Although aggression is not innate it can be evoked by control of environmental circumstances.⁶⁴ It is possible not only to make warriors brave, but to "...make every man a brave man,"⁶⁵ especially if we note that the coward "...may be avoiding, not merely battle, but his own reactions of anxiety."⁶⁶ We can "...induce a man to risk his life when he does not 'have to'" by making such behavior appear admirable,⁶⁷ but, and here Skinner parts from Gold, it would be wrong to do so.⁶⁸

It would be wrong to produce the kind of behavior Gold seeks, and attributes to civic virtue, because to produce it would be to endorse the view that war is justified as an international form of punishment. It would be to defend the belief that if war were no longer possible at that instant order would "...give way to chaos, governments fall and society vanish."⁶⁹ There is possible, Skinner believes, a different kind of non-aversive international control based on positive reinforcement rather than on force and the threat of force.⁷⁰ Skinner, then, disagrees with Gold, not because he thinks

it wrong for individuals to sacrifice for the common good but because it would be wrong to engage in self-sacrifice to perpetuate a form of international control based on the use of aversive consequences.

If now, we define "a military virtue" as "a behavioral disposition inculcated by conditioning, the possession and exercise of which is necessary to the practice of the military profession," and thereby provide a definition acceptable to all authorities reviewed, we may summarize the two views considered concerning the specific nature of military virtues and the manner in which they should be inculcated.

At one extreme it may be argued that there are virtues that are uniquely military in that they are necessary for military success but do not contribute directly to either personal happiness or the pursuit of the good life. Such virtues, therefore, must be inculcated by negative reinforcement or, in extreme cases, punishment, which, it is argued, is justified because unless such virtues are acquired our society will suffer extinction or enslavement and thus the very opportunity to pursue the good life. Such are the arguments that Gold uses to urge us to compel ourselves to acquire civic virtue.

At the other extreme, it may be argued that there are no virtues which are specifically military. If we seek the good life and in doing so acquire the virtues necessary for its pursuit, these virtues will be those also necessary for military success. These virtues should be inculcated only by positive reinforcement because the use of force is both immoral, as contrary to the individual's happiness, and impractical, as ineffective in changing behavior. Such, in broad strokes, are the arguments of Aristotle and Skinner.

The first extreme position, then, has been rejected by those who fear a loss of liberty. Our founding fathers, in fact, so feared the potential for tyranny in military conscription that according to Gold, "...they chose to risk losing the war rather than endure the perceived perils of large standing armies."⁷¹ Today, however, what is at risk in losing a war may be survival itself, so we must question the second position most carefully by asking if we can be certain that the virtues necessary for personal happiness and the good life really will be sufficient also for military success.

To avoid the difficulties of each of these positions I have argued elsewhere that the military professional, as well as other professionals, must possess "a sense of calling."⁷² The military professional must find, in other words, in the practice of the military profession a way of life that is, for her or him, the good life. In MacIntyre's terms, the internal goods of the practice of the military profession must be those that make possible the quest for the good life. If the military professional does possess such a sense of calling, then the argument of Colonel Wakin and others that integrity is the basic military virtue, as well as Gold's argument for civic virtue, can be justified as arguments for a commitment, not to a moral position but to a practice, that is so strong it may demand self-sacrifice because without it there is no good life. Such a sense of calling would overcome the objections of Aristotle and Skinner, also. Virtues necessary for a practice that constitutes the good life are not contrary to personal happiness and would not have to be inculcated by negative reinforcement or punishment.

It may be objected that this proposed solution is practical only if a sufficient number of persons possessing a military calling can be enlisted to execute the military organization's proper objectives. The possession of a

military calling, however, may be the result of either natural selection or positive reinforcement. We do know how to produce such a result by means of positive reinforcement. We have known how since the time of Aristotle. Thus, there is no good reason for believing tht we must rely upon methods, such as negative reinforcement and punishment, which are neither moral nor effective.

Manuel M. Davenport
Texas A&M University

End Notes

¹Cf. Richard A. Gabriel, "Modernism vs. Pre-Modernism: The Need to Rethink the Basis of Military Organizational Forms," in Military Ethics and Professionalism, ed. James Brown and Michael J. Collins, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1981), 55-74; Sam C. Sarkesian, "Moral and Ethical Foundations of Military Professionalism," *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 20; Manuel M. Davenport, "Ethics and the Military Organization," United States Air Force Academy Journal of Professional Ethics 4 (September 1983), pp. 23-27.

²Philip Gold, Evasions: The American Way of Military Service (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1985) p. xxi.

³Loc. cit.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 154-55.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁷Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 178,204.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 149.

¹⁰Plato, "Protagoras," in Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 317-23.

¹¹B.F. Skinner, "What's Wrong with Daily Life in the Western World?" (Address delivered at Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, August 1985), p. 3.

¹²MacIntyre, p. 175.

¹³*Ibid.* p. 176.

¹⁴J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1959), pp. 25-58.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹⁶MacIntyre, pp. 203-04.

¹⁷Aristotle, "Politics," The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 1289.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 1297-99.

¹⁹Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," *op. cit.*, pp. 941-44, 1104-07.

²⁰MacIntyre, p. 204.

²¹Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," pp. 975-77.

²²Ibid., pp. 965-66.

²³Ibid., pp. 951-52

²⁴Ibid., p. 960.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 1022-23.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 1027-28.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 952-53.

²⁸Samuel P. Huntington, "The Military Mind," in War, Morality, and the Military Profession, ed. Malham M. Wakin (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1986), p. 52.

²⁹Malham M. Wakin, "The Ethics of Leadership I," in War, Morality, and the Military Profession, p. 196.

³⁰Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," pp. 971-72.

³¹Aristotle, "Politics," p. 1297.

³²Ibid., pp. 1182-83.

³³War, Morality, and the Military Profession, pp. 174-78, 180, 190-91.

³⁴Psalms, Chapter 15.

³⁵MacIntyre, p. 145.

³⁶Ibid. pp. 144-46.

³⁷Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," pp. 1034-35.

³⁸Aristotle, "Politics," pp. 1179-80.

³⁹Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," pp. 998-1000.

⁴⁰B.A.G. Fuller, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1945), p. 173-74.

⁴¹Aristotle, "Politics," p. 1003.

⁴²Ibid., p. 1013.

⁴³Gold, pp. 50, 70.

⁴⁴Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethic," pp. 964-69.

⁴⁵Ibid, p. 965.

⁴⁶Gold, p. 155.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 118.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 155.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 152; cf. also, pp. 35-36.

⁵⁰For his helpful comments and criticisms concerning my interpretation of the thought of B.F. Skinner, I am grateful to Daniel Fallon, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, Texas A&M University.

⁵¹Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 197.

⁵²Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1953), pp. 64-66.

⁵³Skinner, Walden Two (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962), pp. 259-60.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 194.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 260; cf. also, Science and Human Behavior, pp. 182-84.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 289,

⁵⁷Science and Human Behavior, pp. 112-114.

⁵⁸Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 42

⁵⁹Science and Human Behavior, p. 240-41.

⁶⁰Walden Two, p. 262.

⁶¹Science and Human Behavior, pp. 428-29.

⁶²Walden Two, p. 292.

⁶³Science and Human Behavior, p. 91.

⁶⁴Beyond Freedom and Dignity, pp. 185-86.

⁶⁵Walden Two, p. 114.

⁶⁶Science and Human Behavior, pp. 179-80.

⁶⁷Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 53.

⁶⁸Walden Two, p. 53.

⁶⁹Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 71.

⁷⁰B.F. Skinner, Notebooks, edited by Robert Epstein, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), p. 327.

⁷¹Gold, p. 67.

⁷²Manuel M. Davenport, "Professionals or Hired Guns?" Army 30 (May 1980): 14.