Ethics
of Detention and Interrogation:
Tony Pfaff
Introduction
Detention and interrogation are themselves ethically
troubling activities. Detention deprives a suspect of the right to liberty.
Further, successful interrogators must sometime deceive, incite, and coerce in
ways not normally acceptable for members of the general public. What makes such
activities objectionable is that they involve using people in ways they have
not agreed to be used, and seems at odds with democratic ideals upholding the
dignity and value of human life.[1]
Respecting human dignity means giving people the kind of treatment they
deserve, but prohibitions against torture, cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment are based on the idea that there are some kinds of treatment no one
deserves.
As a result, both domestic and international law place
severe restrictions on who may be detained and the kinds of methods
interrogators may employ. However, exigencies in the Global War on Terror
(GWOT) have stressed the normal moral and legal boundaries associated with
detention and interrogation and given such exigencies, the temptation to ignore
these constraints is intense. Detention facilities in
The law of war sharpens this tension by prohibiting
“physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion,” inflicted on any
enemy prisoner of war (EPW) or civilian to obtain information.[2] Such a bright line makes it difficult for
even well-meaning interrogators to avoid pushing even approved techniques, some
of which are inherently coercive, beyond the spirit, if not letter, of the law.
The ethics of detention and interrogation begin with a
theory of rights, namely that by virtue of being human, all people are
entitled, at a minimum, to the rights of life and liberty. But rights entail
obligations, and if someone has a right to life and liberty, someone else has
an obligation to preserve them, and this obligation falls to the state. But if
the state is to exercise this responsibility it must also have rights of its
own, namely the right to political sovereignty and territorial integrity. This
provides the moral basis for which
Consent is a central moral
criterion on evaluating our behavior toward others. Murders, thefts, and lies
can all be recognized to be wrong because they are violations of consent. No
one consents to be murdered, have his goods stolen, or lied to. If he tried,
the resultant actions would not be classified as “murder,” “theft,” or “lie” at
all. Consent plays such a critical role in moral reasoning because it is the
manifestation of the freedom and dignity of the person.[3]
Failure to abide by someone else’s consent causes one to treat that person as a
non-person, more like a tool than a user, merely a means to one’s ends. However, this does not entail that one must
always treat people in a way they would prefer.
Consent restrains,
as well as enables, what human beings
may be morally permitted to do to one another. By virtue of one’s actions, one
can consent to things one would prefer not happen as well as to things that
would be immoral without that consent. For example, the quarterback on a
football team would prefer not to be tackled by the other team, but if he is,
he has no basis to accuse the other team of assault. Arguably most soldiers
would prefer not to be shot at, but by virtue of their activities as soldiers,
they have accepted that risk. This is why there is no prosecution of enemy
soldiers for killing friendly ones, even though it is reasonable to argue their
efforts in pursuit of an unjust cause are morally wrong.
Criminals also consent to being punished by virtue of
committing a crime. By not respecting the rights of others, criminals must
expect a society founded on those rights to punish violators. Whether they do
expect it is not relevant, it is simply the case it would be unreasonable if
they did not. Further, whether they want to go to jail is also not relevant. It
is their activity, not their desire, which establishes what counts as treatment
they should reasonably expect. Criminals should reasonably
expect that their rights as persons will be respected and that they will be
subject to a judicial procedure that will permit them to address their
innocence or guilt. But if they are found guilty they may expect to be deprived
of their freedom.
By virtue of the threat
they represent, insurgents and terrorists have exposed themselves to being
killed, detained, and interrogated. But as noted above, quarterbacks, soldiers,
and criminals have not exposed themselves to just any kind of treatment. There
are limits. What those limits are is the subject of the following sections.
Permissions
and Limits on Detentions:
This principle of consent
first limits who may be detained. Individuals suspected of insurgent or
terrorist activity may be detained for two reasons: 1) to prevent them from
conducting further attacks 2) to gather intelligence to prevent other
insurgents and terrorists from conducting attacks.
This suggests two classes
of persons who may be detained and interrogated: 1) persons who have engaged in
or assisted those who engage in terrorist or insurgent activities; and 2)
persons who have incidentally come by information regarding insurgent and
terrorist activity, but who are not guilty of associating with such groups. By
engaging in such activities, persons in the first category may be detained as
criminals or enemies, depending on the context. Persons in the second category
may be detained and questioned for specific information, but since they have
not, by virtue of their activities, represented a threat, they may be detained
only long enough to obtain the information. If they refuse to willingly provide
information, they must be released. Persons who do not possess relevant
information may not be detained.
Permissions
and Limits on Interrogation Techniques:
Most
cases for permitting torture and ill-treatment begin with variants of the
“ticking time-bomb” scenario. The ingredients of such scenarios are usually an
impending loss of innocent life, a suspect who knows how to prevent it—and in
most versions is responsible for it—and a third party who has no humane
alternative to obtain the information in the time left. Such cases are
compelling as good people are hard pressed to argue that no form of torture
would be permissible, even if there was no guarantee that the torture would
yield the desired information.
The Israeli Supreme Court,
in rendering its own judgment on the use of torture and ill-treatment,
underscored this point when it opened its judgment with the statement, “(t)he
State of
Setting aside the
false-dilemma portrayed in this retort, arguments about respecting the
humanity of the suspect and upholding laws prohibiting torture and ill-treatment
in such situations would hardly be persuasive to victims and their families who
would justly ask why their right to life is trumped by the suspect’s right not
to be tortured. If we accept that there are cases where torture is morally
permissible, Dershowitz reasonably argues, we should then institutionalize it,
both in terms of law and practice. However,
just because something can be morally
permissible it is not self-evident that it should be legally permissible or that
intelligence professionals should add it to their list of professional
core-competencies.
To
illustrate this point, it is important to first note that “ticking time-bomb”
scenarios are very restrictive. They limit the kinds of suspects whom it is
permissible to torture by the following criteria: 1) the interrogator must have
strong reasons to believe the suspect possesses the information; 2) the
information must be necessary for preventing immediate harm to innocents; and
3) there must be no way to prevent the harm otherwise. Further, such scenarios
require interrogators to apply a “minimum harm” rule and not inflict more than
is necessary to get the desired information. Any pain inflicted to teach a
lesson or after the interrogator has determined torture will not bear fruit is
morally wrong.
What
the criteria above exclude is torture or ill-treatment for a population of
suspects, even if the interrogator knows
one of them has information that will prevent harm to innocents. While the utilitarian logic of this practice
can be compelling — torture a few so many may live — ultimately, this practice
is morally self-defeating because it puts innocent victims of torture in an
impossible position. The person being tortured cannot prove he does not have
the information, which presumably is the only thing he can give the
interrogator to stop the torture. The only options the subject has is to endure
the torture or ill-treatment indefinitely or give the torturer something he
will believe, regardless of whether it is false. Placing someone in a position
where they have the choice of pointlessly enduring physical pain or lying
degrades not only the subject and the interrogator but also the community that
permits it. This same logic precludes torturing a known terrorist on the
suspicion he has useful information. There is no way he can prove he does not.
A complete account of
permissions to apply torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment would
require a discussion of what basis interrogators could claim they know or have
strong reasons to believe a detained terrorist possessed information that could
prevent the loss of innocent life. Credible sources or even confessions can be
wrong or misinterpreted. Since this is an epistemic, rather than moral,
question I will set aside a detailed discussion of what counts as knowledge or
“strong reasons.” However, in judging whether or not torture or ill-treatment
is permitted, the due diligence with which interrogators apply analytical
standards must be taken into account.
Further,
given the severe restrictions on torturing suspects in “ticking time-bomb”
scenarios, it is reasonable to ask if institutionalizing the practice of
torture is morally worthwhile. However, prohibitions against torture are so
fundamental to the notions of human dignity upon which liberal democracies are
founded that we ultimately risk doing more harm than good by overriding them. It is one thing to recognize that on a
case-by-case basis we must accept the lesser of two evils. It is something else
entirely to assert that there are occasions when overriding democratic values
is a good thing. The former risks occasional abuses for which the legal and
political institutions necessary to address them remain intact. The latter risks
undermining fundamental democratic values—and the institutions that preserve
them—in such a way they may not be there for us when the emergency is over.
Institutionalizing
torture, cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment also risks the integrity of
the intelligence and military professions. It will require establishing law
that sets aside the Geneva Convention and the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. While this will be
politically difficult and could undermine international and domestic support
for the global war on terror (GWOT), failure to do so will put the associated
government agencies in the morally precarious position of training its people to
do illegal acts.
Assuming
this is resolved, there are other moral costs that need to be addressed. Institutionalizing
torture means that people skilled in the art and science of torture will have
to be recruited and trained. A number of studies indicate that this has
negative psychological as well as moral consequences as habituating people to
do cruel things risks making them cruel people.[6]
If one accepts that information gained from torture is usually unreliable and if
one adds this to the cost of institutionalizing torture to professions as well
as professionals, it is not so clear, even from the view-point of necessity,
that ultimately the good obtained from permitting torture outweighs its harms.
A
more morally consistent approach would be to recognize that there are occasions
where violating legal and moral norms are understandable—that is we can recognize
that a good person might commit such an act—but not necessarily recognize that
the act is good. In such cases, someone who committed an act of torture must
offer his actions up for review and judgment by a competent authority. An
excellent example of how this worked in real-life is the case of a 4th Infantry
Division Battalion Commander who permitted his men to beat a detainee whom he
had good reasons to believe had information about future attacks against his
unit. When the beating did not get the desired results, he fired rounds around
the detainee’s head. The tactic was apparently successful and
This resolution permitted the commander to do what he felt
certain was the right thing. But it also required him to be certain the right
thing in this case was worth giving up his career. Thus we can recognize good
people may be placed in situations where there is no morally good choice, but
we do not have to redefine our morality to accommodate it.
Conclusion:
The work of the interrogators, because it is indispensable
to the state fulfilling its obligation to secure the life and liberty of its
citizens is itself a moral obligation. But the methods employed must reflect
this nation’s commitment to human dignity. However, acting morally does not necessarily mean states must give up obtaining
critical information, but it does mean they may have to give up certain ways of
obtaining it, even if that means members of the military and intelligence
professions must take greater risks.
Of course, the
tension between necessity and humanity will remain. Because of this, military
and intelligence professionals must accept that in crises they may find
themselves in circumstances where lives will be at stake and the morally
appropriate way to preserve those lives will not be obvious. This should not
preclude action, but these professionals must be prepared to accept the moral,
as well as legal, consequences of torturing or otherwise ill-treating suspects.
Failure to recognize and accept this represents the worst kind of careerism as
it places the professional’s career over the needs of the profession and the
nation it serves.
NOTES
[1]
Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 2 ed,
[2]
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
[3]
Immanuel Kant. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) Lewis
Beck, trans
[4]
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the
General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity, p. 80 quoted in
The Israeli Law Review, p. 2. http://unixware.mscc.huji.ac.il/~law1/ilr/ilr23_2.htm.
See also http://62.90.71.124/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html
[5]
Dershowitz, Alan M. "Stop winking at torture and
codify it," LA Times,
[6]
Jean Marie Arrigo, “A Consequentialist Argument Against Torture Interrogation
of Terrorists,” http://www.usafa.edu/isme03/arrigo03.html
[7]
Deborah Sontag, “How Colonel Risked his Career Menacing Detainee and Lost,” New
York Times,