What’s in a Word?
Getting Clear on What We Mean by “Preemption”
by Lieutenant Colonel John
Mark Mattox, United States European Command
Introduction
One of the great traditions
of American journalism is to latch on to a concept that has not found its way
into public discourse for some time—often a single word or phrase—and then to
talk about it as if it were so familiar a concept as to require no
explanation. Some members of the press
love to banter around these words as if they knew exactly what they meant. Faithful listeners to or readers of these
pundits, fearful that they may be the only ones dull enough not to see the
emperor’s magical clothes, nod in ready assent at the footloose and fancy free
use of these words. One such word now
making the rounds is, of course, “preemption.”
The prime task of philosophy
is not to solve problems; it seldom does.
But it is a very useful vehicle for identifying problems and for
clarifying the meaning of concepts. I propose
that we step back for a moment and be sure we are clear about what we mean and
do not mean by “preemption.” Ensuring
that we enjoy this kind of clarity will, I suggest, go a long way toward identifying
concrete cases in which preemptive military action it is permissible and those
in which it is not.
What
preemption is not
First, let us consider what
preemption is not. Many discussions of
the meaning of “preemption” focus on the distinction between a “preemptive act”
and a “preventive war.” This is, of
course, an important distinction, and one that we should not fail to make. These terms are not used
consistently in popular literature, and so let us make the following
distinction: A preventive war is one
that is initiated before any immediate threat of hostilities with an eye
toward overpowering a potential opponent so that the opponent cannot
strike. A pre-emptive action, on the
other hand, is one that is initiated in
response to an adversary’s having set in motion the chain of events that
is reasonably judged to lead inevitably to a yet unconsummated attack.[1] Thus, unless one acts in a way that “actually reduces or
eliminates the effect” [2]
of an imminent attack by a potential opponent, the attack cannot be called “preemptive.”
We also should note that
“preemption” can be used in the context of either jus ad bellum or jus in
Etymology: What Preemption is
Let us now turn our
attention to what preemption is by
examining the etymology of the word itself.
“Why should we look at etymology?” one might ask. “After all, the meanings of words change over
time, and the way a word was used decades or centuries ago may entail concepts
that differ radically from what is meant when it is used today.” Of course, this is a point of which we should
not lose sight. Nevertheless, it is no
accident that the historical meanings of words generally have important
conceptual links with their current uses.
The fact that we speak of “preemptive” war rather than, for example,
“presumptive” war or “predestinated” war is precisely because of the historical
meaning of the word “preemption.” And so,
as any hairdresser would say, if you want to know what you can infer from the color
of the visible strands of hair, examine the roots.
As it turns out, preemption
is not one of those words that take us back into the deep, dark recesses of English
language history; it is a fairly recent addition to the English lexicon, going
only back to about the late 16th or early 17th century. As applied to warfare, “preemption” is a very
late comer; the first attestation of the word in this sense does not occur
until the middle of the 20th century.
Historically, preemption had nothing to do with war per se. Its longest running meaning has to do with
the acquisition of property. The word
itself comes from the middle Latin praeemptus,
the past participle of prae (meaning
“before”) and emere (meaning “to buy
or purchase”). Thus, praeemere, or
preempt, originally referred to “buying beforehand,”[3]
or to the act or right of claiming or purchasing something before it was offered
for purchase to others.[4]
Thus, we find in the early 17th century
(1610) an attestation of the word stating that “Her late Majestie intended to
have retayned the prerogative of pre-emption,”[5]
meaning “the right of buying provisions at an appraised valuation”[6]
for the royal household before other people were given the option to purchase
those provisions. By the mid 19th
century (1857), we find the American press reporting that “The laws of the
As we consider what some
semanticists would call the “general” or “invariant” meaning of the word
“preemption”—the meaning which seems to apply in all usages, irrespective of
context, the visual image that begins to emerge is something like the
following: Imagine a throng of eager and
determined shoppers, massed at the doors of Macy’s Department Store on the day
after Thanksgiving. They have read the
sale papers, know exactly what they want, have a fair idea of the quantities
likely to be available, may even have plotted mentally the most strategically
advantageous route through the store to the relevant counter, and are willing
to push, shove, elbow, or trample fellow shoppers to obtain the prize—not
because they desire harm to come to fellow shoppers per se (although that may
happen in the course of pursuing their aim), but because they are intent upon
“buying before” anyone else does. In
other words, they are willing to act preemptively as required to obtain the
objective.
It is
not until the mid 20th century that the word actually comes to designate in American
English usage the military concept with which we are familiar: “a measure taken against something possible,
anticipated or feared; preventive; deterrent; such as a preemptive strike
against the enemy.”[11] Thus, it could be said (1959) that “The
American Strategic Air Command . . . might be prevented by a Russian preemptive
strike from ever getting the Sword [sic] out of its scabbard.”[12] By the mid sixties (1966), military reference
manuals begin to include definitions for preemptive strikes: an “armed attack motivated by the conviction
that an enemy attack is under way or is irreversibly imminent.”[13] As we recall the image of our determined,
post-Thanksgiving Day shoppers at Macy’s, we realize that they, too, are under
irreversibly imminent risk of having their treasure snatched right out from
under them by some other equally determined, but in their estimations, less
worthy, shopper. Hence, they feel they are left with no choice but to act
preemptively—to “buy beforehand.” The
thought that they must act now or risk being thwarted is no distant possibility
in their minds. Indeed, their attack
launched on specific display counters at Macy’s is (1971) “launched in the
belief that an enemy attack has already entered the executive phase” [witness
the other “enemy” shoppers massed around the doors] and that the enemy’s decision
to strike “has already been made.”[14] By 1976, one military author could state,
expecting to be clearly understood, that “There was no doubt at all about the
most effective [Cold War] deterrent—it was the ‘Polaris’ submarine; which,
because it was virtually undetectable, was a genuine second-strike weapon which
robbed the pre-emptive attack of all its former attraction.”[15]
Essential
Elements of Preemption
Against this background, we
might attempt to identify the necessary and sufficient elements of a preemptive
military act.
First, preemptive acts are always intentional and never accidental. If one happens unwittingly to achieve
advantage over an opponent by acting before the opponent acts, the advantage,
no matter how significant, cannot be said to be the result of a preemptive act. Thus, while preemption may involve an element
of immediate surprise to an opponent, that surprise must be understood within a
larger context that suggests that, whether a preemptive action is undertaken or
not, action by the opponent was possible, if not likely.
Second, in order for an act to be preemptive, it must be calculated, at the
very minimum, to negate whatever advantage might accrue to an opponent. Circumstantially, it might additionally involve
obtaining positive advantage over one’s opponent, but not always. For example, our Macy’s shoppers’ motivation
for preemptive action might merely be to negate the efforts of the other
shoppers—to obtain the satisfaction of being the first to purchase the item at
issue. However, the shopper might additionally
be motivated by what he or she regards as a positive advantage, namely, the
thought of being “the only kid on the block” to have the item, thereby becoming
the Jones with whom all others must now keep up. Likewise, in political-military terms, in order
for an act to be preemptive, it must be undertaken with the intent at least to
thwart a competitor, if not gain outright advantage over him.
Third, preemptive acts always occur in response to conditions that one can
rightfully regard as threatening. For example, if I:
·
happen
to be the only shopper standing at the door of Macy’s on the day after
Thanksgiving,
·
run into
the store the moment the door opens to buy a specific item that I saw
advertised in the Thanksgiving Day newspaper,
·
find on
the display counter a thousand copies of the item I want, and
·
see that
no one else is buying the item,
I may feel very happy about my purchase. However, although I may have intended to act
preemptively, I have not, in reality, preempted anything. The fact that other shoppers might eventually
buy the remaining 999 copies is irrelevant.
In order for my action to be preemptive, I must actually have beaten
someone else to the purchase.
Fourth, the idea of preemption as we have conceived it can be applied to all
instruments of national power:
diplomatic, economic, informational, or military. Of course, one could stipulate that
preemption, as it pertains to international relations, can only refer to
military acts. However, to do so seems a
bit arbitrary and without logical warrant.
Why, for example, could it not be that a nation might undertake an act
of diplomatic preemption (negotiations, etc.) in order to forestall a crucial
economic decision by a competitor, or a preemptive informational campaign in
order to discredit another nation’s diplomatic efforts, or a preemptive
economic move to render unlikely or impossible another’s military
expansion?
An Invitation
to Equivocate
It is on this latter point that our quest toward
clarity becomes particularly dicey, because it raises the question, “What
characteristic of an ongoing chain of events renders one event in that chain uniquely
identifiable as preemptive?” Consider the case in which one argues that a
military act not preceded by armed conflict is not preemptive, but merely a response to a previous act of, say, economic
aggression. A specific example of just
such a case might be World War II from the perspective of Imperial Japan. Although, from the
In a
similar vein, one might argue, from the
·
the
·
was followed
by twelve years of broken promises by Saddam Hussein,
·
witnessed
regular Iraqi incursions into two no-fly zones, and
·
culminated
with Hussein’s stubborn unwillingness to reveal, to international satisfaction,
the actual status of his weapons of mass destruction program.
On this score, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM might be called
the end of a 12-year cease fire, or the beginning of a retributive war, or any
number of other things that constitute natural follow-on actions to precursor
provocations—but not necessarily a preemptive war. Whether this stance can withstand scrutiny
from the perspective of history is difficult to say. In any case, the example illustrates how
difficult it can be to identify exactly where preemption begins.
A Moral Evaluation of Preemption
Since one side or the other
always may be expected to argue, on one or another ground, that “the other side
started it,” how does one identify which cases truly involve preemption and
which do not? It seems to me that the
morally problematic aspects of preemption come into sharpest focus when
assessed on the basis of intentionality—when
the allegedly preemptive act involves the intention to negate the actions of
other human agents, if not the intention to gain outright advantage over
them. This point is sometimes obscured
by the fact that most discussions of preemption involve states (or persons
acting on behalf of states) rather than persons acting in their individual
capacities as autonomous moral agents. To
take a current example, the United States has argued that the emergence of the “new
kind of war”[18]
the nation currently finds itself fighting might mean that, at times, preemptive military action could be the
nation’s only viable security alternative.
The U.S. National Security Strategy even goes so far as to argue that
the option to act preemptively is really nothing new: “The
It is easy to regard with
moral disapprobation the shopper at Macy’s who shoves and then tramples fellow
shoppers in order to reach the sales table first. However, for some reason, it seems harder to identify
the key moral issues when international conflicts are involved, with their
attendant displays of bravado and high emotion.
Nevertheless, let us here observe that, prima facie at least, the kind
of motivations required to act preemptively on any level run counter to the
kind of motivations embraced by most ethical systems. Morality does not champion the cause of
individuals or nations intent on “buying before” when the buying involves
thwarting others merely for personal gain.
Quite the contrary: Morality is
about cooperation, patience, longsuffering, and seeking to promote the
flourishing of others.
In all fairness,
we should note that preemptive
action is not an inherently evil notion, but like so many other things, it is a
notion which, circumstantially, can be used for evil purposes. Preemption—“buying before,” can be something
which many of us would agree to be a good thing (like Thomas Jefferson’s making
the Louisiana Purchase before some other European power did) or it can be something
that many of us would agree to be bad (like Martha Stewart’s insider trading). But what makes one preemptive act ostensibly
good and the other ostensibly bad? If
the moral status of preemption does, in fact, hinge upon intentionality, then I submit that the difference between
morally permissible and impermissible instances of preemption lies in what Kant
calls a “good will”—that thing without which “nothing can possibly be conceived
in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without
qualification.”[20]
If this is correct, then we can conduct
a moral evaluation by (1) appealing to the just war tradition to list those
things that can be called proper—or at least justifiable—motivations for
applying the bluntest instrument of national power and then (2) considering
whether the justifications brought to bear in specific instances truly are
motivated by a good will.
A utilitarian—or any
consequentialist—would shrug his or her shoulders and say that as long as
things turn out alright, the question of whether a preemptive action was part
of the process in which a happy end result is achieved is moot. However, it may be that no simple
consequentialist test for moral sufficiency can sufficiently constrain the
moral decision-making process that should govern the decision to act or not act
preemptively. Granted, some are
reluctant to appeal to intentionality as a metric because its empirical
verification often is problematic. Nevertheless,
let us not forget that, every day, courts of law render weighty decisions based
on the inference of intentionality. The
fact that rendering a decision is a hard task does not mean, in and of itself,
that we should shrink from the task.
Conclusion
In sum, we need to be very
clear as to what we mean when we speak of preemption. All too often, semantic carelessness invites
moral equivocation; when one does not say what one means, one may not mean what
one says. As a result, some things
labeled as preemption are not; some of them may be natural consequences,
punitive actions, defensive or retaliatory actions—all of which must be
evaluated on their individual merits or demerits without confusing them with
preemption. On the other hand, some seek
to justify preemptive acts by shrouding them in wrong-headed
justifications. When meanings get
muddled, justifications for action tend to become muddled too. On the level of abstraction, I believe that
we, as students of moral philosophy, should be concerned about the way the word
“preemption” gets tossed around. On the
level of practicalities, I believe we should be concerned about the apparent
willingness some to ignore the weighty moral baggage that accompanies any
political decision to act preemptively. When does preemption become wrong? It becomes wrong in principle when it is wrongly
motivated. It becomes wrong in practice
when it is used to initiate wrongly motivated action. This would suggest that we must reject the
arithmetic formula that identification of a clear and present danger equals
justification to act preemptively. For,
no matter how clear and present some might suppose a danger to be, the only
morally satisfactory justification to “buy beforehand” can be found only in a
good will—and such justifications, though not non-existent, are few.
The suggestion that morally
justifiable preemptive acts are rooted in an intentionality born of a good will
is no trivial point. Especially in the
face of the global war on terrorism, Americans need to be exporters of a good
will. As we undertake in so many places
the task of nation building, the greatest gift this nation can bestow may well
be—not the water tower, or the school room or repairs to the sewage system, as
important as these things are in the workaday world—but rather, a good
will. Why? Because as individuals, our
will is all that we really have that is uniquely and permanently ours. When we speak of the “national will” of a
democratic republic, hopefully we mean collective expression of individual
wills. The desire to be people of good
will and a nation of good will necessarily will lead us, among other things, to
be very deliberate in our use of the word “preemption” and in the way in which
we justify ourselves to invoke the concept.
That is important, because in our present political-military
environment, there may be no concept concerning which it is more important to
avoid self-deception born of equivocation.
NOTES
[1]
See Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 274.
[2]
Oxford English Dictionary 2d ed., s.
v. pre-emptive.
[3]
Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language, s. v. preemption.
[4]
See Random House Webster’s College
Dictionary 1991, s. v. preemption, preemptive.
[5]
Oxford English Dictionary 2d ed., s.
v. pre-emption.
[6]
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary
1991, s. v. preemption, preemptive.
[7]
Oxford English Dictionary 2d ed., s.
v. pre-empt.
[8]
Ibid.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary
1991 s. v. preemption, preemptive.
[12]
Oxford English Dictionary 2d ed., s.
v. pre-emptive.
[13]
Ibid.
[14]
Ibid.
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
See, for example, Oxford English
Dictionary 2d ed., s. v. pre-emptive.
[17]
See Bill Gordon, Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, March, 2000; available
online at http://wgordon.web.wesleyan.edu/papers/coprospr.htm;
Internet; accessed
[18] Donald H. Rumsfeld, “A New Kind of War” (speech as
published by the New York Times,
[19] The National Security Strategy of the
[20] Immanuel Kant, Fundamental
Principles Of The Metaphysic Of Morals (1785), trans. Thomas Kingsmill
Abbott,
Section 1; available online
at http://www.swan.ac.uk/poli/texts/kant/kantd.htm;
Internet; accessed