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“While the
The war on terrorism relies heavily on the doctrine of
preemptive war. Indeed, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United
States (NSS) for the first time explicitly lists preemptive war as a key
element of the
And, as a matter of common
sense and self-defense,
At first glance, the doctrine of preemptive war as
articulated in the 2002 NSS seems to violate the dominant self-understanding of
the
Second, and closely related to the first
problem, many view preventive war as a severe violation of international law,
especially as instantiated in the Charter of the United Nations. Although the
UN Charter Article 51 allows the use of force in self-defense, there is little
guidance as to the legality of first strikes under the article, and certainly
nothing that would initially seem to legitimate a preemptive war doctrine.
Article 51 of the UN Charter reads, “Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.” [Italics
added](Article 51 Charter of the United Nations) The key is the timing of the
self-defensive use of force: one must be bloodied before a response is
legitimate. Further, in
practice the Security Council must sanction such use. Absent that approval, and
without the certainty provided by massive causalities on one’s own side,
preventative war is illegal and the practitioners of preemptive war
lawbreakers.
Both of these objections are made from
within the dominant perspective on self-defense and international relations,
what Graham Allison and Philip Zeikow in their Essence of Decision,
refer to as the “Rational Actor Model (RAM)”. The Rational Actor Model holds
that the actions of states can be understood through analogy with the actions
of rational, utility maximizing individuals and must be judged by similar
criteria. From this perspective, the doctrine of preemptive war in the National
Security Strategy is a major violation of the basic presuppositions of the
international system. [2]
However, the RAM is not the only lens
through which to view conflict. Feminist legal theory has brought the
importance of employing an alternative model of decision-making to self-defense
situations, especially concerning the actions of battered spouses. The legal
categorization of the murder of abusive spouses by battered women as
self-defense provides an analogy to preemptive war.
Although, of course, decision-making is
not gendered, approaching the problem of preemptive war from the perspective of
feminist legal philosophy provides a useful starting point from which to shift
the framework of the debate about preemptive war. This requires a move from
reliance on the traditional rational actor based just war tradition, in which
borders clearly defined the areas of conflict, into a more dynamic framework,
suitable for dealing with the strategic problems presented by modern terrorism.
Like the self-defense of battered women, the
The Recognition-Primed Decision-making
model provides an alternative way to frame the understanding of preemptive war,
not as a transgression of the method of conflict management sanctioned by both
international law and tradition, but as an appropriate response to specific
threat conditions. Preemptive war and the self-defense of battered women are
linked as methods of coping with extreme situations like terrorism, with which
the traditional rational actor model is unable to deal.
Preemptive war is a species of
self-defense based on threat assessments derived from pattern recognition,
using expert knowledge and a decision-making process analogous to that employed
by battered spouses in making their own self-defense decisions. The procedure
relies on expert knowledge concerning the pattern of the threat, not its
temporal imminence. This article will therefore refute the view that the RAM
understanding of self-defense as the use of force against an imminent threat is
the only adequate justification for recourse to war.
In this article I will examine the case
in Canadian jurisprudence of Lavallee v
The Queen and the analogies it presents to the situation of the
In drawing out the analogies between
battered women and preemptive war it is first necessary to describe the
conditions of the case Lavallee v The
Queen. Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows: he appellant had been
living with Kevin Rust for three or four years, during which she had been
repeatedly abused, both mentally and physically, to the point where emergency
room care was required. After another argument following a party, the appellant
shot Kevin Rust in the back of the head as he was leaving the room after
beating and threatening once again to kill her. (Dyzenhaus 218-219)
The case was concerned specifically with
the appellant’s appeal of the lower court ruling that had overturned her
acquittal. The Judge, Madame Justice Wilson, based her decision to uphold the
acquittal based on the legitimacy of the expert testimony on the specific
condition of battered women and the relevance of these psychological dynamics
on the understanding of self-defense. Our discussion of the case will thus have
two parts. First, it will discuss the requirement for expert knowledge of the
situation of battered women. Second, it will show how the understanding of
self-defense must be reconfigured to adequately deal with the specific
circumstances surrounding the case of violent self-defense performed by women
against their batterers.[3]
First, the justice ruled that contrary to
the lower court decision, expert testimony on the psychological dynamics
involved in battered women’s relationships with their abusers was necessary for
jurors to understand the situation. The judge held that in spite of the popular
belief, a basic knowledge of human nature (as most jurors feel they posses) is
insufficient to properly evaluate self-defense claims in situations involving
battered women. (Dyzenhaus 223) The nature of battered women and their
relationship to their abusers is, according to the judge, often misunderstood
and therefore expert testimony is necessary. Battered women are not in a
situation analogous to that of most people (generally men involved in altercations
with strangers) judged within the traditional self-defense category. Therefore
an understanding of the specific situation of the battered woman is required to
make an informed judgment.
The second component concerns the nature
of self-defense. In her decision, the judge initially explained that the
traditional view of self-defense is based on “the case of a one-time bar-room
brawl between two men of equal size and strength”. (Dyzenhaus 225) Accepting
this situation as normative shapes the nature of the criteria employed in
judging the legitimacy of the self-defense. Self-defense can be defined as “The
use of force to protect oneself, one’s family, or one’s property from a real or
threatened attack. Generally, a person is justified in using a reasonable
amount of effort in self-defense if he or she believes that the danger of
bodily harm is imminent and that the force is necessary to avoid this danger.”
(Garner 1390) The judge emphasized three key elements of self-defense in her
opinion: the temporal, (specifically the extent of time between awareness of
the threat and violent action to avoid it), magnitude of force used, and lack
of alternatives to self help (exit options). (Dyzenhaus 224) These are standard
elements of the traditional understanding of self-defense, but have a different
significance in the case of the battered spouse defending him or her self
against an abusive partner.
The temporal dimension of self-defense, the time span
between recognition of the threat of serious bodily harm or death and the
defensive action, is of central importance. It entails the requirement for
“imminence” in legitimate self-defense. The self-defensive action in the
traditional view must take place immediately before the action that will, if
not defended against, result in one’s own severe injury or death. The Judge
explains, “The rationale for the imminence rule seems obvious. The law of
self-defense is deigned to ensure that the use of defensive force is really
necessary. It justified the act because the defendant reasonably believed that
he or she had no alternative but to take the attacker’s life. If there is a
significant time interval between the original unlawful assault and the
accuser’s response, one tends to suspect that the accused was motivated by
revenge rather than self-defense.” (Dyzenhaus 225) In the normative case, one
must wait for the actual attack to occur before taking action in self-defense.
One cannot simply stab a fellow bar patron because one thinks he will later
pose a threat. In addition, one cannot wait until after an altercation and then
attack the other in the parking lot and still claim one’s actions were based on
self-defense. The time elapsed is too great and other options were available.
The second component, concerned with the
magnitude of force, requires that the force used must be commensurate to the
threat. One cannot legitimately respond to a punch with a shotgun blast.
However, this does not mean that an escalation of violence is always impermissible:
it can be legitimate to respond with gunfire to the prospect of being beaten to
death by someone bigger, stronger, and/or simply more skilled in hand-to-hand
combat. There are many, many ways to kill another human being.
In summary, self-defense is legitimate
when no alternatives exist; in other words, when one cannot run away, or call
the police. Even then, the use of force must be reasonable. While these
criteria seem legitimate for most cases of self-defense, they do not adequately
treat the situation of battered women.
Madame Justice Wilson’s critique of this
view of self-defense is based on a broader critique of the model underlying
most, if not all, legal reasoning: the rational actor model or reasonable man
standard. The paradigmatic “reasonable man’s” response to a physical threat is
not necessarily analogous to that as experienced by a battered woman. She says,
“The definition of what is reasonable [for a battered woman] must be adapted to
circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhabited by the
hypothetical ‘reasonable man’.”(Dyzenhaus 225) Although within the case here
the critique was designed to undermine the phallocentric understanding of
self-defense, essentially, this is not so much a critique based on gender but
on the nature of the “reasonable decision-maker” or in other words, the model
of decision-making employed. Here she is in effect critiquing legal reasoning
based on the rational actor model. Thus the initial examination of self-defense
through the gate of battered women has led us into a critique of the model of
decision-making assumed to be normative. It is not that certain types of
decision-maker are gendered, but that the traditional understanding of
rationality is itself flawed.
Yet the expertise in threat assessment
that grounds the modified model of self-defense in the case of battered women
is not the result of gender, just as the rational actor model is not gendered.
It is therefore possible to expand the critique of the rational actor model
found in feminist jurisprudence to provide insight into alternative models of
decision-making whose applicability goes beyond that of battered spouses.
For the rational actor model of
decision-making appears not just in legal reasoning, or decisions involving
self-defense. Indeed, according to Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in Essence of Decision, the rational actor
model is the primary decision-making model used in several academic disciplines
“as well as the less structured notion that underlies our everyday assumption
of human purposiveness both in individual behavior and in national foreign
policy.”(Allison 18) It thus informs the “definition of what is reasonable”
which Madame Justice Wilson questioned above. Therefore the key element of
self-defense, the “reasonable apprehension of death” must, according to the
Justice, be reevaluated in the battered women’s situation. Yet this
reevaluation need not be grounded on the gender of the people involved. Indeed,
the reevaluation is not dependent on the differences in gender, but in the form
of rationality employed by the decision-making. We will discuss this further
below when describing the alternative.
This reevaluation depends upon the threat
assessment expertise of the battered woman, as well as the lack of alternatives
to self-help and the severity of the consequences of inaction. The battered
woman, as a result of the cyclical nature of the violence she experiences,
becomes a threat assessment expert. (Dyzenhaus 226) The judge explains, “…it
may in fact be possible for a battered spouse to accurately predict the onset
of violence before the first blow is struck, even if an outsider to the
relationship cannot. Indeed, it has been suggested that a battered woman’s
knowledge of her partner’s violence is so heightened that she is able to
anticipate the nature and extent (though not the onset) of the violence by his
conduct beforehand.” (Dyzenhaus 227) In other words, the woman can predict when
the violence will be so extreme as to threaten her life. Thus the understanding
of imminence must be transformed. In the case Lavallee v Queen, although the fatal blow itself was not temporally
imminent, because the victim had his back turned, due to her expert knowledge
she evaluated the situation as life threatening and decided that she had to
take immediate action to save her life.
This brings us to the other important
element of the self-defense doctrine, the lack of alternatives to self-help.
(Dyzenhaus 228) The obvious response to the plight of the battered woman is to
leave the situation. She must simply exercise her exit option and leave the
batterer. Yet this exit option, though apparently easily available from the
perspective of the traditional model, may not in fact be actionable. The judge
relied on expert testimony on battered women to demonstrate that it is often
impossible, for psychological as well as financial reasons, for a woman to leave
the situation. Hence it can be reasonable for a battered woman to kill her
batterer in self-defense while a man in a bar in an encounter with a stranger
would not be similarly justified. The man in a bar can leave – he is not tied
down by the presence of children, lack of financial support, or the available
of safe refuges.
Third, waiting for perfect certainty in
the accuracy of her threat assessment, puts the battered women at highest
possible risk, death. The consequences of inaction are not discomfort or
inconvenience, but death. Yet there is a bias against self-defense due to the
lack of certainty; one is always within the law if one suffers oneself to be
murdered. Taking action to prevent that event may or may not be legal and open
oneself up to punishment by the criminal justice system.[4] Madame Justice Wilson addresses this problem
specifically when she says, “…Even accepting that a battered woman may be
uniquely sensitized to danger from her batterer, it may yet be contended that
the law ought to require her to wait until the knife is uplifted, the gun
pointed, or the fist clenched before her apprehension is deemed reasonable.
This would allegedly reduce the risk that the woman is mistaken in her fear,
although the law does not require her fear to be correct, only
reasonable.”(Dyzenhaus 228) The justice concludes that this requirement would
be unreasonable, and in effect, a sentence to murder. The fear of excessive use
of self-defense would thus protect batters while forcing the victims of the battery
to bear the costs of this fear with their pain and death: an undesirable
conclusion.
If the cues indicate that this abuse will
in this instance be so extreme as to result in her death, her scope for
entertaining and evaluating other options is so limited as to be meaningless.
She can wait, in spite of her best judgment, hoping that she is mistaken and
that the beating will be not as severe as she fears and rely on the restraining
order and general adherence to civilized norms of behavior to prevent him from
killing her in his rage. Yet if mistaken in her hopes she pays with her life:
the scope for error is extremely limited. The onus is on her to take action
commensurate with the actual threat, while the aggressor is free to act with
whatever level of violence he considers appropriate. He can thus bet that he
can kill her before she realizes the beating will be fatal and takes
appropriate self-defense action. If she then works through the various
self-defense options in accordance with the RAM, such as verbal remonstration
on the way the beating hurts her feelings, as well as flesh, or threatening
legal action she well may be dead before the legal threat is articulated, let
alone actually in place.
This has important international
relations implications discussed further below.
If one accepts that the “reasonable man”
standard is inadequate, then it is necessary to pose an alternative
decision-making process to justify self-defense. Gary Klein refers to this
alternative as recognition primed decision-making (RDM) in his Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions.
According to Klein, RDM describes how people actually make decisions, in spite
of the theoretical dominance of variations of the rational actor model. He
explains that in the rational choice strategy,
“The decision-maker:
1. Identifies the set of options.
2. Identifies the ways of evaluating
these options.
3. Weights each evaluation dimension.
4. Does the rating.
5. Picks the option with the highest
score.”(Klein 10)
This rational choice methodology has several advantages. It
provides a way to quantify data, examines all available options, and compares
those options in a process Klein refers to as “comparative evaluation”. (Klein
20) However, people making decisions rarely have the time to work through the
entire process. In addition, there are serious epistemological deficiencies in
the method. People simply lack all the required information to make legitimate
decisions within the rational choice model. As Klein says, “The problem is that
the assumptions of the rational choice strategy are usually too restrictive.
Rarely is there the time or the information needed to make this type of
strategy work.”(Klein 29)
Klein then presents his alternative
Recognitive Decision-making (RDM) model, based on what Herbert Simon in his Reason in Human Affairs referred to as
“satisfying”(Simon 49). When satisfying, the decision-maker does not examine
all possible options but chooses the first option that will provide an adequate
solution. Effective satisfying relies heavily on the expertise of the
individual in the situation. Klein explains the basic RDM strategy, informed by
satisfying, as follows:
[The decision-makers] understand what
types of goals make sense (so the
priorities are set), which cues are
important (so there is not an overload of information), what to expect next (so they can prepare
themselves and notice surprises), and the typical
ways of responding in a given
situation. By recognizing a situation as typical, they also recognize a course of action likely to
succeed.”(Klein 24)
This
has direct applicability to the battered woman situation. The battered woman
uses RDM in making her self-defense decision. Through experience of battery
with the specific batterer she develops expertise in predicting the course of
the ensuing violence. This includes recognition of the cues of impending
violence, the usual course of the conflict, and the typical ways to respond in
the situation. Through familiarity with the pattern she can predict both what
the batterer will do and what she needs to do to preserve her life. She knows
what to expect next, whether this is affectionate contrition after the beating
stops or that the blows to come after the batterer, for example, stops yelling
and becomes very quiet will be extremely destructive. Therefore, in the case of Lavallee v The Queen, the appellants’
action, shooting the batterer in the back as he leaves the room could have been
a reasonable response to the situation: experience in recognizing the pattern
of the activity has enabled her to make the appropriate decision. Although her
life was not in imminent danger at that particular moment, she knew with a
sufficient degree of certainly that he was going to kill her.[5]
Of course, shooting in the back is not a
reasonable response for the proverbial man in a bar, especially if making
decisions based on the rational actor model. The man in the bar has the luxury
of identifying options, such as leaving, calling the police, waiting for his
friends to back him up or delivering a sucker punch to tilt the fight balance
in his favor. He can weigh each option, compare the expected payoffs, (status
losses from leaving, status gains from continued taunting once his friends are
there to provide backup) and pick the option that maximizes his utility. The
consequences of misjudging the situation are unlikely to be fatal, and there is
a good chance others will step in to stop the fight once honor has been served
with a few punches.
This situation is very different from
that of the battered woman’s in three key ways. Unlike the reasonable man in a
bar with several options, she has expert knowledge of the batterer, very
limited exit options, and is playing for extremely high stakes. First, she has
expert knowledge of the situation. In other words, her situational awareness is
far superior to that of the man in the bar or the man on the street accosted by
a stranger. Her violent self-defensive action is not taking place in a vacuum,
but is embedded in a historical narrative of personal experience. She knows the
pattern of violence and therefore can predict its nature with a high degree of
accuracy through the use of intuition.[6]
The man in the bar or on the street lacks the same in-depth understanding of
the adversary. Second, she lacks exit options, both because of the specific
pathologies of her situation and because her escape is blocked by the batterer.
The exit option provided by legal methods is also unavailable. A restraining
order, though more effective than the media would lead one to believe, is of no
help when the batterer violates that order and is in the room. The battered
woman is then beyond the aid of the legal system, and must rely on herself for
help. Third, the consequences of failing
to take self-defensive action, including killing the batterer, are the highest
imaginable: death. The batterer has already demonstrated both his will and
capability to violently assault her, and hence her intuition can serve as a valid
guide to future action. Failing to act before exploring yet some new
appeasement option or hoping for help from the police responding to the
violation of the restraining order is unlikely to prove effective an effective
life preservation methodology. Thus the self-defensive action can be justified
in terms of RDM even though it appears illegitimate in light of the rational
actor model.
An
obvious objection immediately arises: it seems that allowing pattern
recognition, and particular situational awareness to determine the legitimacy
of self-defensive action could lead down a slippery slope of indiscriminate
violence. It is only, one might claim, adherence to the rational actor model
that prevents everyone appointing him or herself an expert vigilante. However,
simply because the decision is made based on recognition of a pattern, instead
of certain diagnosis of the opponent’s action as posing a threat and responding
violently to that threat after all other options have proven inadequate, does
not mean that the self-defense is unjustified. The pattern must exist.[7]
This objection is rooted in a refusal to
accept that there are situations that depart from the normal conflict
management procedures that are both used most of the time, and that we would
like to see employed all of the time. In the case of battered women, it is the
idea that she should rely on rational persuasion, the legal recourse provided
by a restraining order, or flight from the batterer. The idea that women to
save their lives must, in the midst of peaceful developed countries, turn to
violence is unpleasant. We must be more civilized than that. We must act in
accordance with the highest standards of behavior. Of course, this demand
applies to the victim, not the aggressor. The aggressor, in both the domestic
violence and state based violence cases, is somehow exempt from having to act
in accordance with basic international human rights norms. A bizarre calculus
is at play in which those already killed by the regime are considered sunk
costs, while those potentially killed or injured by the intervening forces are
valued more highly than all past and future victims of the regime. The extreme
response to violence must be “civilized” while the perpetuation of atrocities
by state forces is tacitly condoned.[8]
We will now look at the implications of
this view for the US National Security Strategy. On the level of state action,
the justification of the use of force based on pattern recognition is clearer,
and less susceptible to application, than the doctrine is on that of the
individual because the judgment is not that of the individual directly wronged.
Several observation and evaluation systems must concur that a pattern
justifying intervention exists.
How does this relate to the
First, there is currently only limited legal recourse for
responding to extreme situations like terrorism. The battered woman is faced
with a threat of violence in spite of the well-established law enforcement
institutions with clear jurisdictional authority and responsibility for
ensuring that the restraining orders, for example, fulfill their protective
function. The
It is possible that development of the
international criminal court could create appropriate forms for dealing with
terrorist threat providing, for example, special legal authority for preemptive
strikes. However, that has not yet occurred and so terrorism is dealt with in
the same categories as other criminal activity, giving rise to the problem
discussed in this paper.[9]
The lack of exit options provides the
second of the three areas of similarity. Just as the battered woman cannot
escape the situation, so the
This is not to say that the
This brings us to the second point of
similarity, the high costs of inaction for both the
The strategy of preventive
war informed by the RDM model offers a better method for justifying
self-defensive actions than reliance on the RAM international relations models
of clear and present danger posed by nation states.[12]
In other words, the actionablity of a threat should not be based on its
temporal imminence as in the traditional RAM view of international relations.
Thus the lens provided by
the battered spouse situation generates two related perspectives, the first
specific to
Implications for
For the
The United Nations
If the UN utilized RDM and
privileged human rights over the principles of sovereignty and
non-interference, a pattern of threatening behavior by a state, including
massive human rights violations, motivate preemptive war to protect those
rights.[13]
Here the overlap between preemptive war and humanitarian intervention becomes
explicit. The pattern recognition required for decision-making based on RDM to
justify intervention is easier to discern and less prone to mistakes than that
of the individual battered woman. The extra-judicial massacre of citizens,
especially through murder/rape squads roaming the countryside or shooting
people so that they fall into mass graves, the use of chemical weapons, or
harboring terrorists and terrorist training facilities can be considered
components of a threat-presenting pattern. Indeed, the application of a consideration
for basic human rights, such as that found in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, could provide the foundation for recognition of threatening
patterns. Widespread violation of those rights could serve as a tripwire for
designation as a threat, alerting the international community that a threat
pattern is emerging and initiating a military response.[14]
Currently the concern for the principles of soveregnity and non-interference
prevent the United Nations from acting, in most cases, to protect these rights.
Thus the international collective security apparatus of the UN serves not to
protect the lives of vulnerable populations but provides a shield behind which
they can be butchered. A shift in the understanding of preemptive war could
reduce the perverse incentives to violence provided by the current system.
How would a world that relied on RDM to
justify preemptive war appear? A return to the situation of battered women can
provide the initial outlines.
If a pattern of abuse of a spouse served
to ground self-defensive use of force on the part of the victim, it could
create incentives to avoid violence in dispute settlement procedures within
intimate relationships. Currently, the legal bias requires the suffering of
violence if one cannot persuade the other to stop the abuse or leave the
situation.
Similarly, if a pattern of abuse of human rights of one’s
own citizens and threats by state or non-state actors toward other countries
could justify preemptive war, a global order could come to take shape in which
massive violations of human rights would not be permitted by the collective
security apparatus of the United Nations and terrorists would have to translate
their goals and procedures for meeting those goal into democratic political
forms. Countries that acted unilaterally to stop such abuses would be hailed as
heroes for bearing the protection costs, not attacked as lawbreakers.
Preemptive war would also create incentives for potential genocidal regimes to
find other means of accomplishing their goals, as foreign armed forces would
employ against them the same level of violence they were using against their
own less well-armed citizens.
The end of the rationalistic,
Enlightenment vision of international harmony, non-violent conflict management,
is parasitical upon a rigorous and consistent use of violence. Under the
current system, as long as one’s abuse of human rights, and indeed genocide,
does not spill over international borders, any action from the international
community will be minimal and take place only after much of the goals of the
ethnic cleansing are accomplished.
Preemptive war should be seen as a species of self-defense
based on threat assessments derived from pattern recognition, not the temporal
imminence of the threat. From the RDM perspective, the burden is no longer
borne exclusively by the potential victim to wait until all uncertainty about
the intentions of the other is removed by the death of one’s own citizens, just
as a battered woman need not wait for the final knife blow to take her life,
but can act to defend herself when the pattern indicates that the next
encounter will be fatal.
Of course, difficult, subtle cases will continue to emerge,
and each case will have to be evaluated on its own merits. However,
understanding preemptive war as a type of self-defense in which one’s own
security is increased as a positive externality of defending others, would
facilitate action in many cases, thus reducing both the threat to the
NOTES
[1] As
we will see below, in accordance with the Rational Actor Model, all other
options must be conclusively eliminated prior to the employment of military
force as a last resort.
[2]
See Allison and Zelikow’s discussion of the pervasiveness of the RAM in
decision-making. (Allison 18)
[3]
Importantly, though since the case here discusses specifically battered women,
the problem of domestic violence is not gender specific. Men are battered as
well as women. Nor is violence restricted to heterosexual couples. Gay and
lesbian couples are also subject to domestic violence. See for example No
More Secrets, Violence in Lesbian Relationships, Janice Ristock, Routledge,
2002 and Violence in Gay and Lesbian Domestic Partnerships, Claire
Renzetti, Harrington Park Press, 1996.
[4]
In legal scholarship a distinction is made between “perfect” and “imperfect”
self-defense. “Imperfect self-defense. The use of force by one who makes and
honest but unreasonable mistake that force is necessary to repel an attack.”
“Perfect self-defense. The use of force by one who accurately appraises the
necessity and the amount of force to repel an attack.” (Garner 1390).
[5]
Of course, she was not perfectly sure. However, requiring absolute certainly in
self-defensive action is too much to ask. The burden should not be on the
victim to hope the ensuing violence is not fatal- when she is certain it is too
late. The Golden Palominos, album Dead Inside contains a song entitled
“Victim” which although not about a battered spouse, illustrates this point.
The lyrics, by the poet Nicole Blackman, consist of a first person narrative a
woman who has been kidnapped and held captive. The last line describes the
woman hearing the click of the shotgun pressed against her head: that click is
unassailable certainty.
[6]
Klein explains, “Intuition depends on the use of experience to recognize key
patterns that indicate the dynamics of the situation. Because patters can be
subtle, people often cannot describe what they noticed, or how they judged a
situation as typical or atypical. Therefore, intuition has a strange
reputation. Skilled decision-makers know that they can depend on their
intuition, but at the same time they may feel uncomfortable trusting a source
of power that seems so accidental.”(Klein 31) Intuition does not generate
insights that can be articulated in terms of the rational actor model, and is
thus deemed illegitimate. (See Klein 34)
[7]
As Madame Justice Wilson pointed out, “Obviously the fact that he appellant was
a battered woman does not entitle her to an acquittal. Battered women may well
kill their partners other than in self-defense.”(Dyzenhaus 231)
[8] Leo Strauss, in his Natural Right and History, speaks to
this bias against violence and in favor of adherence to the highest possible
standards of behavior when he makes a distinction between two types of justice.
He says, “Justice has two different principles or sets of principles: the
requirements of public safety, or what is necessary in extreme situations to
preserve the mere existence or independence of society, on the one hand, and
the rules of justice in the more precise sense, on the other. And there is no
principle that defines clearly in what type of cases the public safety, and in
what type of cases the precise rules of justice, have priority. For it is not
possible to define precisely what constitutes an extreme situation in
contradistinction to a normal situation.” (Strauss 35)
[9]
The lack of appropriate forms has resulted in the controversy surrounding the
[10]
The free states in antebellum US provide an example of free erosion in regard
to slavery. Even without actively promoting the abolitionist cause, the mere
presence of an alternative to continued slavery eroded the institution.
[11]
Yet even when the fuel is present there is no ready vehicle to provide succor.
[12]
Indeed, in light of our discussion above it could be considered the first
explicitly feminist national security strategy.
[13]
There is some overlap between preventative war and humanitarian intervention.
Most preemptive wars will be humanitarian interventions, though their primary
motivation will be protection of the
[14]
Single, isolated violations, required by an emergency, would not necessarily
justify intervention: extreme measures are sometimes necessary. It is only the
pattern of violation that would justify intervention. Why? Because states
violating the rights of their own citizens provide fertile ground for the
export of that violation. The burden should be on the regimes violating their
own citizen’s rights to prove that they do not pose a threat to others, either
actively or by harboring those who would, not on the countries attempting to
stop the violations. Now the burden is reversed. A country can do whatever it
likes to its own citizens, behind the shield of national sovereignty, and the
UN will do nothing to hinder it. The former