Targeting the Sleeping Soldier
Whitley Kaufman
Why
is it morally permissible to harm or kill soldiers in wartime? There could hardly be a more fundamental
question for Just War Doctrine, yet strangely we lack a satisfactory answer to
this question. Notice that this issue is
prior even to the much-discussed question of the justification for the
inevitable harm to “innocent civilians.”
Indeed, the usual approach is to assume that it is permissible to kill
soldiers, and then to focus on the derivative question of why and when it is
permissible to cause collateral harm those not actively engaged in the
conflict. Yet it is far from obvious why
it should be morally unproblematic to attack even armed soldiers, given the
overwhelming moral presumption that harming or killing others is
forbidden. And we cannot hope to address
the question of harm to civilians until we have a firm idea of why it is
permissible to harm soldiers.
One answer to this question, from
the doctrine known as Realism, holds that war is intrinsically extra-moral,
beyond the constraints of law and morality.
War is a return to the state of nature, and so anything goes in the name
of victory. Practices that would not be
tolerated in peacetime society (blowing up buildings, killing people, mining
harbors) are morally wrong but necessary under the extreme circumstances of
warfare. In fact Realism has never been
very realistic, for it ignores the fact that soldiers have always recognized
(if not always obeyed) moral constraints in war, the most important of which is
the Discrimination principle requiring that one target only soldiers and not
civilians. Indeed, some realists have
argued that, since all acts of violence in war are immoral, then there
is nothing especially wrong with deliberately targeting civilians. Thus Sir Arthur Harris, head of the RAF
bomber command, defending the bombing of cities in World War II:
Tell me one operation of war which is moral...Sticking
a bayonet into a man’s belly, is that moral?
Then they say, well of course strategic bombing involved civilians. Civilians are always involved in major
wars. After all, previous wars ended up
in the besieging of major cities, and in besieging a city what was the
idea? To cut off all supplies...and
meanwhile the besieging forces lobbed every missile they could lay their hands
on into the city, more or less regardless of where those missiles landed, as an
added incentive to surrender.[1]
Of course, Realism is antithetical
to the Just War Tradition, under which wars are permissible only when they are
justified, both legally and morally. We
thus need an account of killing in war that is consistent with moral
theory. In this tradition, there are essentially
two competing attempted justifications.
First is what I will call the Punishment Account: in this theory, one
may not harm or kill the innocent; only the guilty may be deliberately harmed
(as as the case in punishment). On this
view, one may kill enemy soldiers because they are wrongdoers, and as a
corollary, one may not harm civilians because they are innocent. The Punishment Account has a long and
venerable ancestry in the Just War tradition, and is still influential even
today. However, it suffers from serious
problems. For one thing, it appears to
be blatantly inconsistent with the principle of the moral equality of soldiers,
according to which soldiers are taken to be justified on both sides of a
war. Further, the assertion that
soldiers as a class are guilty while civilians as a class are innocent is
obviously problematic. An unwilling
conscript is hardly more guilty than an enthusiastic civilian supporter of the
war who exhort him to fight. Moreover,
if it is justified to kill an enemy soldier because he deserves it on account
of his guilt, this rationale would seem to permit, indeed require, that
prisoners of war be executed, and that all enemy soldiers after the war is won
also be executed. If they are guilty
while they are fighting, they are no less guilty for having been captured or
defeated – indeed, punishment typically takes place after the offense,
not during it. Obviously, the Punishment
account does not jibe with our practices.
As an alternative, modern Just War
doctrine has largely settled on what I will call the Self-Defense Account: that
all use of violence in war is justified by the principle of self-defense. This version has become so widely accepted
that it could also be called the Standard Account. It begins with the notion that the principle
of self-defense gives us an uncontroversial and morally legitimate grounds for
the use of force. On this view, violence
in war is consistent with principles of peacetime: one may use violence to
protect oneself against an attack.
Moreover, this account appears to give us as well a rationale for the
Discrimination principle: that armed soldiers are legitimate targets because
they are attackers, whereas unarmed civilians may not be targeted because they
are not themselves posing a threat of harm.
Further, once an enemy soldier is captured, or the war is over, then the
soldier no longer pose a threat, and so may not be harmed in self-defense. The Self-Defense Account appears to solve the
moral problem and avoid recourse to Realism, and for this reason has become
almost universally accepted today.
Note that in our tradition the term
“self-defense” has come to be a generic term covering all possible uses of
defensive force, whether in defense of self, other, or property. Thus we can immediately fend off one possible
objection to the Standard Account, that much or even most of the violence in
war is not done in personal self-defense.
For self-defense covers both personal self-defense (the soldier
defending himself), unit defense (the soldier defending his fellow soldiers),
and most important of all, the overarching defensive justification for the war
itself: defense of whatever values the war is being fought for. That is, the resort to any violence at all
must be justified in that the war itself is justified as a defense of some
legitimate value. These values might
include defense of one’s country against aggression, or defense of a people
against genocide or tyranny. Thus we can
reject the criticism of the Standard Account that self-defense is too narrow a
ground to justify most violence in war.[2] Even if the
soldier using force is not himself under a threat of attack, his use of force
may be justified on grounds that he is defending others from a threat, or more
generally attempting to right a prior wrong.
Another great attraction of the
Standard Account is that it allows us to sidestep the controversial question of
guilt versus innocence in wartime, the problem on which the Punishment Account
founders. The Standard Account can avoid
this problem, because guilt or innocence has never been part of the self-defense
justification for killing. In standard
self-defense doctrine, one may use force against an unjustified attacker,
whether he is legally or morally guilty or innocent. For example, consider the mistaken aggressor
who thinks you are a robber and fires a weapon at you: you are permitted to use
defensive force against him despite his being innocent of any wrongdoing, legal
or moral. Thus in wartime, what matters
morally is merely the fact of an attack, not the guilt or innocence of the
soldier. The soldier is an attacker and
hence may be targeted; the civilian, whatever his mental state, is not an
attacker and hence has immunity in war.
Thus we need not even address the question of who is guilty or innocent
in wartime (though that is a relevant matter post bellum).
Despite all the apparent advantages
of the Standard Account, it has indeed been subject to powerful
criticisms. The standard principles
governing self-defense require that four conditions be fulfilled before force is
justified. First, force may only be used
against an Unjustified Aggressor.
Second, the force used must be necessary. Third, the force used must be proportionate
to the harm being avoided. And fourth,
the threat must be imminent. Every one
of these rules has been used to criticize the Standard Account. Given the doctrine of the “Moral Equality of
Soldiers”, for example, can we consider enemy soldiers to be unjust
aggressors? And is all force used in war
genuinely necessary and proportionate?
All of these criticisms can be answered, I believe, but my focus will be
on the criticism that is most compelling: can the use of force in war be
justified as a response to an imminent threat?
The imminence restriction in
domestic criminal law requires that the harm be immediate, about to
happen. A threat of possible harm
tomorrow or next week or next month does not qualify as imminent. The idea of self-defense law is that one may
not resort to force until the very last possible moment; preemptive or
anticipatory use of force is ruled out.
Notoriously, in recent years this rule has been used against women who
kill their husbands, claiming it is a preventive measure because of a history
of repeated beatings they have suffered in the past. In the most extreme cases, some women have killed
their husbands while they slept or were unconscious. The issue is extremely controversial, but the
general tendency has been to hold that such use of force is illegal, since an
unconscious person cannot as a matter of definition pose an imminent threat. But even in cases where the husband was fully
conscious, the imminence rule has been used against women who kill while the
husband was unarmed or not presently engaged in an attack or even a threatened
attack. The expectation of an attack
later does not justify the use of force now; one must wait until one has no
choice but to resort to force.
But suppose we apply this
interpretation of the imminence rule to killing in wartime. The problem is quickly apparent: only a small
portion of the use of force in war would qualify under such a strict
restriction. A direct confrontation with
the enemy: a firefight, an ambush, a pitched battle would satisfy the imminence
rule. But as David Rodin points out in
his critique of the Self-Defense Account, soldiers “are permitted to use
violence against persons who pose no imminent threat to anyone. For instance, they may kill enemy soldiers
who are marching, eating, sleeping, and so on, as well as uniformed support
staff such as lorry drivers, cooks, and administrators.”[3] Perhaps the
clearest example of the problem, and the one on which we will focus here, is
the sleeping soldier. Few would consider
it illegitimate to target soldiers when they are in their camp or barracks and
not presently attacking, and even when most of them are sleeping. Yet we have already said that the sleeping
husband may not legitimately be attacked.
But there are numerous other equally clear examples of non-imminent
threats. Larry May for example uses the
example of the naked soldier taking a bath, as told in Robert Graves’ memoir Goodbye
to All That.[4]
This appears to leave us with a
dilemma: either one cannot target enemy soldiers except when they are actually
brandishing weapons and advancing, or else the Standard Account is wrong. We certainly do want to say that once an
enemy soldier surrenders and lays down his weapon, or is otherwise rendered
hors de combat, he no longer poses a threat and hence may not be targeted. However, most killing in war would not seem
to satisfy the strict imminence standard: shelling soldiers in their camp,
shooting at fleeing soldiers; and this is not even to mention the use of
strategic bombing against munitions factories and other such targets. Are we forced then back into the Realist
position? Is killing in war not morally
justified after all?
One strategy is to insist, as does
Major Peter Kilner, that “soldiers do face an imminent threat from the enemy.”[5] But this
assertion simply obfuscates the question rather than clarifies it. Clearly, soldiers do face imminent threats in
war. But if it is meant to imply that all
threats in war are imminent, or that all use of force in war is against an
imminent threat, it is obviously false.
A second possibility is to “redefine” or reinterpret the imminence rule
so as to make it more flexible (this approach is seen mostly in the debate over
jus ad bellum, where the imminence issue also arises; both John Yoo and Michael
Walzer have suggested such a strategy).
But this seems to be a transparent attempt to evade the imminence rule
while pretending to comply with it.
A third possibility is to loosen the
imminence standard, on the grounds that the “conditions of war are different”
from those of civil society, as Jeff McMahan suggests.[6] McMahan argues
that war “involves threats that consist of activities organized in phases over
extended periods of time,” and that thus preventive defense would be
justified. Thus the sleeping soldier is
a legitimate target: “a soldier sleeping in invaded territory has already
attacked and is engaged in attacking in the same way that I am engaged in
writing this essay even while I pause to make a cup of tea” (id.). The problem with this explanation is that it
misleadingly treats the imminence rule as if it were a sliding standard, to be
flexibly applied depending on the nature of the attack. But this is simply not true as regards civil
society, as is most obviously demonstrated in the battered women cases. Even if the woman is subject to repeated
attacks over extended periods, that does not permit her to evade the imminence
rule. If her husband is asleep, he
cannot pose an imminent threat as a matter of law.
We appear to be left in a dilemma
then: the Self-Defense account is the only plausible justification for killing
in war, and yet it would prove overly restrictive when applied to warfare. I would like to suggest that there is a way
out of this dilemma: we can hold onto the Self-Defense justification, but
without having to twist the imminence rule beyond recognition. My suggestion is that the imminence rule
simply does not apply to wartime in the first place: it is a restriction that
is specific to the domestic context.
That is, we must distinguish the universal rules of self-defense: unjust
attacker, proportionality, and necessity, all of which apply to any use of
defensive force, domestic or international, from the imminence rule, which applies
solely to the domestic context.
The argument for this claim is based
on both moral philosophy and history; I develop it in detail in an article
forthcoming in New Criminal Law Review (Summer 2007), but will present the gist
of it here. The imminence rule, I claim,
is not a general moral restriction on the use of force. There is no moral principle that requires
that one wait until the moment of imminence to defend oneself from an attack. If someone is wrongly planning to kill me, I
am entitled to defend myself as necessary, even if it means acting
preventively. To be sure, the longer I
wait, the more I can be certain that defensive force is truly necessary. But morality does not in general require us
to exercise saintly forbearance. The
longer I wait, after all, the more I put myself in jeopardy, for it may quickly
become too late to act to protect myself.
But why then does self-defense
require that the threat be imminent, at least in the domestic context? The answer, I claim, is that this reflects a
political rather than a moral restriction; it reflects a particular allocation
of the authority to use force as between the state and the individual. Essential to the state is its monopoly on the
use of force; it alone is authorized to inflict violence (through the power of
arrest and punishment). When an
individual feels threatened, he may not resort to violent self-help but must
call on the state to protect him. But
the one significant exception to this monopoly is the individual right of
self-defense where there is an imminent threat.
The reason for this exception is obvious: when the threat is imminent,
there is no time or opportunity for the individual to call on the state to
protect himself; it is either resort to self-help, or submit to the violent
assault. As the state cannot reasonably
require individuals to submit to being killed, it grants an exception allowing
the use of deadly force, but only when the state is unable to protect the
individual in time.
The situation in war is patently
different from the domestic one, however.
As Kilner recognizes, “soldiers have no recourse to a higher authority
to defend them” (id. p. 31). More
precisely, what Kilner should have said is that soldiers are the higher
authority, the representatives of the state, on the battlefield. As such, they are not governed by the
imminence restriction, which applies only to private violence not state
violence. Indeed, on the battlefield it
is arguable that the imminence rule does not even apply to private violence, as
there is no effective monopoly of force in war.
Thus a soldier or a unit can perhaps in some cases act in private
self-defense free of the imminence rule.
But in any case, acting in his capacity as a soldier he is clearly not
bound by the restriction that the threat be imminent. It is thus morally and legally permissible to
target even a sleeping soldier, for while that soldier does not constitute an
imminent threat, he will likely be a threat tomorrow or the next day.
This argument should not be taken as
suggesting that violence in war is essentially unlimited. The unjust attacker, proportionality, and
necessity rules apply every bit as strictly in wartime as in peace. Necessity in particular is a crucial
restriction on the resort to violence: if one can capture the sleeping soldier
rather than kill him, one is morally obligated to do so (assuming it does not
result in undue risk to the soldiers trying to capture him). One is of course morally obligated to disarm
or disable rather than kill where reasonably possible as well. Indeed, the further a threat is from being
imminent, the less likely it will be necessary to use force now, for there may
well be alternative means of preventing the threat. Nonetheless, in some cases it will be
necessary to use force even against sleeping soldiers. Neither law nor morality require that force
be limited to imminent threats in wartime.
This account of the imminence rule
that I am defending is nonstandard and controversial; most commentators
interpret imminence as an intrinsic element of self-defense rather than as a
particular restriction on domestic self-defense law. However, if I am correct, it offers a way of
preserving the Self-Defense Account of killing in war, consistent with basic
principles of self-defense. We can then
avoid the problematic task of defending wartime force on the grounds of guilt
or innocence, and also fend off the Realists who claim that military force is
simply beyond moral or legal justification.
There is no more fundamental moral issue in Just War doctrine than this
one: on what grounds may a soldier use force against enemy soldiers. It is, I claim, the principle of self-defense
that licenses such a use of force.
NOTES:
[1]Quoted in Gwynne Dyer, War (2nd Edition 2004).
[2]E.g. Douglas Lackey, The Ethics of War and Peace.
[3]War and Self-Defense (Oxford 2002), p. 127-28.
[4]Killing Naked Soldiers, Ethics & International
Affairs, 2005.
[5]“Military Leaders’ Obligation to Justify Killing in
War,” Military Review (March/April 2002), p. 31.
[6]“War As Self-Defense,” Ethics & International
Affairs 18:1 (2004), p. 76.