Remarks made by LTG Richard Chilcoat
President, National Defense University
JSCOPE Dinner Speaker
28 Jan 99

 

GOOD EVENING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN… IT’S GREAT TO BE HERE…IT’S A PRIVILEGE TO PARTICIPATE IN JSCOPE…SO I OFFER A SPECIAL THANKS TO MY WEST POINT CLASSMATE--TONY HARTLE--FOR AFFORDING ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE WITH YOU THIS EVENING. THE CONFERENCE GIVES ALL OF US A CHANCE TO STEP BACK AND REFLECT ON THE KEY ETHICAL ISSUES THAT IMPACT THE ESSENCE OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION. YOU, THE JSCOPE ORGANIZERS AND CONFEREES "KEEP THE FLAME ALIVE"…THANKS FOR YOUR GOOD WORKS.

I THINK I SERVE YOU BEST THIS EVENING BY OFFERING A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE…WHICH IS THE BUSINESS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY… ON A MATTER I CONSIDER TO BE ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ISSUES—IN ETHICAL, SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND STRATEGIC TERMS—FACING THE UNITED STATES TODAY: (AND THAT IS) THE CURRENT STATE OF AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. THIS IS THE "HOT BUTTON" TOPIC OF TODAY’S WAR COLLEGE STUDENTS…AND IT’S RARE…THAT A DAY PASSES…WITHOUT REFERENCE TO IT IN THE NATIONAL PRESS AND THE "EARLY BIRD."

FOR STARTERS, LET’S ASK OURSELVES: WHY SHOULD WE VIEW THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP AS A MATTER OF FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL CONCERN? THERE ARE TWO REASONS:

FIRST, THIS RELATIONSHIP LIES AT THE VERY HEART OF WHAT DEMOCRACY IS ALL ABOUT. WHAT DEFINES THE STATE, AS THE EMINENT GERMAN SOCIOLOGIST MAX WEBER INFORMED US, IS GOVERNMENT’S MONOPOLY OF THE LEGITIMATE POSSESSION AND USE OF FORCE. THE MILITARY IS THE PRINCIPAL EMBODIMENT OF STATE-CENTERED AND STATE-CONTROLLED VIOLENCE. THUS, IN A FORM OF GOVERNMENT WHERE THE PEOPLE ARE SUPPOSED TO RULE, CIVILIAN SUPREMACY OVER THE MILITARY IS ESSENTIAL. INDEED, IT IS AN ETHICAL IMPERATIVE. WHERE THIS RELATIONSHIP FAILS OR FALTERS, THE VERY END OF GOVERNMENT—"THE COMMON BENEFIT, PROTECTION, AND SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE," AS THE VIRGINIA BILL OF RIGHTS FIRST ENJOINED—STANDS IN JEOPARDY.

SECOND, THE THREE PARTIES TO THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP—THE MILITARY, ITS CIVILIAN POLITICAL MASTERS, AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES—ARE LINKED TO ONE ANOTHER BY A SOCIAL CONTRACT. "THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF A CIVILIZED STATE," WALTER LIPPMANN OBSERVED, "IS THAT POWER IS LEGITIMATE ONLY WHEN IT IS UNDER CONTRACT." A SOCIAL CONTRACT IS A MUTUALLY BINDING…THOUGH TACIT…SET OF EXPECTATIONS AND OBLIGATIONS…BECAUSE IT DEPENDS ON THE ABILITY—AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE WILLINGNESS—OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED TO LIVE UP TO THEIR END OF THE UNWRITTEN BARGAIN. HENCE, IT IS, IN EVERY SENSE, AN ETHICAL COMPACT.

WHAT, THEN, DO CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES AND THE PEOPLE EXPECT OF THE MILITARY AS AN INSTITUTION? I THINK THEY EXPECT, AT LEAST, FOUR THINGS:

THE FIRST IS OPERATIONAL COMPETENCE—THE ABILITY TO FULFILL THE MISSION, TO GET THE JOB DONE, TO ACCOMPLISH ALL TASKS ASSIGNED (EVEN MANY THAT ARE ONLY IMPLIED). I WOULD INCLUDE, HERE TOO, THE RESPONSIBLE USE OF FORCE. MILITARY LEADERS ARE ENTRUSTED WITH THE NATION’S YOUTH…THEY MANAGE VIOLENCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD…THEY MUST BE ETHICAL… THAT’S WHY THE MILITARY SERVICES STRIVE TO BE VALUES-BASED INSTITUTIONS…AND THAT’S WHY THEY WORK TO DEVELOP LEADERS OF CHARACTER. WITHOUT SUCH LEADERS, YOU WOULD HAVE UNNECESSARY LOSS OF LIFE, INDISCRIMINATE USE OF FORCE, AND WORSE.

MOREOVER, WE HAVE TO MEASURE OPERATIONAL COMPETENCE BOTH IN TERMS OF STRATEGIC EFFECTIVENESS AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS POINT LIES IN THE REALIZATION THAT IT’S POSSIBLE TO BE MILITARILY EFFECTIVE… WITHOUT BEING STRATEGICALLY EFFECTIVE. IN VIETNAM, IT HAS BEEN OFTEN SAID THAT WE WON THE BATTLES…AND LOST THE WAR. IN TODAY’S WORLD, AND IN TOMORROW’S, WE WILL HAVE TO BE COMPETENT ACROSS A BROAD SPECTRUM OF ACTIVITIES THAT INCLUDE THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, TO INCLUDE NICHES AND ASYMMETRIES…AND, THUS, STRATEGIC AGILITY, FLEXIBILITY, AND VERSATILITY WILL BE IN DEMAND MORE THAN EVER BEFORE.

THE SECOND THING CIVILIANS EXPECT OF THE MILITARY IS SOUND ADVICE—RENDERING THE BEST PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT TO THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES WHO ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOR ENSURING THE COUNTRY’S SECURITY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT GIVEN THE FACT THAT MANY POLITICIANS ENTER OFFICE TODAY INCREASINGLY DEVOID NOT ONLY OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING BUT OF STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING AS WELL. WHO MIGHT FILL THIS VOID: THE MILITARY? I THINK SO—PROVIDED, THAT IS, THAT THE MILITARY IS UP TO THE TASK. THERE ARE THOSE WHO WOULD ARGUE THAT THERE IS SOME INTELLECTUAL THRESHOLD BEYOND WHICH THOSE WHO HAVE GROWN UP PROFESSIONALLY…IN A HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTION…GOVERNED BY AN ETHOS OF OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY…WHO HAVE BEEN FORCED TO THINK TECHNICALLY AND TACTICALLY…AND, NO MATTER WHAT, THEY SIMPLY CAN’T TRANSFORM THEMSELVES INTO STRATEGIC THINKERS. WE IN UNIFORM HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT’S NOT THE CASE…AND, OF COURSE, IT’S OUR JOB AT THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (AND PME INSTITUTIONS IN GENERAL) TO DEVELOP AND GRADUATE STRATEGIC THINKERS.

THIRD, CIVILIANS EXPECT THE MILITARY TO BE POLITICALLY NEUTRAL—TO REFRAIN FROM INVOLVEMENT IN THE EXPEDIENCY, FAVORITISM, SPECIAL INTEREST, AND SELF-INTERESTED MOTIVES OF LOW, PARTISAN POLITICS. BUT DOES THAT MEAN STAYING OUT OF THE HIGH POLITICS OF STATECRAFT? I THINK NOT. LET US FIRST RECOGNIZE THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF STAYING OUT OF POLITICS ALTOGETHER. AFTER ALL, "POLITICS IN AMERICA," NOTED THEODORE WHITE, "IS THE BINDING SECULAR RELIGION." MORE IMPORTANTLY, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LOW AND HIGH POLITICS, PROBABLY BEST PUT BY A WELL-KNOWN CAREER STATESMAN AND BUREAUCRAT, WHO SAID, "DIPLOMACY IS ABOUT SURVIVING UNTIL THE NEXT CENTURY; POLITICS IS ABOUT SURVIVING UNTIL NEXT FRIDAY."

 

FROM WASHINGTON THROUGH EISENHOWER AND MARSHALL, WE HAVE PRIDED OURSELVES ON THE PRESENCE OF THE SOLDIER-STATESMAN. TODAY, GIVEN THE CONVERGENCE THAT HAS OCCURRED BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL DOMAINS FOR BOTH MILITARY OPERATIONS AND STATECRAFT, THE NEED FOR DIPLOMATS IN KHAKI SEEMS EVERY BIT AS GREAT AS THAT FOR DIPLOMATS IN PINSTRIPES. SOLDIERS, TO AND TOMORROW, ARE REQUIRED TO BE MORE MULTIDIMENSIONAL THAN EVER.

 

FINALLY, I THINK CIVILIANS EXPECT THE MILITARY TO BE CIVICALLY RESPONSIBLE—TO BE AN INSTITUTION THAT NOT ONLY GETS THE JOB DONE OPERATIONALLY, BUT THAT DOES SO IN A MANNER THAT CONTRIBUTES TO, AND DOES NOT UNDERMINE, OUR CIVIL SOCIETY. GEORGE WASHINGTON WAS MOVED TO SAY: "WHEN WE ASSUMED THE SOLDIER, WE DID NOT LAY ASIDE THE CITIZEN." TODAY, I TELL OUR WAR COLLEGE STUDENTS NOT TO PUT ASIDE THEIR DEMOCRATIC VALUES AS THEY INCULCATE THE VALUES OF THEIR MILITARY SERVICE. OUR FIRST ALLEGIANCE, OF DEMOCRATIC NECESSITY, MUST BE TO THE SOCIETY WE REPRESENT AND ITS CONSTITUTION. AND WE CANNOT AFFORD…IN REALITY OR PERSPECTION…TO BECOME ALIENATED FROM—AND UNREPRESENTATIVE OF—THE SOCIETY WE HAVE SWORN TO DEFEND. IF THAT DAY EVER ARRIVES, THE STAGE WILL BE SET FOR A TRUE CRISIS IN AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

DO WE HAVE SUCH A CRISIS TODAY? THERE ARE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ON THE SUBJECT (THE SCHOOLS OF CRISIS AND NON-CRISIS), NOW JOINED IN LIVELY DEBATE. THE MOST FORCEFUL PROPONENTS, ARGUABLY, THAT THERE IS A CRISIS HAVE COME FROM JOURNALISTS TOM RICKS OF THE WALL STREET JOURNAL AND JIM KITFIELD OF NATIONAL JOURNAL. RICKS HAS CONTENDED, IN VARIOUS FORA, THAT THE MILITARY OFFICER IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY POLITICIZED AND CONSERVATIVE…THAT THERE THUS HAS BEEN A DISTURBING DECLINE IN AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM…AND THAT, MOST IMPORTANT, THERE IS A WIDENING GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY. HE EVEN QUOTES RETIRED ADMIRAL STAN ARTHUR, WHO COMMANDED U.S. NAVAL FORCES DURING THE GULF WAR: "TODAY THE ARMED FORCES ARE NO LONGER REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE THEY SERVE. MORE AND MORE, ENLISTED [MEN AND WOMEN] AS WELL AS OFFICERS ARE BEGINNING TO FEEL THAT THEY ARE SPECIAL, BETTER THAN THE SOCIETY THEY SERVE. THIS IS NOT HEALTHY IN AN ARMED FORCE SERVING A DEMOCRACY."(UNQUOTE) I DON’T KNOW THE CONTEXT BEHIND ADMIRAL ARTHUR’S WORDS, BUT REGARDLESS, THEY GIVE ME A CHILL.

KITFIELD HAS ECHOED THIS POSITION IN REFERRING TO THE SO-CALLED GAP—THE "NEARLY UNBRIDGEABLE CULTURAL DIVIDE," TO USE HIS WORDS—BETWEEN THIS NATION’S MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS. HE CLAIMS THAT, "BY NEARLY EVERY MEASUREMENT—RECRUITMENT, RETENTION, EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION, MORALE, READINESS TO FIGHT—THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE, IS IN TROUBLE . . . AND THOSE TROUBLES CAN BEST BE TRACED TO THE INCREASINGLY UNEASY INTERSECTION OF THE MILITARY AND MAINSTREAM AMERICAN SOCIETY." HE QUOTES FORMER JCS CHAIRMAN, GENERAL JOHN SHALIKASHVILI, WHO HAS SAID: "I SHARE DEEPLY THE CONCERN THAT WE ARE LIVING THROUGH A PERIOD WHEN THE GAP BETWEEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR MILITARY IS GETTING WIDER." AGAIN, A CHILLING THOUGHT, AND PERHAPS A CAUTION, FROM GENERAL SHALI.

ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ARGUMENT, CURRENT JCS CHAIRMAN, GENERAL SHELTON, RECENTLY STATED: "THERE IS A BOND—A MUTUAL RESPECT—BETWEEN OUR CITIZENS AND THE MILITARY THAT FEW OTHER NATIONS CAN MATCH." "THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL WRITTEN RECENTLY," HE CONTINUES, "ABOUT THE MILITARY BECOMING ISOLATED FROM SOCIETY. WHILE I UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS, I DO NOT BELIEVE THE PEOPLE WHO WEAR THE UNIFORM OF THE UNITED STATES ARE DISCONNECTED FROM THE REST OF AMERICAN SOCIETY OR ARE IN DANGER OF BECOMING ISOLATED."

SIMILARLY, JOHN HILLEN, OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TAKES THE POSITION THAT, IN HIS WORDS, "THE SO-CALLED GAP BETWEEN AMERICAN SOCIETY AND ITS MILITARY . . . HAS BEEN MISIDENTIFIED AND HIGHLY OVERSOLD." (THE NON-CRISIS SCHOOL OF THOUGHT). HE ASKS THE QUESTION, "IS THERE REALLY A FUNDAMENTAL, IRRECONCILABLE, AND ULTIMATELY DANGEROUS GAP IN VALUES BETWEEN AMERICA AND ITS MILITARY?" TO WHICH HE REPLIES, "NO DOUBT, THE VALUES, BELIEFS, AND PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR THAT DEFINE THE CULTURE OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE CULTURE OF SOCIETY IN GENERAL. BUT I BELIEVE THAT MOST OF AMERICA APPRECIATES THAT DIFFERENCE, RECOGNIZING THAT THE UNIQUE VALUES AND ATTRIBUTES OF MILITARY CULTURE ARE AN OCCUPATIONAL NECESSITY FOR AN INSTITUTION TASKED WITH WINNING UNDER THE UNNATURAL STRESSES OF WAR." (CLOSE QUOTE)

THERE OBVIOUSLY ARE SOUND, DEFENSIBLE, WELL-REASONED ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS DEBATE. WHAT WE SHOULD NOT DO IS REJECT OUT OF HAND THE PROPOSITION THAT THERE IS A GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY, OR THAT WE HAVE A CRISIS ON OUR HANDS. IT COULD BE THAT THERE IS A CRISIS THAT DEMANDS OUR ATTENTION, BUT WE JUST DO NOT RECOGNIZE IT FOR WHAT IT IS. NDU’S GREG FOSTER MADE THIS POINT IN THE AUTUMN 1997 ISSUE OF THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, WHEN HE OBSERVED: "THIS IS NOT A CRISIS IN THE CONVENTIONAL SENSE—NOT, THAT IS, A SUDDEN OCCURRENCE OF POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC PROPORTIONS THAT CREATES PUBLIC ALARM AND COMMANDS URGENT RESPONSE FROM ANXIETY-RIDDEN DECISION-MAKERS AT THE HELM OF GOVERNMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS RATHER MORE LIKE A BARELY NOTICED LYMPHOMA OR TERMITE INFESTATION THAT FEEDS ON ITSELF AND DESTROYS SILENTLY FROM WITHIN." (END OF QUOTE) AN INTERESTING WAY TO PUT IT…AND A SOBERING THOUGHT INDEED.

WHAT WE MUST DO IS ACCEPT THE ALLEGED GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY AS SOMETHING TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, MONITORED, AND MANAGED. JOHN HILLEN’S COMMENTS IN THIS REGARD ARE USEFUL FOOD FOR THOUGHT. "THIS SORT OF GAP," HE SAYS, "NEEDS TO BE MANAGED, BUT IT DOES NOT HAVE TO BE CLOSED. ELIMINATING THE GAP MIGHT SOLVE THE ‘PROBLEM’ THAT THE MILITARY DOES NOT LOOK LIKE SOCIETY, BUT IT MIGHT CREATE A GREATER ONE—THAT THE MILITARY WILL LOOK TOO MUCH LIKE SOCIETY. . . . IF [THE MILITARY] GOES TOO FAR IN PLEASING THE SOCIAL MORES OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, IT MAY LOSE THE CULTURE [THE WARRIOR CULTURE] NEEDED FOR SUCCESS IN WAR. IF IT GOES TOO RIGIDLY IN A PURELY MARTIAL DIRECTION, IT COULD CREATE A PRAETORIAN FORCE… CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE SOCIETY IT PROTECTS…WITH MILITARY DISOBEDIENCE TOWARD CIVILIAN SUPERIORS BEING THE FIRST SIGN OF TROUBLE." (UNQUOTE)

MANAGING THIS "GAP" IS, IN MY ESTIMATION, A TASK FOR US ALL, AND ESPECIALLY STRATEGIC LEADERS…THAT’S WHY I’M DELIGHTED THAT WAR COLLEGE STUDENTS ARE THINKING HARD ABOUT THE SUBJECT. STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IS A UNIQUELY INTELLECTUAL ENTERPRISE. "REASON AND JUDGMENT," SAID THE ROMAN HISTORIAN TACITUS, "ARE THE QUALITIES OF A LEADER"…AND I WOULD ADD, ESPECIALLY THE STRATEGIC LEADER. STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IS NOT ABOUT POSITION, NOR IS IT ABOUT THOSE INTANGIBLES THAT OTHERWISE CAN INVEST ONE WITH AUTHORITY—CHARISMA, PRESENCE, EXPERTISE, AND THE LIKE. IT IS VERY MUCH ABOUT VISION, THAT MUCH OVERUSED TERM BUT EXTRAORDINARILY IMPORTANT—AND RARE—CAPACITY THAT SETS THE STRATEGIC LEADER APART FROM HIS GARDEN-VARIETY PEERS.

"VISION," SAID JONATHAN SWIFT, "IS THE ART OF SEEING THINGS INVISIBLE." BUT, IN POINT OF FACT, VISION INVOLVES MORE THAN JUST THE ABILITY TO SEE WHAT OTHERS CANNOT OR WILL NOT SEE. IT’S MORE THAN JUST DISCERNMENT AND IMAGINATION; IT IS EVERY BIT AS MUCH ABOUT COURAGE AND INITIATIVE.

REMEMBER THE FAMILIAR VERSE ABOUT PROPHETS—OR VISIONARIES—IN THE NEW TESTAMENT BOOK OF MATTHEW: (I QUOTE) "AND THEY WERE OFFENDED IN HIM. BUT JESUS SAID UNTO THEM, A PROPHET IS NOT WITHOUT HONOR, SAVE IN HIS OWN COUNTRY, AND IN HIS OWN HOUSE." (UNQUOTE) IN THE MANNER OF STEPHEN COVEY’S 7 HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PEOPLE, I HAVE SOUGHT TO FORMULATE FOR OUR WAR COLLEGE STUDENTS THE "7 HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC LEADERS." ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE HABITS—AND THE ONE OF MOST RELEVANCE TO OUR DELIBERATIONS HERE—IS "TO PRACTICE ETHICAL BEHAVIOR AND TO EXERCISE MORAL COURAGE." PRECISELY BECAUSE PROPHETS—HERETICS, ICONOCLASTS, MUSTANGS, OR MAVERICKS—ARE SO OFTEN WITHOUT HONOR IN THEIR OWN LAND, WHERE ACCEPTANCE, RECOGNITION, AND RESPECT MEAN THE MOST TO MOST PEOPLE, THE PERSON POSSESSED OF NEW IDEAS…OR DIFFERENT WAYS OF THINKING…OR ACTING…MUST HAVE COURAGE TO SPEAK OUT, CHAMPION A NEW IDEA, AND ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THOSE WHO SURROUND THEM. THUCYDIDES’S WORDS FROM THE FUNERAL ORATION OF PERICLES ARE INSTRUCTIVE: "BUT THE BRAVEST ARE SURELY THOSE WHO HAVE THE CLEAREST VISION OF WHAT IS BEFORE THEM, GLORY AND DANGER ALIKE, AND YET, NOTWITHSTANDING, GO OUT TO MEET IT."

THE GREATEST DANGER THAT LIES AHEAD OF US, IF WE FAIL TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE WHATEVER GAP THERE IS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY, IS THAT THE MILITARY WILL BECOME MORE ESTRANGED AND PROGRESSIVELY LESS RESPONSIVE TO THE BROADER NEEDS AND AIMS OF THE COUNTRY; THAT ITS MEMBERS, THINKING THEMSELVES MORALLY SUPERIOR TO THE REST OF SOCIETY AND TECHNICALLY SUPERIOR TO CIVILIAN DECISIONMAKERS WHO DO NOT UNDERSTAND THEM, YET UNAWARE OF THEIR OWN CIVIC AND STRATEGIC ILLITERACY, WILL EQUATE THE NATIONAL INTEREST WITH THE SELF-INTEREST OF THEIR OWN MILITARY INSTITUTION.

THE FLIP SIDE OF THIS SCENARIO—A DANGER OF NO LESS CONSEQUENCE—IS THAT THE MILITARY’S CIVILIAN OVERSEERS, INCREASINGLY DEVOID OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING, WILL DEFER UNQUESTIONINGLY TO MILITARY JUDGMENT, THUS TURNING THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL OF CIVILIAN SUPREMACY INTO A POLITICAL REALITY OF CIVILIAN SUBJUGATION.

WE IN THE MILITARY HAVE A CRUCIAL PART TO PLAY HERE…TO ENSURE NEITHER SENARIO BECOMES REAL. THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT WITHIN THE MILITARY MUST NURTURE CRITICAL AND CREATIVE THINKING, RESPONSIBLE ADVICE AND DISSENT, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC LEADERS. WE NEED NOTHING MORE TO GALVANIZE US IN THIS QUEST THAN THOSE MOST PAINFUL OF WORDS ABOUT THE MILITARY MIND THAT H.G. WELLS SUMMONED FORTH IN HIS SEMINAL OUTLINE OF HISTORY: "THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY MIND IS BY NECESSITY AN INFERIOR AND UNIMAGINATIVE MIND; NO MAN OF HIGH INTELLECTUAL QUALITY WOULD WILLINGLY IMPRISON HIS GIFTS IN SUCH A CALLING." (IS THAT NOT OUTRAGEOUS?!) IF THERE IS TRUTH TO THIS INDICTMENT, OUR OVERRIDING AIM SHOULD BE TO ERADICATE THE CONDITION. IF IT IS FALSE, OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. ETHICALLY AND STRATEGICALLY, WE OWE IT TO OURSELVES BEYOND ALL ELSE TO DO SO.

IT WOULD BE PRESUMPTUOUS OF ME TO CLAIM THE STATUS OF VISIONARY…I AM HERE TO PREDICT NEITHER THE RISE NOR FALL OF AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. MY CONCERN IS SIMPLY THAT THEY DO NOT SUFFER FROM BENIGN NEGLECT. SO LET ME CLOSE WITH THE WORDS OF THE GREAT BRITISH STATESMAN, BENJAMIN DISRAELI, FROM HIS MAIDEN SPEECH TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN 1837: "I WILL SIT DOWN NOW," HE SAID, "BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN YOU WILL HEAR ME."

THANK YOU…AND THANKS FOR YOUR INTEREST IN JSCOPE AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHICS.