The Impact of Policies on Organizational Values and Culture
LTC William F. Bell, USA 
3230 Birnamwood Dr
Colorado Springs CO 80920


The hypotheses of this paper are three-fold. First, the values of any organization are primarily communicated to its members through the organizational policies that most directly effect them. Furthermore, changes in the values over time impact organizational culture. Second, that all policies have unintended 2nd and 3rd order consequences or side effects that take significant time to come to the attention of the senior leadership.1 These effects can be either positive or negative. Unintended effects can also have combined impacts. Third, implementing fundamental or cultural change within organizations in response to unintended negative consequences is very difficult. This paper will propose a causal chain that ties policies to values and to culture in potentially negative ways. It will then use current Army personnel policies to illustrate how this causal chain can explain certain negative effects of personnel policies on Army values. The paper will recommend options for changing policies to meet or support stated values, again using the Army's personnel system as an example.


Why do organizations have or espouse values?

Organizational values set acceptable or expected norms or bounds of behavior for the individual members of the organization. Without organizational values, organization members will, by default, follow their individual value systems. These may or may not promote behavior that the organization finds desirable. Therefore, organizations establish values to provide their members guidelines for their behavior. Organizational values also provide the framework for the culture of the organization. Culture is the body of custom, ideas, assumptions, and institutional patterns transmitted from one generation to the next and are particularly powerful in determining individual behavior.2 It is "the collective programming of the mind."3 Any values that has the net result of potentially changing culture must be analyzed very carefully because it is very difficult to reverse those changes.

Obviously, the values of the organization should support the mission of the organization. It would make little sense for an organization to espouse values that work against its long-range goals.4 To summarize, the values of the organization should provide a guide or framework for the organizations members in accomplishing their part of the organization's mission.


How do organizations establish or set values in the minds of their members?

Organizations must use a broad-spectrum approach to educate its members of the organization's values. Obviously values are only important when the organizations' members have accepted them. First, organizations should write them down and widely publicize them. If an organization has initial entry and/or continuing education requirements, the values should be explained in detail to the members as they "pass through" the organization's education system.

Second, it must require all of the senior leaders of the organization to demonstrate or live by the values. Douglas Macgregor states that highly successful organizations do not simply proclaim a set of values; rather they immerse their managers as well as their employees in the ideology to an obsessive degree.5 Any perceived disconnect between the behavior of the senior leaders and the values of the organization will strongly undermine the commitment of the organization to those values in the minds of its members. This is important because the adherence of the members to the organization's values is the essence of discipline. Anything that undermines values also undermines organizational discipline.

Third, new members learn the values of the organization through their initial socialization processes with other members of the organization. This is an informal method, quite powerful, but chancy as it assumes that the older organization members hold to the stated values of the organization.6

The last means of establishing the organization's commitment in its own values is more indirect, but the most powerful. It must demonstrate those values to the organization's members through the organization rules and policies.7 Statements are not enough. The values must be "sold" to the constituents through actions.8

This brings us to the basic assumption of this paper- that humans act rationally and rely on reason to perceive reality effectively. This "Objectivist" view is basic to this paper's hypotheses and means that organization members will individually evaluate reality and act accordingly. To state another way, it means that values are objectively evaluated based on the direct experience of the members. The creation of culture and the socialization of the organization's members rely heavily on learning processes to ensure an institutionalized reality.9 In many cases this is trial and error learning.10 This learning may take place in planned or informal, often unintended ways.11 The reward system of the organization (promotion, training selection, benefits, prestige, etc.) highlights what values are truly organizationally important. Individuals will then execute behaviors that further their long term professional survival and well being.12 This strongly implies that if there is a difference between what an organization declares as its values and the values demonstrated by its policies, the rational members would put priority on the values determined from the policies.13 The synthesis of above is the following concept: The greater the impact of the organization's rules and policies on an individual, the more the values of that organization are taught and reinforced in the individual's mind.


What types of policies teach individuals the most about the organization values?

If one accepts the preceding, this question is logical and obvious and the answer is a logical one to ask. The policies that most personally and directly affect the members of the organization are those that teach the members the most about the organization's values and culture. Organizations have many policies that have little to no impact on its members except in special situations. Other policies are instituted for statutory reasons, but have slight impact on a day to day basis. The policies that have the greatest impact on the individuals in any organization are those that affect promotions, separations, school or training selections, family issues, and assignments, i.e. the personnel policies. An individual learns more about the values of their organization from its personnel policies than any other single source.14 Therefore, it follows that the personnel policies of an organization have the greatest impact on demonstrating and teaching the values of an organization to its members.


What if there is disagreement between the stated values and the demonstrated or "derived" values?15

If there is any disagreement between what the organization states as its values, and in how the organization demonstrates its values, successful individuals will go with the values the organization demonstrates.16 As stated earlier, individuals will often go to great lengths to rationalize their self-interest-oriented (and derived value) behavior in stated organizational value terms to avoid this disagreement. In some cases, this disagreement often requires management to consciously exhibit a type of organizational hypocrisy, or publicly stating support for the stated values of the organization while acting in accordance with the contrary demonstrated values of the organization. It also appears from reviewing the literature that truth is an early casualty to this disagreement. That is to say, the wider the "values gulf" is perceived, the more difficult for "bad news" to make its way through the organization and to rise to the top management.

It is ludicrous to think that these value disagreements or dilemmas are lost on the organization's members, even when they have "successfully" rationalized their behavior in derived value terms. Any significant separation between the stated and actual values of an organization causes cynicism among the organization's members in direct proportion to the size of the separation17. Individuals that fail to adapt to the actual (not the stated) values of the organization will not succeed in the organization.18 Therefore, failure to act in accordance with the actual (not stated) values of the organization is a type of professional suicide. It also follows that those who quickly adapt to the actual values of the organization have a decided advantage over those who do not. Substantial disconnects between the stated and demonstrated values of an organization will have the greatest averse impact on the more idealistic members of the organization, because they are likely to hold onto the stated values longer. This likely puts them at a significant disadvantage in terms of promotions, selections, and assignments.19


How do policies impact the individual?20

All policies, personnel or otherwise, have both intended and unintended effects. All policies are implemented by organizations for specific reasons or to accomplish specific goals. These are the intended effects. Often, but not always, the policy contains a feedback mechanism so that the management can determine its success or failure. The major difficulty with organizations and organizational policies is the failure to recognize that organizations are very complex organisms. Organizations are not "closed" systems, but are acted upon by many outside influences, i.e. are "open" systems.21 Policies effect the complex organization in ways that can not be foreseen or anticipated.22 These "unintended" effects can be positive and/or negative.23 Unintended effects can be 1st, 2nd, or 3rd order effects. Whereas, it may be possible to anticipate a 1st order effect (i.e. this happened because of this), it is difficult to anticipate 2nd order effects and virtually impossible to anticipate 3rd order ones. It is also very difficult to design feedback mechanisms to track those effects. Note that the unintended effects can be both positive AND/OR negative. There may be differences in impact on different groups within the organization. They may also have both positive and negative impacts on the same group.24

Unintended effects can get really complicated, because policies, particularly personnel policies, do not exist in isolation. With apologies to Sir Isaac Newton's Theory of Gravity, every policy has an influence on every other policy. (This appears to be especially true of personnel policies, probably because the informal communications network would accent them.25) Sometimes the positive consequences of one policy may cancel out the negative consequences of another policy. It is just as possible that the negative unintended 2nd and 3rd order effects of one policy synergistically reinforce the negative 2nd and 3rd order effects of one or more other policies in a kind of compounding effect.26 Last, these effects tend to insidiously move the component values of the organization progressively further and further from the initial organizational values.27

It is in the 2nd and 3rd order effects that the problems occur with most policies. This is because (1) they are very difficult to anticipate, (2) they can interact in unforeseeable ways, (3) their effects can slowly build over time, (4) when detected their interpretation can be discounted or biased due to overconfidence or organizational compartmentalization, and (5) the fact that effects are, for example, a 3rd order effect, has no bearing on how severely they can impact an individual or an organization. The 3rd order effect of a policy may be devastating to an individual whereas the original intended effect has little or no impact. For the individual, the intended effects of policies are meaningless; only the actual effects of policies on the individuals have meaning. It is what impacts the individual that is meaningful to the individual and therefore determines his behavior as well as his understanding of the actual organizational values system.

Unintended positive and negative effects teach individuals the values of the organization. It does not matter that the organization did not intend those 1st, 2nd, or 3rd order negative effects. The individual has no clear way to ascertain whether the effects were intended or not. 28 Nor is that particularly relevant. To them adaptation is professional survival; therefore it is logical. To summarize thus far, the successful individuals in any organization are those who adapt their behavior to the unintended, as well as intended, effects of policies as well as to the actual (vice stated) values of the organization. It goes without saying that the organization may end up with its personnel believing a set of organization values that are considerably different than those either intended or desired. These derived values may also work directly against the organization's goals or objectives.


Can organizations deal with the unintended negative impacts of policies?

It takes time for an organization to become aware of the unintended negative impacts of policies. In particular 2nd and 3rd order impacts can be very subtle or long developing.29 Often they are difficult to trace back to the original policy or policies that caused them.30 By the time an organization becomes aware of negative unintended impacts of its policies, the successful members of the organization have already adjusted to those impacts. In other words, they have in large part been considered an organizational success because they have successfully and early modified their behavior to the new value paradigm.31

Also, by the time the organization becomes aware of negative unintended impacts of its policies, many personnel have been attrited because they have either failed to adapt to the new value paradigm or are prevented from doing so because of conflict with their personal value system. In many cases these members joined the organization because of the confluence of their personal values with those stated by the organization and the perceived (again, not necessarily intended) organizational hypocrisy drives them out. It is unfortunate because many of them are the members of the organization that the senior management most values or needs because of their very idealism.

It therefore can be concluded that the longer an organization takes to discover the unintended negative effects of a policy or policies, the more members of the organization will owe their very success to their adaptation to the new paradigm.

An example may illustrate this dilemma for an organization. Lets theorize a company that operates in teams of employees working on specific projects. Senior management of a company decide to add a requirement for periodic peer ratings of these workers intended to get them to work closer together and require development of interpersonal skills. These peer ratings will go into the workers' personnel folders for use in "counseling." Many of the workers did what management said they wanted- they provided honest feedback to their peers. Other groups, formed around the informal organizations at the company, decided to work together to make everyone in the group look good. The project teams quickly split into two groups those that did as management requested, and those that "played the game." Distrust built in the organization. Those that "cooperated" with each other on the peer ratings had a marked advantage; furthermore, they also cooperated against the other group. Those that did the peer ratings, as management wanted got significantly lower scores. They became discouraged and left the organization as they were bypassed for promotions and raises. New members were socialized into the company by the remaining workers who "played the game." Productivity began to flatten as many of the now disgruntled or departed workers were among the most productive.32

The senior management now discovers that a set of policies that was implemented many years ago has caused a significant or fundamental change in the actual or operational values of the organization. These values vary considerably from the stated values of the organization. The most successful members of the organization follow the new value paradigm because they ascertained the delta between the actual and stated values early on. Those members who adhered to the stated values have been reduced in numbers to impotence. What is the impetus for the organization to readdress its policies to changes to its values? The more members of the organization owe their success to their successful adaptation to the new value paradigm, the more difficult it becomes for the organization to change the policies to remove the original unintended negative effects.33


How do organizations implement fundamental change?

"Fundamental change" is defined as change that affects the core or culture of the organization. Organizations can intentionally change or unintentionally change. Fundamental change takes a considerable length of time. Intentional, fundamental change requires that the entire scope of organization policies be integrated and focused toward the change. In private organizations, managers often find it far easier to tinker with the compensation system than attempt real change to the company's culture.34 Real change is difficult. Logically, the more tightly integrated the values and policies are toward the fundamental change, the more rapid the change will be.35 Unintentional fundamental change can also occur because of an unintended shift in the values of the organization due to negative consequences or effects from policies that have gone undetected or uncorrected for a long period of time.36

Intentional change to these unintended effects can occur when the senior leadership recognizes the need for the change before they are either co-opted by the new paradigm or becomes too hard to do because too much of the organization has successfully adapted. This can either be the changing of the stated values to match the policies, or, the changing of the policies to match the stated values, or, a conscious decision to live with the dual sets of values (stated and actual.) This may be more common than one might imagine. For example, the stated values may have benefit for the organization politically while the actual values may have benefits for the organization operationally or administratively. As an aside, Macgregor points out that most highly successful organizations are unwavering on their core, stated values, but are willing to throw out any policies that are deemed unsuccessful at reinforcing those values.37 This deliberate reintegration of the policies of the organization with the desired values of the organization may be easier to accomplish in private organizations where the "bottom-line" is the primary focus vice public organizations that must respond to a variety of influences and focuses.38 In any event, reintegration of policies can only occur with unwavering, rigid leadership at the helm of the organization.39


How do organizations change when the senior leadership is unwilling or unable to change the values of the organization?

It is the ultimate responsibility of leadership to recognize and correct the policies of the organization when they have become maladapted to the intended culture of the organization.40 But this is often easier stated than accomplished. When the senior leadership of the organization owes its success to the new paradigm, internal change becomes highly unlikely. Like tends to promote like. As has often been stated, organizations like innovation, but reward conformity.41 Or to put it another way, organizations often reward successful, but limited, initiative; however, they do not necessarily encourage it.42 Any organizational changes contain an element of risk. Furthermore, the risks of changing are believed to be less well known than the consequences of not changing. Leaders become committed to losing policies or selectively interpreting performance feedback indicators in such a way as to rationalize inaction.43 At some point the new value paradigm becomes the norm by which members are evaluated. This homogeneity in top management makes any strategic change even less likely.44

Change can either be internally generated or externally generated. At this point, only external stimulus can cause the organization to fundamentally change its policies to align them with its stated values. To restate the above, for fundamental change to occur, the values of the organization must be brought into line with its policies or visa versa. This is especially true for personnel policies, because, as stated, they have the greatest impact on establishing the values of the organization in the minds of its members.

Corporate or private organizations are aware, albeit possibly viscerally, of the need for external stimulus for change to occur. They are also aware of the difficulty in having senior leadership that owes its success to a particular policy (or set of policies) engineer fundamental change. For corporate organizations, the external stimulus is simple: decline of profitability or market share.45 This gives them an unmistakable yardstick by which to evaluate the success or failure of policies. If fundamental change is required, outsiders are routinely brought in who haven't been products of the organization policies to execute the needed change. They recognize that products of a system have great difficulty fundamentally changing their system.

Public organizations generally find it more difficult to execute fundamental change without external stimulus, although political appointees can be valuable to public organizations because they are free to break paradigms they are not part of.46 Military organizations, in particular, do not have (or exercise) the option in a strategic sense of "bringing in new leadership" to change organizational values under most circumstances. This occurs with decreasing frequency in peacetime at the company, battalion and brigade level. It rarely occurs at any higher level without some other impetus (ex. moral turpitude.) Military fundamental change usually requires either (1) an organizationally emotional significant event (ex. Vietnam), or, (2) action by an external agency (ex. Congress with Goldwater-Nichols.), or, (3) battlefield failure or fear of failure (ex. GEN Marshall during WW II.) Even these deliberate fundamental changes eventually sowed the seeds of their own decay. The policies of one period become the major problems or obstacles of the next period of the organization's history.47


Model Summary.

The crux of the above causal chain or model is that the policies of all organizations can create a gap between the stated values of an organization and its actual or operational values. This is primarily due to the unintended 2nd and 3rd order consequences of the policies and the values they teach the members of the organization. By the time that the senior leadership of the organization becomes aware of these unintended effects, a substantial portion of the members of the organization has adjusted to the new value paradigm. Those members that did not adjust or were slow to adjust are disadvantaged in the organization. At the point that the senior leadership is co-opted by the new value paradigm, change back to the stated values of the organization is no longer possible without an external impetus. If this new value paradigm is left in place, it will begin to change the organizational culture. In short, policies effect values and values effect culture. Awareness of this causal chain should make managers less wedded to the policies of the past that preclude organizations from realizing their stated and desired values. Specific recommendations for managers will be saved until the end. Now that we have constructed a model or causal chain for values and policies, we will examine how this model may apply to actual Army policies.


An example of the application of the causal chain to the U.S. Army.

In his annual report to the President and the Congress, Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated that "readiness is cumulative. It takes 20 years to develop senior military leaders.A decline in .adequately trained people will lengthen the amount of time it takes to rebuild readiness."48 The report is self-congratulatory in stating, "Readiness has been maintained."49 Secretary Of The Army Togo West and the Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer echo those statements and add the need for competent leaders, as they are the keys to the Army's success in peacetime and war.50 Others are not so sure. For example, in a recent issue of the Army War College publication Parameters, LTG (Ret.) Walter Ulmer reports that a number of "cracks" are emerging in unit readiness. Most troubling are his reports, echoed in an increasing number of professional military journals of "fear of failure."51 GEN Sullivan stated in an April 28 letter to the Association of the United States Army's regional, state, and local chapters, "Experience tells me we are headed for trouble. Scholars have learned from the pathology of military defeats that commanders who hold slavishly to preconceived ideas.often lose with disastrous consequences."52 Other articles and books have been equally critical of the apparent growing problems in the Army.53 In particular, the "fear of failure" or risk averse behavior and decision making is being increasingly reported by those in the best position to assess the Army's ability to operate under war-time conditions, the observers at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). A review of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website for CTC lessons learned revealed this strong underlying theme.54

The first question is, does this relate to values? The Army's leadership manual states that leaders must have initiative and exhibit candor and courage. It says that leadership must be decentralized, develops trust, and must demonstrate risk-taking skills.55 Officers are evaluated on their efficiency reports on these first three values, but not on the last three (although it could be argued that they are "implied"56). The Annual Report on The Army After Next Project agrees that prudent risk taking and trust by leaders will be critical to battle field success in the future.57 Force XXI Operations strongly supports this notion.58 It would appear, therefore, that the growing concerns about risk aversion are most definitely related to values.

The next question is what caused the separation between stated Army values and the operational values to occur? In a recent article in Armor Magazine, MAJ Donald Vandergriff clearly puts the responsibility on the personnel system. He believes that the current system undermines trust and is directly responsible for creating a risk averse atmosphere.59 LTG Ulmer strongly implies the same.60 The key question then becomes, how did it occur?

This author believes that the initial step in the creation of a risk averse officer corps was the shift to a new Officer Reporting System report in 1979.61 This form replaced the previous report form that had been used since 1973 and had several advantages.62 The primary problem with the old report form was inflation i.e. there was no way to prevent the steady rise of "average" scores. This was to be corrected in the new form. Furthermore, the senior rater (the superior of his superior in simplistic terms) of the rated officer was the only rater allowed a numerical rating. This was a significant change from the old form and fundamentally changed the relationship between the rated officer, his rater, and his senior rater. Under the old system the officer's rater and senior rater (called endorser), had equal weight in the numeric score given the officer. As this score was the main focus of promotion and selection boards, there was a psychological shift in the importance of the senior rater to the rated officer.63 The officer corps began to place increasing importance on the relatively sparse contacts the officer had with his senior rater. Some may only see their senior rater at most 6-8 times per year (some only 1-2 per year), yet these fleeting contacts were seen as critical to the officer's career. Reports and statistical measurements gained increased importance as a means of communication with the senior rater vice personal contact. In particular, many officers became reluctant to allow subordinates latitude to make mistakes as those might come to the attention of the senior rater.64 The officer's rater or immediate superior would have the same understanding of the importance of his/her senior rater, etc.65 The 1979 OER also made patronage more effective as it now allowed senior raters to openly advance the careers of selected officers at the expense of others with little to know practical interference from raters. It may also be significant, if only in the minds of the rated officers, that the rank peers of the senior rater are those that sit on all promotion and school selection boards. Another new OER was recently put into effect. It attempts to combat senior rater inflation and give personnel managers more tools for determining future assignments, but leaves the senior rater- rater dynamic intact.66

The Army downsizing began the next step in the causal chain. It started in earnest with the end of the Gulf War and continues, it is perceived, to this day. The removal of the bottom 1/3 of the officer corps made the remainder much more conscious of their professional vulnerability.67 An Army career was no longer seen as stable. Officers became even more concerned about their efficiency reports and the infrequent senior rater contacts that impacted them. Even fewer risks seemed prudent for the officer, because it was perceived that any failure could impact their career.68 One bad report could end a career.69 Duty with soldiers in units (vice duty on staffs) began to be viewed as "risky" where before it was avidly sought.

The impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 began to be felt during this time. The net result on the officer was to halve the amount of time he was allowed to spend as a major in tactical units.70 Whereas before, a major might spent two years or more as a battalion operations officer and/or battalion executive officer, now the requirements for joint service duty allowed 12 months of tactical unit duty for most.

Also during the last several years a shortage of captains who have commanded companies (i.e. branch qualified) has developed. As a result, the Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) changed policy and captains now spend 12 to 18 months in command of companies where before they had command for two years or more.71 Furthermore few, if any, captains are allowed now to spend any significant time at the battalion or brigade level to gain additional experience. Instead they are now quickly transferred out to meet the personnel system's need for "branch qualified" captains.72 Lieutenants must now do the jobs that would have been performed by the captains, thereby denying them valuable platoon leader and company executive officer time and experience. The captains and majors also now have half as much time to "make a name for themselves" with their senior raters. This focuses their units' attention on a large number of short-term, measurable tasks to the possible exclusion of longer-term efforts.73

Recently, as a result of problems at the Army basic training centers, the decision was made to divert 100 lieutenants from tactical units to serve as company executive officers. This may be a worthwhile policy to increase visibility of officers in those units, but further decreases the tactical unit experience of officers. Compounding the experience issue is another recently announced personnel policy change in the promotion of lieutenants to captain. Previously this occurred after 48 months in the Army. The policy change will promote them to captain after 42 months.74 Battalion commanders now and in the future will have much less tactical unit experience than those ten years ago.75 This further impacts their willingness to engage in risks and to effectively mentor and trust their subordinates.76 It should be no surprise that their subordinates echo their risk aversions. New members of the officer corps will obviously adapt these attitudes quickly as they are socialized into the Army structure.

Two other factors are becoming increasingly important in the creation of a risk averse culture. There is a growing atmosphere of casualty aversion in the military. Although the impact was seen in Somalia and in current operations in Bosnia, its roots stretch back through the Gulf War to the Vietnam War and the all-volunteer army. . This pressure comes for both the military and political leadership. The military is not only reluctant to risk its members, but also its very expensive weapon systems. In a very real sense, casualty aversion equals risk aversion.77 Closely tied to casualty aversion is the impact of information technologies. It is now possible through advanced communications systems for the highest levels of command to bypass intervening levels of command and directly monitor the activities and actions of their lowest subordinate units. All indications are that this information technology trend will continue. It is highly questionable whether or not the senior commanders will succumb to the temptations to "meddle" in the actions of their subordinates when they disagree with their decisions.78 It does seem probable that the awareness of higher command visibility of every detail of their actual operations will further dampen junior leader initiative and cause even more risk aversion to avoid "instant criticism."79 This could potentially create the same type of animosities that existed during the Vietnam War between the units engaged in combat and the senior officers orbiting overhead in their command and control helicopters. It should also be noted that the demands of the information data bases will likely occupy an increasing percentage of the officer corps time in garrison (vice leading soldiers).

Morris Janowitz in1960 first commented upon the last element of the causal chain. It is a narrowing of the differences between how the officers view a military and civilian career.80 Some of this is due to a strong civilian job market and some due to changing societal beliefs. The Army, in its advertisements to convince young men and women that the Army was "just another job," did much of it. It has impacted the possible commitment of both officers and their spouses to the "Army life." Another dynamic at work is the fact that the military is increasingly an older force with a growing number of married members. An older, married Army is likely to be more risk averse even if none of the other factors were in play.

Every policy addressed above had well-focused, well-intended reasons for being implemented. The new efficiency report attacked the inflation problem of the old; the downsizing focused on minimizing personnel turbulence; the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to increase joint training among the officer corps; the captains were diverted to assist in the training of the reserve components; and the lieutenants were to free the company commanders to spend more time with the trainees under their command. Yet the entire above causal chain has had the synergistic effect of increasing risk aversion. We assumed that parts of the personnel system existed independent of the system as a whole.81 Each policy had the unintended consequence of making the officers reluctant to assume risk and each policy compounded the effects of the other. The net result is a large numbers of officers who see no professional benefit to engaging in prudent risk behaviors beyond "check the block" assignments. The gulf between the stated values and those practiced in the Army grew. The individual officers had no way to determine if the Army intended the operative set of values or not. It became irrelevant, as those who adapted to the new paradigm were successful. At a point the new operative values became the paradigm for success.82 Trust has been a casualty to career survival in the minds of many officers and the need to obtain patrons became more important. Risk aversion has its own 2nd order effect on the ability for an organization to be self-critical. Ideas do not flow freely from individuals that do not trust the organization.83 Risk taking is not viewed as relatively rewarding; rather it was viewed as potentially career damaging. The Army is hypocritical in stating that it wants competitive officers; yet these same officers should be satisfied with only making middle field grade rank.84

The proof of the above causal chain can be found in the "Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment." A significant finding of the report was that "many leaders have not gained the trust or confidence of their soldiers." Of 14,498 soldiers surveyed, only 54% of the men and 41% of the women reported that the leaders in their company set good examples for soldiers. Furthermore, 43% of the men and 47% of the women said that their leaders were more interested in looking good than being good. Last, 37% of the men and 40% of the women felt that the leaders were more interested in their careers than the well being of their soldiers.85 One may argue with the model used to explain the rise of risk averse behavior by the officer corps, but this report, combined with the anecdotal CTC evidence is hard to refute.86 Note that the National Training Center Commander was instructed by his superior at Forces Command to find ways to promote and reward risk taking and initiative by visiting units.87

An additional proof may be found in the yet to be released 1997 Leadership and Professionalism Assessment. The Army Times reported examples from a July 1997 briefing prepared for the Center for Army Leadership on the study. The briefing stated ". the Army's current culture forces some officers to behave in ways that are contrary to the Army's stated values." In addition, a "zero-defects" environment coupled with a perceived reluctance on the part of senior leaders to acknowledge the problems was reported. Example quotes from numerous soldiers would indicate that truth has been sacrificed in favor of careerism and that senior officers are not held in high regard.88 None of this bodes well for combat success.


Conclusions and recommendations.

All organizations suffer from the unintended consequences of policies. It is impossible to avoid them. It is critical for an organization to never believe that they are immune from these effects. They must put into place feedback mechanisms that not only track the implementation of individual policies, but also continually gauge the value health of the organization. All policies, personnel policies in particular, must be periodically evaluated in accordance with three criteria. First, did the policy achieve its desired end? Second, does the policy enforce or reinforce the values of the organization? Third, does the policy work in conjunction with other policies to further the organization? If leaders can not step back from the culture of their organization and analyze it objectively, the values and culture will manage the leader instead the leader driving the values.89 Any challenge to the basic assumptions at work in an organization will cause anxiety and defensiveness, but the fundamental role of leaders is to constantly do exactly that. To paraphrase Edgar Schein, if one wishes to distinguish leadership from management, it can be argued that managers are controlled by existing and actual organizational values while leaders shape, create, and change the organization's values to develop the culture the organization requires.90

Once an organization's leadership has detected a significant separation between the stated and actual operation values of the organization, the problem becomes much more difficult. This is the case for the Army. The problem is more difficult because a substantial portion of the members of the officer corps have adjusted to the new value paradigm and it therefore would require a much larger effort over a greater length of time to correct. As stated in the above model, the longer the senior leadership delays in addressing the separation in values, the more the cynicism of the members will grow and the greater the loss of credibility by the senior leadership. It is interesting to note that American military cadets, in comparison with those of twelve other Western countries, begin their careers with some of the highest ratings for initiative and candor. They also have the second highest score for desirability of security.91 This implies that their risk aversion may be learned, but with a cultural root.

The keys to reversing a significant, long-standing gap in values for any organization is four fold. These are (1) provide education, (2) re-establish credibility, (3) provide leadership, and (4) enforcement. The Army must make a long term, large sustained commitment to have any chance to impact the growing culture of risk aversion.92 The most important initial step would be to make clear what their values are in very unambiguous terms. This would likely be painful to many, but embraced by many others. Changing values to fit an acronym while ignoring important policy impacts is not useful in providing the organization the solid base and continuity that it needs.

The second step must be for the Army to give those values credence. A panel of very distinguished personnel with great credibility within and outside the Army should be convened.93 Experts from academia and business, as well as former Congressmen and military leaders should be included. The Inspector General and the Army Research Institute should be put at its disposal. The panel's charter would be to review and recommend changes to every major personnel policy in the Army in accordance with the above three questions.94 Many of the recommendations in LTG Ulmer's article should be considered.95 Obviously great care must be taken to understand the systems involved as improper re-engineering could make the problem even worse.96 An additional task would be to recommend feedback mechanisms on the policies and the values of the Army. This is vital if the Army is to avoid finding itself in the same position in the future. Any organization is more likely to change if it has developed routines for monitoring and making changes.97

Next, more leadership continuity at the unit level must occur. The time leaders spend in tactical units is too short if the desire is to create a culture of excellence in those units. The Army must ask itself the basic question of whether or not its priority is to its units or to the needs of the personnel managers.

The final step for the Army must be to constantly and continually immerse the officer corps in the work of the panel and its results. This must be driven forcefully from top-down. Any perceived value hypocrisy on the part of senior leaders must be ruthlessly dealt with as the entire officer corps would be watching for any signs or early indicators of values that differ from the stated ones. It is critical that the credibility of the senior leadership be re-established.

There is likely to be significant resistance to these proposals. Much of the senior leadership denies that risk aversion problems exist or believe that it is merely a temporary event caused by the downsizing.98 A kind of cognitive dissonance seems to have set in, reinforced by past successes and the apparent belief that the Army's culture is an immutable entity. As has been stated, however, downsizing is only one facet of the problem and the Army's culture is changing. The large number of potential current sources for risk aversion compounds the Army's problem. As Argyris states, "Every time the previous conditions are reinforced, the consequences are reinforced."99 Time is not on the Army's side.

It is important to note that at no time has it been said that the stated values of the Army changed, only how they were perceived and implemented by the organization. What the Army stands for has not changed, only how things are done.100 The Cold War is over. It takes two decades to build an officer corps. It is now time for the Army to change or develop the policies, systems, and culture that will give our nation the leaders necessary to command Army 2020. It really doesn't matter if the Army is manned by the best educated, best paid, or best trained soldiers in the world if the Army's policies have created an officer corps without the core values to lead those soldiers effectively on the battlefield. The only alternative is to let disaster force the necessary changes.101

" From Long Island to the present, unhappy observers of the Army have noted that good human material in the ranks has failed to realize its potential because of inadequate leadership at the junior and middle levels, from squad to battalion. Good leadership, when it appears at those levels in our first battles, stands out. We may reasonably ask.what produces, after ten years of service, an effective sergeant or captain."102


At the end of World War II, the U.S. Army conducted a study comparing the effectiveness of 24 representative divisions from the European Theater. Of the top ten divisions only one was American. Unsurprisingly, it was the quality of the 88th Infantry Division's leadership that made the difference.103

Successful organizations have three learning-related factors: well-developed core values and competencies, an attitude that supports continuous improvement and the ability to fundamentally renew or revitalize.104 "In the end, the incalculables of determination, morale, fighting skill, and leadership far more than technology will determine who wins and who loses."105




1. A first order effect is the direct outcome (intended or unintended) of the policy; a second order effect is a direct spin-off of the original policy effect; and a third order effect is a consequence of the second order effect (this happened because this happened because this happened. An example from the recent news to illustrate: the current administration has made international trade arguably the primary focus of its foreign policy. To futher this policy, the transfer of dual use missile technology was taken from the Defense Department and given to the Commerce Department. The 1st order effect was the now permitted transfer of this technology to China. India feels more threatened, conducts a series of nuclear tests, and declares itself a nuclear power, the 2nd order effect. Pakistan announces it will also conduct nuclear tests as soon as possible, the 3rd order effect.


2. . John W, Gardner, On Leadership (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 135.


3. . Joseph L. Soeters, "Value Orientation in Military Academies: A Thirteen Country Study," Armed Forces & Society, vol. 24, no. 1 (Fall 1997), 8.


4. James H. Carrington, Command Control Compromise, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press), 21.


5. Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx, (Westport: Praeger, 1997), 33.


6. Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992), 13. This also borrows from the ideas of Herbert A. Simon on informal communication in organizations.


7. Macgregor, 21.


8. Macgregor, 24.


9. Edwin C. Nevis, Anthony J. DiBella, and Janet M. Gould, "Understanding Organizations as Learning Systems," 1997; available at; Internet; accessed 6 May 1998.


10. Edgar H. Schein, "Kurt Lewin's Change Theory in the Field and in the Classroom: Notes Toward a Model of Managed Learning," 1997; available from; Internet; accessed 6 May 1998.


11. Nevis, DiBella, and Gould.


12. Thomas E. Becker, "Integrity in Organizations: Beyond Honesty and Conscientiousness," The Academy of Management Review vol. 23, no. 1 (January 1998): 156. Also Larry E. Greiner, "Evolution and Revolution as Organizations Grow," Harvard Business Review vol. 76, no. 3 (May, June 1998): 55, as well as Chris Argyris, "Empowerment: The Emperor's New Clothes," Harvard Business Review vol. 76, no. 3 (May, June 1998): 102-103, and Nevis, DiBella, and Gould, referenced above.


13. This is not to say that intangible or emotionally based decisions do not occur. Loyalty and organizational identification is still a powerful motivator in many organizations (see Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 4th ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1997), Chapter 10.) But it is rarely a black and white situation. This author believes that most individuals will first attempt to rationalize their logical (self-interest) behavior in terms of organizational values; in fact, people will go through sometimes remarkable logic chains to do so. In the end, self-interest was the driving force behind their behavior.


14. Deciphering an organizations culture is only successful through studying the punishment and reward system of the organization. Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 13.


15. "Deep beliefs are often inconsistent with espoused values in organizations." Peter M. Senge et al., The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook, (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1994), 20. Also see Schein, 325-327 for examples.


16. Organizational culture, experience, and core values are overlayed by best practises and common processes. The above stated disagreement can also be called a "performance gap." Nevis, et al.


17. Senge, 21. This is equally true in private and public organizations. Note the statements and public cynicism about government campaign reform. See Argyris, 101.


18. A close acquaintance of the author was told in his initial interview that the job hours was 9 AM to 5 PM with weekends free, because the company strongly supported family values. The first day of work he arrived at 8 AM to allow himself time to get orieted before the other workr showed up. He discovered his fellow workers had been there since 7 AM. He does frequently take Sundays off. A fellow worker followed the stated work times. He lasted about three months before he was let go by the company.


19. John Gardner states that this may be a natural evolution of "maturing" organizations i.e. the purposes (and values) of the organization fade and what finally gets served is institutional self-enhancement. See Gardner, 124-5.


20. This paper's basic assumption is that organizational values are considered in policy development. This is probably not true, at least in part. Policies are usually developed for their own purposes with organizational values overlaid on them, at best. This author makes the assumption that values were considered, because it is the best case, or delays the probable unintended consequences the longest. Policies that do not consider values, accelerate the organizational value disagreement markedly.


21. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, "Organizations and the Systems Concept," in Classics of Public Administration, ed. Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, 3d ed., (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1992), 248-259.


22. Argyris, 101.


23. Dennis F. Thompson, "The Possibility of Administrative Ethics," in Classics of Public Administration, ed. Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, 3d ed., (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1992), 523-532.


24. For example, a city decides to severely limit growth through urban sprawl for envoronmental and ecological reasons. They pass a series of anti-growth ordnances (1st order effect). As the city is a desirable place to work and live, property values and property taxes go up (2nd order effect because of supply and demand). The unintended 3rd order effect is the "squeezing" of the poor out of the city as they can no longer afford to live there. Note that there is a positive unintended 3rd order effect on the wealthier property owners, especially when they go to sell their property.


25. See the works of Chester I. Barnard for more on how informal organizations work. One example would be Chester I. Barnard, "Informal Organizations and Their Relation to Formal Organizations," in Classics of Public Administration, ed. Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, 3d ed., (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1992), 96-100.


26. Thompson, 529-30.


27. John J. Voyer, Janet M. Gould, and David N. Ford, "Systemic Creation of Organizational Anxiety: An Empirical Study," August 1996; available at <>; Internet; accessed on 6 May 1198.


28. For example, a company may state that its primary value is its people and quality standards for products, but its record may be of requiring 70-80 hour work weeks and quantity and profits over quality in its products. Schein, "Organizational Culture and Leadership," 21.


29. "Cognition Theory suggests that 'Disaster-provoking events tend to accumulate because they have been overlooked or misinterpreted as a result of false assumptions, poor communication, cultural lag and misplaced optimism'." LTC Jack L. Killen, "Strategic Visions, Why They Fail," Strategic Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 1997): 21-22. Argyris also believes that top down organizations tend toward group think which hides "error" until late. Chris Argyris, Integrating the Individual and the Organization, (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1997), xiii-xv.


30. In larger organizations, the personnel tasked to develop new policies are commonly not those charged to implement said policies. The former group move on to new assignments, taking with them the indepth background knowledge of what factors were considered in policy development. The latter group rarely have the same policy insights.


31. Greiner, 56.


32. This case study was adapted from one inGeorge E. Stevens, ed., Cases and Exercises in Human Resources Management, 2nd ed. , (Chicago: Irwin, 1996), 105-115.


33. Greiner, 56, 64. Also Argyris, xvi, because of error threatens the members (operational) values and norms.


34. Jeffery Pfeffer, "Six Dangerous Myths About Pay," Harvard Business Review vol. 76, no. 3 (May, June 1998): 113.


35. The example of the U.S. Army after the Vietnam War is very illustrative of how a large number of values and policies could be integrated to cause rapid fundamental change. Rapid is a relative term as it still took many years.


36. "Values always decay over time." Gardner, 13.


37. Macgregor, 33.

38. This is not to say that an organizational focus on short term, quarterly profits vice a longer view might not have its own 2d and 3d order efects and eventually erode the organization. LTG Walter Ulmer, "Re: A Suggestion," electronic mail to the author, 11 June 1998.


39. Schein, 5.


40. Ibid.


41. For example, Argyris, 98-99.


42. LTC Ralph Peters goes even further when he states that, "Dependable mediocrity is preferred over exceptional excellence." LTC Ralph Peters, "Generals, It's Time To Face Reality," Army Times, May 25, 1998.


43. Henrich R. Greve, "Performance, Aspirations, and Risky Organizational Change," Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 43, no. 1 (March 1998), 58.


44. Warren Boeker, "Strategic Change: The Influence of Managerial Characteristics and Organizational Growth," The Academy of Management Journal vol. 40, no. 1 (February 1997), 158, 166.


45. The "Fortune 500 list, for example, has had considerable turnover during the last 50 years," Greiner, 56. Also see Schein, 322-23.


46. Congressional action as the external stimulous is typical at the federal level. Congress passes broad general laws that are imterpreted by federal regulatory agencies. If the agency interpretation is contrary to Congress's desires, or, over time, the policy implentation diverges from political necessity, or, the agencies actions diverge from required (or legislated) agency values, Congress intervenes. Recent action by Congress with the IRS or the FDA over tobacco rules are examples.


47. Greiner, 58.


48. William S. Cohen, "Annual Report to the President and the Congress," (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1998), 26.


49. Ibid., 81.


50. Togo D. West and General Dennis J. Reimer, "A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1998," (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1997): 31-35.


51. Walter F. Ulmer, "Military leadership into the 21st century: Another 'Bridge Too Far?'," Parameters vol. 28, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 5-6.


52. Gorden R. Sullivan, "Sullivan:Defense needs spending increase for people, programs," AUSA News, June 1998, 1.


53. For example, three recent articles by LTC (Ret.) Ralph Peters, "Wasting Talent the Army Way," Army Times, May 16, 1998, "Ruinous General Heroes Gone Astray," Army Times, February 16, 1998, and, "The Army That Couldn't Get There," Army Times, March 2, 1998. Others include LTC (Ret.) Robert L. McGinnis, "Double Standard For Adultery," Army Times, April 5, 1998, and many others.


54. For example, see TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS, available at; Internet; accessed May 7, 1998. Increasing occurances of adverse behavior on the part of the leadership of units going through the CTCs was also relayed to the author by several Armt War College students with recent CTC experience. One bluntly stated, "Units can't win playing it may be the biggest problem facing the Army." Another student said, "If we don't take risks (at the CTCs), will we have the knowledge and confidence to take them in war? If we don't, we will lose."


55. FM 22-100, "Military Leadership," (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 1990), viii.


56. However, only courage is among the values stated in the recent message titled Army Values. See Subject: Army Values (Corrected Copy), from DAPEE-HR-L, Washington, D.C., 111201Z MAR 98.


57. "Knowledge and Speed- The Annual Report on The Army After Next Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army," (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1997), 20-23.


58. TRADOC 525-5, "Force XXI Operation," (Fort Monroe, Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994), 2-9, 3-3. 3-4, 4-4, 4-5, and 4-10.


59. MAJ Donald E. Vandergriff, "Without a Proper Culture," Armor, (January-February 1998), 23.


60. Ulmer, 7-8.


61. DA Form 67-8, dated 1 Sep 79.


62. DA Form 67-7, dated 1 Jan 73.


63. Although the reports contain considerable narrative, board members have consistently reported that the rater's narrative is generally ignored while the senior rater's much smaller narrative is usually read.


64. Anecdotal evidence is wide spread. For example, these remarks were made by BG Honore, Assistant Division Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, at recent conference in Huntsville, Alabama; "A company commander went out and did a report of survey.three months ago because two privates were slave starting an M1 tank, and during the slave starting process, burned up $415K worth of circuit cards in less than two minutes. That's the battalion's budget for a quarter. So as the risk goes up, the company commander decisdes whether he's going to stay in the Army or not. 'So, do you think I'm going to get a two block or a one block,' is his question to me?", Sean D. Naylor, "General Irked Over Fielding of Equipment," Army Times, May 18, 1998.


65. Some of the theoretical basis for this changed relationship with the senior rater can be from in Raymond T. Sparrowe and Robert C. Liden, "Process and Structure in Leader_member Exchange," The Academy of Management review, vol. 22, no. 2, ((April 1997), 522-552. This study also implies to the author an increased importance to mentoring and sponsorship due to the relationship shift.


66. DA Form 67-9, dated 1 Oct 97. CDRPERSCOM ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-MSE//, MILPER MESSAGE NR 97-099, SUBJECT: OFFICER EVALUATION REPORTING SYSTEM. In 1985), Lorsch in his study of top management ("Strategic Myopia: Culture as an Invisible Barrier to Change."), discussed how they attempted to make small incremental changes, when more substantial restructuring was necessary. Also see Schein 298-302. Argyris' Single loop model would seem to argue that the 1997 OER merely reinforces the "error" of the 1979 OER.


67. Selection to the Army Command and general Staff College and the Army War College were long viewed as key events in the officer's career. Both meant that the officer was a success. The great increase of non-selection for promotion of attendees at those two institutions had a large chilling effect on the Army.

68. Note that the Army's entire current generation of lieutenants and captains, the future colonels and generals, have only known a downsizing Army, with all its uncertainties and perceived risks.


69. Vandergriff, 23, for example. Interestingly, also reported in LTC William L. Hauser, America's Army in Crisis, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 223, but this author believes that the current effect is far more profound.


70. These assignments being critical to career advancement.


71. Successful company/battery/troop command is the prerequisite to the future of the officer in the Army in most specialties.


72. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: Observations on Personnel Readiness in Later deploying Army Divisions, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, March, 1998).


73. This author believes that it is highly significant that this same effect was noted in an Army War College study initiated by General Westmoreland in 1970 as quoted in Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 84-85.


74. This is to get captains into command faster to meet the demands for branch qualified captains, not to increase the time the captains spend in command. Jim Tice, "Faster Leap to First Lieutenant," Army Times, February 2, 1998.


75. Those officers that receive early or below the zone promotions have even less experience before becoming battalion commanders.


76. "We expect people to learn when the costs of failure are high, when personal threat is great, when there is no opportunity to 'replay' an important decision, and when there is no opportunity to simplify complexity and shorten time delays so as to better understand the consequences of actions." Senger, 35. The last point is fundamental to Army After Next.


77. Grant T. Hammond, "Paths to Extinction: The US Air Force in 2025," available at, Internet, accessed 31 July 1998. Also, Charles J. Dunlap, "Organizational Change and the New Technologies of War," available at, Internet, accessed 31 July 1998.


78. The political pressure in Operations Other Than War (OOTW), where the actions of a squad leader can have international implications, can only increase these temptations.


79. Ibid.


80. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier , ((New York: The Free Press, 1960), 9-10. Also see Charles Moskos, "Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces," in . The Military: More Than Just a Job, eds. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1988), 15-26.


81. We tend to fix problems, not systems. Senge, 25.


82. General Dupuy said, "When 51% of the commanders in the Army- general through captains- operate instinctively in accordance within principles., at that time iit will be genuine doctrine." Richard M. Swain, Donald L. Gilmore, and Carolyn D. Conway, eds., Selected Papers of General William E. Dupuy, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1994). As with doctrine, so it would appear with operating value systems.


83. Senge, 36.


84. It can also be argued that our current pay system, which centers the most significant pay raises around promotion (vice longevity), also contributes to risk aversion.


85. "Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment" as presented to the Army War College class of 1998.


86. It appears that the Army may have come full circle from the post-Vietnam era in terms of officer values.


87. Sean D. Taylor, "The NTC: Facing New Challenges / Do Soldiers Lack the Necessary Skills to Keep Up?", Army Times, June 7, 1998. This laudable effort is unlikely to effect overall risk taking in the officer corps due to the small number of relative officers exposed to the NTC experience and the existence of all of the risk averse reinforcing systems. To state differently, risk encouraging training systems can not overcome risk averse personnel systems.


88. Sean D. Naylor, "Leader Survey Still Secretive / A Year After the Fact, Poll Showing Malaise Still Not to be Released," Army Times, July 13, 1998, and, "Survey Says.", Army Times, July 13, 1998.


89. Schein, 15.


90. Ibid., 5.


91. Soeters, 31-32.


92. Edgar Schein states that it takes from5 to 15 or more years to change basic assumptions without destroying and rebuilding the organization. Schein, 317.


93. This is similar to the recommendation in LTC (Ret.) Palph Peters, "Generals, It's Time To Face Reality," Army Times, May 25, 1998.


94. It must not be assumed that the "risk aversion" paradigm is the only one in question. A soon to be published manuscript by LTC Mark Bowman implies similar unintended consequences from our physical fitness policies. LTC Mark S. Bowman, "We are Healthy and in Shape But We Get Hurt. Why?", Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 1997): 3-7. It was also argued recently by a speaker at the Army War College that the Goldwater-Nichols Act had a number of negative 2nd and 3rd order consequences for civilian control of the military by the strengthening of the Joint Staff.


95. Ulmer, 10-23.


96. Senge, 39.


97. Greve, 59.


98. For example, the statements by the Army's chief personnel officer, LTG Vollrath at Naylor, "Leader Survey Still Secretive / A Year After the Fact, Poll Showing Malaise Still Not to be Released," Army Times, July 13, 1998, and the Army Chief of Staff GEN Dennis J. Reimer, "Developing Great Leaders in Turbulent Times," Military Review, Vol. 78, no. 1., (January-February 1998), 7.


99. Argyris, Integrating the Individual and the Organization, xvi.


100. Macgregor, 33.


101. Schein, 327.


102. John Shy, "First Battles in Retrospect," in America's First Battles," ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence: Kansas, 1986), 352.


103. David M. Keithly and James J. Tritten, "A Charismatic Dimension of Military Leadership?," Journal of Political and Sociology vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer), 145-46.


104. Nevis, DiBella, and Gould.

105. Paul Van Riper and Robert H. Scales, "Preparing for War in the 21st Century," in "Landpower in the 21st Century: Preparing for Conflict," Parameters Special edition(April 1998), 8.