

THE NECESSARY IMMORALITY OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

James H. Toner

JSCOPE '94

27 January 1994

[It is useful for a leader] to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite

—Machiavelli (1469-1527), *The Prince*, Ch.

18.

Part One

One of the great difficulties involved in reading, writing, and teaching about military ethics is the tendency of people in the field, and I do not exclude myself, to be rather self-congratulatory about the moral climate we associate with the profession of arms. Blithely we contend that honor and truth-telling are functional military imperatives. Glibly we maintain that cheating and stealing contravene the norms of the professional military ethic. Rather smugly we declare our common allegiance to, and membership in, a self-proclaimed citadel of modern chivalry, whose corrupt knights—one thinks of Calley—are supposedly the great aberrations. So we, the anointed, quickly condemn the very few exceptions to our confraternity of high purpose and noble aim, feel better about ourselves for the condemnation, and go about our business with all the calm self-assurance of the saved.

Reality intrudes, of course. Clearly, Calley *was* an exception. To argue to the contrary would be to besmirch the names and reputations of thousands of gallant soldiers who found themselves in Calley's circumstances but not in Calley's shoes. The arguments in this paper are not intended to advocate war crimes or to exonerate war criminals. After all is said and written, however, the American military exists to kill the national enemies of the United States, or, at minimum, to prepare to kill them. That is not to say that is the sole purpose of the military; neither is it to say that it is even the primary purpose of the military, which can deter, just as it can wage, war. But, for example, following the attack on Pearl Harbor in

1941, after all else had failed, the Army and Navy were called upon to do what soldiers and sailors have done, or tried to do, throughout the ages: find, fix, fight, and finish their national enemies.¹ That is an unpleasantry, but it is also a truth. The ultimate reality of military service is that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are paid to destroy the enemies of their country.

A man by the name of Palamarchuk, a car thief, claims that during World War II, he was trained as an underwater demolitions expert, being paid "\$54 a month to kill people." Consequently, stealing cars hardly disturbed him ethically.² The American military has been recognized by writers and jurists alike as a separate society, yet one still part of its larger civilian element. Much of the law, the custom, the ritual, and the training of the profession of arms owes to the recognition that the military requires a certain latitude forbidden to civilian agencies. If the military is to be able to discharge all its possibly fearsome tasks, Private Jones, United States Army, must be held to an accounting different from the expectations we might have for Mr. Smith, civilian employee of any business. Private Jones can be ordered to risk his life and to kill; Mr. Smith, of course, is free to walk away from such liabilities. After teaching Jones—and Palamarchuk—how to kill, is it entirely rational to teach them not to lie, not to cheat, not to steal?

II

Here stands in uniform before the Congress of the United States a lieutenant colonel in the United States Marine Corps. See the colonel deceive. Dissemble. Delude. Lie. Observe the self-satisfied smugness with which far too many of us peremptorily condemned what we branded the machinations of a power-mad marine. But hear the colonel explain, with feeling and with manly self-confidence, that his was a higher ethic. Feel the colonel's outrage that the politics of a vacillating Congress could, in his judgment, displace the legitimate security concerns of greater patriots and of more enlightened professionals. Soldiers kill and soldiers die. As Murray Kempton put it, more than thirty years ago, "the good soldier will lie under

orders as bravely as he will die under them."³ And so it is with Oliver North: "I'm not in the habit of questioning my superiors."⁴ He recognized both opportunity and challenge, and responded with innovation and alacrity; for doing his duty, he was ravaged.

We in the field of military ethics all too quickly condemn our errant knight, finding when and where we can reasons to mitigate North's ethical "lapse" because he had been such a good Marine until the recent unfortunate episode. And it is easy to understand North's confusion, confronted as he was with the timidity and, some might say, the treachery about him. He may have misled the Congress, but his was a nobler cause and a grander calling.

We stand in judgment of North because we apply to him as a man the hoary notions of a Gothic standard he learned as a naive midshipman; when his country called him as an adult, he was ready but many of the innocents in his profession were not!

Oliver North had been done a monumental disservice by the pious platitudes of the Naval Academy's Code of Honor. For there are most certainly times to lie. To cheat. To steal. To kill. Even the Bible, after all, tells us that "There is an appointed time for everything, and a time for every affair under the heavens" (Ecclesiastes 3:1). Only the ethically stunted can hold, for example, that the Pole harboring a Jew in his basement in 1939, asked by an SS officer if he knows the whereabouts of any Jews, should tell the shining truth and thereby betray the greater good. It is silly to object that when the crewmen of the captured ship *Pueblo* in effect cheated their captors by flashing their middle fingers in photos, calling the gesture the "Hawaiian good luck sign," they were morally wrong. It was short sighted to object to purloining Communist secrets through espionage as CIA agents did for years. One may well dispute whether Lt Col North was actually serving his country by lying; one has trouble doubting, however, that Lt Col North *thought* he was being truly patriotic. He had been ill served by an absolutist code which taught him things as a midshipman which the adult world belied.

The professional military can and does kill. But it cannot lie, or cheat, or steal? Nor can it tolerate those who do? But how many professional military members are lying, right

now, as they fill out OER/OPRs on subordinates? How many justify what amounts to lying on the very real foundation stone of group loyalty? How many career soldiers truly want to work for the boss who tells the strict truth that Major Blue is a good officer—rather than that Major Blue is an outstanding officer, deserving of immediate promotion? Is the colonel who is filling out that report a debauched and evil man, undeserving of trust? Or is he a good and compassionate commander, as anxious to advance his soldiers' careers as is another colonel, in another division, far away, filling out an OER on Major Green? And is Captain Orange an immoral or corrupt man because he uses the DSN (military telephone system) for occasional personal calls, or photocopies private materials on government machines, or takes an occasional pen or pencil for personal use?

Can there be no hierarchy of values, no sophistication whatsoever, in the values preached and taught? A military organization which encourages preparation for maiming and mutilating the enemy cannot find it in its soul publicly to tolerate the soldier who takes home a yellow legal pad for personal use? Surely reason itself leads us to see how thread-bare and fallacious is the old argument that he who steals a government pen will soon be misappropriating a fortune in government funds. In September 1993 a major cheating scandal at the Naval Academy was uncovered. The Naval Academy does not have an honor code, but an "honor concept," and it does not oblige midshipmen to be responsible for turning in peers who cheat. A *Newsweek* article suggests that "The discretion allowed by the code may have provided students with a rationale for looking the other way."⁵ It may also have provided students the opportunity for developing a mature moral judgment. While instances of felony, or grand larceny, or espionage should, of course, be reported, which Army major or Navy lieutenant commander, for example, has ever "turned in" a peer for stealing a government pen, or a wrench or two, or for government communications equipment used for purely personal matters? There can be such a thing as excessive scrupulousness. As one Naval Academy graduate put it after the cheating scandal at USNA indicted 125 midshipmen, leading to the possibility of massive expulsions, "Should we brand kids for life for a single mistake?

Even in the criminal world we don't do that."⁶ There are, after all, times to look the other way. Certain instances of "cheating" may, in fact, more nearly be instances of keen initiative.⁷

III

Modern military ethics instruction is too often a feeble Potemkin Village, exhorting us never to lie or cheat or steal when the very essence of combat obliges soldiers to do exactly those things—or much worse. POWs in Vietnam and Korea routinely lied to their captors, or cheated them whenever feasible. In destroying enemy installations and equipment, soldiers are, in effect, stealing from their enemy's national treasury. Such activities are not only not discouraged; they are often handsomely rewarded. Phrasaically shrouding the essence of such behavior is the vale of moral purity, which so frequently confounds and confuses the very soldiers it is intended to enlighten.⁸ I was once informed by an instructor at the U.S. Army Ranger School at Fort Benning, Georgia that whenever inspectors of any type are around, Ranger students are told that they have a moral obligation to collect prisoners of war after sweeping a battlefield. When the inspectors depart, however, the students are counseled that fallen enemies on the battlefield should be dispatched with pistol or bayonet, lest they shoot passing Rangers in the back. (Besides, there is no real way for commandos to take care of such POWs.) Of course that real-world combat advice is perfectly correct (and, tragically, a time-tested, valid recommendation) but our hypocritical mask of purity obliges instructors to have one set of "public" instructions and another set of "private" instructions.

Pronouncements of ethical purity among soldiers do little to resolve the real-world tensions for professionals who are possibly obliged to kill—and to lie, cheat, and steal—upon occasion for their government. Great lip service is paid to codes and paradigms which, in actual circumstances, are silly, sophomoric, or senseless. The result is moral confusion. Instead of a guide to ethical conduct which informs soldiers that, regrettably, as there will be times and circumstances that may warrant killing other human beings whom your country

labels as "enemy," so there will be times and circumstances when lying or cheating or stealing is required for the greater good. As you may be asked to risk your life for your country, so also, in its service may you be asked to risk your privileged sense of personal purity.

There is a Latin phrase—*Ultra posses nemo obligatur* (no one is obligated to do more than he can)—which seems to capture the essence of my argument. Soldiers are not morally bound to be saints; that is, in today's ethical climate, no one expects soldiers to be perfectionists. There is, and ought to be, some discretionary morality, some latitude afforded to soldiers in the matter of lying, cheating, and stealing. Of course, it would be easy to mistake my position. Not for a moment do I hold that rampant lying ought to be permissible; but there are times and circumstances when truth-telling is not the prudent policy. As Colonel Anthony Hartle has put it, "Is it unethical for a military officer to mislead the enemy? We can confidently say no. The requirements of the practice of truth-telling extend only to fellow participants in the practice."⁹

The *New York Times* reported in August 1993 that officials in the Strategic Defense Initiative program "rigged a crucial 1984 test and faked other data in a program of deception that misled Congress as well as the intended target, the Soviet Union, four [unnamed] Reagan Administration officials said."¹⁰ Total honesty can, apparently, thwart or frustrate government officials in the discharge of their official duties. As Machiavelli pointed out well more than four hundred years ago: "Men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived."¹¹ Reason of state can oblige soldier-statesmen to lie, and they are ill fitted to do so when they have learned a mechanical, banal ethical creed which permits no room for moral discretion.

Consider carefully the prudent advice tendered by Machiavelli: "A wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not to

observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse this nonobservance."¹²

IV

As this was being written, efforts to capture Somalian warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid had proved fruitless. One source suggested that U.S. military headquarters in Somalia issued a report, as the magazine put it, "about yet another bungled attempt" to capture Aidid which, in fact, was "an invention to cover up an operation by the supersecret Delta Force." The Deltas really were retaliating against a previous mortar attack, but "cover[ed] their tracks . . . [by] invent[ing] a plausible fiction."¹³ Such "plausible fictions" may not be in the same league as the possible murder in 1969 of a suspected North Vietnamese double agent and its alleged cover-up,¹⁴ but the basic premise holds: lies and duplicities are sometimes required by, and in the probable best interest of, the well-being of the state, as well as of the involved military unit.

The pietistic platitudes of customary military ethics are thus not innocuous; they puzzle and perplex those who hear them about the nature of the real world. The oddity is that most, if not all, scholars in military ethics will quickly admit that we have not yet seen the end of war and that there does exist such a compelling notion as reason of state. In serving the Republic, soldiers are expected to put the well-being of country ahead of self. Zealous devotion to ethical purity (as in "I never lie!") can be seen, therefore, as a kind of ethical egoism and crass self indulgence. As there are times to lie to the enemy and perhaps even to certain congressional or other governmental agents (as, apparently, in the matter of SDI testing), and as there are clearly times to stretch truth on OERs, so is there need of a modified ethical creed which states that soldiers will lie under orders as bravely as they will die under them. The soldier who, in extreme conditions, will not risk life or limb for country and

comrades-in-arms may well be a physical coward, preferring his own safety above all else; the soldier who, in extreme conditions, will not compromise truth for country and comrades-in-arms may well be a moral coward, preferring his own integrity above all else.

It may well be tragic that both human beings and the statecraft they practice are imperfect and imperfectible, but it is an indisputable fact. In the face of this reality, the maintenance of strict codes of honor and of conduct oblige those subject to them to carry medieval standards of conduct to absurd contemporary lengths. Moral rigidity in developing standards of officer conduct creates an inflexibility wholly inconsistent with the needs, not only of the combat arms, but also of the civil responsibilities necessarily discharged, upon occasion, by soldier-statesmen.

Of course, no one will dispute the idea that soldiers ought to tell the truth when permitted to do so by appropriate circumstances. Soldiers should similarly refrain from killing when permitted to do so by circumstances. But in the heat of combat, whether on the battlefield or in the bureaucracy, there will be times when killing can be justified and when lying, too, is not only morally permissible but ethically mandatory. Outdated and ancient codes and creeds that create ethical paralysis impede clear thinking and obstruct swift and decisive action. As Machiavelli put it: The prince, or the leader, must "have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune force it . . . not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it."¹⁵

Absolutist prohibitions against lying, cheating, and stealing result, at best, in hypocrisy and in the numbness properly associated with the moral somnolence now frequently parading as moral instruction in the military. The flat, catechetical tones of much of contemporary military moral instruction represent a tyranny of the mind, refusing to foster genuine intellectual growth among the young and denying moral latitude and discretion to the mature. There are no pat, simple answers to the kinds of questions soldiers must answer, in the combat of bureaucratic or battlefield conflict. To insist upon the rigor mortis of a rigid, rule-based set of expectations is the moral equivalent of sending soldiers off to battle with pikes and body

armor. If, when justified by circumstance, soldiers can violate one of the greatest of all commandments^{3/4}Thou shalt not kill^{3/4}then they can certainly lie, cheat, or steal when appropriate circumstances arise.

V

Up to a point, it is even permissible for soldiers to advance their own careers by modified duplicity; executives, after all, do it all the time. To argue the reverse is to expect divine conduct of the human, and that is a manifestly unfair expectation and a forlorn hope. We need to bet with, not against, human nature. Currently we demand of soldiers that they elevate country ahead of self. But there are few saints among us. We need to develop a modern approach to soldierly conduct which emphasizes rational self-interest instead of relying upon the crusty and clearly obsolete invocations of patriotic devoutness and self-sacrifice. That is not to denigrate these notions, but modern psychology testifies in plangent voice that people customarily act in their own self-interest. A step in the right direction, to be sure, is the military's increasing devotion to TQM, stemming from a recognition that old ways of doing business are out of place in today's military.¹⁶ Indeed, as one magazine recently put it, William Perry, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, "wants to run defense like a business."¹⁷ It is *deja vu* for many senior officers, some of whom remember reforms of this nature which were introduced a generation ago. Twenty-five years ago, hidebound careerists rejected, to the extent they feasibly could, the kinds of innovations and modern business practices now, finally, receiving the choruses of approval too long overdue.

A few years ago, the *Wall Street Journal* used this as a sub-headline: "Ethics are [*sic*] nice, but they can be a handicap, some executives declare." The article explained that about a quarter of 671 managers surveyed by a research firm contends that being ethical can damage a successful career; that group believed that more than half the executives they know would bend the rules to get ahead. One fifty-year-old executive said, "I know of unethical acts at all levels of management. I have to do it in order to survive."¹⁸ A publication by Jay L.

Walker, entitled *The Complete Book of Wall Street Ethics*, has 158 blank pages.¹⁹ As business management practices become increasingly important in the contemporary profession of arms, one can find such books as *Duty, Honor, Company: West Point Fundamentals for Business Success*.²⁰ A recent poll revealed that seventy-five percent of respondents believe that there is less honesty in government now than there was a decade ago.²¹ To attempt to inculcate into young soldiers today codes of honor and conduct that are clearly atavistic and obviously anachronistic is professionally irresponsible and ethically ill advised.

VI

Today's soldiers are businessmen and businesswomen in green, blue, or tan suits. The codes by which they lived on the streets before entering the military and the expectations of the businesses into which they will return after their service are demonstrably at odds with an archaic ethic which paralyzes the minds, hence the ethical faculties, of soldiers presumably imbued with an absolutist ethic in modern times when elementary answers do not square with complicated questions.

An old bit of doggerel I learned in OCS may help to explain this: "Here lie the bones of Lt Jones, the pride of the institution. He died one night in his first fire fight, by applying the school solution." For too long now, the profession of arms has been trussed by an ethic suitable for medieval knights but painfully out of step with the times in which we now live. "When I was a child," the apostle Paul says in one of his epistles, "I spoke as a child, I felt as a child, I thought as a child. Now that I have become a man, I have put away the things of a child."²² It is past time to teach all soldiers that they, not some ancient code, must bear the burden of deciding the right and of choosing the true; it is past time to teach all soldiers that the ethics of simple answers and the morals of school solutions frequently result in the absence of thought and in the poverty of action; it is past time to teach all soldiers that insistence upon never lying, never cheating, never stealing, and never killing results, not in a powerful armed service, but in the virtual destruction of the modern American military.

If, in sorrow, we recognize that lives and politics are imperfectible, we nonetheless have the responsibility of teaching the difficult truth that the exigencies of military life result, unavoidably, in occasional commission of "immoralities" and that machinations, much as Machiavelli tried once to teach us, are not always evil. It is time, as TQM counsels us, to empower our soldiers and to trust their discretion in the combat both of battlefield and of bureaucracy. Knowing, as we do, that it is sometimes permissible, even desirable, to kill for our country, we have begun to recognize, at long last, that it also sometimes permissible, even desirable, to lie for our country. The empowered soldier has put away the simple slogans and the silly shibboleths he²³ learned when young. Now that mature soldier decides whether, when, and to whom to tell the "truth." He has put away the things of a child. At last, we have let him become a man.

Part Two

The first part of this paper presents, rather starkly, a position I will label the "accommodationist" approach to military ethics. Accommodationists hold that the military ethic must be drawn increasingly closer to the norms and mores of the civilian sector. "Ethical accommodationists" would argue that military ethics must be based upon, or at least be much more similar to, the ethics one finds in the civilian community. Thus, if there is a pattern of self-serving lying and cheating, never mind stealing, in the civilian or business community, perhaps the case can be made that the military ethic should become increasingly "sophisticated," "progressive," and "enlightened." Although the paper makes no forthright mention of its lineage, the core of the argument in the paper—that traditional military ethics is old fashioned and outdated—is hardly new. As long ago as 1957, Samuel Huntington was pointing out that "Liberalism's injunction to the military has in effect been: conform or die." Liberalism, he pointed out more than thirty-five years ago, customarily attempts either to transmute or to extirpate military values.²⁴

In the paper I tried to raise, with whatever sweet sophistry I could muster, the basic argument—made perhaps less fastidiously elsewhere—that the military profession is wholly out of step with the "times." Because others may lie or cheat or steal, I argued, the military may also do the same. In order to purchase a grain of respectability for my enterprise, I held back from blanket endorsement of such transparently unethical behavior. As the saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. And I suspect that most of us, in straying from the paths of righteousness, do so by degrees. That is, we err most grievously at the margins. We lie or cheat or steal for the wolf of self-promotion or of self-gratification which we routinely clothe in the sheep's raiment of patriotism, service loyalty, or family responsibility. The gravest vice is camouflaged as the greatest virtue.

There is hardly any doubt that virtue and character, traditionally understood, are under assault.²⁵ In *The Chronicle of Higher Education* of 10 November 1993, for example, one

reads of the new program in "Queer [*sic*] Studies" at a New England college (Wellesley).²⁶ At another New England institution, MIT, a recent survey indicates that more than eight of ten undergraduates admit cheating at least once in their college careers. More than two-thirds confessed to committing some form of plagiarism and eleven percent cheated on at least one exam. The director of MIT's undergraduate program, who co-authored the study, observed, "Of course it's worrisome, but we're not looking at this in a moralistic way [that *is* reassuring—JHT], to say people who do this is [*sic*] bad and they're beyond helping."²⁷ The departure from the traditional canons of morality is much in evidence based upon these "educational" developments at two presumably respected Massachusetts colleges.

It is likely that there will always be tension between the expectations of civil society and the requirements of the profession of arms.²⁸ But if the larger civilian community ever effectively "extirpates" or "transmutes" the ancient and, I think, noble traditional values of the profession of arms, it will have lost a principal propaedeutic source of what it means to be a lady and a gentleman.

The paper I wrote, of course, is filled with tendentious nonsense. Aside from errors of interpretation, the paper is plagued by numerous logical fallacies. Although the footnotes in the paper are correct citations, I have made a case which I trust readers (or listeners) were easily able to pick apart.

The best counter to the specious and somewhat minatory notions propounded in the paper is a paragraph from a remarkable talk given at the Air Force Academy nearly a quarter-century ago. In that talk, General Sir John Hackett offered the following explanation of how the military can serve the state:

A man can be selfish, cowardly, disloyal, false, fleeting, perjured, and morally corrupt in a wide variety of other ways and still be outstandingly good in pursuits in which other imperatives bear than those upon the fighting man. He can be a superb creative artist, for example, or a scientist in the very top flight, and still be a very bad man. What the bad man cannot be is a good sailor, or soldier, or airman. Military institutions thus form a repository of moral resource that should always be a source of strength within the state.²⁹

I think he spoke better than even he knew. The accommodationists who would metamorphose military values into more demotically acceptable views wholly misunderstand the profession whose integrity they would thereby destroy.

¹As the *Baltimore Sun* put it on 29 August 1993, as U.S. Army Rangers were being sent into Somalia: They were "supposed to grease Aidid [the warlord chief]. Push his button. Punch his ticket. Ice the guy." But what of the U.S. executive order against assassinations? "If you send in one guy carrying a sniper-scoped rifle to cancel Aidid's contract that's assassination. But if you send in 400 troops trained in 'counterterrorism' and they happen just to stumble upon Aidid one day and slit his throat, well that's the fortunes of war" p (2).

²*Time*, 16 August 1993, p 48.

³Murray Kempton, "Ribbons and Bibbons," *The New Republic*, 30 November 1963, p 14. I am grateful to Col Malham M. Wakin for referring to this book review in his article, "The Ethics of Leadership I," in *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, 2d ed., ed. Malham Wakin (Boulder: Westview, 1986), p 198, n. 21.

⁴Quoted in Anthony Hartle, "The Ethical Odyssey of Oliver North," *Parameters* 23 (Summer 1993), p 29.

⁵"Sailing Through Troubled Seas," *Newsweek*, 27 September 1993, p 44.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷At the Naval Academy, for example, students may use old tests (known as "gouge") to prepare for exams. During the recent scandal, some midshipmen may have thought that pilfered tests were merely gouge. The distinction between stolen exams and gouge may not be as clear as some might cavalierly contend.

⁸The same may be true of codes of conduct. See Elliott Gruner, "What Code? Or, No Great Escapes: The Code of Conduct and Other Dreams of Resistance," *Armed Forces & Society* 19 (Summer 1993), pp. 599-610.

⁹Hartle, "Oliver North," p. 33.

¹⁰18 August 1993, p 1. See also the editorial in the next day's issue of the newspaper. Actually, there is a great deal of debate about this imbroglio. See the editorial "Congress is Scuppering Missile Defense" in *The Wall Street Journal*, 23 August 1993 (p. A11) and the exchange of letters in the *Times* on 3 September 1993, p. A10. Army officials vigorously denied rigging the SDI test. See *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 30 August 1993, p. 25.

¹¹*The Prince*, Ch. 18.

¹²Ibid.

¹³*U.S. News & World Report*, 13 September 1993, p. 22.

¹⁴See Jeff Stein, *A Murder in Wartime* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).

¹⁵*The Prince*, Ch. 18.

¹⁶The Israeli military, too, has begun to employ TQM. See "Israeli Military Tries Total Quality Management To Make the Most of a Small Army and Budget," *The Wall Street Journal*, 24 August 1993, p. 6.

¹⁷*U.S. News & World Report*, 13 September 1993, p. 52.

¹⁸*The Wall Street Journal*, 8 September 1987, p. 1.

¹⁹Ibid., 23 April 1987, p1. Cf. Ronald E. Berenbeim, "The Corporate Ethics Test," *Business and Society Review*, Number 81 (Spring 1992). pp. 77-80; John W. Hill, Michael B. Metzger, and Dan R. Dalton, "How Ethical is Your Company?" *Management Accounting*, July 1992, pp. 59-61; and A. Thomas Young, "Ethics in Business," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 58 (15 September 1992), pp. 725-730.

²⁰By Gil Dorland and John Dorland (New York: Holt, 1992).

²¹"Lies, Lies, Lies," *Time*, 5 October 1992, p. 32.

²²1 Cor 13:11.

²³or she.

²⁴Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Random House, 1957), p. 155.

²⁵See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). I presented my arguments at greater length in James Toner, *The Sword and the Cross* (New York: Praeger, 1992).

²⁶See p. B63.

²⁷*Montgomery Advertiser*, 15 December 1993, p. 6A.

²⁸I have tried to deal at length with this problem, and with several of its manifestations, in a book to be published in the summer of 1994 by the University Press of Kentucky, *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burdens of Military Ethics*.

²⁹Sir John W. Hackett, "The Military in the Service of the State," in *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, 2d ed., Ed. Malham Wakin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p119.