

JSCOPE
January 1992
CH (COL) John W. Schumacher
Director of Ethical Development Programs
U.S. Army War College (DCLM)
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

TEACHING THE TEACHERS
OF
MILITARY ETHICS

INTRODUCTION:

A year ago this past Fall I was invited to a local church to speak in the morning worship service. I had been introduced as one who was the "Director of Ethical Development Programs" at the U.S. Army War College. Later, at dinner, our hostess looked at me with some dismay and made the declaration, "what has ethics to do with teaching at a 'W A R' college?" As sincerely as I knew how I responded, "Mam, with the lethality--the destructive power--that is at the control of modern military leaders you should hope that we do teach ethics at the War College. In fact, ethics must be foundational to all that we attempt to teach our future military leaders."

Of course, this is why we are here at JSCOPE and why we continue to meet year after year to discuss this critically important dimension of leadership.

The focus of my thoughts for this presentation is to give you some insights to my own experience in "Teaching the Teachers of Military Ethics."

I am keenly aware that in this audience today is a representation of a broad spectrum of expertise and experience in the field of philosophy and ethics. There is also a wide range of expectations from our institutions on how ethics is integrated into the curriculum. In light of this I feel the need to tell you that I can only speak to my own experience at the Army War College. In so doing, it is my hope that each of you can apply something of what I share to your own unique challenge where you serve.

My own experience is worth sharing at this point in the hope that it will encourage and affirm those of you who feel that you do not have a great deal of academic depth in the field of

philosophy and ethics.

I arrived at the Army War College in the summer of 1989 from a 4 year tour in Alaska as the Command Chaplain for our Army troops there. I had graduated from USAWC in 1985 with a follow on assignment to Alaska. I had no formal training in ethics except for what I had gained as a student at the War College in 1985. I was able early on to be mentored by Colonel Mal Wakin for about 3 weeks at the Air Force Academy, was trained at the Josephson Institute, attended numerous seminars, and read avidly on the subject of ethics. Even with all this opportunity to learn then and the subsequent opportunities I have had in the 2 1/2 years since, I do not claim any expertise in the field of ethics. However, through my faculty experience of designing ethics instruction at USAWC I have come to some personal conclusions and observations: 1) It is essential that students have a fundamental understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of ethics. 2) That it is essential that students be given ethical decisionmaking models and, 3) that these models be applied to case studies that present students with genuine ethical dilemmas. I have included 2 of these case studies in Appendix A. The first of these cases came from one of my students 2 years ago and the second case came from the files of Paul Rousch, an ethics instructor at the Naval Academy.

At the Army War College we teach in a seminar configuration. Our student body of 289 is broken down into 18 seminars with 16 students in each seminar. Each seminar is a cross section of the student body and is composed of a representative of the Navy or Marines, the Air Force, a DOD or DA civilian, a representative from the Army Reserve or National Guard, 2 International students, and the remaining 10 are active duty Army. The curriculum is essentially presented in two modes: 1) speakers who address the entire student body and, 2) classroom instruction lead by the faculty instructor (FI).

I have given you a copy of my "point paper" on ethics instruction at USAWC at Appendix B. My responsibilities include the training of the other 17 FI's who will present the lesson on the "Elements of Ethical Decisionmaking" to their individual seminars. (See page 2 of the "point paper".)

I. THE SCOPE OF OUR CHALLENGE:

It is important that I take a moment here to focus on who it is that I am teaching. These are the FI's who will present the basic ethics lesson to their seminars. It is a fascinating group. With the exception of one civilian psychologist, they are all Army colonels, some of whom have commanded at the Brigade level. All have very definite ideas about ethics, what it is and

how it should be taught. My challenge is to take these great people where they are, affirming their convictions and experiences, while, at the same time, attempting to move them to a deeper understanding of the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of ethics. The challenge, as I see it, is to present them with a "package" that is both academically sound and "comfortable" to teach. There is a fine line between high sounding principles that may reflect your training as an ethicist and a sound understanding of a basic framework emphasizing the essentials of ethical decisionmaking.

Can it be done? Obviously it can, but we must have the proper focus. By that I mean that my focus has been not to attempt to "give" ethics to 45 year old colonels, or through them to 40 year old lieutenant colonels. Rather my goal is to prepare the FI's to instruct their students in knowing the difference between understanding the full range of choices and how to best make those choices, and what to me would be a weak alternative of telling them what to choose.

On this point I wish to share a quote from a book entitled, The Teaching of Ethics in the Military, published by the Hastings Center and coauthored by Peter Stromberg, Daniel Callahan, and our own Mal Wakin: (page 66)

"The midcareer officers at the Staff Colleges and the senior officers at the War Colleges post challenges of a different sort for military ethics instruction. These experienced professionals have been involved in the military's moral decisionmaking process for several years. They have war stories to tell about unethical or unprofessional conduct they have witnessed, and their idealism has often been tempered, if not replaced by cynicism."

These authors go on to point out:

"Yet in seminars at their professional schools we have found them to be universally concerned about maintaining or raising the standards of professional military ethics."

And finally they draw a conclusion with which I heartily agree:

"Developing a successful ethics program for the senior service schools is as complex as developing such a program for mature physicians, lawyers, and judges. ...The critical challenge is to prepare appropriate instructors and discussion leaders". (page 67)

II. THE GOALS OF OUR TRAINING:

A. Our goals must be legitimate and achievable:

General William Richardson, former TRADOC commander, now retired, summed my feeling on a proper and achievable training focus in this statement on military education.

"Today, we must emphasize how to think rather than what to think. This requires emphasis on the process as well as product--on using and applying the basic analytical tools of our profession rather than reaching the school solution."

Thus, if our goal is to focus on the process of ethical decisionmaking with an academically oriented framework for guiding the "process", we are on the right track and we have established an achievable goal.

B. Specific course goals:

Here I wish to give you an overview of what has been developed as the foundational emphasis in our ethics instruction at the Army War College.

Our focus has 2 vectors. We have for many years invited Colonel Mal Wakin to lecture to our student body on the core issues of, "...the role of ethics in command decisions...". Following his lecture the students and faculty are given about an hour to dialogue with Colonel Wakin through a "question and answer" format. The remaining 45 minutes of this 3 hour session is spent in the seminar room where the students and FI's continue the discussions on issues raised in the lecture and "Q & A". Preparing the faculty for this period is also a very important part of "training ethics instructors".

For this introductory lecture, faculty instructors are briefed on the required readings for the students, the anticipated content of the lecture and are encouraged to consider the following points in the "after lecture" seminar discussion:

- 1) Why is professional ethics an essential field of study for military professionals, particularly senior level leaders?
- 2) How does the ethical behavior of senior leaders influence the ethical climate in the organizations they lead?
- 3) Does the senior military leader have a duty to impose his ethical standards on his/her organization?
- 4) How does the environment in which a senior or strategic leader affect their decisions and what are the ethical implications? How is that environment different from that of the battalion commander?

The goal of training FI's for this lesson is rather straightforward and predictable. The real challenge comes in

preparing the follow-on class. Here the FI is given a lesson plan is to be presented to the students in the seminar room.

C. Goals of the ethics lesson:

The basic driving forces behind the package we give to our faculty instructors can be summed up in the following goals:

1) Attempt to convince the students of the importance of a strong and clearly defined ethical climate in an organization.

2) Demonstrate that there will be less of the "Black and white: moral and ethical choices in the future. There will be more and more of the "varying shades of grey" issues they will have to decide and that true ethical dilemmas will be the norm and not the exception at the senior leader level.

[When General Cavazos, former FORSCOM commander, spoke at the Army War College in 1989 he mentioned that when he commanded at the 4 star level that only the difficult, complex decisions (usually with bad alternatives) got to his level. If there was an easy or good answer, someone made that decision below his level. It was the decision that presented 4 alternatives that got to him. He had to decide on the least bad of the four.]

The senior leader must be able to "perceive" the ethical implications of every alternative.

3) Give the students an opportunity to consider the broader scope of ethics through a series of quotes from corporate and military leaders.

4) Expose the students to a basic look at the moral/philosophical underpinnings of ethics. (I will be more specific in a moment.)

5) Prepare the students for an "in-depth" look at case studies to show them the ethical content of decisions and provide a framework/model for ethical decisionmaking.

III. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE ETHICS CONTENT:

Allow me now to give you some of the specific material we ask our faculty instructors to present to our students. You will find a number of what I consider to be key elements of this lesson in Appendix C.

A. Moral Theory:

I remind you that neither I nor my fellow faculty instructors are schooled ethicists or moral philosophers. I also will tell you that for our purposes as FI's I do not see this as a significant limitation. I do not believe there is either the time or the need to delve deeply into ethical theory. It is, however, essential that we focus on at least 4 basic ethical constructs. For our instruction I have selected: 1) Ethical Egoism, 2) Ethical Relativism, 3) Utilitarianism, and 4)

Deontology.

To prepare students and faculty for this part of the lesson I have given readings on these theories from a book by James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy. I have found this book to be extremely helpful in providing an understandable, easy to read, explanation of the important elements of these theories. I want them to know that Kant, Mill and others have had direct impact on articulating the basis for the ethical standards that fall into the categories of both "weak" and "strong", that impact on the decisionmaking process.

My own evolutionary development as the one responsible for ethical development lessons is that it is critically important to, as often as possible, use laymen's language in outlining these theories. For instance, Egoism becomes "careerism", Relativism becomes "situationalism", Utilitarianism becomes "consequentialism", and Deontology becomes "absolutism or formalism". I have found that with some patience, openness, and sensitivity to resistance to discussing moral philosophy that the faculty instructors will begin to become comfortable with talking about the dangers of careerism and relativism and affirm the strength of an ethical framework that holds to clearly defined rules (formalism) that always take into consideration the consequences of applying those rules (consequentialism).

I will tell you that there is resistance on the part of some FI's about pushing ethics to this level, yet I have found that for those who are willing to do some basic reading and study that the framework becomes increasingly comfortable. I will deal with the resistance issue later.

Also included in our lesson is a teaching point on the "stakeholder" concept, an extension of the consequentialist theory. The "stakeholder" concept has been borrowed from the corporate world and focuses on the axiom that anyone who has a stake in our decisions has a fundamental right to be considered in the decisionmaking process. This concept catches on quickly. All case studies considered in the Core and Advanced Ethics Course will be analyzed in part by a consideration of who the stakeholders were in that particular case and how they would be affected by the decision.

And finally, I ask the instructors to take some time to talk about how to get the most out of case studies. My experience is that students will often "redefine" a case and then spend their time trying to "solve" the "new" problem. The real value of the case study is to get the students to apply the ethical reasoning you have just been talking about and so spend their time "ferreting out" the issues. This can be done by making it clear what it is that you expect of them when they return from a sub-group discussion to present their analysis of the case. I might

add here that it is my conviction that "real life" cases will work much better than "canned" cases. It also reduces the temptation to redefine the case. The format for case studies that we use in our lesson is at Appendix D. I have seen many case study formats. All have merit. The important thing is to force a discussion process that gets at the issues and avoids jumping to some kind of a solution. Training for the faculty instructors to "follow your lead" is vitally important if the students are going to be forced to use a critical reasoning process to get at ethical issues.

Follow on lessons will emphasize this format in studying the cases of the "My Lai" massacre, the execution of General Yamashita, and General MacArthur lying to his troops at Bataan, telling them that reinforcements were on the way when he knew they were not.

C. Parameters:

You must be able to "sell" what you want to be taught to the FI's first. If they don't buy in to your "vision" they can easily revert to a 3 hour "bull session" on "ain't it awful" war stories when they have their students in the seminar room. This will accomplish little or nothing. Your focus must include a sensitivity to the use of high sounding terms and phrases with which your FI's are clearly uncomfortable. The "team" effort is fundamental to the preparation as well as the conduct of the lesson. Each year I have done significant revision of the ethics lesson based on "end of course" critiques received from my fellow FI's.

IV. FACULTY DYNAMICS:

I wish now to shift my focus to the real heart of this presentation. I have felt it to be essential that you would understand first the place of ethics in our curriculum and the basic content of the lesson itself. In that way you have a much better understanding of the faculty dynamics which are clearly fundamental to what you want your students to gain from their brief exposure to the basic issues involved in the ethical decisionmaking process.

A. High Energy and Emotion:

Probably no element in our entire curriculum is as emotionally charged as is the ethics lessons. I have received the entire spectrum of feedback. One faculty member told me it was too complicated and needed to be put in "Dick and Jane" language. Others have come to say, "we are long overdue to have some material on basic moral philosophy". Some will give feedback that reads, "this is the best ethics lesson to date";

others, at the same time, will say that the lesson doesn't work and needs a complete overhaul. It is not good to let your ego get involved in this process. It is quite an "adventure" to find the path that will challenge your most loyal supporters and not alienate your most vocal critics.

B. Reasons for Resistance:

I offer you some of my observations, which I would suggest are not unique to my experience alone. Lesson authors are all vulnerable, but often most of them have much less emotional subjects to develop.

1) Personal values: Our values are very much a part of who we are and how we feel about honesty, truth, commitment, courage and candor. Our geographical roots, our ethnic identity, and our religious values all impact on what we think is a right decision.

2) "You can't teach ethics": I agree in principle and attempt to diffuse the issue by keeping the focus on the decisionmaking process.

3. "Ethics is just common sense" or "ethics is basically everybody doing what they think is right": In all cases I attempt to give as non-threatening response as possible.

4. "Results are the only things that matter": Most who say that don't really mean it. They are people with a code--a set of rules that are a fundamental part of the way in which they make decisions.

5. "Moral theory is too heavy": Simply, my approach is to avoid making it "heavy", though I do not intend to back away from the conviction that it is a "must" if we are going to have academic credibility at the Senior Service College level.

B. Overcoming Resistance:

I now offer you some suggestions that have become important to me--and I think produce results--in overcoming such resistance.

1) Attitude of the Instructor (Lesson Author): Don't "flap", don't ever become defensive, but do "listen, listen, listen". Your credibility in the "school house", your camaraderie, your willingness to work hard as a member of the teaching team, all serve to defuse much of the emotion.

2) Recognize your limitations: I have never felt that I had to be the "expert", to be the "fount of all knowledge" regarding ethics. It is important to be open to opportunities to grow whether it be workshops, reading, or dialoguing with your fellow FI's. I submit that there is a fine line between having your own convictions and being defensive to input that challenges those convictions.

3) Be willing to involve your faculty team in your course and lesson preparation. When people feel that they have helped

to create something they are much more prone to take ownership of the final product. Additionally, it doesn't hurt to give good, constructive, positive feedback to your fellow faculty on the lessons on which they have worked so hard to create a viable professional and academic product.

CONCLUSION:

Teaching the teachers of ethics is a very rewarding experience. The challenge is both systemic and academic, while at the same time, relational. The rewards far outweigh the frustrations or resistance that is a natural part of the learning process.

Mark Twain once said: "To be good is noble, but to teach others to be good is nobler, and a lot less trouble".

I take issue with his conclusion. Both to "teach" and to "role model" (to "be good") requires the very best that we have to give. In the case of ethics, we cannot forget that ultimately our efforts impact on the quality of moral and ethical decisions that will be made by these potential senior leaders for many years to come!

APPENDIX A

ETHICS CASE STUDY #1:

THE SECRET BOMBING OF CAMBODIA

Date: March 15, 1970

Time: 2200 Hours

Place: Bien Hoa Air Force Base, South Vietnam

In the last week of February, 1970, Air Force Major Hal Knight relieved the commander of the "Sky Spot" radar center at Bien Hoa. His was one of four such radar centers in Vietnam providing close-in ground control for B-52 raids launched from Guam, Okinawa, and Thailand. Bombing missions were designed and approved in Washington and the target lists (called "frags") were cabled to Knight's commanding officer, Lt Col David Patterson. Patterson passed them on to Knight.

The duty of Knight and his staff was to compute the particulars of each bombing run and communicate them to the planes' crews as they entered the war zone. He, the captain who was his second in command, and eight enlisted men matched the position, altitude and airspeed of the planes to the ballistics of the bomb load and the coordinates of the drop site.

As the B-52's entered the war zone sometime between midnight and dawn, Knight and his men picked up each plane on the radar and established radio contact, gave the navigators the coordinates for their missions, tracked the planes as they proceeded to their target zones, and laid down a narrow radar beam to guide the planes precisely over the targets. The controllers watched on their screens as the planes formed up into cells of three for the bombing run, then counted down for the bombardiers to give the precise instant to release the bombs.

When the mission was complete, Knight filled out a post-strike report form and entered the coordinates of the bombed sites into the computer system of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), and thus into the official record system of the Pentagon and the official history of the war.

By February of 1970, the Air Force had been conducting "continuous limited air strikes" for five years. The North Vietnamese had long before moved their main supply line, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, west across the border into Cambodia, and Prince Sihanouk, the Cambodian head of state, had long ago yielded to a mix of bribes and threats and looked the other way when they brought in supplies through the port of Sihanoukville and set up permanent base camps in Cambodia's eastern fringes.

In 1967, 68, and 69, Americans and South Vietnamese had conducted numerous reconnaissance missions across the Cambodian borders, some of which Sihanouk had protested and others he had ignored. In January of 1968, the North Vietnamese had launched the Tet Offensive, and in November Richard Nixon had been elected on a platform promising Vietnamization of the war and an American withdrawal. By February of 1970, thirteen months into Nixon's first term, it was apparent that the president was anxious to attack the sanctuaries in Cambodia as a means to buy time for Vietnamization, but that he was unwilling to pay the political price in terms of popular displeasure and congressional relations for widening the war. TET

Hal Knight was aware of all this, and he had spoken to veterans of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols--Special Forces who had crossed into Cambodia and came back with reports of underground hospitals, weapons, and supply caches and regiment-sized concentrations of troops.

In the early afternoon of March 15th, Major Knight was called into Lt Col Patterson's Office and told the following:

From time to time we have special missions that we run off here. We will get our normal frags, but then sometimes we will get a call on the telephone from Saigon, and the fellow on the other end of the phone will say there is a man coming to see you, and he will give you a time.

When the time comes, go over to the other side of the field and meet his airplane. A man will step off the plane and hand you an envelope. Take the envelope and come straight back to the site. When you get back to the site, lock it up in your desk and then don't leave your desk.

In the envelope you will find a set of target coordinates. Calculate the ballistics for them, and direct the sorties that night to those coordinates. You can ignore the normal frags for that night to those coordinates. You can ignore the normal frags for that night.

When the run is over, take all the paperwork--the computer tapes, the brush kraft reportings and the display board paper, everything--lock it up again in the desk, and stay with it until dawn. When daylight comes, gather up every scrap, take it out to the burn barrel outside the revetment and incinerate every piece.

Finally, take the frags that were cabled in the usual way from Washington and enter that set in the Strategic Air Command computer system as though they had been bombed that night.

You don't talk to anybody about these missions.

When Knight inquired who authorized this procedure, Patterson told him he wasn't to ask.

It is 2200 hours on the night of March 15. The first special courier flight arrived this afternoon and passed you an envelope which you have locked up in your desk. The bombers will be overhead in two hours. Put yourself in Major Knight's position, which is entirely non-fictional, and be prepared to discuss with the Seminar exactly what you think should be done.

Things you should know about the Cambodia case:

1. All the details and quotations are drawn from "Bombing in Cambodia" Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, July 16, 23, 25, 26, 30; August 7, 8, 9, 1973. (SuDoc #Y4.Ar5/3:C14) (I have a copy in my office.)

2. Knight did follow the secret procedures on that occasion and on many subsequent ones. 3,630 secret sorties were flown over Cambodia between March 17, 1969 and May 1970. In early 1973, Knight, who had become distressed at the severe treatment meted out to General Lavelle in another secret bombing case, wrote a letter to Senator Proxmire. Proxmire's staff interviewed Knight, then referred the matter to the Arms Services Committee.

3. Knight was at the end of a chain of command stretching downward from Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor. Kissinger insisted on absolute secrecy, and to assure that secrecy he went to two extremes: (a) He wiretapped the home and office phones of his assistants Anthony Lake, Roger Morris, and Morton Halperin. (Halperin later sued and received a large settlement. Wire tapping, the hallmark tactic of the Nixon administration, began six weeks into his presidency with the secret bombing of Cambodia, and it was initiated by Kissinger.) (b) Kissinger worked through Alexander Haig to pressure a SAC colonel assigned to the Joint Chiefs names Sitton to create the secret procedures that evaded the Strategic Air Command's accountability system. (There is a fascinating story, too long to retell here, how Kissinger and Haig used all the props of the presidency, including a sudden and unexplained trans-Atlantic trip on Air Force One, to wow Colonel Sitton into collaborating in subverting the record system of SAC.)

4. Knight was twice passed over and retired as a major.

LEADERSHIP: PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT

"DO THE RIGHT THING"

The title of the recently released movie by Spike Lee "Do the Right Thing" epitomizes for me what the "ethical choice" should be when faced with a difficult dilemma. It is my position that a leader has the highest responsibility to "do the right thing".

In my last command I had a physician on my staff who was an excellent doctor but was in violation of the Army weight standards. This situation represented a conflict between an Army policy and my perception of a higher goal -- preserving good medical care. The Doctor and his weight problem presented a difficult dilemma for me.

The Doctor was an excellent physician-surgeon who graduated tops in his medical school, and was regarded as the best surgical resident during his training years. He was a very likeable person, loved by his patients, respected by his peers, and the only surgeon on the staff. He was always one of the first to volunteer for community and church activities. His personal challenge was weight control. He weighed 50 pounds over the allowable Army standard for his age and height.

As luck would have it, the Post Commanding General was seen in the surgery clinic by this doctor. The next morning I received a call from the Chief of Staff complimenting the hospital and the Doctor for the excellent medical care given the General. However, he also informed me that the General was very displeased that I would tolerate an officer, no matter how good, violating the Army weight standard.

I immediately reviewed the hospital's weight control program documenting that the Doctor was in compliance with all regulations (i.e. flagged, on diet and exercise programs, closely monitored, and properly counselled).

After six months with close follow-up, he made progress but never successfully reached the Army weight standard. Eventually the decision to process him for elimination from the Army faced me. A number of mitigating factors influenced this decision. Assistance and advice was requested from my higher headquarters (Health Services Command -- H.S.C.). H.S.C. made it clear to me that the disposition on the Doctor was totally my decision, however they reminded me that the Army Medical Corps was critically short surgeons and if the Doctor was eliminated from the Army there would be no replacement; thereby significantly decreasing the availability of medical care for the people served by my hospital. The Post Commanding General

also made it clear to me that he expected adherence to the Army weight standards and no loss of health care services.

Today, the Army Medical Corps still occasionally experiences conflicts between strict adherence to certain Army policies (i.e. weight and P.T.) and preserving access to adequate medical care. Ideally, an Army physician should be clinically competent and meet all soldier requirements including weight and P.T. standards; but in reality, a significant number of physicians fall short of that goal. As long as the Army is on the short side of the supply-demand equation for critically needed physicians -- a dilemma will arise every time a good clinical doctor is eliminated from the Army. The unwritten and unspoken Army Medical Corps policy has been - soldier skills are important but clinical skills are paramount. Consistent with this unwritten policy has been an aggressive elimination of clinically incompetent physicians and a passive tolerance for the lack of soldier skills.

What ethical values are involved in this situation?

What actions would you take as you consider the Commanding General's expectations?

The ending to this story was pleasant as the Doctor remained on active duty and after three more months on the weight program he reached the allowable weight.

I paid a significant price for this decision in the form of mental tension, charges of favoritism from other members of my staff, and a formal counselling session with the Commanding General. This case emphasized to me that when legal, moral, or ethical choices conflict -- the ethical solution is the moral high ground. However, you must expect to pay a high price when moral or legal rules are broken. Man seems to be on an endless search for the perfect formula or code to guide his actions and decisions. Our Judeo-Christian beliefs come close to this perfect formula, but it has been my experience that no specific code or rule will be correct all the time and in all cases.

Ninety-nine percent of the time the legal and moral solution is also the ethical solution, and the successful leader will "do the right thing" in the other one percent also.

"Ethics is not a luxury, it is a necessity."
Something - LTGen Griffith, TIG 1991

"DO THE RIGHT THING"

(CONCLUSIONS)

I concluded that the Doctor's value to the Army Medical Corps outweighed my obligation to process him for elimination from the Army. The critical factors in my decision were as follows:

1. The Medical Corps is part of the Army and should be expected to meet and adhere to all Army standards and policies.
2. Severe mitigating circumstances must be present if strict adherence to any Army policy is not followed; and then, you must be prepared to accept the negative consequences.
3. The loss of the only surgeon for my hospital would result in an unacceptable decrease in medical services for people in my hospital's area of responsibility, and possibly contribute to an increase in disease and suffering.
4. The Doctor did not reach the allowable weight, but his effort on the weight control program was earnest and sincere.
5. His medical skills were invaluable and irreplaceable, thus every effort should be made to keep him on active duty.

*Conflict B/
Pure formalism
and Consequentialism*

APPENDIX B

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMAND, LEADERSHIP, AND MANAGEMENT
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

CH (COL) JOHN W. SCHUMACHER
DIRECTOR, ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

POINT PAPER
ON
ETHICS INSTRUCTION
SEPTEMBER 1990

INTRODUCTION:

"Today, we must emphasize how to think rather than what to think. This requires emphasis on process as well as product--on using and applying the basic analytic tools of our profession rather than on reaching the school solution".

General William R. Richardson, Ret.
Former TRADOC Commander
From his article, "Officer Training
and Education", Military Review, 1984

The educational philosophy of the U.S. Army War College places the educational emphasis on teaching students how to think. The intent is to stimulate students to think creatively and critically. In this environment ethics is foundational to the entire curriculum building process. "The lessons of history and ethics permeate discussions on important issues such as threat, national interest, strategy and theater level warfare". (USAWC Curriculum Pamphlet 1991, pg. 2)

ETHICS AND THE CORE CURRICULUM:

The Core Curriculum is a progression of carefully interrelated courses. The student has the opportunity to perform a series of self-assessments and learn about strategic vision, senior leadership skills (including the ethical dimension of senior level decisionmaking), and other traits and characteristics basic to leadership at the strategic level in both war and peace. Then follows the study of the theory of war, the international political system, the national security decisionmaking process and the national security strategy. The concern for ethical decisionmaking is interwoven throughout the entire curriculum.

COURSE 1--STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP:

Course 1 lays the foundation and framework for the

curriculum. The course focuses on the strategic level of senior leadership. Ethics and command climate are presented by discussing the basics of moral philosophy and then illustrating them in several provocative historical case studies.

Two lessons focus specifically on the moral philosophical underpinnings of ethics:

Ethics and The Senior Leader--a lecture by Col. Mal Wakin of the U.S. Air Force Academy

Elements of Ethical Decisionmaking--a three hour seminar discussion of basic ethical issues: Absolutism, Consequentialism, Egoism, Relativism and Virtue Ethics.

Two subsequent lessons examine the application or misapplication of moral reasoning by use of case studies on My Lai, General LaValle, General Yamashita, and General MacArthur.

COURSE 2--WAR, NATIONAL POLICY, AND STRATEGY:

Course 2 examines the links that relate the U.S. Armed Forces to the national government, American society, and the global environment; addresses the national security policy process; introduces the strategic thought process; analyzes national security and national military strategies; and outlines current U.S. global military and nuclear strategy. Prevailing in this environment is the undercurrent of issues relating to Just War. A poster outlining Just War (Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum) is placed on the wall in each of our 18 seminar classrooms during the Jus In Bello discussion of My Lai in Course 1.

COURSE 3--IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:

Course 3 continues the examination of Strategic Leadership and Ethics introduced in Course 1 and includes Joint Planning for Theater Warfare. This is followed by the Conduct of Theater Warfare. Just War and other ethical concerns relating to translating national security strategy into near and mid-term military capabilities and their potential implementation remain a vital part of the informal seminar discussions.

COURSE 4--GLOBAL AND THEATER STRATEGY APPLICATION:

In Course 4 the students have the opportunity to integrate and use the key principles of learning from Courses 1-3 in a series of simulated exercises. Throughout this entire multi-faceted exercise students consider, plan, and employ the various elements of national power in global and theater settings. An ethical consciousness is encouraged by the instructors as the students find themselves in a role playing mode for many of these

lessons.

ADVANCED COURSE PROGRAM;

The Advanced Courses Program consists of a menu of courses that are a direct outgrowth of core curriculum courses. The students are required to take 3 courses during each of these two terms. Terms consist of 9 classes, 3 hours each. An advance course in Ethics is offered in each term, i.e. the same course is offered in each term so that the students have two opportunities to take this course. In AY 90 approximately 65 students took the Advanced Ethics course.

Ethics Advanced Course:

Under the broader title of "Command and Leadership" the course in Advanced Ethics is offered. The program consists of readings, lectures, and case studies and focuses on the following subject areas:

The Ethics of International Diplomacy
The Ethics of the Corporate World and DOD
Setting the Ethical Climate at the Senior Cmd Level
Ethical Dimensions of the Law of Land Warfare
Ethics and the Senior Leader
Student Presentations of Case Studies

CONCLUSION:

A quote from Michael Josephson of the Josephson Institute of Ethics seems an appropriate summary:

"If you make tough decisions based on the old bromide that good ethics is always good business, you begin to think that good business is always good ethics. Both are wrong. Honesty is not always the best policy if economic success is the criteria and sometimes, cheaters prosper. Ethics is not simply an investment. It is a commitment to live up to consistently high standards of honesty, integrity, fairness and respect for others, not because it pays off, but because it is the right thing to do, the right way to be."

Tab A: USAWC Memo 10-11 which outlines the Ethics and Professional Program at USAWC

Tab B: Hardcopy of VGT used by faculty in Course 1 illustrating the place of Ethics in the War College Curriculum.

APPENDIX C

SLIDE #	NAME	DESCRIPTION
14	LSN3-11 .CHT	2Theories

FI Note:

These next 4 theories come directly from the Ethical Armor slides used in previous years. The 4 theories are broken into 2 groups: Weak and Workable.

DISPLAY TIME:

2 WEAK MORAL THEORIES

.ETHICAL EGOISM
(Careerism)

.SITUATIONALISM
(Also called relativism. In layman's language, it means that there is no one standard for judging between right and wrong, i.e., only the situation itself will determine the decision. Thus, everything is relative.)

SLIDE #	NAME	DESCRIPTION
15	LSN3-12 .CHT	Egoism

FI Notes:

- This runs in the face of "selfless" service.
- We sometimes refer to this as careerism
- The chief criterion is self-interest. Actions and decisions are those which support self-interest.
- The egoist (careerist) places his own well-being above every other consideration.
- We all have self-interests. The crucial question is whether self-interest should take precedence over all other interest. Can a soldier have self-interest as his highest motivation?

*Consideration for others
rules out egoism
Others have rights - the same rights as we do.*

DISPLAY TIME:

EGOISM

.CAREERISM

**.RIGHT ACTIONS ARE
THOSE THAT PROMOTE
SELF INTEREST**

**.PLACE OUR OWN
WELL BEING AHEAD OF
EVERY OTHER
CONSIDERATION**

SLIDE #	NAME	DESCRIPTION
16	LSN3-13 .CHT	Situationalism

FI Notes:

- This view emphasizes "doing the right thing" in particular situations. The trouble with this theory is the conclusions to which it can lead.
- If situationalists use rules of conduct at all, they are considered only "rules of thumb."s General rules never supersede particular judgments as to what should be done.
- Situationalists never say "this act is always right or always wrong (e.g., it is not always wrong to lie).
- The problem is that it offers no standard for judging between right and wrong in particular situations.

DISPLAY TIME:

SITUATIONALISM

.OK TO LIE IF IT SEEMS TO BE THE "RIGHT" THING TO DO

.WHAT IS THE "LOVING" THING TO DO IN A GIVEN SITUATION — *Subtle - looks good but can lead to bad decisions*

.NO GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE BEHAVIOR

.SITUATIONS DIFFER SO THE "RIGHT" ACTION WILL DIFFER

SLIDE #	NAME	DESCRIPTION
17	LSN3-14 .CHT	2GdTheories

FI Note:

These theories both have merit. We are neither all of one theory or the other. Most people find themselves combining the two theories in one form or another in their decision making process. This will be pointed out in slide #20.

DISPLAY TIME:

2 ETHICAL THEORIES THAT HELP US DETERMINE WHAT ACTIONS WE SHOULD PERFORM AND WHAT ACTIONS WE SHOULD NOT PERFORM.

.FORMALISM/ABSOLUTISM

Some issues fall clearly within the category of right and wrong.

.UTILITARIANISM/CONSEQUENTIALISM

Some issues are decided on the basis of consequences.

BOTH THEORIES HAVE MERIT

SLIDE #	NAME	DESCRIPTION
18	LSN3-15 .CHT	Formalism

FI Notes:

- This view identifies several general principles for judging right or wrong in our relations with others, which are not dependent on the immediate situation or on consequences.
 - Certain ways of acting are always right or wrong in character.
 - Usually Formalists identify a standard consisting of several general rules to guide conduct in relationships.
 - It is inadequate as a "stand alone" theory since we must always consider the "consequences" of our decisions.
- (Next slide).

DISPLAY TIME:

FORMALISM

**.THERE ARE GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR
JUDGING RIGHT AND WRONG**

**.CERTAIN ACTIONS ARE ALWAYS RIGHT
OR WRONG**

**.WE MUST OPERATE BY CERTAIN RULES
TO BE RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS**

**.CONCERNED ABOUT THE MEANS FOR
REACHING AN ACCEPTABLE "END"**

SLIDE #	NAME	DESCRIPTION
19	LSN3-16 .CHT	Utilitarianism

FI Notes:

-Because the "end result" is the only significant criterion for ethical judgments, utilitarianism may ignore other considerations such as the well-being of minorities. He/she may also disregard obligations growing out of past relations, and neglect traditional norms (rules, standards, regs. etc.,).

-Emphasize that this theory is not bad in and of itself, but can lead to bad decisions. Ideally, our moral framework ought to be a combination of rules (formalism) and a continual awareness of the consequences (utilitarianism).

DISPLAY TIME:

UTILITARIANISM/
CONSEQUENTIALISM

.GREATEST GOOD FOR THE GREATEST
NUMBER

.STRESSES GOOD RESULTS

.WHAT ARE THE BENEFICIAL RESULTS
OF VARIOUS ACTIONS

.END RESULT IS THE ONLY BASIC
CRITERION FOR ETHICAL JUDGMENT

Examples: "Ends Justifies the Means"
"Management by Objective"
"Cost Benefit Analysis"
"I don't care how, just get it done!"

SLIDE #	NAME	DESCRIPTION
20	LSN3-17 .CHT	An Exanded View

DISPLAY TIME:

**AN EXPANDED VIEW OF UTILITARIANISM/
CONSEQUENTIALISM**

**ALL DECISIONS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
AND REFLECT A CONCERN FOR THE IN-
TERESTS AND WELL-BEING OF OTHERS.
(Formalism)**

**Stakeholder Rule: Everyone af-
fected by an act has a moral
claim on the decision maker.**

**IT IS ETHICALLY PROPER TO VIOLATE AN
ETHICAL PRINCIPLE WHEN IT IS CLEARLY
NECESSARY TO ADVANCE ANOTHER TRUE
ETHICAL PRINCIPLE WHICH WILL PRO-
DUCE THE GREATEST BALANCE OF GOOD
IN THE LONG RUN.
(Utilitarianism)**

**If everyone did it, would it be
good for society?**

↳ Rule of Universality

APPENDIX D

A FORMAT FOR ANALYZING CASE STUDIES

- .Which options are unacceptable and why?
- .How does the dealing with ambiguous facts reveal value priorities or reasoning shortcomings?
- .Were the major options limited by assumptions or systemic constraints that could have been challenged or changed?
- .Who should be involved in making the decision?
- .Who should be consulted first?
- .Who should be informed and in what sequence?
- .What problems of implementation can be anticipated?
- .What mechanisms for monitoring and modifying should be established?
- .How could the problem have been avoided place?
- .Is there anything you would do to avoid similar situations?