“Humanitarian Intervention as a Pre-emptive Military Action: Issues to be Addressed”
Dr. Joanne K. Lekea
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
With regards to the definition of humanitarian intervention, we should bear in mind that this definition, as well as the principles underpinning it, has significantly changed following the changes occurring in inter-state relationships˙ military intervention is a political term, which reflects the public debates on relevant issues. The existing definitions - as it will become clear from their quoting below - some times brief and other times more extended demonstrate the emphasis placed on protecting human rights. However, before defining humanitarian intervention, it is worth looking at how intervention itself is defined˙ intervention, thus, is defined as “the insertion of external forces, often into zones of ongoing or potential conflict, to prevent the outbreak or spread of hostilities; or to resolve the situation to the advantage of a favored party; or more broadly to take advantage of the situation in order to acquire territory or influence”. Military intervention is usually characterized by sending troops to a sovereign country, contrary to the consent of its government: “military intervention is the use of armed troops to effect a change in the political system of a sovereign state without prior permission and without declaring war” .
Humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, emphasizes on the fundamental rights of the citizens been violated, as it comprises: “the proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government”. It is worth noting that the repulsive acts of the government that violates its citizens' rights form the basis, which gives the right to foreign states to intervene in order to put the situation under international control. Humanitarian intervention is often coined as a state using force against another with the aim of terminating gross violations of human rights against its citizens˙ specifically, it is referred to as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied”. Furthermore, it is defined as “coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread human suffering”.
The definitions above put humanitarian interventions in the right dimensions and provide a complete framework for debating about them. However, we need to look at whether we can claim that humanitarian interventions, as a whole, form a kind of pre-emptive war for the benefit of humanity, under the condition that their aims are not limited to relieving a state's population from suffering due to a number of different causes (as demonstrated from the definitions cited above)˙ can be extended to cover for preventing the extension of the conflict - and its resulting problems - beyond the borders of the specific state that could possibly be the reason for an extended armed conflict. The concept is demonstrating itself in the state's own practice: it is not random that in the vast majority of humanitarian interventions, the justification and the legal grounds of the intervention relates to the fear of destabilizing peace and international security.
The issue of pre-emptive war is part of the generic discussion about the right of states to revolt to legal defense - a debate with a number of open issues, as many claim that legal defense should take the form of military force only when there is a direct threat and any response by other non-forcible means is impossible. On the other hand, it is claimed that a state can use military force in a pre-emptive way, in order to defend itself against an attack before it takes place. As it is clear from the above, the right of a state A to go into war with a state B, with the justification that there is intelligence information suggesting that state B will launch an attack against it in the near future is a grey area.
The doctrine of pre-emptive war is not without its problems (as it is not a panacea). The attempt of thinking of, considering and treating humanitarian interventions as a form of pre-emptive war has not taken place yet, so there is ample space for the current research. In addition, it is worth looking at the approaches to this doctrine in order to solve other contemporary issues. One of these approaches is trying to attack the problem of international terrorism - with all necessary adjustments and clarifications - is at the moment debated on international level.
This is the case, as there are issues about violating the state's territorial integrity˙ another important aspect is whether information originating from a state's secret services intelligence, which in most of the cases form the grounds on which the coming attack is justified achieve high credibility, to the level of justifying declaring war˙ furthermore, other aspects we need to consider relate to the extent to which the current situation could have been resolved by other non-military means; military means can seriously threat non-combatants, especially if hostilities take place within the limits of populated areas˙ finally, an issue of vital importance is the extent to which the principles of proportionality and necessity are been applied.
The issue pictured above is worth considering within the framework of humanitarian interventions, restructured in the following form:
•Firstly, is it possible to claim that a humanitarian intervention that is launched from a state A or from an alliance of states AB is allowed, when a predictable chain of attacks exists against violations of human rights in the territory of a state C in the near future? What are the treaties on the basis of which such an attack can be justified with the use of military weapons? How is the principle of not interfering with the internal affairs of a sovereign state been applied in this case? Who is empowered to make such a decision? These questions fall under the principles of existence of just cause and right intention, principles forming the moral grounds for justifying the launch of the attack, as well as the decision making process by the legitimate authority˙ these principles are closely related to international law legislation, as it will become clear from the following sections.
•Secondly, can a humanitarian intervention, launched in order to stop or prevent gross and widespread violations of human rights from occurring, as well as its possible "side-effects" be considered as a form of pre-emptive war, whose target is to prevent the extension of mass violations of human rights in the case that these violations may constitute a threat for the international peace and security?
The focus of this research is fully defined by these questions; it will try and answer them in order to demonstrate that humanitarian intervention is a form of pre-emptive war (conducted for the benefit of humanity as a whole), aiming at preventing or stopping grave and widespread violations of human rights with military means and which occurs within the territory of a sovereign state, against which there are no territorial disputes - or disputes of any other kind - and the final aim is the protection of human rights and the establishment of international peace and security.
In relation to the arguments above, we will try to adopt an approach to the principles of just war about the just cause, the competent authority and the right intention, that exclusively refers to humanitarian interventions and their relationship to the doctrine of pre-emptive war. The aim of this approach will be to demonstrate the different nature and practice of these interventions as opposed to war actions. Also, to show that the view, under which these principles are considered, is different, because the state (or the group of states) is not involved any more in an inevitable war, as a result of an attack from another hostile state, but uses its military power to help a sovereign state, which for a number of reasons is in a difficult situation.
The use of military means in peace and humanitarian missions is a challenge for the Just War Theory. According to the United Nations Charter, in order for the criterion of just cause to be satisfied - for making use of military means to settle an international dispute - the state using force should have been under attack or in dispute about critical issues (for example, violation of its borders). In the case of humanitarian interventions, this is no longer the case, but another state that is not under attack or in any dispute is taking part in a dispute in order to help a state, which is in a difficult situation (due to internal turbulence or because there are disputes with nearby states that result in armed conflicts).
In the past, especially during the 19th century, as well as nowadays, it is not rare to witness a state - or a group of states - intervening in the internal or foreign affairs of another state. The rationale used in most of the cases is that the turbulent situation in one state can pose a threat to international peace and security.
These interventions, however, do not happen without skepticism, concerning at least the levels of political correctness and legitimacy of the action. There are four things we need to consider when making a decision in favor or against a humanitarian intervention:
Ø the influence, that the state has on international legislation with its decision to intervene or not;
Ø the reasons for which it intervenes;
Ø the extent to which its intervention contributes to both the national and international interests; and finally
Ø whether the legal frameworks, established by the international legislation and the international organizations, are adhered to in order for the operation to be legal.
The legal justification of an operation is not enough, as we might witness more operations - typically justified - because they were called to help the state in danger - but essentially they are based on national interests. The moral justification of the operation has to complement its legal justification to secure fulfillment of the criterion of right intention so that only the right purposes are served.
The principle of non-operation, first appearing at the beginning of the 19th
century is stated in the French Constitutional Map of 1793 for the first time,
From the viewpoint of the Just War Theory, deciding to intervene in the internal affairs of another country can be justified if certain conditions hold. Historically, we can refer to two relevant pieces of information: Ambrosius states that whoever does not help his friend dealing with a difficult situation has the same degree of responsibility as the person who caused it, while Hugo Grotius advocates that humanitarian intervention is a just reason for a state to go into war, as the king of a country or its leaders have to seek and punish those who violate the rights of people in other states, even if they are not affected by the abuses. In the case of citizens being abused by the states' leaders, intervention is justifiable. Among the reasons that give a state the right to intervene are: cannibalism, piracy and abuse of old people.
The issues of moral and legal justification of a humanitarian intervention, as well as the relationship of human rights to territorial integrity and political independence, formed the framework for a number of debates both on moral and legal grounds. The relationship between the moral and legal parts of humanitarian interventions is the focus of the current paper. In that, we are trying to combine International Law with the principles of a moral theory about war, the Just War theory; we are looking at whether the principles of Just War theory can be applied in the case of humanitarian interventions and whether any adjustments are required. The opponents of humanitarian interventions fall, in general, under three categories: those who, under no circumstances, justify it and in parallel argue that the use of military force can only be justified as a response to an armed attack˙ those who justify the intervention only as a response to gross violations of human rights (genocide, mass murders, slavery)˙ finally, to those who justify the right to humanitarian intervention even if violations have not reached genocide levels.
First of all, from a political philosophy and theory viewpoint, we believe that the people in power at a specific point in time form the medium through which citizen rights are been represented; citizens live in a country and, essentially, they are the state. The idea that the state is a group of people with the final aim of protecting them better is not a new one. The moral background, the values and the rights of each person are these factors, which, in essence, give states their rights, which relate to their territorial integrity and political independence. Thus, the rights of the states are derived from the rights of citizens and that is the reason why the state has the right to protect them.
How are these all related to humanitarian interventions? The citizens, when consenting to the formation of a society and are, thus, taken to the creation of a state through some political procedures, in essence they agree to the people in power protecting their rights. When states and governments preserve and seek their primary target – preserving citizens’ rights – then going into war with this country or even launching an attack against it, is considered to be a crime and is declared illegal by the U.N. Charter. What happens though with the governments that not only do they not protect the rights of their citizens, but are those who violate them?
Indeed, there are governments that on top of not protecting the rights of their citizens, they violate them. In this case, we can claim that the humanitarian intervention is launched in order to protect the rights of the citizens of a state, whose government violates them to a great extent intentionally. Then, the right of political independence is gone as the state is not capable of carrying out its primary mission, which is the protection of its citizens. The use of military force by the intervention powers within these frameworks is been carried out in order to protect human rights and this is an additional reason for adhering to the principles of discrimination and proportionality that relate to the conduct of war operations in a more rigid manner.
From a legal viewpoint, paying respect to human rights is in the interest of all states and does not fall anymore under the internal legislation of the individual states; serious violations form the legal grounds on which the launch of humanitarian interventions can be justified, whilst the latest decisions of the Security Council allow the intervention even in cases when there is a threat to international peace and security. This means that these military interventions, apart from their humanitarian aspect, have an aspect of pre-emptive usage of military force in order for a problem of a local or state level to not further influence international peace and security.
The concern for cases of serious
violations of human rights has been acutely expressed, as a number of the General
Assembly Resolutions indicate ˙ there are extensive references to human
rights in the cases of
The political regime of a state is closely related to the degree of respect it pays to human rights. It is widely acceptable that if the violations of human rights in a state have not reached certain limits and they are not extended, then the international community should not intervene and judge the legitimacy of the government where the violations are taking place. On the other hand, many people disagree with this argument as the democratic system of government is directly linked to the respect of human rights and the effective running of the state. These are the reasons justifying the humanitarian intervention to another state, not only for relieving the population, but also for changing the government system to democratic, so that the government model can terminate violations and bring peace and security to the state.
With respect to the above, for a number of scholars, the moral use of military force is the responsibility of each individual state except if states are replaced by some kind of super-power in the future: this means that avoiding to intervene where intervention is needed is equivalent to avoiding to take responsibility, as even those states that have limited capabilities will need to be active even when their actions will result in less benefits˙ the right to intervene is not an issue of power, but an issue of responsibility to the international community.
It has already been stated that the intervention on humanitarian grounds gave rise to a number of debates in the field of International Law for some time now. In many cases the humanitarian aspect of the intervention was a pretext to justify the intervention of dominating states to smaller ones within their sphere of power. The principle of non-intervention in this case guarantees the independence of these states and their citizens, as apart from the territorial integrity of a state, it is also important to be independent at a financial and political level (independence which is either limited or controlled by the wills of the powerful states).
In this subsection, in contrast with the argument stated above, we are going to advocate the view that the following two principles can be considered as just and sufficient to justify the launch of a humanitarian intervention:
v when there are behaviors in a state that result in serious violations of human rights and, in parallel with the consequences of these behaviors, there is a danger for international peace and security (e.g., the peace and security of other states is influenced by these actions);
v when there are behaviors in a state that result in serious violations of human rights, even if those violations are exclusively limited to the borders of this state, without any threat for international peace and security .
These principles, of course, place the respect of human rights and the maintenance of peace and security on top of a ‘strictly by the book’ reading of territorial integrity. These principles will have to be compatible with international law legislation and be applied in such a way that will provide guidance every time that the moral and legal justification of a humanitarian intervention will be in question.
The issue of which power can decide whether an intervention is just or
not went through a number of development stages. In the
In the current era, unilateral interventions continued mainly until the end of the Cold War; the leader of the state still was the competent authority to decide about interventions, which will set the state’s army in motion (either for war or for military intervention) until the time that the U.N. Charter was adopted and any decisions relevant to military action were taken in a collective manner, whilst the decisions taken only by the leaders of the individual states have problems both of legitimacy and moral justification.
According to the U.N. Charter, humanitarian interventions that are carried out by the use of military force raises certain issues as the use of force – in order to be legal – will have to fall under one of the following cases:
a) there is authorization from the Security Council allowing the use of military force within the framework of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter;
b) there is authorization for taking military action to a regional agency  and
c) the military action should be justified as exercising the legal right of citizens to self-defense, either at individual or collective level.
As far as the first case is concerned, in Article 39 it is stated that if the Security Council shall determine “the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security”. Article 41 defines peaceful means of applying pressure in order for the resolutions of the Security Council to be effective (partial or complete interruption of economic relations and means of communication, even with severance of diplomatic relations), while Article 42 states that in the case that the measures defined in Article 41 prove to be insufficient and ineffective, then the Security Council can decide to proceed with military operations with the participation of air, sea or land forces. In any case, the members of the United Nations will have to apply any measures deemed necessary.
With respect to the second case, it is not possible to find any article in the U.N. Charter, which gives the right to regional agencies to decide about launching military actions with their own initiative, whilst regional agencies will have to be run according to the principles of the United Nations and promote their aims˙ in Article 53(1) it is stated that “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any state, until such time as the Organization may, on the request of the governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state”.
Finally, with regards to the third case it refers to the inherent right of self-defense, as this is described in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. When a member state is attacked, then it has the right of individual or collective self-defense. There are, of course, important differences between humanitarian intervention and collective self-defense, though many times there are overlaps, e.g. when a state faces extensive and serious issues of violation of human rights as a result of the attack from another state. In this case, any help received from a third state and the intervention that might be launched will have to be judged with reference to the framework of collective self-defense and not with the right of humanitarian intervention.
In the recent past, the Security Council has decided and gave its consent for interventions for the following cases: Iraq’s invasion into Kuwait in 1991, in Yugoslavia in 1991, in Haiti during 1991-1994, in Liberia during 1990-1992, in Angola from 1993 onwards, in Somalia during 1992-1993, in Rwanda in 1994, in East Zaire in 1996, in Central African Republic during 1996-1998, in Albania in 1997, in Sierra Leone during 1997-1998 and in East Timor in 1999.
Within the framework of the U.N. Charter, with a rigid interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51, the ability of legal justification of unilateral humanitarian interventions is very limited. Even regional agencies in order to fulfill the legitimacy requirements, will need to have the consent and the authorization of the Security Council for their actions. Quid juris, though, in the case in which a state Α takes military action in the territory of another state Β, with the aim of limiting or stopping the violations of human rights [with an aim, thus, that is compatible with the principles of the United Nations according to Article 1(3)] and without acting against the political independence or territorial integrity of state B? It is located at this point a conflict between the aims of the United Nations for protecting human rights and the prohibition from using military force.
The question above helps us to identify a ‘grey area’ regarding issues concerning the framework for launching humanitarian interventions, especially when they are decided by a single state. With regards to the prohibition posed by Article 2(4), we consider that this can be extended in the case of humanitarian interventions as well, when there is no prior consent for them by the Security Council. This allows for the reduction of unilateral interventions from states or regional agencies, which will serve interests well hidden behind the so-called humanitarian motives. The attitude of the Security Council is very important in this direction, which will need to show real humanitarian interest when looking at the cases for which intervention is suggested, as well as adhering to the same criteria in the decisions regarding the practice of humanitarian interventions.
From a moral viewpoint, it is many times the case that an issue can be urgent and the procedures of the Security Council might be too slow for the pace of events; in some exceptional cases, where immediate action is required, a unilateral humanitarian intervention (or an intervention carried out by a regional agency) without prior consent of the Security Council might be morally justified, but not legitimate. As many times there are humanitarian motives in unilateral interventions, their legitimacy could be later established with a resolution by the Security Council. The judgment of the Security Council is very valuable not only from a legal viewpoint but also from a moral one, as it constitutes another assurance that indeed all measures have been either tested or judged to be insufficient and the military intervention is, thus, necessary.
The unilateral humanitarian intervention should, therefore, be a really exceptional, rare case and should be avoided to the greatest possible extent and the states should definitely not take advantage of that practice to serve their own national interests. The current International Law, anyway, as expressed through the U.N. Charter disallows it, creating a strong barrier, which protects the right to independence for small states, when there is no strong reason for carrying out the intervention. The intervention, which is carried out without the consent of the Security Council does not stop being a military action, which was decided and put in action without any previous negotiations and which, in the end, might be hiding reasons of national interest, not at all humanitarians.
It should be noted here that in order for a unilateral humanitarian intervention without the previous consent of the Security Council to be carried out and claim not only legitimacy but also accordance to the moral rules, the principles ruling the conduct of war should be followed – these are defined from International Treaties and Conventions as well as from all international regulations in their strictest readings, given that the purpose for which the intervention is carried out is relief of a states’ civilians without asking for any returns for the help provided.
The ‘side-targets’, as well as the ultimate aim of a humanitarian intervention, should always be closely related to the symptoms that caused the launch of the intervention. One of the most important tests, which judge whether the intervention was a success or not, is if the final aim was achieved or not; in other words, to what extent human rights were established and whether that contributed to the stabilization of international peace and security. In any case, the state or group of states launching the intervention should not seek to gain benefits related to its national interests or increase its influence, which the state or group of states hopes to achieve in the area where the intervention is launched.
As it was mentioned in the sub-section about the just cause, it is indeed very difficult for a state to act on the basis of selfless motives˙ on the other hand, it is from any aspect unacceptable to realize that the humanitarian motives were only used for the promotion of national interests during or even after the end of a humanitarian intervention. When such practices are observed, then the theory and practice of humanitarian interventions is been damaged in its essence: their humanitarian nature proves to be false and problematic and as a result the states’ practice is under serious doubt. This doubt leads to a reduction of the number of humanitarian interventions been carried out and people who really need help may not receive it.
There are some cases of
interventions that the states presented as humanitarians but in which, it
turned out after their conduct, that there were other motives than simply altruistic.
The intervention of
Concluding, we can say that as the final aim of an intervention, closely related to the causes that invoked it, should be the maintenance and stabilization of peace and the respect to human rights. This, often, demands the reformation of democratic institutions in the cases where the legally established power was arbitrary ousted or even the offer of help for assisting a state to restructure its services when it – for any reason (natural disaster, civil war or any other reason) - faces serious problems in producing, managing and distributing resources. In that case, even if there are other motives beyond humanitarian reasons (which should always be at the centre of humanitarian interventions), these expediencies should not in any case be promoted at the expense of the offer for help and the essential contribution to the state in the soil of which the intervention is launched ˙ this would have been in conflict even to the real existence of a just cause, which initiated the procedures for launching the intervention.
In any case when the aim of the humanitarian intervention is achieved and the running of the state is smooth again, any military forces as well as any military personnel that took part in the operation, will have to leave the state as soon as possible and without trying to create any dependence. The withdrawal of military troops and personnel from the state where the intervention happened immediately after achieving its aim, even if it does not provide strong evidence that the state or group of states that launched the intervention is not trying to promote their national interests, it is though an indication for that at least one of the principal aims of the intervention had a selfless basis: the offering of help to a state, which had difficulties so that it can now effectively face them based on its own powers, institutions and administration, which the foreign state helped to reorganize and put them in action again. If the aims stated above are achieved, in the absence of any others, the military troops and personnel have to leave the state without any further non-necessary ‘interventions’.
As we can gather from the analysis above, humanitarian interventions can indeed be seen as a kind of pre-emptive war with the aim of preventing or stopping any extensive violations of human rights, and, in that way, to prevent any local conflicts from spreading that would put international peace and security in danger. These two parameters are absolutely desirable and legitimate within the frameworks set by the international law readings referring to armed conflicts. This is also true for the framework set by the U.N. Charter, which puts emphasis on the respect of human rights, but also to its importance for the maintenance and stabilization of international peace.
Concluding the current research, we should note and take seriously into consideration the fact that humanitarian interventions, even when viewed as a kind of pre-emptive war to the benefit of humanity as a whole, should be motivated by altruistic motives and should honor their moral dimension. They should not, in any way, be carried out aiming at promoting the interests of the state or the group of states launching the intervention, but they should be carried out in the interests of the citizens of another state who are facing difficult situations to the greatest extent from their own government, so that the protection of civilians – for the benefits of whom the intervention is launched – should be supported with even stricter measures from those that are applicable for the case of war.
 Connaughton, R. M., 1992. Peacekeeping
and Military Intervention,
 Luttwak, Edward/Koehl Stuart L., 1998. The
Dictionary of Modern War. A Guide to the Ideas, Institutions and Weapons of the
Modern Military Power Vocabulary.
 Lang Jr., Anthony F., 2002. Agency and Ethics. The Politics of Military Intervention. New York, Albany: State University of New York Press, p.3.
 Tesón, Fernardo R., 1997. Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality.
 Liakopoulos, Dimitris J.., 2001. The law in humanitarian intervention. From
 Farer, Tom J., 1991. “An Inquiry into the legitimacy of Humanitarian
Intervention” εις Damrosch, Lori Fishler/Schefer, David J.
(eds), 1991. Law and Force in the new
 Holzgrefe, J.L., 2003.
“The humanitarian intervention debate”, εις Holzgrefe, J.L./Keohane, Robert O. (eds),
2003. Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical,
Legal and Political Dilemmas.
 Welsh, Jennifer M. (ed), 2004. Humanitarian Intervention and International
 Indicative is the fact that there is only one reference to the violation of international peace in the Resolutions adopted by the Security Council from 1990 onwards; this is in SC Resolution 660 (1990) with regards to Iraq's invasion into Kuweit.
 Tepliz, R.F., 1995. “Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the
 This is called preemptive war. See Dinstein, Y., 1983. The Laws of War. Tel Avid: Shocken and Tel Avid University Press, p.p.68-70. Based on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, referring to the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, preemptive action can only be justified on the grounds that hostile action is expected in the near future. See, Gross, Emanuel, 2000. “Self-defense against Terrorism-What Does It Mean? The Israeli Perspective”. Journal of Military Ethics (2002) 1(2):96-97.
 The references cited here regarding the war against terrorism aim at demonstrating that the approach to the doctrine of pre-emptive war and the resulting limitations from the viewpoint of the Just War Theory is possible. Specifically, the question of whether the war against terrorism can be applied in a preventive manner having legal grounds at the same time poses questions and relates to attempts of applying it to other cases, one of which is the case of humanitarian interventions, with all necessary adjustments of course.
 This issue has been debated to a great extent
in accordance with the possibility of a pre-emptive war against terrorism. The
issue of whether an attack from a state A against a terrorist organization B
acting in a foreign state C, is a violation of territorial integrity of the
country C is something that has been analyzed from a great number of scholars.
 In the case of pre-emptive war against
terrorism for example, receiving reliable information is of vital importance;
otherwise, the war can be considered as an act of aggression, non-justifiable under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. For more information, see Schmitt, Michael,
1992. “State-sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law”. Yale Journal of International Law 17:
609-685. Also, Scheideman, S.N., 2000. “Note: Standards of Proof in the
Forcible Responses to Terrorism”.
 For the case of pre-emptive war against terrorism see Rowles, J.S., 1987. “Military Responses to Terrorism: Substantive and Procedural Constrains in International Law”. American Society of International Law Proceedings 81: 307-317. Also, Baker, M.B., 1987. “Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the U.N. Charter)”. Houston Journal of International Law, p.p.25-49.
 Kasher, A., 1996. Military Ethics. Tel Avid: Ministry of Defense Press.
 As, for example, mass population movements to neighboring states resulting in problems in managing resources in those countries that can lead to further financial problems, even to conflicts with the leaders of the country or countries, where abuse of population takes place and which are the source countries for the refugees.
 The questions posed above will be further analyzed in the sub-sections of the current chapter, especially in those related to the conditions of taking the decision for the operation from the legitimate authority and the existence of a just cause, deeming the operation necessary.
 This is closely related to the issue of existence of a just cause, which will justify the decision to launch the operation. For further information on this, see the current paper and, more specifically, sub-section 3.2. where the existence of a just reason to make the operation necessary is analyzed.
 Connaughton, R.M., 1996. Military Support and Protection for Humanitarian Assistance, Rwanda, April-December 1994. United Kindgom: Strategic & Combat Studies Institute, p.p.4-6 and Baines, Thomas, 1997. “The Applicability of the Laws of War to Peacekeeping”, presented at Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE), held in Washington, 1997.
 See also Articles 2(4) and 51.
 On this issue, see Weiss, Thomas G./Collins, Cindy, 2000. Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and the Dilemmas of Help. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. Also, Humanitarian Studies Unit, 2001. Reflections On Humanitarian Action: Principles, Ethics and Contradictions (Transnational Institute). London: Pluto Press.
 For an overview on the subject, see Lyons, Gene M./Mastanduno, Michael, 1995. Beyond
Fatouros, Argyris A., 1994. Chaos after Terror; International
Legislation at the threshold of the 21st century. Athens-Commotini:
 Peacekeeping operations, for example, decided by the Security Council after 1999, drawing power from Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, have been extended, with respect to both their number and targets which they support and advocate. For more information, check the official website of United Nations at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko.
 Wakin, Malham M., 2000. Integrity First, Reflections of a Military Philosopher. Maryland: Lexington Books, p.p.157-159. Also, Pfaff, Charles A., 2000. “Peacekeeping and the Just War Tradition”, presented `in JSCOPE, held in Washington, 2000.
 Johnson, James Turner, 1999. Morality and Contemporary Warfare. New York: Yale University Press, p.p.75-76.
 Mays, Antje, 1997. “Of Law, Lawlessness and Sovereignty”, presented in JSCOPE, held in Washington, in 1997.
 For an overview, see Reisman, Michael W.,
1990. “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law”. American Journal of International Law 84:
866-876. Also, World Conference on Human Rights, 1993. The
 Tesón, ibid, p.23.
 For an overview see Moseley, Alexander/Norman, Richard, 2002. Human
Rights and Military Intervention. Hampshire, Abingdon, Oxon: Ashgate
Publishing. Also, Matlary, Janne Haaland, 2002. Intervention for Human Rights in Europe.
 Especially for the case
 See Aristotle and other ancient and contemporary political philosophers.
 See the current analytical discussion in Randelzhofer,
Responsibility and the Individual: Reparation in Instances of Grave Violations
of Human Rights.
 For a full account see Lehning, Percy B.
Democracy, and Justice in the New Europe (European Political Science Series).
 Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
 According to Tesón, justifying humanitarian interventions resembles to a great extent to justifying war, when the latter can be justified and is carried out as self-defense. The citizens of the state that is going into war for reasons of self-defense are in essence, trying to defend their rights – in other words they are motivated by the same desire that is the essential motive of humanitarian intervention. See Tesón, ibid, p.p.119-121. This view, though, neglects an important factor: the case of the citizens of a state deciding to defend their rights is a completely different case from the intervention of another state˙ the legitimate authority taking this decision differentiates between the two cases, which should be further analyzed in different frameworks.
 Weston, B., 1992. “Human Rights” in Claude
Richard Pierre/Weston, Burns H., 1992. Human
Rights in the World Community.
 See the Security Council Resolutions from 1990 onwards.
 GA Resolution 46/242.
 GA Resolution 46/133.
 GA Resolution 46/134.
 GA Resolution 46/136.
 GA Resolution 46/7.
 GA Resolution 45/173.
 Fox, G.H., 1992. “The Right to Political Participation in International Law”. 17 Yale Journal of International Law: 549-569.
 See the following texts: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, American Convention on Human Rights, First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
 Restatement of Foreign Relations (Third), §201(d).
 The remark that states with democratic
governments are less likely to declare war leads to linking this type of
government to expectations of reaching a stable state with international peace
was first stated by Kant. For more information, see: Tesón, F.R., 1992. “The
Kantian Theory of International Law”. 92
 Johnson, ibid, p.p.76-81. This argument is closely linked to the principle of legitimate authority, which will be analysed in the following sub-section.
Hadjikonstantinou, Kostas, 1999. Approaches
to International Humanitarian Law.
 For example, the
 Fatouros, ibid, p.p.11-17 and Regan, Richard J., 1996. Just War, Principles and Cases. Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, p.p.68-83.
 These two principles do not exhaust the limits of humanitarian intervention. We can easily add more to the list, such as launching the intervention in order to avoid an ecological disaster or an intervention carried out in order to help a state overcome a natural disaster. This resembles more a case of humanitarian assistance, rather than a case of humanitarian intervention.
 That should read in cases of gross and widespread violations of human rights.
 Nussbaum, Arthur, 1962. A Concise History of the Law of Nations.
 Chesterman, Simon, 2001. Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian
intervention and international law.
 Sarooshi, Danesh, 1993. Humanitarian Intervention
and International Humanitarian Assistance: Law and Practice (
 There is, of course, the case of peaceful intervention for solving a problem, as described in Articles 40 and 41 of the U.N. Charter.
 See Articles 39 και 42 of the U.N. Charter.
See Articles 52, 53 και 54 of the U.N. Charter.
 See Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
 The U.N. Charter in Article 25 states that “The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”. Furthermore, Article 43(1) states that “All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security”. Article 48(1) states that “The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine”.
 Article 52(1) of the U.N. Charter.
 Despite these, regional agencies sometimes do carry
out operations within their area limits without authorization from the Security
Council. An example is the peacekeeping force which
was sent by ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) to
 Sarooshi, ibid, p.4.
 For more information, see Resolution 688 (1991) as a result of Resolution 687 (1991), which predicted on one hand the terms under which hostilities would stop but, on the other hand, did not refer to the difficult position of the Iraqi citizens.
 SC Resolution 713 (1991) and 724 (1991).
 SC Resolution 841 (1993), 873 (1993), 875 (1993), 917 (1994), 933 (1994) and 940 (1994).
 SC Resolution 788 (1992).
 SC Resolution 864 (1994).
 SC Resolution 733 (1992), 746 (1992), 751 (1992) and 794 (1992). Also, SC Resolution 814 (1993) and 837 (1993).
 SC Resolution 912 (1994), 918 (1994) and 929 (1994).
 SC Resolution 1078 (1996) and 1080 (1996).
 SC Resolution 1125 (1997).
 SC Resolution 1101 (1997) and 1114 (1997).
 SC Resolution 1132 (1997), 1156 (1998), 1162 (1998) and 1181 (1998).
 SC Resolution 1246 (1999), 1264 (1999) and 1272 (1999).
 It states that “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations”.
 It states that the use of military force is only allowed in the case of individual or collective self-defense, in which case the issue should be directly reported to the Security Council.
 U.N. Charter, Article 53.
 The same principle applies to regional agencies, who should not act without prior authorization of the Security Council.
 Goodrich, Leland
M./Hambro, Edvard/Simons, Anne Patricia, 1969. Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents. New York:
Columbia University Press, p.45. It is worth noting that
neither in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, nor in the Resolution on the Definition
of Aggression of the General Assembly (1974), or in the Declaration on the Threat
or Use of Force is any reference to any practice for the case of humanitarian
intervention without the prior consent of the Security Council. In parallel,
there is the argument of those who claim that the Genocide Convention imposes
on states to perform unilateral interventions when they judge that there is a
need for it and they have the necessary power to prevent and punish the crime
of genocide (Genocide Convention, Article I), as well as to stop gross and
extended violations of fundamental human rights, in which case the U.N. Charter
should be interpreted in line with other International Law Treaties and
Conventions. See, Reisman, M./McDougal, Myres S., 1973. “Humanitarian
Intervention to Protect the Ibos”, in Lillich, Richard B., 1973. Humanitarian
Intervention and the United Nations.
 Stein, Mark S., 2004. “Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention”. Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation 21:1, Winter 2004.
 Lepard, Brian
D., 2002. Rethiking Humanitarian
Intervention. A Fresh Legal Approach Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles in
International Law and World Religions.
 This is something that occured in the
interventions of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in
 Fonteyne, Jean-Pierre L., 1974. “The Customary
International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity
Under the U.N. Charter”.
 See sub-section 2.1. of the current paper.
 S/PV.873 (1960).
 Walzer, Michael, 1984 (4th Edition). Just and Unsjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustration. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Peguin Books, p.105.
 Palit, D.K., 1998. The Lightning Campaign: The
Indo-Pakistan War, 1971.
 Chesterman, ibid, p.77.
 For a further analysis of these causes, see the section on the existence of just cause that deems the intervention necessary.
 On this subject, see Seybolt, Taylor B., 2004. Humanitarian Military Intervention: Causes of Success and Failure (Sipri Research Reports). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 The relevant issues were neither referred to nor
analyzed in this paper as they are not relevant to the central issues analyzed
in it. They are at the center, though, of another paper, in preparation, which
tries to restructure the jus in
Ashraful, Hasan, 1998. Human Rights Dilemmas in Contemporary Times: Issues and Answers. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Incorporation.
Baines, Thomas, 1997. “The
Applicability of the Laws of War to Peacekeeping”, presented at Joint Services
Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE), held in
Baker, M.B., 1987. “Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the U.N. Charter)”. Houston Journal of International Law, p.p.25-49.
Bovard, James, 2000. Freedom in Chains: The Rise of the State and
the Demise of the Citizen. Hampshire,
Buchanan, Allen, 1992. “Self-Determination and the Right to Secede”. Journal of International Affairs 45: 347-365.
Chesterman, Simon, 2001. Just War
or Just Peace? Humanitarian intervention and international law.
Connaughton, R. M., 1992. Peacekeeping and Military
Connaughton, R.M., 1996. Military Support and Protection for Humanitarian Assistance,
Dinstein, Y., 1983. The Laws of
War. Tel Aviv: Shocken and
Farer, Tom J., 1991. “An Inquiry into the legitimacy of Humanitarian
Intervention” εις Damrosch, Lori Fishler/Schefer, David J.
(eds), 1991. Law and Force in the new
Fatouros, Argyris A.,
1994. Chaos after Terror; International Legislation at the threshold of the
21st century. Athens-Commotini:
Fonteyne, Jean-Pierre L., 1974. “The Customary International Law
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N.
Fox, G.H., 1992. “The Right to Political Participation in International Law”. 17 Yale Journal of International Law: 549-569.
Goodrich, Leland M./Hambro,
Edvard/Simons, Anne Patricia, 1969. Charter
of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents.
Gross, Emanuel, 2002. “Self-defense against Terrorism-What Does It Mean? The Israeli Perspective”. Journal of Military Ethics (2002) 1(2):91-108.
1999. Approaches to International
Hannum, Hurst, 1990. Autonomy,
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights.
Holzgrefe, J.L., 2003. “The humanitarian intervention debate”, εις
Holzgrefe, J.L./Keohane, Robert O. (eds), 2003. Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas.
Humanitarian Studies Unit, 2001. Reflections
On Humanitarian Action: Principles, Ethics and Contradictions (Transnational
Johnson, James Turner, 1999.
Morality and Contemporary Warfare.
Kasher, A., 1996. Military Ethics. Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Press.
Kuperman, Alan J., 2001. The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide
Lang Jr., Anthony F., 2002. Agency
and Ethics. The Politics of Military Intervention.
Lehning, Percy B.
/Weale, Albert, 1997. Citizenship, Democracy, and Justice in the New
Lekea, Joanne K., 2003. “ ‘Missile Strike Carried Out With Yemeni Cooperation’- The War Against Terrorism: A Different Kind of War?”. Journal of Military Ethics (2003) (2(3)): 230-239.
Lepard, Brian D., 2002. Rethiking Humanitarian Intervention. A
Fresh Legal Approach Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles in International
Law and World Religions.
Liakopoulos, Dimitris J.., 2001. The law in humanitarian intervention.
Luttwak, Edward/Koehl Stuart L., 1998. The
Dictionary of Modern War. A Guide to the Ideas, Institutions and Weapons of the
Modern Military Power Vocabulary.
Lyons, Gene M./Mastanduno, Michael, 1995. Beyond
Matlary, Janne Haaland, 2002. Intervention
for Human Rights in
Mays, Antje, 1997. “Of Law,
Lawlessness and Sovereignty”, presented in JSCOPE, held in
Moseley, Alexander/Norman, Richard, 2002. Human Rights and Military Intervention. Hampshire, Abingdon, Oxon: Ashgate Publishing.
Nussbaum, Arthur, 1962. A Concise
History of the Law of Nations.
Orford, Anne/Crawford, James/Bell, John (eds), 2003. Reading Humanitarian Intervention : Human
Rights and the Use of Force in International Law (
Palit, D.K., 1998. The Lightning Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War, 1971.
Papakostas, Alkis-B. N., 1988. International Law, Peaceful and Forcible
Means of Solving International Disputes. Athens-Commotini:
Pfaff, Charles A., 2000.
“Peacekeeping and the Just War Tradition”, presented `in JSCOPE, held in
Christian, 1999. State Responsibility and the
Individual: Reparation in Instances of Grave Violations of Human Rights.
Regan, Richard J., 1996. Just War, Principles and Cases.
Reisman, M./McDougal, Myres S., 1973. “Humanitarian Intervention to
Protect the Ibos”, in Lillich, Richard B., 1973. Humanitarian Intervention
and the United Nations.
Reisman, Michael W., 1990. “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law”. American Journal of International Law 84: 866-876.
Rose, Euclid A.,
2002. Dependency and Socialism in the Modern
Rosenau, James N., 1992. “Sovereignty in a Turbulent World”. Scientific
paper which was presented in the Conference on National Sovereignty and
Collective Intervention, which took place at
Rowles, J.S., 1987. “Military Responses to Terrorism: Substantive and Procedural Constrains in International Law”. American Society of International Law Proceedings 81: 307-317.
Sarooshi, Danesh, 1993. Humanitarian Intervention and International
Humanitarian Assistance: Law and Practice (
Scheideman, S.N., 2000. “Note: Standards of Proof in the Forcible
Responses to Terrorism”.
Schmitt, Michael, 1992. “State-sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law”. Yale Journal of International Law 17: 609-685.
Seybolt, Taylor B., 2004. Humanitarian
Military Intervention: Causes of Success and Failure (Sipri Research Reports).
Stein, Mark S., 2004. “Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention”. Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation 21:1, Winter 2004.
Tepliz, R.F., 1995. “Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the
Tesón, F.R., 1992. “The Kantian Theory of International Law”. 92
Tesón, Fernardo R., 1997. Humanitarian
Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality.
Wakin, Malham M., 2000. Integrity First, Reflections of a Military
Walzer, Michael, 1984 (4th Edition). Just and Unsjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustration. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Peguin Books.
Weiss, Thomas G./Collins, Cindy, 2000. Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and the Dilemmas of Help. Boulder, Co: Westview Press.
Weller, Marc, 1994. Regional Peace Keeping and International
Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis (
Welsh, Jennifer M. (ed), 2004. Humanitarian
Intervention and International Relations.
Weston, B., 1992. “Human Rights” in Claude Richard Pierre/Weston, Burns
H., 1992. Human Rights in the World
World Conference on Human Rights, 1993. The