James Jay Carafano
Lieutenant Colonel, USA
Executive Editor
Joint Force Quarterly
Attn: NDU-NSS-JFQ
300 5th Avenue, Building 62
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC 20319-5066
Phone (202) 685-4220
Fax (202) 685-4219
Email: carafanoj@ndu.edu <mailto:carafanoj@ndu.edu>
Introduction
Like
many, Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars was part of the foundation
of my education in military ethics. In this paper I want to revisit Walzer’s
use of history. Rather than derive theory from history, as his subtitle
suggests Walzer uses historical examples to illustrate theory.He
has little confidence in the study of facts. Rather history is subjective
and vague – primarily a tool for illustrating the complexities of choice
rather than a guide for action.
To
discuss command responsibility Walzer draws on General Bradley’s decision
to carpet bomb the area west St. Lo during the allied breakout from Normandy
in July 1944.[1]
During the bombing Allied planes killed and wounded an unknown number of
French civilians, as well as hundreds of American soldiers. Walzer suggests
unless Bradley had taken “due care,” made the minimum reasonable effort
to minimize civilian casualties or consider reasonable alternatives he
decision to bomb civilians in morally indefensible.Commanders
had two responsibilities – they make positive steps to limit unintended
civilian deaths and ensure subordinates are held to standards.
This
discussion is unsatisfying.First,
Walzer failsto consider a third
responsibility – the commander’s requirement to protect his own forces.
Second, his analysis of Bradley’s decision is ambiguous. He admits he lacks
the technical expertise and research to fairly judge the general’s choice
and simply concludes “there is no sure rule against which to measure the
conduct of General Bradley.” [2]
Walzer
misses an opportunity to make an important point -- in modern warfare technical
knowledge and expertise are central to the issue of determining command
responsibility.As Charles Williams
Maynes pointed out in a recent article, since World War II we have not
become more moral, but we have become more accurate.The
spot that required 9,000 bombs to hit accurately in World War II, required
200 in Vietnam and one in Kosovo.[3]Technical
issues, accuracy among them, are an essential part of the calculus of determining
morale responsibility – for a discussion of ethical conduct to contribute
to understanding, the considerations of theory and practice must go hand
in hand – practice is not simply a handmaiden for illuminating theory.Bradley’s
deadly decision is a case in point.
Limits
of Airpower
The
most important constraints in safely employing airpower were well known
to the army’s senior ground commanders. Even if the air forces attacked
at the right time and place, there was still no guarantee they'd hit the
enemy.Accuracy was problematic.For
medium bombers to have a 95 percent chance of hitting a 6,000 square foot
target, they had to drop 600 bombs (medium bombers were considered 2.5
times more accurate than Cobra's main punch, the heavy bombers).[4]On
average, regardless of the type of bomb employed, only 90 percent fell
within a thousand yards of the target.At
best, even if the lead bombardier attacked with prefect accuracy, the odds
were that at least 10 percent of the ordnance would fall over a thousand-yards
from the target.As for the bombs
that hit the target, they might land anywhere within that thousand-yard
radius.This was the crucial limitation
of aerial bombardment.The explosive
effects of the bombs didn't extend much further than the crater. A direct
hit devastated a target with explosive affect, shrapnel and concussion
from the detonating bomb.On the
other hand, all there was to show for a miss was a hole in the ground and
a lot of dirt in the air.
Accuracy
was a double-edged problem.Commanders
also had to worry about protecting friendly forces.A
“no bomb line” was used to mark the forward line of friendly troops and
protect them from aerial fires.Ground
commanders had limited flexibility in moving or marking the line.The
line had to be placed on terrain recognizable from the air.In
addition, to shift the line air units had to be alerted over the air support
radio net one hour prior to the effective time to insure that the order
reached all the air units, and this alert only took care of the fighter/bombers.Medium
and heavy bombers couldn't communicate with ground forces.Messages
had to be relayed to England and then to the planes.These
requirements dictated that no bomb lines should be coordinated well ahead
of time and placed on the most prominent terrain available.
The
ground commanders knew that marking the bombing limits was a problem.On
July 17, General Eddy, the 9th Infantry Division Commander, and his air
support officer went to the VII Corps headquarters to give General Collins
a “first hand appreciation” of the problem.[5]They
had good reason to be concerned.The
most common method for marking the no bomb line was firing colored artillery
smoke.This technique had severe
limitations.The 4th Infantry Division,
for example, in a report dated more that three weeks before Cobra observed,
"smokes [sic] and dusts present on the field of battle may lead to confusion
on the part of the pilot."[6]Smoke,
the division concluded, should only be used if there was no alternative
for marking a target.The air forces
also knew that marking targets with smoke was a problem.Initially
they did not want to use smoke to mark the northern boundary, but after
conducting a reconnaissance they changed their mind and requested a series
of smoke targets along the front at one miles intervals for ten minutes,
starting five minutes before the initial attack.Even
with this measure the air staffs remained deeply concerned about the danger
of short bombings.[7]
In
fact, there was no safe, effective means to mark the no bomb line -- and
this wasn't news to anyone.The
Infantry Board at Fort Benning, Georgia had experimented with the problem
only a year before.They tried marking
positions with smoke, phosphorescent paint, mirrors, colored lights, flares
and even flags.No technique worked
very well.The best pilots could
do was identify targets at 2,000 feet (13,000 feet less than the planned
attack altitude for the bomber attacks in Cobra).In
addition, only direct radio communications proved effective in coordinating
air and ground operations.[8]
During
combat, even radio didn't completely solve the problem of air-ground coordination.In
Normandy, where ground units had radio contact with tactical aircraft through
their attached air support parties, short bombings or strafings were endemic.In
the first week of the campaign there were nine official reports of accidental
attacks.The actual number of incidents
was probably much higher.Just about
every combat soldier had a story to tell.As
one veteran remembered:
I
always knew our Air Force was pretty good,
because
twice we were strafed by our own planes.
We
tried to put identification panels out where our
pilots
could see them, but in the apple orchard country of Normandy that was kind
of hard to do.[9]
During
the assault on Cherbourg (the attack General Bradley said helped inspire
the idea for the Cobra bombing), planes bombed one friendly position 2,000
yards behind the no bomb line (almost twice the safety distance planned
for Cobra) three times.
Communications
wasn't a panacea, because pilots found it difficult to fix their exact
positions even under ideal conditions.Fighter
pilots went into battle with their maps strapped to their knee -- reading
coordinates, flying their aircraft, watching out for enemy planes, antiaircraft
fire, friendly troops, civilian non-combatants and enemy targets all at
the same time.Fighter pilots when
asked how they decided when they were behind the enemy lines claimed:
It
was quite simple. All they [pilots] did was watch
the roads
and when they saw a Frenchman flogging a horse and drawing a cart down
the road they knew they were over German held territory. On our side of
the line, trucks and transportation lined the road, generally bumper to
bumper.[10]
As
imprecise and haphazard as the task of locating and identifying the enemy
lines was for the fighters, the difficulty increased exponentially for
medium and heavy bombers flying at much higher altitudes.
Despite
such limitations General Bradley relied on the no bomb line as his primary
tool for protecting the ground forces.The
First U.S. Army no bomb line, marked A-B on the operations overlay, was
easily identifiable because it followed parallel to the St. Lô to
Périers
road running straight east to west across the VII Corps’s front.
General
Bradley wanted the bombers to attack parallel to the road and use St. Lô
to Périers
road to mark the boundary between friend and foe.In
addition, by taking a parallel approach the bombers would not fly over
the VII Corps’s forces, reducing the chance that bombs released at the
wrong point would land on the troops.To
further identify the no bomb line, American units would mark their forward
positions with florescent panels, while the artillery would fire red smoke
along a 250-yard strip by along the road.Drivers
were also told to paint white stars on the top of their vehicles to help
low flying planes identify friendly units.
Fixing
the distance between the forward line of troops and the no bomb line was
another important factor in safeguarding the soldiers.If
the ground force withdrew too far to avoid the bombing the enemy might
recover from the affects of the attack before the friendly troops could
assault.During Operation Charnwood
the Allied forces withdrew 6,000 yards.By
the time the attackers got to the front the German defenses had already
recovered.
General
Bradley elected to make a compromise between distance and caution.He
wanted troops to withdraw only 800 yards, one hour before the attack.The
air commanders wanted more than six times that distance, almost three miles.They
then proposed 3,000 yards and finally compromised at 1,200 yards.For
additional safety, only the smaller fighter/bombers would attack targets
in the 250-yard strip directly adjacent to the road (making the bomber
safety distance 1,500 yards).
Friendly
troops were not the only concern on the battlefield.When
days before Cobra, General Bradley briefed the press at the First U.S.
Army press camp at Vouilly, reporters asked if the civilians had been warned.In
response General Bradley remembered:
I
shook my head as if to escape the necessity of saying no. If we were to
tip our hands to the French, we would also
show it to the Germans . . . . The success of Cobra hung upon surprise;
it was essential we have surprise even if it meant the slaughter of innocents
as well.[11]
Employing
firepower incurred heavy moral responsibility.Though
many civilians had evacuated the area, the target included a number of
sizable villages.
We
know for a fact that the Americans interviewed French civilians who had
knowledge of what was going on beyond the German lines.The
Americans knew many villages contained civilians -- that civilian casualties
had been incurred from U.S. air attacks – the Americans also knew that
the civilians did not have complete freedom to flee the combat area.First,
moving on the roads would have put them in physical risk.Second,
by moving they would become refugees – which incurred another whole set
of risks. Its clear that the civilians did not have the freedom to leave
the battle zone – and any assumption that civilians in a combat zone have
freedom of choice would have been ethically flawed in itself.Bradley
knew innocents were at grave risk in the attack. Noncombatant casualties
were likely.
Walzer
offers-up several alternative courses of action that Bradley might have
used to avoid the carpet bombing.In
reality, a careful study shows none were really practical alternatives
– and Bradley tactical scheme was not only appropriate, but the best option
available.[12]
In
addition, General Bradley’s decision to bomb without warning adhered to
the laws of war with regards to protecting the innocents. Civilians whoremained
in a known combat zone were considered adequately warned.While
it was still unacceptable to intentionally target civilians, casualties
might be incurred in pursuit of legitimate military objectives with a proportionally
suitable amount of force.The law
of war also recognized the necessity of secrecy and the inherent right
of commanders to weigh the safety of their troops against the danger of
revealing their intentions for an operation.Commanders
could take prudent precautions, even if it meant noncombatants were put
at risk.This didn't mean that civilian
lives and property were forfeit.Commanders
had a responsibility to take all practical measures to safeguard the innocents.In
this case, General Bradley felt security concerns precluded any warnings
to civilians.
All
together, General Bradley thought this plan provided an adequate balance
between the need for firepower, his moral obligations and the safety of
his troops.On July 19, General
Bradley and Major General Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada, Commander of the IX
Tactical Air Command boarded a small two engine plane flew to Air Chief
Marshal Leigh-Mallory’s headquarters in a ramshackle old mansion at Stanmore
outside London to review the plan with the air commanders and staff.In
addition to Leigh-Mallory, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, General Spaatz and
General Brereton, a host of high-ranking air staff officers and commanders
joined in the meeting which started about 3:30 p.m.Though
both Bradley and Leigh-Mallory departed before the meeting ended, General
Bradley left feeling upbeat, believing that potential problems had been
addressed including the two most contentious issues, the distance the troops
would withdraw from the no bomb line and the direction of flight for the
attacking planes.General Bradley's
aide Major Hansen recorded, "Conf[erence] went well, came out by five[p.m.]
with Brad[ley] speaking amiably, laughing."[13]General
Spaatz even ordered up a C-47 for General Bradley’s return flight to Normandy
insisting that it wasn’t proper for the First U.S. Army Commander to be
running around in a tiny two motor plane.As
General Bradley returned to his headquarters in style, he assumed everything
was set for the big attack.
Finally
on July 24, despite continued poor weather, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory
and General Bradley gave the go ahead to start Cobra, gambling that the
weather would clear-up over the target area before the planes arrived.[14]By
midmorning the weather had gotten worse and before noon the air chief marshal
and General Bradley thought it best to recall the planes.Not
all of the aircraft had received the message and some of the uninformed
pilots completed their bomb runs with disastrous results.One
pilot bombed an American ammunition dump, another an Allied airfield, other
planes dropped their payloads north of the road on the 30th Infantry Division.[15]
Later
that afternoon, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory met with General Bradley
at the First U.S. Army field headquarters. General Bradley was furious.It
wasn't just that the attack was postponed.It
wasn't just that bombs fell on American soldiers. It was because General
Bradley claimed he had learned for the first time that the heavy bombers
had flown perpendicular to the target area, right over the American troops.This
was not what he had agreed to.The
air chief marshal claimed he did not know about the change in plans.His
directive for the bombing, in fact, had not even designated the direction
of attack.[16]He
thought it had all been agreed to at the Stanmore meeting on July 19.
Apparently,
without clearly relaying their final decision to General Bradley, the air
commanders decided the bombers needed to approach perpendicular to the
target, rather than fly a course parallel to the American positions.The
perpendicular course they concluded would minimize the time aircraft would
be over enemy lines, exposed to antiaircraft fire.More
important, the target box was narrower on the parallel axis.On
a parallel approach fewer planes could fit over the target area.It
was simple geometry.It would take
much longer to complete the bombing on a parallel course.A
parallel bombing run would be more like a shifting steady rain, rather
than the single powerful strike General Bradley needed.To
maximize shock affect and deliver the most bombs in the shortest time,
the bombers needed to attack perpendicular to the target.In
addition, a perpendicular course would be safer for the aircraft, they
would spend less time over the target exposed to anti-aircraft fire.
The
reason that the air commanders had not pressed their case on General Bradley
more clearly at the conference at Stanmore on July 19, or in the days following
the meeting is far from apparent – and remains one of the unresolved controversies
of the campaign.There is evidence
to suggest that some senior air staff officers raised the issue at the
Stanmore meeting.Air force notes
made after the conference even stated that they thought General Bradley
had understood the risks of short bombings and that he said he was “prepared
to accept such casualties no matter which way the planes approached.”On
the other hand, at the same meeting officers recalled that Air Chief Marshal
Leigh-Mallory quickly rejected the proposal of bombing on a parallel course.In
short, while it is clear that the air commanders decided to conduct the
perpendicular bombing at the Stanmore meeting, General Bradley and Air
Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory were probably not present when the final decision
was made.
Confusion
persisted, after the meeting Leigh Mallory’s deputy Major General Hoyt
Vandenberg claims in his dairy to have contacted the air chief marshal
to confirm that General Bradley would accept a parallel bombing.After
the aborted attack on July 24 a team of air staff officers again met with
General Bradley to impress on him the imperative of a parallel bombing,
but there appears to be no record of senior air commanders ever taking
up the issue personally with the First U.S. Army commander.In
fact, there appears to be no joint Army/Air Force records of the precise
coordination agreed to during the period of 19-24 July.Either
some one lied or, if both sides are to be believed, each left the July
19 meeting believing exactly opposite thing.Indeed,
misperception on both parts may be the answer.The
bulk of the evidence suggests that the confluence of mismatched personalities,
the convoluted relationship between air and ground commanders and the lack
of a sound doctrine created a situation in which, at the end of the day,
commanders simply failed to understand what each other were doing.[17]
Now
that the damage was already done, General Bradley and Air Chief Marshal
Leigh-Mallory had to decide what to do next. They had a simple choice.They
could repeat the bomb run, bomb on a parallel course that would not give
General Bradley the quick, powerful strike he wanted to lead off the attack
or call off the aerial bombardment.It
was a difficult choice.General Bradley
had already seen the tremendous disruption that could be caused by a short
bombing.If he had any hopes that
the other safety measures he had put in place would be sufficient, he now
had incontrovertible evidence that they were inadequate.If
the planes attacked the same way again, Americans would most likely die
from American bombs.
Bradley
decided to repeat the bombing the next day and again planes hit friendly
troops.The total loses in the VII
Corps were approximately 108 dead and 472 injured.[18]Despite
the fact that less than 3 percent of the bombs landed on the American lines,
the attacks created a near crisis in the VII Corps.In
addition, to the outrage and frustration at the tragic killing and wounding
of soldiers, the disaster threatened the whole offensive.The
first effect was the obvious physical damage and the disruption of attack
plans.Just as serious was the psychological
injuries.Friendly fire undercut unit
morale, creating a heightened sense of fear and hopelessness in soldiers
and a mistrust and apprehension over again employing friendly fire support
systems. In some cases the results were severe.The
30th Infantry Division, for example, reported an additional 164 cases of
combat exhaustion.All total, the
short bombings were a disastrous start for the beginning of the breakthrough.[19]
Evaluating
Bradley’s Decision
Half
a century later, the debate over the Cobra disaster has lost none of its
vitality.Today, typing on a keyboard
far from the terror of the hedgerows, it is a simple task to point out
the shortfalls of the bombing plan.On
that July day, the issue seemed very different.An
officer at the front concluded:
I
believe every man in the company will agree that if
we
have such an attack again they would want the bombing just where it was,
right to our lines.We would rather
take the ones that fall on us to get the effect on the Germans
in front of us.[20]
The
issue, however, was not whether or not the bombing should have been conducted,
but if the commanders had done everything possible to mitigate the risks.
General
Eisenhower, for one, was concerned about the implications of assigning
blame for the disaster.He wrote
to General Marshal:
Complete
investigations are underway....In themeantime
I am Anxious that treatment in the newspapers, if the matter become one
of public discussion, be moderate and sensible So that we do not get a
ground versus air war started that is completely senseless and harmful.[21]
At
the time no one was anxious to fix responsibility to any senior leader.In
fact, Lieutenant Colonel Alvin B. Welch from the First U.S. Army’s Inspector
General’s office conducted an official investigation of the incident, finding
“no delinquencies on the part of the ground units.”His
report specifically did not address at all the activities and decisions
by senior air and ground commanders.[22]
Official
reports offered no criticisms of senior commanders. Historian Martin Blumenson
also absolved the First U.S. Army commander of any responsibility for the
short bombings.More recent studies
by historians including John Sullivan and Richard G. Davis are more critical
of both Bradley and Leigh-Mallory, stressing their lack of experience in
planning air-ground operations and inadequate coordination with the air
commanders.[23]
These
historians, however, do not go far enough.While
Bradley cannot be faulted for the civilian casualties, a thorough review
of the evidence suggests that not only must General Bradley bear major
responsibility for the friendly casualties, but that his failure was more
than simply inexperience or an inadvertent lack of proper oversight.
Why
did things go so terribly wrong?The
issue has too frequently focused on the simple issue of parallel versus
perpendicular attack.General Hobbs,
the 30th Infantry Division Commander attributed blame to the route taken
by the heavy planes.He claimed,
"bombers that flew parallel to our front lines dropped their bombs on the
target.Many of the bombers who flew
across our line dropped their bombs short and it was these that caused
our casualties."[24]But,
the general’s assessment and the historians who generally followed his
reasoning are incorrect.
A
parallel attack was no “magic bullet” for solving the challenge of bombing
in close proximity to ground troops.In
fact, with the battlefield totally obscured by smoke, dust and fire there
was no guarantee that a parallel approach would have been any more successful
in preventing short bombings.In
addition, even on a parallel course there was a risk of hitting American
troops.If the bombers overshot or
undershot the target area, bombs might have landed on U.S. forces holding
positions either northeast or northwest of the target area.All
the previous Allied experience in air-ground coordination suggested that
a parallel approach was not a sufficient precaution to preclude a serious
threat from short bombings.
While
the seeds of disaster were sown with a lack of clear understanding between
the ground and air commanders over the direction of the aerial attack,
there is much more to the story. Some of the most tragic short bombings
were made by the supposedly more accurate fighter/bombers and some of these
planes were flying parallel, not perpendicular to the target and at an
altitude of only 2,000 feet!In
short, even planes flying a parallel course at low altitudes attacked American
troops.
In
fact, neither the parallel bombing nor any of the other precautions General
Bradley ordered had proved sufficient.The
smoke markings actually worsened situation.When
the corps artillery fired red smoke to mark the no bomb line, the smoke
clouds drifted north obscuring the line.After
the first bombs hit their targets, dust from the explosions mixed with
the smoke, further exacerbating the problem.The
panel markers placed in front of the friendly positions and white stars
painted on the vehicles were equally useless.In
fact, all the marking and coordination techniques employed by the Americans
were inadequate, even for marking targets for the fighter/bombers.This
was not a new discovery.These techniques
had consistently failed to prove themselves earlier in the campaign.
Another
problem during Cobra was that commanders hadn't ensured that the ground
troops were adequately prepared.Even
though troops were supposed to withdraw 1,200 yards from the no bomb line,
some units were positioned as close as 800 yards or less.Others
pulled back shortly before the air strike, but were not told to dig-in.The
2d Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment, for example, which was hit hard
on July 24, was deployed in battle formation preparing to attack, not dug-in
and protected. Lieutenant Chester H. Jordan in the 3rd Battalion, 47th
Infantry Regiment recalled, “I reasoned the Germans would be in no shape
to throw anything at us so why dig a hole.”When
the attack started his platoon “cheered the bomber on like kids at a football
game,” until the first short bombs began to land.[25]The
failure to take protective cover was invitation to disaster.Neither
the First U.S. Army or the VII Corps ordered additional precautions on
July 25 or warned units that heavy bombers were flying a perpendicular
route and that there was an increased likelihood of short bombings.In
fact, the VII Corps issued a message on July 25 at 1:55 a.m. reassuring
commanders that there would no bombings north of the road.Some
units, on their own discretion, ordered troops to dig-in.Foxholes
protected soldiers from the fragmentation effect of exploding bombs, but
even then they were not completely safe.As
the death of General McNair illustrated, entrenchments were not sufficient
protection from direct blast effects.
General
Bradley appreciated the necessity of closely integrating aerial fires with
the other elements of the plan, but on this occasion he failed.All
the American experience with employing close air support in World War II
up to that point had indicated that the safety measures adopted would be
inadequate.Nevertheless, official
inquiries into the bombing absolved senior air and ground commanders of
any personal culpability.The reports
cataloged twelve separate incidents (not including short bombing and strafings
by the fighter/bombers), determining that the causes of the short bombings
were human error or confusion and disorientation of pilots and bombardiers.[26]
The
preconditions for disaster were the cumulative result of three critical
failures; inadequate coordination with the supporting air forces, inability
to mark the forward positions of ground forces, and the lack of warning
and protection of the troops.But,
what the reports fail to fully emphasize is that none of these shortfalls
were beyond General Bradley's control.In
particular, he made the most important and tragic decisions in regards
to the bombing; how far the troops would withdraw from the no bomb line
and what precautions had to be taken.Considering
the Allies’ history of problems in short bombings and strafings, particularly
in Normandy, Bradley’s failure not to pay more attention to the issue and
work with the air commanders until the issue was fully resolved was inexcusable.
The overall fire support plan was his initiative and it was seriously flawed.
In
his memoirs A Soldier’s Story, Bradley goes to great lengths to
acquit himself.For insistence, in
the text his preference for having the bombers fly a parallel course is
italicized, suggesting that if the air commanders had just followed his
wishes there would have been no casualties – a dubious proposition.General
Bradley also included curious statements in his account of the pre-Cobra
planning, such as a remark that General Eddy, the cautious 9th
Infantry Division commander, had:
balked
initially at this order to withdraw.After
having fought hard for that mile he disliked giving it up with the prospect
of having to fight once more to regain it.But
I [Bradley] was unwilling to chance a bombing any closer to our lines.[27]
The
recounting of this conversation fails to note that the actual safety separation
General Bradley had decided on was 1,200 yards, (1,500 for the heavy bombers)
a distance well short of a mile.Bradley
also does not reveal that he himself had initially argued for only an 800
yards separation.In addition, he
does not point out that if the American troops had withdrawn the 3,000
yards suggested by the air commanders there would have been minimal frontline
casualties from the short bombings.
Also
if you look at the time it took the forward troops to recover from the
attack and the significant delay the bombing caused in delaying German
counterattacks it is arguable that adding an extra 1,000 yards to the safety
zone would not have significantly affected the outcome of the day’s battle.In
short, having troops so close to the no bomb line was not a military necessity.
Finally,
General Bradley’s description of General Eddy’s concerns hardly squares
with Eddy’s complaints on July 17 about the danger of short bombings.[28]Nor
does General Bradley mention that Brigadier General F. H. Smith, the Director
of Operations for the Allied Expeditionary Air Force at the July 19 meeting
at Stanmore had briefed Bradley that there might be “gross bombing errors
causing troop casualties.”[29]In
short, General Bradley’s own accounts of the Cobra bombing did much to
obfuscate his personal responsibility.The
evidence suggests he knew the front lines troops would incur casualties.He
was willing to take that risk. He was not, however, prepared to acknowledge
this truth publicly. His explanations are a disingenuous moment in what
is regarded as an otherwise honorable and distinguished career.
Why
General Bradley made such poor choices with regard to this particular aspect
of the campaign cannot be confidently fixed from the available evidence.However,
it is clear that whether due to a serious tactical misjudgment, intentionally
assuming the terrible risk of killing and maiming his own troops, or unrealistic
wishful thinking on his part, General Bradley failed to adequately address
the issue of protection for his ground forces.[30]
Conclusions
History
has more to offer than Walzer suggests. In fact, we can judge the appropriateness
of Bradley’s actions – and we can extract useful ethical guidelines from
a detailed study of the facts surrounding his decision.Walzer’s
mistrust of history suggest that knowing the difference between right and
wrong is sufficient. Knowing standards, however, is wholly insufficient
for making correct moral decisions in war.Commanders
must have the appropriate technical expertise to implement decisions.History
offers not only an illustration of ethical dilemmas, but a practical laboratory
for understanding the intellectual – as well as the moral tools needed
to make the right decisions in battle.
Note: Complete bibliographic citations for the endnotes can be found
at http://militaryhistory.educator.webjump.com. Additional resources for
the study of the breakout can found at http://militaryhistory.education.webjump.com