JSCOPE 2000

A Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics

Moral Considerations in Military Decision Making

Day 2, Models of Moral Decisions II

Moral Military Decision-making After the Year 2000

Cadet Nathan Diller, USAFA

Cadet Robert Stanton, USMA

Cadet Scott Ross, USMA

Cadet Kenneth Evans, USMA

Cadet Carrie Wibben, USMA

LTC Tim Challans, USMA, Moderator

Introduction

Making decisions about entering conflicts and how to fight in those conflicts is only becoming harder. This bit of conventional wisdom rolls off of the lips of virtually every spokesperson at every opportunity; few would deny it or dispute it. The number and complexity of conflicts fluctuates from day to day, yet seems to be increasing over time in an ominous way, out of anyone’s control, much like the stock market. Do we all know what we are doing here? The stakes are very high. Are we making the best decisions? We find ourselves in a bewildering array of conflicts, the history of which may someday seem as random as if someone were to take darts and throw them at a world map.

In this business, the learning curve is a nice way of talking about a killing curve. One of the key principles in military ethics is to observe the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. In WWI, for every ninety combatant casualties, there were ten non-combatant casualties. In WWII the numbers were roughly even. Today, for every ten combatant casualties, there are ninety non-combatant casualties. We are not getting better. We can no longer claim that things are not broken. We have to think hard about these issues. We have to examine them from top to bottom and from bottom to top; we have to dig into the foundations of these matters.

These issues are moral issues, and one necessary way to examine these issues deeply is to turn to moral philosophy. Many people in the military are skeptical about moral philosophy and think it is a waste of time. After all, we now have been reinvigorated with a new set of values and several education programs to help make a moral military. But, the values can’t tell us when to intervene, when to give aid, when to go to war – or when not to do so. They don’t tell us how to tell the difference between combatants and non-combatants, and they don’t tell us how we should go about applying the deadly force that we’ve been entrusted to use in a moral manner.

The cadet panel for this group of papers is going to explore these issues philosophically. They are not going to explore simply the descriptive, empirical questions of where we are and where we’ve been, formulating policies on precedent – these are historical and politically scientific questions. They are going to dive headlong into the deeper recesses of philosophy, into the normative realm as well as the metaethical realm. Cadet Nathan Dillard (USAFA) is going to explore the distinction between combatant and non-combatant, as this becomes ever more difficult to understand and observe. Cadet Robert Stanton (USMA) is going to explore the meaning of the idea of an obligation, and then explore the obligation of a single nation state, such as the United States, to enforce the observation of human rights -- the duty may not necessitate the moral obligation to act as much as some others will argue. Cadet Scott Ross (USMA) is going to explore the existence of human rights – human rights as just war criteria, criteria establishing permission rather than obligation for intervention. Cadet K.C. Evans (USMA) is going to explore rights as a foundation for an obligation for intervention, and proposes UN arbitration and enforcement of intervention. This entails more of an obligation than that proposed by Cadet Stanton and Cadet Ross. Cadet Carrie Wibben (USMA) is going to explore a Kantian moral framework to explore the possibility of a coherent set of criteria that would aid in choosing when to intervene morally as well as how to make moral judgments about interventions.

Many leaders in the military think that such an exploration is not useful or needed. In fact, GEN Krulak recently “really took the Academy [Annapolis] to task for it's current 'mumbo-jumbo' approach to teaching ethics and leadership. He held up as an example an article published in a recent Shipmate by Mid'n 3/C Carmella M. House entitled "Preparing for the Future-Lessons Learned from Tailhook" on page 8 of the Jan-Feb issue. He stabbed his finger at the article muttering about the author's use of phrases like 'Kantian ethics' and 'utilitarianism' and finally threw the rag aside in disgust declaring he couldn't understand a damn thing the author was trying to say.” However, this is exactly the kind of intellectual exploration that should be going on at the academies and other institutions that are important in developing the future leaders of the military. Leaders at all levels should be able to engage in an informed dialogue that is as mature if not more so than dialogues out in the general public. We need to raise the bar – the stakes are too high to leave our deadly business to those who are unwilling to engage in the deep reflection that is necessary.

Cadet Robert Stanton

Turn on the television today, flip the channel to CNN or any other world news broadcast and you are bound to see evidence of oppression in some remote part of the world. You may be lucky enough to see a refugee camp in Ethiopia, mass graves in Rwanda, the murder of hundreds in Zaire, “safe havens” in Bosnia, or disembowelments of pregnant women in Burundi. The media has brought America face to face with more than just the poverty and social problems behind our own borders. We are now able to see the faces and the mangled bodies of victims worldwide. The reporters and film crews have brought Hobbes vision of mankind into the plush living rooms where we eat our pizza and watch Monday night football. We have no choice but to witness the cruelty and horror that is inflicted on human beings by our fellow man. Nearly 50 years ago the United States pioneered the creation of the United Nations and was a primary mover in committing the UN to the protection and preservation of human rights on an international level. The United States has been the stalwart defender of human rights on the international level for the past 50 years. Yet in the past few years, our moral compass seems to have strayed from the path of righteousness to some degree. While we have become involved in more efforts to protect human rights than ever before, such as actions in Rwanda, Somalia, or Kosovo, we have failed to maintain a consistent practice of intervention worldwide. There are numerous cases around the world in which human rights are being violated but we choose not to defend them. Where does this leave us? We begin to wonder what exactly is the United States’ policy on intervention? We attempt to determine who decides that we should go somewhere to risk American lives and precious resources in the name of human rights. One of the few places that we see this addressed concisely is within The International Bill of Human Rights, written by the United Nations. The bill was created in order to “complete the provisions of the United Nations Charter, set forth in the Preamble and Articles 1,55, and 56 which establish a duty for all member nations to observe and respect human rights.” The last half of this sentence discusses specifically the “duty for all member nations,” which would include the US, and thus implies some measure of obligation on the part of the United States. I intend to explore the nature of this so-called “obligation,” as the bill implies, in my paper and I will try to determine whether or not an obligation for action truly exists.

When we consider an action that is obligatory we are talking about something that is a must. Not only is the action one that we “ought” to do, but an obligation is something that we must do for some reason or another, with the penalty of inaction being severe. When do we incur the need for an obligatory act? We can look at obligation on a micro and a macro level. For instance, on a micro level we are obligated to do things each day. I must go to school tomorrow or I will face disciplinary action. My father must go to work or he will lose his job. My mother must cook breakfast for my dad or he will divorce her (that may be an exaggeration). In each one of these situations, one individual is obligated to perform a specific act or he or she will suffer specific consequences. For an act to be obligatory there must be the threat of a consequence if the act is not carried out. If there were no consequence for failure to perform an obligation, than the simple idea of an obligation would carry no weight. Thus, for an act to be obligatory, it must carry with it consequences for inaction. Obligation on a macro level is similar, but the consequences will affect more people than those consequences at the micro level. For instance, we are obligated by means of a treaty with other NATO countries to come to their aid if the sovereignty of their country is threatened. The consequences of our inaction if some country invaded Great Britain would be severe and would affect the entire United States. For instance, Great Britain may place a trade embargo on the US or they may refuse to come to our aid if the Canadians threatened the sanctity of our borders. While this is the difference between macro and micro level obligations, we can also draw a distinction between legal, social, or moral obligations.

The obligations described above would be considered legal or social obligations. The obligations are incurred because of some social or legal construct that is binding in its own right. That construct could be a state law, a written proclamation, a declaration, or a simple handshake between two friends, all of which carry significant consequences. Yet, to classify something as a legal obligation still infers that there is some moral principle that the obligation is grounded upon. That moral principle could be one of utilitarianism, in which we take actions based on the good of the whole. On the other hand, that principle could be grounded in a more altruistic belief, like a handshake that is based on the trust between two individuals. Therefore, no matter what legal or social construct we exist in, we are still grounding our obligations in a moral system. If this is then the case, we get back to our original question of obligation. When we consider the possibility of our moral obligation for intervention in the case of human rights violations, we must first determine if there will be consequences that have bearing on our lives as Americans if we fail to act. Secondly, we must determine whether or not that obligation is grounded in some moral construct. If either one of these premises fails to hold, than we can conclude that we do not possess a moral “obligation” for intervention.

If we determine that somewhere in the world basic human rights are being violated on a macro scale, then there will be consequences if the United States does not take some kind of action. Our country is founded on a basic set of ideals and morals as laid out by our founding fathers in the Declaration of Independence. We have an identity as a people that values such things as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. When we as a country are witnesses to situations that would constitute violations of human rights if they were to happen behind our borders, we are compelled to act. This is the case because “moral principles are basic to American society, and therefore this country cannot maintain its integrity unless its foreign policy responds to and reflects such principles.”[1] The price of inaction would be a betrayal of the very ideals that we hold as our national identity and if we were to betray those ideals, then we would lose credibility with the international community and more importantly we would lose sight of our own moral principles. When discussing this same topic Henry A. Kissinger stated that “this nation must be true to its own beliefs or it will lose its bearings in the world.”[2] The consequences of inaction if we as a country observe human rights violations on a macro level will be detrimental to our national identity. This idea can be illustrated through the influence of modern medial on our national identity.

In the past decade, the United States military has seen action in all corners of the world. Our forces have been sent from Mogadishu to Burundi in order to provide some sort of safety and security to a part of the world that is lacking in both. We don’t have to look far to see the reason for this. We simply need to turn on the television at night and watch the evening news in order to find some cause for the United States to get involved in a situation somewhere outside of our own borders. The media has become the spokesman for the downtrodden, the saint for the oppressed, and strangely the voice that reminds us of our national values. When we sit in our living room drinking our nightly beer, we as a nation can not help but feel pity for these poor people in a far away land who are being treated terribly. The advent of the technological revolution that has allowed the outside world to get into our living room has forced Americans to take a long look at what they believe in and what they value. We find ourselves disgusted with the global community and yet we also are able to find a small measure of satisfaction in the knowledge that we are at least helping some of these people. If we were to avoid intervention, we would find that we would at the same time begin to lose our national identity.

The media challenges us, and if we were too shy away from that challenge, over time we would begin to see a gradual degradation of morality in the hearts and minds of Americans. We can consider the practice of moral behavior as similar to that of an athletic skill. I am a decent soccer player because I practice playing. My teammates on the field challenge me each day and force to exercise the skill I have learned. Yet, of an even more relevant nature, those same players force me to exercise the competitive spirit that I have gained as a result of years of competing in the sport. If I were to quit playing two significant consequences would occur. First, my skill level would decrease because I would be failing to use it. But secondly, and more relevant to the present topic of moral behavior, the competitive spirit that I have would disappear. As athletes, we must always challenge ourselves in some way or another. Without that challenge we grow dull, like a butter knife, and we lose the edge that competition breeds. In the same manner, if our sense of morality is not challenged we do not develop the moral courage to act. At the same time, if we are not challenged we eventually lose our ability to act in a moral manner. The media gives us that challenge. It becomes the adversary who forces us to take a look at our life and determine if we are living the way that we should. It gives us the opportunity to act on our moral values. If we as a country were to allow human rights violations to occur without any action in opposition, then we would face numerous consequences. The most significant consequence of inaction would be this loss of moral identity that we now have as a country. Yet this does not solely satisfy the criteria for moral obligation. We must next consider the second criteria, which is to determine the moral construct that would ground the obligation if one exists.

In the case of human rights violations, we need to go no farther than the issue of human rights themselves to find our moral grounding. For the United States to have a moral obligation of intervention there must be a violation of a universal human right. Yet this makes the assumption that human rights are universal. This is the problem. I do not think that I can justify any human right as being universal for all people at all times in all places. Rather, human rights seem to be contingent on a few things. To begin with, rights differ from culture to culture. In many cases this diversity is a result of a fundamental belief, or as a result of the climate that a culture may have developed in. The fact that one culture developed on the North Slope of Alaska, while another developed in the Amazon river basin will have a definite impact on the fundamental truths that each culture believes in. Those differences will then be reflected in the moral system that the two cultures practice. Some cultures believe in infanticide, while here in the west we would see this as an atrocity. Other cultures believe in the genital mutilation of women, while we would find this to be a horrible and condemnable practice. This difference in morality is known as cultural relativism, and according to this doctrine moral rules vary from place to place. If morality varies based on location and culture, then we can not find a universal human right.

Yet some people will still assert that there does exist some basic human rights that must be universal, such as the right to life for instance. Nonetheless, no matter what “right” you choose, there will always be some way to justify violating that right. Even the right to life, what we would consider the most basic and universal of all rights, can be violated in certain circumstances. We utilize the death penalty, advocate self-defense, and we have a military that receives a license to kill in times of war. All of these situations allow us to violate the basic right to life of another individual and thus that right cannot be universal. In short, we are saying that we “ought” not to violate the right to life, but under certain circumstances we are allowed to violate that right. Once again, this does not constitute a human right that is universal. In order to consider a right “universal” it must apply at all times, in all places for all peoples regardless of culture, creed, religion, or circumstance. Therefore, if there is no such thing as a universal human right, then I must conclude that we are not bound simply by moral obligation to intervene based solely on the violation of human rights. This does not say that we cannot choose to intervene, and it also does not say that intervention is not the “right” action to take, for it may be, but it does not constitute a “moral obligation.”

As I stated previously, our nation is one that is founded on certain principles that are in place to protect the sanctity of human life and promote the welfare of all human beings. We are a country which espouses to a specific set of rights and beliefs that govern the treatment of others in order to promote the happiness and well being of the entire community. These beliefs are an ingrained part of our society. They are taught at home by parents, in school by teachers, and in church by preachers. We see these beliefs affecting the environment in which we work, the homes that we live in and on the fields upon which we enjoy ourselves. These beliefs are paramount in identifying who we are as a people. Without this moral ground the United States would cease to exist as it does today. As a matter of fact, many of the internal problems that we witness seem to be a result of the declining morality within our countries. Yet that morality still exists, and we are bound by our beliefs and our identity to uphold those beliefs whenever we see them violated. To begin with, this idealism happens to be one reason that we need to explore the possibility of intervention in the name of the protection of human rights. Along with this outlook, we also have to consider the realistic viewpoint as well.

The realistic viewpoint can seen in many forms. One of these viewpoints raises the problem of limited resources. If we were to insist that the United States had a moral obligation to act when human rights violations were occurring we would likely find ourselves becoming the Mother Theresa of the world. We do not have the resources to act in every situation where violations occur. The bottom line is that we simply cannot afford, economically, politically, socially, or militarily, to intervene every time that morality would ask for intervention. Our military is not limitless, our funds are not without end, and the patience of the American people will not stand for hundreds of thousands of its sons and daughters being absent from their families for years at a time. Nonetheless, this does not erase the fact that promoting the welfare of our fellow man is the right thing to do and is a belief ingrained into our national identity. As a country that was founded on moral beliefs as I stated before, we must uphold a standard of morality in our dealings with the global community. Yet this does not abdicate the responsibility that we incur as a moral nation and as a nation that is the leader in the international community.

A second realistic view that we must consider is that which looks at the world from an egoist perspective. This viewpoint feels that we must consider our own needs before we consider the needs of others. We base our actions on what will benefit us the most. Many ethicists believe that the only way to maintain rights is to act in the interests of one’s own self. They feel that if we act in our own interests, we will inevitably promote a world in which all people can pursue their own wants. Granted this doctrine has some restrictions, but for the most part it is a belief system that is founded on the self. Following this doctrine would force us to determine what exactly we can gain from the act of intervention. The egoist point of view would demand that we prove how intervention would benefit our national interest. For instance, we can intervene in the affairs of Haiti in order to stem the tide of refugees attempting to illegally cross our borders. The egoist would have to find a concrete justification for intervention. Yet, these are not the only realist perspectives that we can take when looking at the situations calling for intervention.

One realist approach to the dilemma of humanitarian intervention is that which calls for world stability. People must have a society in which to exist. There must be some sort of guidelines, rules, or laws that people must obey in order to have a society. Human beings have tendencies that will lead them down a road of selfish egoism, and if left to travel there unaccompanied they will return creating chaos and destruction. Ultimately, humans are selfish creatures, but we recognize this and therefore we surrender some of our freedoms in order to have the society or the government protect our rights. A national government exists primarily to safeguard the welfare of its people and provide a somewhat controlled environment in which the people may pursue their own interests. The international community is no different. Countries have banded together and created a governing or administrative body known as the United Nations that serves a similar purpose as the national governments. The U.N. allows countries to pursue their own interests, within certain guidelines, and it safeguards their sovereignty, which we could equate with the freedom of the individual. In order to maintain a stable world order, there will be occasions in which we must intervene. If a nation is part of the U.N. than it must abide by the laws the U.N. lays out, just as I must obey the laws of the country in which I live. The breakdown of global stability takes place when we begin to allow nations to violate the governing bodies rules without consequences. Therefore, when those rules are being violated a “need” for intervention ensues.

At this point we can see that there is both an idealistic and a realistic need for intervention, even if there is no “moral obligation” tied to the violation of human rights. The need exists to maintain the stability of the international community, to allow the United States to maintain its credibility as a moral and trustworthy nation and so that the American people can hold fast to their own moral identity. Yet we are still plagued by the fact that we only have limited resources to intervene. Thus, we must establish a hierarchy of need to determine when and where we can place our efforts and resources so that they will have the greatest impact.

The first thing that we must consider is the scope and severity of the violations. When considering a possible area in which to intervene we must determine how widespread the violations are and how severe they may be. For instance, we would consider the Nazi extermination of the Jewish people to be extremely widespread, and terribly severe. We also must take this into context. In other words, the number of victims matters when compared with the number of people in that subset of human beings. Another consideration that we must factor into the hierarchy of need is the social and political implications on the intervening nation. We must consider the possibility of making a larger problem out of a perceived solution to a smaller issue. The third consideration to take into account is the cost to our national resources. How much will it cost? Will the cost hurt our own country? Do we have the resources as well as the money? Will commitment to affecting this violation negatively impact our own people in the future, and if so, to what degree? These are all questions that we must ask when determining economic implications.

When we as a country observe human rights violations taking place on a macro level there arises a need to intervene. Yet this does not entail a moral obligation. We are not bound by the defense of a universal human right, or by a realistic “must” for survival. Yet we do feel bound to take action because of the moral principles ingrained in our culture. We also feel the need to intervene in order to maintain the international stability of the global community. Nonetheless, we cannot simply go where we please, or wherever anyone asks us to go. We must be careful where we put our resources. Therefore we establish a hierarchy of need to help us determine where we can be most effective for the greatest amount of people. Humanitarian intervention on behalf of other people who cannot help themselves is a need, but we live in a realistic world where idealism does not always rule, and we can’t always save the little kid from the block bully.

Bibliography

Mower, Alfred Glenn. The United States, The United Nations, and Human Rights. England: Greenwood Press, 1979.

Cadet Scott Ross

Introduction

The recent change in international structure from a bipolar world to a unipolar world brought with it a change in the predominant form of global conflict. The bipolar world produced the threat of major conflict between two main poles and their allies. The majority of the globe’s states found it necessary to side with one pole or the other, and thus the bipolar tension consumed the world. Surprisingly, the strong threat from both massive sides kept the world fairly stable. The military conflict that actually occurred was relatively minor because neither side wished to push conflict past the brink of an all-out war. Such a war would do neither side much good. When the bipolar world crumbled into a unipolar world, the push and pull that kept the world fairly stable crumbled with it. Weaker countries that were once the grounds of important polar power struggles found themselves abandoned by the stronger countries that previously played a large part in their affairs. For several countries such as Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the collapse of stability resulted in nationalist sentiment that fueled dangerous ethnic tension. Michael Ignatieff, in The Warrior’s Honor, noted the process that leads to ethnic conflict. First comes the collapse of the state. Next comes nationalistic paranoia which is followed by warfare.[3] The collapse of the bipolar world caused the collapse of weaker states as their function within the world system changed. That resulted, as Ignatieff noted, in nationalistic tendencies and ethnic conflict. Indeed, the wall came down in 1989, and Croatia moved toward full independence from Yugoslavia only a year later.[4]

The new structure of the world suggests that conflict during the beginning of the 21^st century will consist of mostly small-scale warfare, fueled by nationalism, and contained within the borders of a sovereign state. Thus far, these ethnic conflicts, prominent in places like Angola, Rwanda, and Kosovo, prove to result in shockingly outrageous violations of basic human rights. The reduced threat of the bipolar world suggests that the effective use of military force by stronger countries as now a more viable option than it was in the bipolar past. Therefore, an appeal to humanity reveals the plausibility of using military force to stop the human rights violations produced by the recent inner state ethnic conflicts. Once the concept of human rights is explored, although it reveals no obligation to intervene, application of the just war tradition suggests that military force is justifiable in the affairs of a sovereign country for the protection of human rights.

Understanding Human Rights

To fully understand why military intervention is justifiable on behalf of human rights, it is first necessary to understand what constitutes human rights. To begin with, human rights are universal rights. They pertain to all humans regardless of race, religion, nationality, age, or gender. Discovering what these universal human rights are requires two main efforts. First, it is necessary to understand why human rights are universal by determining the objective base on which human rights are grounded. Second, it is necessary to analyze that objective base to understand what universal human rights entail.

The universal claim of human rights is grounded in human nature discounting all human constructs. To find the ground for a universal claim, it is necessary to discover an objective standard. An objective standard is constant and necessary; it waivers under no circumstances. If anything constant and necessary ties all humans together, it is human nature. To discover the cornerstone of human nature, all human creations should be mentally disregarded. By this, I mean the thoughts of all technology, theories, and governmental structures should be ignored (at least to the best of our ability). Although humans think of them, they are not necessarily inherent in human nature, and they therefore lend no help to the quest for an objective base within human nature. Not all humans have ever experienced all human constructs. Additionally, it took many of the constructs a long time to develop, and they continue to evolve and change. They cannot be counted as part of human nature’s constant. Furthermore, human constructs created merely one of many possible worlds. Therefore, to attempt to draw objective claims from a sphere of humanity that contains only some of the many possible human constructs is extremely difficult at best. Indeed, if some relatively important figures such as Buddha, Jesus, Aristotle, Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Hitler, to name only a few, never lived, our concept of the “conventional” world from which people often try to make universal claims would most likely prove different. Therefore, to consider human constructs when searching for the essence of human nature is a detriment to the concept of universality with respect to human rights.

The objective base of human nature suggests that the main goal of humans is survival, and that provides basis for a universal human right to life. The essence of human nature appears unstructured and survivalistic. Humans exist without the constraint or protection of governmental structure and law enforcement. Additionally, there exists no great deal of interdependence. When a person is hungry, he cannot go down a street constructed by other people in a car made by other people that runs on gas refined by other people to get a hamburger someone else cooked that came from a cow that someone else raised and slaughtered. Inside the base of human nature, to survive and thus have life a person must fend for himself. The one thing any person knows absolutely, as Descartes realized in Meditations of First Philosophy, is that he exists. To keep that knowledge, and therefore to remain in existence and maintain any human nature, human nature entails that a person has a right to survive. Indeed, without survival, it is absolutely impossible for an individual do anything else. Survival entails life, so at appears that if humans have any universal right, it is the right to life.

Humans not only have the right to life, but they have the right to a good life. This idea is well argued by Tara Smith in Moral Rights and Political Freedom. Smith notes the following:

In contemplating whether to live, a person does not ponder life as an empty receptacle.

One contemplates specific ideas of what life could be like, envisioning concrete

experiences. A person can have no life that is not some kind of life, composed of events

of one sort or another. Thus this is what one considers in deciding whether to “keep on

going.” To the extent that individuals choose to maintain their lives, they do so for the

sake of having their lives of desirable character.[5]

She goes on to write:

As the telos of rights, “Life” refers to more than the barren preserve found in the high-

tech hospital wards of the slums of Calcutta. Neither offers the sort of life that people

aspire to. Since the objective that occasions our tending to its necessary conditions is a

good life, that is the end that recognition of rights will serve. Rights’ telos is a happy

life, one of flourishing or well-being. It is important to understand that I used them, “life”

and “a good life” are not distinct ambitions, but alternate labels for the same end.[6]

So, because living suggests an unavoidable idea of something worth living for, life should actually be worth living. The concept of a life worth living is considered a good life.

Thus far, I argued that there exists an objective base that entails the universal human right to a good life, and I make the claim now that the right to a good life is the only universal human right that stems from human nature. Other rights necessarily stem from the right to a good life itself, but there are no other rights that are themselves grounded in human nature. There is opposition to that claim, but I propose that careful reflection reveals a distinction between moral rights and legal rights that lends favor to my claim. Rights that people often consider universal human rights are actually legal rights grounded in a relative legal system. Legal systems, different throughout the world and based on a society’s culture, do not in themselves provide basis for human universals. The universal human right to a good life, being based in human nature itself, something all humans share regardless of their legal system or culture, is a moral right. People often claim the right to personal property. Many people believe they are entitled to personal property under any circumstances. However, they are only entitled to personal property under their culture’s norms and legal system. Human nature itself does not entail a right to property. Additionally, personal property is not necessarily a requirement for a good life, so the right to a good life does not necessarily entail the right to personal property. Physical items such as clothing and shelter are, of course, necessary for life in its most basic terms. However, clothing and shelter need not be a single individual’s property. They could, in all possibility, be shared. Indeed, some political philosophies such as Marxist Communism suggest the concept of sharing items normally considered personal property for the development a perfect society. The culture of the United States is individualistic. The individual is given a higher degree of importance when compared to the whole than he is in other group oriented cultures.[7] Subsequently, Americans have a strong notion of personal property. Furthermore, the notion of personal property is strongly supported and enforced through America’s legal system. However, it lies within the realm of possibility that another country not as focused on the individual will not maintain as strong of a notion of personal property. Because of this variance the claim to personal property does not appear to have universal moral justification. Someone’s claim to a certain right may be perfectly justified as a right under the legal system that governs his life. However, because the concept of human nature supercedes the authority of any state’s legal system, that legal right is not necessarily justified as a universal human right.

I argued for the right to a good life, but the concept of “good” requires some sort of qualification. Though the right to a life that is good is universal, what makes that life good is relative. In other words, people have a universal right to achieve a relative standard. The standard for good is based on a culture’s or an individual's values. Being from the southern United States, my Uncle’s idea of a good life is to work in his garden and sit on the porch of his secluded house while enjoying the beauty of nature. Someone from New York City would probably detest that idea of a good life. His idea of a good life falls more in line with making money and rubbing elbows with the rich and famous. In both cases, the individual has an idea of a good life, and he has the right to work for that good life.

If a person’s culture merely inhibits him from achieving his desired good life, then his rights are not violated. However, if a human-caused external condition expressly prohibits a person from achieving his desired good life, then he experiences a rights violation. For example, assume that an individual in Somalia wants to be a doctor. The tragic political and economic state of his country probably makes that impossible. Are his rights violated because he is inhibited from achieving his idea of a good life? Though his situation is most unfortunate, the individual’s rights are not violated. Only when his society dictates specifically to him that he cannot be a doctor and further dictates that he cannot travel to a place that will allow him to do so are his human rights violated. The fact that a person in the United States has much more opportunity to become a doctor than someone in Somalia might seem to make the concept of achieving a good life lose its universal appeal. However, it is important to understand that the concept of good is relative to a society’s culture. As long as the individual has maximum opportunity to achieve the best life his society can provide, minus direct prohibitions, then his rights are not violated. One person’s culture might inhibit him more than another person’s culture. That is unfortunate, but it is not a concern in regard to the ability of someone to achieve a good life as human nature dictates. If a culture prohibits someone from achieving a good life, however, then there is a human rights problem.

Next, it is vital to place a limitation on human rights. One person’s rights end where another person’s rights begin. This principle demonstrates itself through some appeal to pragmatic concerns. Consider the case of Ted Bundy. Bundy had a fixation with killing young women for sexual pleasure. His idea of the ultimate good life was to emerge himself in a secret world of murderous sexual deviancy. The girls Bundy killed had the right to a good life as did Bundy. Therefore, for Bundy to carry out his right to a good life meant taking away the right of the girls to a good life, and that concept presents a serious dilemma. Consider another case in which one person’s idea of a good life includes vandalizing property while another person’s idea of a good life includes having a nice house. One person’s rights to a good life must be violated, and this presents another serious dilemma. The solution to this dilemma lies in realizing that one person can execute his rights only up to the point that they violate the rights of another person. For a good life, Bundy was allowed all the sexual fantasy he desired, but only until that fantasy began violating the good life of others. The vandal can exercise his right as far as possible (though, granted, that probably is not very far) until he steps inside the sphere of another person’s rights.

Though legal laws may seem to violate human rights because they place direct prohibitions on individuals from achieving their ideas good lives, legal laws do not necessarily violate human rights because laws are often designed to ensure individuals’ spheres of human rights do not intertwine. Most legal laws support the concept that one individual’s rights end where another individual’s rights begin. For example, murder is illegal, so Bundy was wrong morally and legally to kill innocent girls in his pursuit for a good life. Laws prohibited Bundy from mixing his sphere of rights with the spheres of his victims. To cover another example, laws exist against vandalism. Vandals cannot pursue their concept of a good life to the point that it interferes with rights of property owners. It is possible for a legal system to have laws that violate human rights, but that occurs comparatively infrequently. For example, if food supply in a state is abundant but a law exists that says people in that state can only eat once a day, that law violates the people’s right to a good life. Such a law does not serve to maintain the separation of individuals’ spheres of human rights.

To sum up, human rights must be universal. Anything universal rests on an objective base, and human nature provides an objective claim for universal human rights. Analysis of human nature reveals that all humans have the right to a good life, and that entails other more specific rights based on a person’s cultural or individual concept of what a good life is. A person has the right to achieve a good life up to the point that achieving that good life interferes with someone else’s pursuit of a good life. For a violation of someone’s right to a good life to occur, his life must be in imminent danger, or he must be expressly prohibited from living in a manner that he believes is good based on what his conditions dictate are reasonable for him to attain.

Justification Through The Just War Tradition

Now that human rights are defined, it is necessary to determine the justification of military intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state on the claim of the protection of those human rights. This is possible through utilizing the concepts set forth through the jus ad bellum component of the just war tradition. Military intervention must have a just cause, it must have just intentions, it must be declared by a legitimate authority, it must be used as a last resort, and it must meet the requirement of proportionality.

The protection of human rights provides a just cause for military intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state. As I already noted, human rights are universal and therefore applicable to all people regardless of political borders. If a sovereign state violates only someone’s legal rights, military intervention is certainly questionable because a sovereign state is responsible for its own legal system. It is wrong of the sovereign state to treat its people in such a manner, but military intervention in that country’s sovereign affairs is not warranted. Though a sovereign state is responsible for the creation of its legal system, it is not responsible for the creation of the system of human nature that entails human rights. For a sovereign country to violate human rights is for it to violate rights that supercede its authority. Unlike legal rights, the crutch for human rights does not rest on the power of the sovereign state. Therefore, intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state to protect human rights is acceptable because human rights are not controlled by any particular state’s sovereignty.

Protection of human rights is the propagation of some form of freedom and the promotion of the ability of humans to achieve a good life, and that appears a just intention. To protect human rights is to protect a universal right that all humans, by virtue of the fact that they are human, are entitled to. To truly meet the standard of just intention, however, the intervening party must interfere only to the necessary point. Once human rights are protected, military intervention should halt. A clear and limited goal must be set prior to military action, and military action should cease once that goal is achieved.

Either a sovereign state alone or a group of sovereign states has legitimate authority to intervene militarily in the affairs of a sovereign country on behalf of human rights. The concept of legitimate authority with respect to intervention on behalf of human rights has fueled much recent controversy. Many feel the United Nations, being the only union with military might that represents countries from all over the world, is the only authority that can legitimately sanction the use of military force to correct humanitarian atrocities. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated recently that “the Security Council should have primary responsibility for peace and security, and when it comes to the use of force, the council must be involved.”[8] He stated this in response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s decision to attack Yugoslavia at least in part to defend the human rights of the Kosovar Albanians. NATO’s membership is limited to only countries from the north Atlantic, and even within the north Atlantic criteria, membership is selective. Therefore, some feel that alliances such as NATO should submit to the more representative United Nations for the legitimization of the use of force. Furthermore, many people feel that the slanted views of a single sovereign state certainly fail to meet the requirement of legitimate authority with respect to military force for human rights protection inside a foreign sovereign country. The concept of the UN as the sole legitimate authority for human rights protection through force is correct, only to a very limited extent. If military intervention is declared only to protect human rights, then the United Nations, providing the best representation for all humans, is the only legitimate authority for that declaration. However, in certain circumstances, if the protection of human rights is only part of the reason for military intervention, then groups such as NATO or even single sovereign states provide a source of legitimate authority. NATO desired to protect human rights, but it desired to protect human rights for the protection the stability of the Balkans. History proved the Balkans a hot spot for European instability. NATO felt the humanitarian atrocities in that area could ultimately lead to greater problems throughout the region, and that is a region in which NATO holds vital organizational interest. Because the protection of human rights served another purpose for NATO, and that purpose, a defense of important organizational interests, was itself a just cause, NATO provided a legitimate authority for military intervention. As with NATO, if the protection of human rights is necessary for a single sovereign country to meet another goal that proves a just cause, then that single sovereign country is a legitimate authority for military force. If at all possible, the United Nations should provide the authority for military intervention in the affairs of a sovereign country for the reason of the protection of human rights. Indeed, if the protection of human rights is the only reason that requires military intervention, then the United Nations is the only possible source of legitimate authority. However, humanitarian atrocities often lead to problems outside the violation of human rights themselves. In such cases, if the vast structure of the United Nations, with its many diverse opinions, fails to take decisive action, then a smaller group of sovereign states, or even a single sovereign state, provides a legitimate source of authority for military intervention.

As is the case for military intervention for any reason, military intervention for the protection of human rights should be a last resort. Military intervention is justified only after all other means of resolving the problem are exhausted. Diplomatic attempts must reach a dead end. Also, the threat of force should be clearly used before the force itself. NATO gave Yugloslav President Slobodan Milosevic a clear deadline to halt hostilities before it would instigate the use of force. NATO clearly placed the threat before the action of force. Only after NATO tried persistently to solve the Yugloslav problem with diplomatic means, and only after the Serbs failed to back away at the threat of force, did NATO actually use force.

Military intervention for humanitarian reasons, as with any reason, must meet the requirement of proportionality. The cost of the fighting should not outweigh the benefits gained from the fight. Protection of human rights is certainly a just and noble cause. However, if the cost of military intervention is too great, it is a noble cause on which an authority should not act. The forces fought should be much weaker than the ones sent to fight. In the case of NATO in Kosovo, NATO’s power and ability far exceeded the forces of its Serbian enemy, so the requirement of proportionality was met with respect to military power. Besides the proportionality of immediate military might, international relations concerns provide another factor for proportionality. The intervening power should not intervene if intervention requires placing it under serious political international threat. Going back to NATO’s Kosovo action, NATO faced no serious threat from the international scene. Russia, China, and some smaller countries provided some threat, and the United Nations expressed some displeasure, but the total threat was weak enough that NATO still met the requirement of proportionality.

The requirements of just cause, last resort, and proportionality together suggest that human rights violations must occur on a massive scale to require military intervention. Claiming just cause from a minor violation of human rights can result in problems. Quibbling over details of the minor situation can put the supposed fact of a human rights violation into question. Massive violations, however, are harder to disguise as something besides the violation of human rights. For example, the genocide of many ethnic Albanians made clear that their human rights were violated, and thus the requirement of just cause, with regard to human rights violations, was met with little controversy. If the Serbs killed only small pockets of ethnic Albanians, not only would perceiving a human rights violation be more difficult, but it would also prove more difficult to claim the need for military intervention. This brings in the concept of proportionality. Unless human rights violations occur on a massive scale, it is highly questionable as to whether or not the use of military force meets the requirement of proportionality. With massive violations of human rights, it is also more probable to meet the requirement of last resort. It is vastly more evident, when humanitarian rights violations continue on a large scale, that the atrocities continue to be a problem even after exhausting all plausible means except for military force to resolve the problem.

The Lack of Obligation

Human rights entail that a person is entitled to something, but they do not entail that a person is obligated to do something. As I already ascertained, a person has the right to life. That entails he has the right to eat. However, having the right to eat does not entail that someone else is obligated to provide him with food. He has the right to get food for himself, but no one is obligated, with respect to that right, to feed him. To admit to an obligation by person A is to suggest a violation of person A’s right to a good life. Extending rights to an obligation interferes with the carefully balanced spheres of rights. It does not successfully meet the requirement of one person’s rights ending where another person’s rights begin. Additionally, the basic nature of rights suggests the entitlement to something, but it does not suggest the obligation to do something.

Because human rights do not entail an obligation, no power is obligated to intervene military on behalf of human rights, even if the human rights violations clearly meet guidelines for military intervention set forth by the just war tradition. Not only does this lack of an obligation exist because of the nature of human rights, but it also exists because of the nature of states. States are constructed to meet the needs of and protect the rights of their own people. Granted, not all states act in such a manner, but they should act in such a manner. If military intervention will somehow result in negative effects on a state’s populace, or if a state’s populace is opposed to military intervention, then military intervention is not an obligation. It is important to note that most intervention forces are groups of states rather than just a single state. Even in these cases of alliances, the state, still existing for the people, is still not obligated to send forces as part of the alliance’s military contingent if its populace opposes the notion.

Conclusion

The collapse of one type of global structure brought with it the formation of a different global structure. The nature of today’s unipolar world suggests the emergence of ethnic conflicts inside weaker sovereign states that result in the massive violations of human rights. This conflict lies in stark contrast to the bipolar world’s stable threat that existed during the last decade. The recent rapid change in world conflict unfortunately failed to bring with it a rapid change in the doctrine of military intervention. With the unipolar world’s lack of a major threat, the use of military force by larger countries is a much more feasible option that it was under the controls dictated by the bipolar world. The greater opportunity of larger powers to effectively use military force combined with the occurrence of massive human rights violations in weaker countries suggests that military force can serve the function of preventing those human rights violations. Human nature entails that all humans have the universal right to a good life. When human rights are grossly violated inside the borders of a sovereign state, as they continually are in today’s world, the just war tradition suggests that military intervention for the protection of human rights is justifiable. World powers, though the concept of human rights does not itself entail an obligation to do so, clearly hold the opportunity to protect universal human rights that supercede any manmade sovereign authority.

NOTES

The only assistance I received is mentioned in the footnotes.

WORKS CITED

“Annan Calls for U.N. To Lead Peacekeeping Efforts” [news on-line]. May 7, 1999.

accessed 13 November 1999. available from http://cnn.com/world/europe/9905/

07/kosovo.03/ ; Internet.

Ignatieff, Michael. The Warrior’s Honor. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997.

Smith, Tara. Moral Rights and Political Freedom. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995.

Vincent, R.J. Human Rights and International Relations. London: Cambridge

University Press, 1997.

Thesis

Viewing the concept of human rights through the lens of the just war tradition provides clear justification for military intervention in the affairs of a sovereign country for the protection of human rights, but it entails no obligation for such intervention.

Discussion

The recent change in international structure from a bipolar world to a unipolar world brought with it a change in the predominant form of global conflict. The bipolar world produced the threat of major conflict between two main poles and their allies. Surprisingly, the strong threat from both massive sides kept the world fairly stable. When the bipolar world crumbled into a unipolar world, the push and pull that kept the world fairly stable crumbled with it. Weaker countries that were once the grounds of important polar power struggles found themselves suddenly abandoned by the stronger countries that previously played a large part in their affairs. The collapse of the bipolar world caused the collapse of weaker states as their function within the world system changed. That resulted in nationalistic tendencies and ethnic conflict.

The new structure of the world suggests that conflict during the beginning of the 21^st century will consist of mostly small-scale warfare, fueled by nationalism, and contained within the borders of a sovereign state. Thus far, these ethnic conflicts, prominent in places like Angola, Rwanda, and Kosovo, prove to result in shockingly outrageous violations of human rights. The new structure of the world also suggests that the effective use of military force by stronger countries as now a more viable option than it was in the threatening bipolar past. Unfortunately, the world has yet to reconcile when to use this more available military force to correct the growing number of massive human rights violations. The question of when to intervene militarily is a tremendous controversy, and it poses a problem that needs a clear answer to promote global cooperation and international stability. The goal of this thesis is to help create a path towards such an answer.

I plan to organize my paper into four main sections. In Section I will explain, more in depth than above, the reason for the thesis. The Section II will explore the nature of human rights, and it will analyze what human rights entail. In Section III, I will discuss the consequences of the nature of human rights when analyzed in terms of the just war tradition. In this section, I will explain why the nature of human rights suggests that the sovereignty of a country can legitimately be violated for the purpose of protecting human rights. In Section IV, I will explain, based on the nature of human rights, that although military intervention in the affairs of a sovereign country is justified, there is no obligation for such intervention.

Research Plan

The main questions I will explore are directly related to Sections II, III, and IV of the paper.

Section II: An Exploration of Human Rights

The most important question I will need to answer in Section II is: Do universal human rights exist, and if so, what are they? Unfortunately, the question has no “approved solution.” Most people assume that there is such a thing as human rights, but actually proving that human rights exist is difficult. Moreover, people too often disagree as to what those rights are. I need to successfully prove that there are universal human rights and I need to explain what those rights are for two main reasons. First, human rights must be determined to know exactly what actions by a sovereign country constitute a human rights violation. Second, it is necessary to prove that some rights exist as universal, meaning they apply to all humans, to provide justification for intervening in the affairs of sovereign country whose power does not apply to all people. In other words, rights must be proved, and they mist be proved as universal, to prove that an authority exists that supersedes the authority of a sovereign state.

The answer to the question of human rights lies in correct reasoning, and it must be more rational than empirical. I must gain knowledge of other attempts to prove universal human claims, especially in regard to human rights. This knowledge will be essential in my ability to reflect and relate a correct logical chain that develops from an objective base to a human right.

Once I demonstrate why human rights exist and explain what they are, I must answer another question: What do human rights entail? By this, I mean to explore what actions (or lack of actions) are necessary to ensure that human rights are maintained. This is vital to relate human rights to the just war tradition (Section III) and to analyze the concept of an obligation to protect human rights (Section IV).

I will use four sources in my analysis of human rights. I will study human rights as discussed by R.J. Vincent in Human Rights and International Relations and as discussed by Tara Smith in Moral Rights and Political Freedom. I will look at John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, and I will also look at factual aspects of human nature provided by Dave Grossman in On Killing.

Section III: Justification Through the Just War Tradition

In the third section I will attempt to successfully answer the main question of the paper: Is military intervention in the affairs of a sovereign country for the protection of human rights justified? I will attempt to do this through the jus ad bellum component of the just war tradition. This path poses a potential problem. The just war tradition is not a theory that explains why war is justified. Rather, it assumes that war is justified in some circumstances. The just war tradition maintains that if war is at all justified, then it is justified only if it meats all of the criteria set forth by the just war tradition. That means I will need to ask the reader to assume there are some occasions that justify military force. Considering the general acceptance of the just war tradition and its extremely conservative criteria, and considering there is no convincing argument that says war is never justified, this is an assumption I am willing ask the reader to accept.

The most difficult question I will need to answer with respect to the just war tradition is: What is the legitimate authority for the implementation of military force in the affairs of a sovereign country for the protection of human rights? The question is currently a point of heated international controversy. To answer it, I will need to provide a well-supported and sound argument. Because of the current controversy over the question, asking the reader to accept any assumptions is a dangerous approach.

For information about the just war tradition, I will rely largely on The Ethics of War by A.J. Coates. For the question of legitimate authority, I will attempt to draw information from R.J. Vincent’s Human Rights and International Relations as well as articles from CNN’s Internet page.

Section IV: The Question of Obligation

After I determine that military intervention in the affairs of a sovereign country is justified, I will need to answer the question: Is any source obligated to protect human rights with military force if the use of that force means interfering in the affairs of a sovereign country? If military intervention is justified, then it must be determined whether or not military intervention is necessary. The question as to what is the appropriate “source” of military intervention will be determined in Section III when I explore the jus ad bellum component of legitimate authority. It is necessary to answer the question of obligation to determine what the priorities of states should be, especially with respect to international relations. The question’s answer will stem from what is entailed by the nature of human rights that I explore in Section II.

Because the answer to the question of obligation stems from the nature of human rights, the sources I will use to explore the question of obligation are the same sources that I will use for the exploration of human rights. I will use R.J. Vincent’s Human Rights and International Relations, Tara Smith’s Moral Rights and Political Freedom, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, and Dave Grossman’s On Killing.

Proposed Bibliography

“Annan Calls for U.N. To Lead Peacekeeping Efforts” [news on-line]. May 7, 1999.

accessed 13 November 1999. available from http://cnn.com/world/europe/9905/

07/kosovo.03/ ; Internet.

Coates, A.J. The Ethics of War. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997.

Grossman, David. On Killing. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1996.

Ignatieff, Michael. The Warrior’s Honor. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997.

Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. (Not yet determined which version)

Smith, Tara. Moral Rights and Political Freedom. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995.

Vincent, R.J. Human Rights and International Relations. London: Cambridge

University Press, 1997.

Cadet Kenneth Evans

Ushering in the end of the century and the change in the millennium is a new era in global politics, one that is not dominated by diametrically opposed political and social ideologies. This new structure allows for the increased spread of the Western liberal ideals conceived of by the enlightened philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. However, this new era also poses new challenges, one of which is the burden of protecting and advancing humanitarian rights. While the United Nations exists to some extent as an organization designed to help maintain these rights, the approaching millennium poses the question of whether the UN has an obligation to protect humanitarian rights, and if so to what extent and under what circumstances it justifiably can intervene to uphold these rights. In this paper I will attempt to prove that based on the obligation of a government to uphold and defend its laws, the United Nations does indeed have a duty to protect fundamental human rights. In mediating intrastate conflicts, however, there are also several practical considerations to bear in mind when determining the validity of and need for intervention.

The first question, regarding whether or not the United Nations has an obligation is central to the avocation and protection of human rights in the coming century. For if one rejects the notion of an obligation, then the UN becomes completely justified in turning its collective back on suffering and tragedy, contrary to the very idea of a United Nations. It is important to note that obligation is to be interpreted as the duty to protect human rights. Duty implies that the UN cannot selectively choose when and where to intervene based upon practical expediency. A duty does not mean an ought, or should, but rather necessitates action on the part of the United Nations. The question of when, and to what extent this imperative exists will be further explored in this essay.

It is central to this argument to establish what, if any, universal human rights exist. I contend that in fact only one immutable, timeless human right exists, and that is the right to personal security. I define personal security as a freedom from physical violence or a threat of human-generated physical violence so likely as to eliminate the value of human life. The argument here is based substantially on Hobbes’ conception of the state of nature, in which “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger as himself.” [9] Thus, security may only be obtained through entering to some degree into a society in which one’s right to life can be upheld. Without such a society, one faces “continual fear and the danger of violent death: and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." [10] A right to freedom is the cornerstone upon any civilization must rest. Consequently, without the right to life society of any recognizable form would cease to function. A right to freedom from man-made violence is the cornerstone upon which any civilization must rest. Without such a right anarchy would ensue. Life would be rendered meaningless as at any moment as a neighbor, sister, or stranger could take, without fear of retribution, one’s life. The basic characteristics of society such as a governing body and the existence of personal property would be rendered moot by the absence of personal security from violence or the threat of violence. Therefore society and human security are symbiotic elements; without security, society cannot exist, and the right human security cannot exist without a society. For this reason, I argue that the right to human security is a fundamental, inalienable right.

By entering into these societies, man has created a pact with the other members of the society, and a transgression of this pact, more specifically violating the right of security of another, is necessarily a violation of the universal human right. In order to prevent such transgressions, man develops laws and the corresponding punishments for infractions of that law. The members of the society, having handed over a degree of liberty to a higher authority in exchange for protection, place a duty upon the higher authority to punish those who violate the established law. Those who do not agree with the established law or do not wish to live under the protection of the society have a corresponding freedom to leave the society and take their chances in an anarchic and chaotic state of nature.

At this point I will shift to the argument of Hugo Grotius. Grotius argues that as man enters into society with other men, states have likewise entered into a similar pact with other states, under similar conditions as individuals have. As Grotius states, “the law which is broader in scope than municipal law is the law of nations; that is the law which has received its obligatory force from the will of all nations, or of many nations.” [11] An objection to this claim is that while there is a clear natural law dictating why man must abide by the law of his or her state, there is no such necessity in international law. I would respond to this by stating first that we have already established that the governing body of a state is instituted to protect the lives of its citizens. If a state fails to abide by the laws established by consent in the international community, that state faces sanctions of some kind from the international community at large, most conspicuously armed coercion. Conflict in which a nation faces a coalition of outraged states obviously is not in the best interest of its citizens; their lives are put in danger through war and economic or diplomatic sanctions hurt the general populace. Therefore, because the security of a state’s citizens is threatened by transgression of international law, and because the state was established by pact to protect its individuals in the first place, it is in the duty of the state to abide by international law.

The question that then arises is by what instrument are states that do violate the international accord to be punished? The answer, unavailable to Grotius in the sixteenth century, is the United Nations. The United Nations exists as a governing body that states surrender some amount of sovereignty to in exchange for security. One can equate the capitulation of sovereignty to the United Nations a macrosystemic version of the individuals surrender of liberty to the state.

Just as the state may punish the individual for violations of its established laws that the individual has consented to, the United Nations may sanction in some fashion the state for transgressions of international law. I would contend that the United Nations has even more of a right to punish violations of a law than states individually do. In a state, one only recognizes a law as valid on the basis of his or her citizenship, whereas member states of the United Nations have formally accepted the covenants of the governing body by existing as directly voting in, paying dues to, and conducting diplomatic relations with the UN. Such a degree of interaction can hardly be found between a state and the vast majority of its citizens.

Thus we see the United Nations has a right to punish violators of international law, but the question remains as to whether or not this right can be extended as far as an obligation. This question can be resolved if we look again to the UN as a body to which sovereign states have surrendered some degree of liberty in exchange for security. I have previously drawn the analogy between the state and the individual, and I will do so again. Indeed, “the members of the community at large have given up their individual right to punish wrong doers with the stipulation that the state will do it for them.” [12] Consider this scenario to clarify the previous quotation. If a state were to rid itself of such an obligation to uphold law, and given that Man’s state of nature is a rather unpleasant one, then two possibilities exits. The first is that no one takes responsibility for maintaining law, and society degrades into the same state that preexisted. The other possibility is that duty of sustaining law falls upon individuals or groups, making society essentially supported by bands of vigilantes. These two scenarios highlight the necessity of having a state-controlled method for enforcement of law. This duty of the state is analogous to the law of the international community, where states surrender their right to individually punish transgressors to a higher governing body, the UN, which supercedes that authority of individual states. One must be careful in using the term “transgressors” here. By transgressors I mean virtually all transgressions of international law, except for an unprovoked violent attack on a state’s sovereignty, in which case the right to retribution is almost always reserved. That having been said, according to Grotius, the UN not only has a right to uphold the laws that it has set forth, but because states have surrendered power to the UN, it has an obligation to maintain international law.

The ultimate conclusion that this leads us to is both the right and the obligation of the UN to intervene in humanitarian crises. First, humanitarian rights are a fundamental concept embodied by the United Nations. This necessity to place human rights foremost is evident in the United Nations Charter on two separate accounts. The first account stems from the notion that in the UN Charter there is not a clear delineation between the security of individuals and the security of states. And, obviously, human security as we have already established is imperiled by intrastate conflict. The UN’s emphasis on the rights of the individual to security is found in Article 99, which states, the secretary general may bring to the Security Council, “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” [13] The second account in which the UN reflects the need to uphold human rights is apparent throughout the organization's charter, beginning with the second paragraph of the preamble, in which nations “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human Person.” [14] There is further evidence throughout the charter, for example Article 55, which demands “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights,” [15] and Article 13, which calls for help from all nations in “assisting in the realization of human rights.” [16] Finally, the most sweeping declaration of Human Rights if found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is clear that the principle of respecting rights is a large portion of the responsibility of the United Nations, evidenced by its original charter and the human rights declaration, produced not long after the United Nations itself.

The existence of human rights as a part of the UN’s foundation should and is recognized by all member nations. As author David Callahan states, “the commitment to human rights . . . comes with membership to an international organization like the United Nations.” [17] As we established earlier, the contract that other nations enter into by joining the United Nations binds them to commitment to the principles and laws upon which the United Nations is based. To not do so is to undermine the entire purpose of a transnational organization. For the past decade, UN secretary-generals have recognized that for a state not to abide by these principles is to put the state’s sovereignty into danger. First, in April of 1991 UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar stated, “the defense of the oppressed in the name of moralityshould prevail over frontiers.” [18] Boutros Ghali made an even stronger claim in 1992 when he stated, “the time of absolute sovereignty . . . has passed.” [19] The fact that the member states of the United Nations have ratified and agreed to its charter indicates a clear pledge to international law, and they therefore subject themselves to punishment for infractions of that agreed upon law.

The point may be raised that many articles in the Declaration of Human Rights exceed what I have established as the basic rights of man, and therefore exceed what is essential to society. However, it is apparent that nations have not selectively picked and choosed what sections of the UN Charter they agree with. An analogy may be made again to the laws of a state; as an individual does not have the right to capriciously decide which laws are in their best interest to follow, a nation does not have a right to deny the legitimacy of the UN’s laws. These countries have voluntarily entered into the UN and are reap its benefits, and they therefore are obligated to abide by its laws. tit is evident that the right of an individual to security from violence is a fundamentally necessary right of man, unwavering and unalterable.

Because the nation has the obligation to abide the law, the logical conclusion to this argument seems to be that because the United Nations has an obligation to also uphold law. Furthermore, they have an obligation to uphold every article contained not only in the Declaration of Human Rights, but any legislation passed in the General Assembly or in any number of subcommittees. This, obviously, is unfeasible based on any number of reasons: cost, manpower, potential for conflict, and so on. However, simply because it is unfeasible does not make it any less true. In an attempt to reconcile the unfeasibility of upholding all law with the judicial propriety of it, I contend that all of these other articles and laws passed by the UN are contingent upon the single basic right of man to security. Without this right, as already established, there are no other rights; society cannot function properly. Therefore, before other violations are addressed, the United Nations must make violations of the right to security paramount to all other concerns. Such a hierarchy allows for the recognition of the need to uphold other laws, but at the same time establishes a precedence such that the most egregious violations are dealt with first.

These violations could potentially occur in may ways. There could be civil war, interstate conflict, or ruthless oppression by a totalitarian or communist government. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has experienced far fewer interstate conflicts and many more interstate conflicts. In 1992, soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 29 out of 30 thirty globe’s armed conflicts occurred were confined within state borders. [20] There seems to be little cause to believe that these ethnic, interstate conflicts are abating. Instead, according to Senator Moynihan, “the defining mode of conflict in the era ahead is ethnic conflict.” [21] Because of this, I will not focus on UN reaction to either repressive regimes or interstate conflict, but rather concentrate on the efforts that the UN must take to address ethnic conflict.

Having established that the UN has an obligation to uphold the right to security above all else, and keeping in mind the focus is on interstate conflict, it would seem to follow that the UN should intervene whenever the right to security is being violated in a civil war. Currently, or at least until very recently, there have been conflicts ongoing in East Timor, Sudan, Nigeria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Liberia, to name a few of the more volatile. Intervening in all of these locations is realistically impossible. There is little debate that many factors hamstring the UN’s ability to respond to every global ethnic conflict as it should. The UN’s system for actually approving any substantial action is over-bureaucratized, it suffers from inadequate funding, and additionally communication between the UN Secretariat, the Security Council and troop-contributing countries is muddled and confused. Also, routine international intervention could fuel nationalistic secessionism by small but vocal minorities, in an attempt to have the UN lend legitimacy to their cause, as was the fear in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. Such an increase in secessionist fervor could actually result in creating more suffering than that which it alleviates, and thus be contrary to the cause of intervention in the first place. Therefore, it is clear that intervening in any and all instances where basic rights are being violated is not only unfeasible, but it could result in doing more harm than good. It is necessary then to develop a system in which instances of rights violations can be evaluated in order to determine the necessity and feasibility of intervention.

Intervening in a civil war is an extremely delicate issue, for it is a domestic dispute within a country’s own borders, fought generally by or for a country’s own civilians. A civil war is, in itself, not the business of the United Nations. It is only when the nation’s government or the insurgents resort to means that as Michael Walzer states, “shock the moral conscience of mankind,” [22] that the UN can take action. It is at this point that the nations and / or insurgents violate the basic right of man to security that international law is violated, and on such a scale to warrant intervention. Some may assert that it is impossible o objectively quantify how many rapes or murders it takes to disgust the world’s since of morality. To this claim I object; there is a certain level of escalation to which the world is capable of recognizing as too extreme. These include ethnic extermination, mass rape and beatings, and wholly indiscriminate use of force against civilians by military or paramilitary organizations. Therefore, the first criterion that the UN must evaluate is the level of human rights abuses occurring within the civil war. This decision makes obvious sense; the most egregious human rights violations receive the most attention.

Even if a conflict does morally disgust the global community, it is important to recognize that intervention does not always have to end granting total sovereignty to an ethnic group. Instead, there are incremental steps that may be taken, such as granting more legislative power to a particular region or party that represents a group, removing restrictions on a group’s rights, or granting that group limited autonomy within the confines of a its parent nation. Such intermediate steps function in softening the blow of intervention to the troubled nation, yet still ensure that the fundamental rights of its people are being met. Because intervening in a the affairs of another nation is such a dramatic step, I will attempt to lay down more criteria for recognizing the legitimacy of an insurgent ethnic movement. These criteria are necessary, because as we have already established it is impossible for the UN to deal with all of the conflicts currently taking place. Thus we will first use the level of human rights abuse as a starting place to see if UN intervention is necessary. From there, it is possible to develop a criteria using five evaluative steps. The UN’s priority of intervention can then be dictated by how satisfactorily these steps are met.

The first of these characteristics is that the group seeking autonomy must demonstrate a distinct ethnic majority with historical claims to relatively clear borders. Such a distinction is necessary in order to first lend legitimacy to the movement for independence. Second, and perhaps more importantly, a movement for autonomy in which there is a large, recognizable homogenous ethnic group is more likely to be stable once independence is obtained. A good example of this need for a distinct ethnic group is evident in the fracturing of the former Yugoslavia. The clearest ethic majority began to break away first, as was the case with Macedonia. The United Nations supported the independence of that nascent country because it had a clearly identifiable ethnic majority. The nation was close to seventy percent Macedonian, with a similar majority speaking Macedonian and following the Greek Orthodox religion. Contrast Macedonia with Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose ethnicities are approximately forty percent Serbian, forty percent Moslem, and twenty percent Croatian. [23] Macedonia’s independence from Yugoslavia was a rather smooth transition, compared with the bloody dispute that insued following Bosnia and Herzegovina’s movement for independence. Much of the dissimilitude can be attributed to the fairly homogenous constitution of Macedonia, versus the varied ethnicities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The next criterion that must be addressed is the ethnic group’s historical ties to a specific piece of land. The need for this is fairly self evident. If an ethnic group does not have certain ties to land, it demands carving up pieces of another nation in order to satisfy the needs of a particular ethnic group. Pursuing this route can clearly lead to regional instability, as the nation form which the land was taken will likely seek restitution for their lost territory, or refuse outright to secede land. Take for example the Kurds. While they certainly have some valid claims to land in the Mid-East region, they have no historical ties to a specific region. Instead, they call home Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the Soviet Union. [24] The problem of a Kurdish homeland has continued to plague the Middle East region, with almost perpetual outbursts of violence in Turkey and Iraq. Contrast the Kurds with the former Russian states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, whose close ties to a specific region made their movement for independence from the former Soviet Union swift and nonviolent.

The next characteristic that the UN must examine is the likelihood of the secessionists pursuing a functioning democratic government. The need for this ties back into the requisite that the nascent state be relatively ethnically homogenous. Essentially, there is no reason for the UN to back the creation of a state if it’s new government will not perform as it should, and allow the new state to slip back into violence. One of the most appalling examples of this is Burundi, which experienced “the arrival of a multiparty democracy.” [25] Soon after Burundi was rocked by a large-scale massacre in which a hundred thousand people are estimated to have perished. [26] Furthermore, a function of an effective democratic government is one in which human rights are upheld and protected. Without the insurance of a democratic government, the UN potentially faces the same human rights abuses that it was seeking to avoid by mediating the intrastate conflict in the first place.

The final, and I would say the most controversial, tenet that the UN must take into consideration is the relative military power of the state in which the secessionist movement is taking place. This tenet is an obvious matter of reasonable cost; it is irrational to spend more troops or expend more resources resolving a conflict than are being lost in the conflict. One of the best illustrations of this tenet is the Russian campaign in Chechnya. Although the Russian military is waging an obvious war against the civilian population, in which more than 125,000 civilians have fled the country, [27] there is little the UN can do besides providing relief for the refugees and light diplomatic pressure. Russia can bar military action through their Security Council veto power, and even if they couldn’t the expenditure of human life that would be incurred as a result of intervention in Russia not would be proportional to the good it would serve.

With this last criterion we are brought to the final conclusion. First, we established that humans voluntarily enter into societies in order to protect the most basic need of man, security from physical violence. Society therefore has an obligation to uphold law in order to protect its citizens. In a similar fashion, states enter into an international society, which is governed by agreed upon international law. The United Nations is the body to which these states collectively surrender a degree of freedom, in exchange for security. It is therefore the obligation of the UN to uphold the laws to which the society of international states has agreed upon. Although there are many laws for that the UN should uphold, because human rights are the most fundamental and basic right of man, they ought to be the first priority of the United Nations. Given that civil wars are the most common and egregious violations of these basic rights, intrastate conflicts ought to be the primary focus of the UN. However, for the last decade the UN has been faced with an overwhelming number of the civil disputes, so that some system for determining UN intervention must be developed. In answer to this, five criterion were given . First, there must be widespread violations of basic human rights. Then, four other tenets were given: the need for a clear ethnic majority, a historical tie to the land, the ability to form a relatively stable democracy, and finally the possibility to intervene at a reasonable cost. Keeping this in mind, I am reminded of a quote regarding UN intervention: “the impossibility of intervening everywhere should not bar the UN from acting anywhere.” [28] Indeed, while it is the obligation of the United Nations to uphold international law and protect basic human rights, the realities of increased ethnic conflict in the twenty-first century demand a realistic, pragmatic approach to mediating intrastate conflicts.

Thesis

The United Nations has an obligation to uphold basic human rights, defined as personal security from violence or the threat of violence. Pragmatic criteria must be met before UN military intervention occurs, and in order to determine a hierarchy of need for UN interventions. In the future, a standing UN army should be created to protect these human rights.

Discussion of argument

First I intend to argue that the right to life and the right to safety from violence or the threat of violence are fundamental rights of man. These are inalienable rights because without them life is either nonexistent or meaningless. Because man seeks protection and safety, he enters into a society. A government is formed in which man surrenders some degree of freedom in exchange for protection. It is therefore the obligation of the government to uphold and enforce the law. Just because the government cannot prevent all crime does not mean it is any less responsible to use the resources it has available to enforce law.

Following the First World War states created the League of nations in an attempt to further peace and stability to a world that had entered into a new stage of violence and death brought on by war. Although it was unsuccessful, it laid the foundation for the United Nations’ inception at the end of the Second World War. The United Nations was established as an institution to further peace and international security. An analogy can be drawn between the states creating and joining the United Nations and individuals creating and entering into a society. Both states and individuals surrender freedom to a higher body in exchange for protection. Therefore, it is the obligation of the United Nations to uphold and protect international law that states assent

to by joining the international community.

As is true with trying to uphold civil war, it is impossible to prevent every infraction of international law. The most basic and most important laws must be defended first. Thus, the human right to security and freedom from violence is the most fundamental and basic right, and ought to be safeguarded above all else. Even if the right to life isn’t directly stated in international law, it is tacitly assented to by numerous mentions in the UN Declaration of Human Rights and within the UN Charter itself.

Most recently and likely for the foreseeable future, intrastate conflicts have resulted in the most egregious violations of the human right to life. This includes situations in which the conflict directly or indirectly creates widespread loss of life, primarily in the form famine.

Currently, there are far too many conflicts for the United Nations to intervene in all of them. Therefore, a hierarchy of need must be developed in order to determine which situations require the most attention and which are the most viable for long term resolution.

Using the seriousness of the conflict, immediacy of the problem, and viability for a long-term remedy as guidelines, the following are the proposed criteria dictating intervention and a brief reason each:

1) Level of violence -- The loss of human life or suffering inflicted has to be to such a level as to “shock the moral conscience of mankind.” If this tenet necessary for intervention to occur. If it is satisfied, then the other four criteria may be used as guidelines for determining which conflicts best suit intervention.

If the violations of human right result from oppression and not armed conflict, the UN is should intervene, and this type of intervention ought to take precedence over intervention in armed conflict.

2) A clear, distinct ethnic group -- This criterion helps to prevent further oppression by the newly autonomous ethnic group and legitimizes movement for independence.

3) Historical ties to land -- Using this criterion also helps to legitimize the move for independence and increases the chances for long-term success in the resolution of the conflict.

4) The ability and probability of the potential state to form a democracy -- To not form a democracy would be to invite government that inflict the same human rights abuses that intervention sought to alleviate in the first place.

The final three criteria are all weighed evenly, and the absence of one does not necessarily negate the possibility of intervention.

Noting several problems of recent UN interventions, such as confused command structures and unwillingness of nations to commit troops, and slowness in reacting to crises, a viable solution could be the creation of a standing voluntary United Nations military. This force could be financed through international taxes on travel and monetary exchanges, and would be the “teeth” of the UN’s resolutions.

Research Questions

I. Human Rights

1) What, if any, universal human rights exist?

-Do these rights necessarily entail an obligation?

Sources

Fain, Haskell. Normative Politics and the International Community. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 1987.

Hannum, Hurst. Guide to International Human Rights Practice. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press: 1992.

Meron, Theodore. Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy issues. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1984.

Smith, Tara. Moral Rights and Political Freedom. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1995.

Vincent, R.J. Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge, University Press: 1986.

II. The Social Contract as applied to the international community

1) Can a Social Contract be applied to the international community?

-Do states sacrifice some degree of liberty?

-If so, how? Economically? By adhering to international law?

2) Can a man leave a society if he does not agree with the bounds of his contract?

-Can a state realistically leave the international community?

-What effect does leaving the international community have upon

obligations to obey international law?

-Does the UN still have an obligation to intervene in nations that

withdraw from the UN?

3) Can you consider the United Nations a legitimate government in the same sense as a nation’s government?

-Do the UN Charter and / or UN resolutions constitute international law?

-What examples of international law exist and how are they ratified?

-Does international law make any provisions for human rights?

-Treaties, accords, peace agreements… ?

Sources

Beitz, Charles R. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Dallmayr, Wilfred Reinhard. From Contract to Community: Political Theory at the Crossroads. New York: M. Dekker, 1978.

Fain, Haskell. Normative Politics and the International Community. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 1987.

Hobbes, Thomas. The Leviathan. Amherst, N.Y: Promethius Books, 1998.

Meron, Theodore. Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy issues. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1984.

III. Criteria of intervention

1) Why should the onus of intervention rest on the UN, as opposed to regional coalitions?

2) Which type of intervention should take precedence given limited resources?

-Intervention in a civil war vs. oppression

-Which one has historically cost more lives and been more successful?

-Look at case studies

3) What criteria need to be met in order to intervene?

-What criteria have been used in the past?

-Were those criteria successful?

4) What mistakes were made in previous UN interventions and how could they be rectified in the future?

5) What common theme connects these criteria, so that I know it is a complete set?

-How necessary are these criteria for intervention?

6) Given that the UN ought to intervene everywhere, but cannot, how do I get past Kant’s maxim of ought implies can?

Sources

Callahan, David. Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict. New York: Hill and Wang, 1997.

Christiansen, Drew and Powers, Gerard. “Send in the Peacekeepers: Sovereignty Isn’t Sacred.” in Commonwealth V. 124 (February 28, 1997), 16-18.

Evans, Gareth. “Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict.” Foreign Policy V. 96 (Fall, 1994), 3-20.

Goodpaster, Andrew J. When Diplomacy is Not Enough: Managing International Military Interventions. New York: Carnegie Commission, 1996.

Meyer, Karl E. “Enforcing Human Rights.” in World Policy Journal V. 16 (Fall, 1999), 45-50.

IV. Viability of a standing UN army

1) Why would a standing army be more beneficial and/or effective than the current system?

2) How would the Army be funded? Led?

Sources

Doll, William J. The Army and Multinational Peace Operations: Problems and Solutions. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993.

Evans, Gareth. “Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict.” Foreign Policy V. 96 (Fall, 1994), 3-20.

Touval, Saadia. “Why the UN Fails.” in Foreign Affairs, V. 73 (September/October, 1999), 44-57.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Beitz, Charles R. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Callahan, David. Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict. New York: Hill and Wang, 1997.

Doll, William J. The Army and Multinational Peace Operations: Problems and Solutions. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993.

Dallmayr, Wilfred Reinhard. From Contract to Community: Political Theory at the Crossroads. New York: M. Dekker, 1978.

Evans, Gareth. “Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict.” Foreign Policy V. 96 (Fall, 1994), 3-20.

Fain, Haskell. Normative Politics and the International Community. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 1987.

Goodpaster, Andrew J. When Diplomacy is Not Enough: Managing International Military Interventions. New York: Carnegie Commission, 1996.

Hannum, Hurst. Guide to International Human Rights Practice. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press: 1992.

Hobbes, Thomas. The Leviathan. Amherst, N.Y: Promethius Books, 1998.

Meron, Theodore. Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy issues. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1984.

Smith, Tara. Moral Rights and Political Freedom. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1995.

Vincent, R.J. Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge, University Press: 1986.

Periodicals

Christiansen, Drew and Powers, Gerard. “Send in the Peacekeepers: Sovereignty Isn’t Sacred.” in Commonwealth V. 124 (February 28, 1997), 16-18.

Evans, Gareth. “Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict.” Foreign Policy V. 96 (Fall, 1994), 3-20.

Meyer, Karl E. “Enforcing Human Rights.” in World Policy Journal V. 16 (Fall, 1999), 45-50.

Touval, Saadia. “Why the UN Fails.” in Foreign Affairs, V. 73 (September/October, 1999), 44-57.

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Cadet Carrie Wibben

In this day and age, it would seem that a society whose members suffer from terminal uniqueness would have little use for a moral system based upon universal and binding principle. It seems as if a considerable amount of energy has gone into describing methods within our language to relieve us of the troublesome burden of moral assessment and moral responsibility. Many may be wondering if such a universal moral guide to direct action even exists in our world today. The answer is “yes”; the Categorical Imperative, proposed by Immanuel Kant, still holds value today as shall become evident when the underlying ideas are illuminated and exposed.

Many ethical theories completely lack any account of the connection between principles and acts. However, in Kant’s Categorical Imperative, commonly known as the “supreme principle of morality,” Kant examines whether agents act on principle, as well as the moral status of their acts.[29] The duty or law that is to motivate our actions and give them moral value is produced by reason, and Kant distinguishes between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, or rules of action. Quite simply stated, the Categorical Imperative provides a test of the universality of the principles on which agents act, and in Kant’s mind, it is the only possible standard of moral obligation, as traditional criteria of morality generally tend to fall short. Kant gives at least three formulations of his Categorical Imperative as follows:

1. “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will

that it should become a universal law."

2. “Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become universal law of nature.”

3. Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.”[30]

As Kant uses the term duty, he means it as a type of moral obligation that an agent has toward another person, or an action that is morally mandatory. According to Nell, author of an essay on Kantian ethics, “Ethical duties are those which an agent cannot in principle be compelled to fulfill by anybody else.”[31] These duties are those that pursue certain ends, as opposed to those that compel agents to do certain acts. The ends which ethical duties require men to pursue are termed obligatory ends. An example of an obligatory end would be developing whatever skills and talents one can to be able to do more, which is an ethical duty. Any agent who does so must have the obligatory end which Kant calls “developing his perfection.”[32] In several of his writings in ethics, Kant also adopts the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, while endorsing the distinction between duties to oneself and duties to others. To further explore this portion of the Kantian framework of duties, a few examples follow.

The first example deals with the issue of suicide, which would fall under the category of a perfect duty to oneself. Kant’s maxim regarding suicide is: From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.[33] It is then possible to apply a form of the Categorical Imperative and ask simply whether his principle, solely founded on self-love, could become a universal law of nature. Of course, the answer is that a maxim such as this cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature while remaining wholly inconsistent with the system of nature and the supreme principle of all duty.

The next example addresses the issue of lying, insofar as an agent’s refusal to repay a loan after borrowing money would be seen as such. This example would be described as a perfect duty to others. The agent in this example knows that unless he promises to repay the debt, he will not be lent the money, and Kant’s maxim in this case would be something like: When I am in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I can never do so.[34] This maxim would never hold as a universal law of nature, for if everyone made promises with no intention of keeping them, the promise itself would become impossible, and all such statements would be regarded as vain pretences.

A third example is a situation in which an agent possesses a talent which, if he were to perfect it, would be helpful to his culture or to the society of which he is a member.[35] This example falls under the heading of an imperfect duty to oneself. Rather than seeking to perfect this talent, the agent prefers to indulge in pleasure instead. At this point, he must ask: Does this maxim of neglect of my natural gifts agree with what is called duty? This agent may see that a system of nature could possibly exist with such a universal law as this, but he cannot rationally will that this should become a universal law of nature or be implanted in us as such by natural instinct.

The fourth example we will examine addresses the issue of charity. This issue can be described as an imperfect duty to others. A certain agent, who is in prosperity, may decide not to help another as fortunate as he, arguing as such: “What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as he can make himself be and I will take nothing from him or envy him, but I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or his assistance in distress.”[36] We certainly could conceive of the human race surviving if this mode of thinking were to become a universal law of nature, but it is seemingly impossible to will that such a principle should have universal validity of a law of nature. It is under this final category of imperfect duties to others that the issue of humanitarian intervention also falls, which is in some ways closely related to the concept of charity. In reference to the term ‘obligatory ends,’ as described earlier, all actions that fall under this category of imperfect duties to others are not obligatory in nature, but rather simply permissible.

With a clear understanding of exactly where the issue of humanitarian intervention in the affairs of another country fits into the Kantian framework of duties, we can now shift to a more practical discussion concerning this issue. Richard Haass, who deals mainly with issues concerning the use of American military force in the post-Cold War world, makes an important distinction between the terms “peace-keeping” and “peace-making.” According to him, “peace-keeping is appropriate where all the major parties to the dispute accept an arrangement and the presence of outside troops,” whereas “Peace-making, on the other hand, assumes that at least one of the principal protagonists opposes the status quo, the presence of outsiders, or both.”[37] While this is an important distinction, the term peacekeeping as used in the past is generally meant to include both definitions, as it is intended to when used in the following critique of our current UN and US policy concerning the issue of humanitarian intervention.

The United Nations doctrine of humanitarian intervention was a significant expansion of the United Nation’s well-established peacekeeping role, but it moved the United Nations into vulnerable territory. United Nations peacekeeping operations have become the most visible element of the United Nations in the 1990’s and have placed the world organization at the center stage of international relations. Deciding when, where, and how to intervene with military force in the affairs of another country presents a truly perplexing set of questions. From a traditional standpoint, it is difficult to rationalize humanitarian intervention with armed troops under any conditions, even if it is to protect civilians such as aid workers who are involved. It is clearly dangerous for any organization, to include the United Nations, to attempt intervention in unstable situations. After the end of the Cold War, however, the need for intervention within states by the United Nations for humanitarian reasons became much more widely accepted. The United Nation’s attempt to remain neutral during the intervention in both Somalia and Bosnia, as demanded by United Nations doctrine, proved to be very costly in terms of human and monetary resources. With future situations of the same magnitude seemingly inevitable, a stronger policy of intervention, to include humanitarian intervention, is necessary. When combining military and humanitarian missions, the first priority must be the protection of basic human rights, while keeping in mind the security of people to lead normal lives and to develop their potential. In an attempt to simplify the complex and challenging task of outlining specific guidelines for countries to follow when faced with a decision to intervene militarily in the affairs of another country, my focus will temporarily shift more specifically toward the military intervention criteria for the United States.

There is a constant demand for a concrete set of policy guidelines for when and how to use military forces that has erupted as a result of the seemingly innumerable situations throughout the world in which some form of humanitarian catastrophe is apparent, such as basic breaches of human rights. In this increasingly uncertain world, it is therefore imperative that American policymakers follow clear guidelines in deciding where and when American military intervention is most needed and how it can be most effective. Unfortunately, however, neither the United States, nor any organization in the world for that matter, currently has any such guidelines in place. As a result, we have recently been tempted to intervene militarily in peripheral areas of the world such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, and the result has either been failure or provisional settlements.

The policy guidelines for how and when to use American military forces abroad must be flexible enough to address a wide range of military options, but they must also be constant enough to balance the projected benefit of any intervention against the cost of losing American lives. The primary mission of the United States Armed Forces is to fight and win our nation’s wars. This does not mean that war is our only task, but only that we must not lose focus on the primary mission of our armed forces. American military power certainly cannot be reserved for use only in cases involving vital interest; however, involvement in marginal interests should never interfere with our ability to maintain a trained and proficient military force capable of protecting and defending our nation. Humanitarian concerns generally do not fall under the category of vital national interests, mainly because they involve problems with few or no definite military solutions. This issue has received an extensive amount of attention, and some have come up with broad lists of criteria for when it may be permissible to intervene in this manner.

While there is always a risk linked militarily and politically to any form of military intervention, many argue that establishing manageable criteria for intervention will help to minimize those risks. Some say we can start by prioritizing the value of our national interests and placing more emphasis on the core interests of this nation. Those who argue this point may also argue that support for peace and humanitarian operations must be limited to those with clearly defined goals that somehow serve the national interest. Another common argument states that if we decide to use military intervention in any given conflict, we must set achievable military objectives that coincide with our current operational military doctrine. According to those who hold this view, any form of military intervention must strive to achieve a goal that serves the long-term security interests of every nation involved, to include the United States. Finally, some say that we must attempt to gain the support of a very powerful group, the American people, and do our best to keep them involved as occasionally the population has compelled the state to undertake humanitarian efforts. This argument states that the success of any operation deployed by the Commander-in-Chief depends largely on how well he has developed public support for the goals of a military intervention in advance of deployment. If he does not accomplish this task, we should expect the demands for disengagement when casualties begin to mount, as demonstrated when eighteen soldiers died in the operation in Mogadishu. By meeting these somewhat broad criteria, supporters feel that we will minimize risk while gaining every conceivable advantage, and we will be able to better ensure that our role is a decisive one.

A common thread is sewn throughout the broad views of appropriate criteria provided above: national security interests. In principle, it appears that identifying national security interests is quite useful when faced with possible intervention situations. As referenced earlier, it is not uncommon to encounter lists of interests ranked as vital, important, minor (marginal), and peripheral. In reality, though, such lists are arguably of little use. People seem to have grown numb to the repeated claims of “national security interests,” when in all actuality, far less is at stake. In such instances, it is quite inappropriate to draw a direct parallel between the importance of an interest and a willingness to intervene on its behalf. An interest may be widely looked upon as extremely important, but military force may not always be the best or most appropriate tool to promote or protect that particular interest. Of course this may throw into question the entire National Security Strategy of the United States, which is an issue that will eventually be addressed.

What types of missions can we envision for the future? Most would agree that peacekeeping and humanitarian operations are more or less a given, just as our forward democratic presence is a given. Our commitment to our allies and our vow to cause any disturber of the peace to have second thoughts is readily evident as we look a few years ahead. When the category of violence is brought to light, however, we begin the see diverging viewpoints. All wars are limited, and as Carl von Clausewitz pointed out, there has never been a state of absolute war as such a state would surely result in total annihilation. Wars are limited by three means according to Haass: “by the territory on which they are fought; by the means used to fight them; or by the objectives for which they are fought…”[38] Objectives for which we use violent force can range greatly. To help quell some of the complex issues associated with the use of violent force, some have turned to a set of principles indicating when it is permissible to go to war, such as the terms spelled out in the common Just War Tradition. There is, however, no concrete set of rules for the use of military force, and to set one up, many argue, may be dangerous.

As the United Nations continues to stretch its resources ever thinner in an attempt to maintain peace and deploy troops and civilians around the world, it must undertake the reforms necessary to ensure that humanitarian intervention works effectively and reaches the specific ends that it sets out to achieve. The majority of the thirteen peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations since the end of the Cold War have addressed some form of intrastate humanitarian crisis.[39] These types of crises are much more involved than traditional peacekeeping efforts. This new form of multidimensional peacekeeping places significantly more obligations on the already laden shoulders of the United Nations. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States also bears the weight of these additional obligations. We therefore have the duty to try to convince the Council to take appropriate action whenever there is a threat to international peace and security. Considerations of the United States’ responsibilities in a promising system of global policing may lead to an ironic conclusion: at times, the United States can best support humanitarian operations by simply not contributing to them at all. However, many feel that the United States should continue to take on global challenges that affect American interests, however indirectly.

As noted in our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, we are “a nation which seeks neither territory, hegemony, nor empire,” and “the United States is in a position of trusted leadership on the world scene.”[40] We are viewed by many as a stabilizing force, and these same nations look to us for inspiration and security. Our model of democratic reform grows throughout the globe on a daily basis. If the United States does not contribute troops to an operation, most feel that, at a minimum, it should provide the type of support for which it may be best suited. According to our National Military Strategy regarding humanitarian assistance, “Not only must our forces be prepared to provide humanitarian aid…but in some cases they must also be prepared to engage in conflict in order to assist and protect those in need.”[41] Above all, the United States has a responsibility to provide clear-sighted leadership in defining appropriate occasions for humanitarian intervention.

When presented with a possible list of criteria, the common practice is to analyze each criterion individually for potential problems. The problem with this method is it results in overall inconsistency. The majority of the lists floating around are composed of criteria that possess no logical structure. These lists also lack consistency in the area of specificity in that some criteria will be very broad, while others are quite specific in nature. The solution I offer will ensure that any given list of criteria is, as a whole, both morally consistent and logically sound.

Once a possible list of criteria is created, the list can be tested and re-tested until eventually a much-needed guideline for humanitarian intervention is what remains. As we recall, Kant’s Categorical Imperative provides a test of the universality of the principles on which agents act, and it provides a possible standard of moral obligation. Once one is able to come up with some sort of list of possible criteria, he may find it to be quite productive to apply some form of Kant’s Categorical Imperative to test the list for moral stability. After using this test of morality to narrow down the possibilities, he would then discard of those criteria that fail the test and keep those that pass as a part of the final list. The following is just an example of one possible list indicating when we should intervene that may later be put to test utilizing the Categorical Imperative:

1. United States involvement advances our national interest and risks to American personnel are considered acceptable

2. There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the broader spectrum of intervention and peacekeeping.

3. There is a threat to or breach of either national or international peace and security, possibly defined as one of the following:

-International aggression

-Urgent humanitarian disaster/violence

-Sudden interruption of established democracy

-Gross violation of human rights coupled with violence

4. The means to accomplish the mission are available, to include forces, financing, etc.

5. The consequences of inaction are unacceptable

6. The anticipated duration of the operation is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

7. United States participation is necessary for operation’s success

8. Domestic and Congressional support exists

Now that we have a maxim: “I will intervene using military force when one or more

of these conditions prevail,” we can now apply the Categorical Imperative. We are now at the point where we can ask ourselves if we can universalize the maxim. For example, consider the first criterion on the list provided: “The United States’ involvement advances our national interest, and risks to American personnel are considered acceptable.” We might universalize this criterion by stating that “All nations should intervene when it advances their national interest and risks to soldiers who intervene from that nation are considered acceptable.” We may now ask a series of questions to test this criterion such as:

1.) Is this logically possible?

2.) As a law of nature, would this rule be consistent with the world as we know it?

3.) By following this rule, would we be treating persons as means only?

4.) Could this rule be promulgated by a universal lawgiver in a kingdom of ends?

The answers to these questions are not readily apparent, nor should they be. By eventually answering these questions, we will undoubtedly gain a much deeper insight as to whether or not each individual criterion is both logically and morally acceptable from a deontological perspective.

The portions of Kant’s ethical theory highlighted at the beginning of this paper, mainly the Categorical Imperative, provide us with an excellent tool with which to test certain criteria, such as those listed above, in an effort to establish a list of morally acceptable principles. The Categorical Imperative can successfully guide action, and it can do so with a considerable amount of accuracy. As Nell stated in reference to the Categorical Imperative, “I was impressed with the scope, fertility, and precision of that ethical theory.”[42] The particular principles we are searching for here outline when it is permissible to intervene in the affairs of another country for humanitarian causes. By analyzing and critiquing current policies and recent interventions, we can gain a firm understanding of where we stand in this enterprise right now, as well as where we need to be in the near future. The list of criteria above is merely the starting point of a much more significant and exciting undertaking.

As we have discovered, the current conflict in the area of humanitarian intervention stems from the fact that no consistent or coherent list of criteria exists to guide when and how we should intervene militarily in the affairs of another country. There is a desperate need for a consistent and coherent list in order to ensure we have a logically based reason for intervention that is moral, but not based merely on self-interest. Kant’s Categorical Imperative, if applied correctly, can serve as a moral guide to direct our actions when faced with highly complex and challenging decisions such as the decision to intervene and disrupt the sovereignty of another nation.

For Charles Darwin, the explanation provided by creationism, which asserts that species were all created at once by a divine hand, was simply not good enough. He needed a better explanation, an explanation that he eventually found in his theories of natural selection and evolution, which revolutionized science, philosophy, and theology. For myself, our current method of developing and analyzing potential criteria for humanitarian intervention is simply not good enough. I am convinced that a more effective solution remains undiscovered, which initiated my search for a morally and logically consistent method to obtain a list of criteria that we can use to guide our decisions to intervene in the affairs of another country. I feel that Kant’s Categorical Imperative may be the answer.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Haass, Richard N. Inervention (Washington, DC: Jarboe pPrinting, 1994). 59-60.

Kant, Immanuel Th e Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1991). 51.

National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC: U. S. Government

Printing Office), January 1992, 2.

Nell, Onora, Acting on Principle, An Essay on Kantian Ethics, (New York: Columbia

University Press 1975. 3.

Robert H. Jackson, “Armed Humanitarianism,” International Journal, 1993, p 581.

I. Thesis

A. I propose that portions of Kant’s theoretical framework, specifically his theory of duties and the Categorical Imperative, can be used to formulate and test a proposed list of criteria for humanitarian intervention to ensure that the individual criteria are morally consistent and logically sound.

II. Discussion

At this day in age, it would seem that a society whose members suffer from terminal uniqueness would have little use for a moral system based solely upon universal and binding principle. It seems as if a lot of energy has gone into describing methods within our language to relieve us of the troublesome burden of moral assessment and moral responsibility. Many may be wondering if such a universal moral guide to direct action even exists in our world today. The answer is “yes,” the Categorical Imperative, proposed by Immanuel Kant, still holds value today.

For Charles Darwin, the explanation provided by creationism, which asserts that species were all created at once by a divine hand, was simply not good enough. He needed a better explanation, an explanation that he eventually found in his theories of natural selection and evolution, which revolutionized science, philosophy, and theology. For myself, our current method of developing and analyzing potential criteria for humanitarian intervention is simply not good enough. I am convinced that a more effective solution remains undiscovered, which initiated my search for a morally and logically consistent method to obtain a list of criteria that we can use to guide our decisions to intervene in the affairs of another country. I feel that Kant’s moral system, specifically his Categorical Imperative, may be the answer.

As I begin my exploration, I will start by laying out the portions of Kant’s theoretical framework that I will use to support my thesis. These include Kant’s Categorical Imperative, as described in Kant’s “Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics” found in “The Metaphysics of Morals,” essays on Kant’s idea of perpetual peace, and other portions of Kant’s “Political Writings.” More specifically, I plan to explain in detail Kant’s theory of duties, and demonstrate how intervention falls under the category of an imperfect duty to others. Acts of charity would fall under this category, and acts such as this are certainly moral actions, but not obligatory in nature. Once there is a clear understanding of exactly where the issue of humanitarian intervention fits into the Kantian framework of duties, I will shift to a more practical discussion.

In this section, I plan to critique current United Nations and United States policy concerning the issue of humanitarian intervention. I plan to analyze and critique our National Military Strategy, as well as recent interventions in an effort to gain a firm understanding of where we stand in our search for a guideline for when it is permissible to intervene in the affairs of another country now. This critique of current policy will also help to determine where we need to be in the near future. An explanation of the current conflict will follow. I plan to highlight the fact that without a consistent and coherent list of criteria for humanitarian intervention, we have no way to ensure our current reasons for intervention are logically and morally based, and not merely based upon self-interest.

From this point, I plan to intertwine the initial theoretical discussion with the proceeding practical discussion and come up with a potential list of criteria. I will then test this list for moral and logical stability using Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Before finalizing my list, I will ensure that all criteria have a logical structure and are similar in terms of specificity. Once I have accomplished all of this, the end result should be a consistent and coherent list of criteria for humanitarian intervention to guide our actions that stands the test of the “supreme principle of morality.”

III. Research Plan

For my research plan, I will break my paper down into the three major sections mentioned earlier in the discussion phase and develop a list of possible questions under each section. I hope that by answering these questions, I will be able to further develop my thesis. After each section, I will indicate the sources I plan to use to research the list of questions.

Section I – Kant’s moral framework

1. Can Kant’s moral system help to establish criteria for humanitarian intervention?

a. If so, which parts of Kant’s theoretical framework will be used and why?

2. Can the Categorical Imperative be used to test a potential list of criteria for moral and logical consistency?

3. Can Kant’s theory of duties help us determine moral ends?

4. Do Kantian duties have application in the civic sphere?

a. Do moral duties apply to individuals alone, or can states have moral duties as well?

Section I Sources:

Bohman, James and Lutz-Bachman, Matthias, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan

Ideal (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997).

Guyer, Paul, The Cambridge Companion to Kant (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1992).

Kant, Immanuel, The Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1991).

Kant, Immanuel, Political Writings (New York: Cambridge University Press 1970, 1991).

Nell, Onora, Acting on Principle, An Essay on Kantian Ethics (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1975).

Section II – Critique of current policy

1. Why is there a need for a concrete set of policy guidelines for intervention?

2. What is wrong, if anything, with our current National Security/Military Strategy from a moral standpoint?

3. What was the nature and extent of recent intervention – were specific goals/end-states set initially, and if so, were they achieved?

a. Did our overall actions help or hurt the nation into which we intervened in the short/long run?

b. Were all of our interventions morally and logically stable?

4. Should we be able to intervene solely for national security interests?

a. Would this be justified under Kant’s moral system? (use Categorical Imperative).

5. Are our efforts to democratize third world countries morally justified?

a. Can this act be justified using Kant’s moral system? (use Categorical Imperative).

Section II Sources:

Haass, Richard N. Intervention (Washington, DC: Jarboe Printing, 1994). 59-60.

National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: U. S. Government

Printing Office), January 1992.

National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: U. S. Government

Printing Office), May 1997.

Section III – Criteria for humanitarian intervention

1. What is wrong with the current method of developing/analyzing criteria for humanitarian intervention?

2. What is a possible solution to this problem?

a. Why is the new solution/method better than the old method?

3. What level of specificity should the criteria contain – how specific/general should the criteria be?

4. Should these criteria apply to just the United States, or to the United Nations as well?

5. What are the potential criteria?

6. From the initial list, what criteria pass the test of Kant’s Categorical Imperative?

7. What structure should these criteria take on?

1. Should they be in the form of goals?

2. Should they state specific desired end states?

8. What is the final list of criteria for humanitarian intervention in the affairs of another country?

Section III Sources:

The answers to the questions in this section will be based on the findings in previous sections. Therefore, all of the sources used thus far will contribute in answering this series of questions as well.

INITIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bohman, James and Lutz-Bachman, Matthias, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan

Ideal Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997.

Guyer, Paul, The Cambridge Companion to Kant (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1992).

Haass, Richard N. Intervention (Washington, DC: Jarboe Printing, 1994).

Kant, Immanuel, The Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1991).

Kant, Immanuel, Political Writings (New York: Cambridge University Press 1970, 1991).

National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: U. S. Government

Printing Office), January 1992.

National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: U. S. Government

Printing Office), May 1997.

Nell, Onora, Acting on Principle, An Essay on Kantian Ethics (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1975).

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[1] Alfred Glenn Mower, Jr. The United States, The United Nations, and Human Rights, (England: Greenwood Press, 1979) x.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997), 45.

[4] Ibid., 41.

[5] Tara Smith, Moral Rights and Political Freedom (Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield, 1995), 44.

[6] Ibid.

[7] R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 63.

[8] “Annan Calls for U.N. To Lead Peacekeeping Efforts” [news on-line] (May 7, 1999, accessed 13 November 1999); available from http://cnn.com/world/europe/9905/07/kosovo.03/ ; Internet.

[9] Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, (Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books, 1988), 63.

[10] “Hobbes.” Internet, accessed 7 November 1999. Available from: http://www.rjgeib.com/thoughts /nature/hobbes-quotes.html

[11] Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Publishers, 1994), 83.

[12] Ibid., 81.

[13] Gareth Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict,” in Foreign Policy V. 96 (Fall, 1994), 9.

[14] “UN Charter,” from the UN homepage, accessed 14 November 1999. Available from http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/. Internet.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict, New York: Hill and Wang, 1997.

[18] Evans, 8.

[19] Ibid., 8.

[20] Evans, 3.

[21] Callahan, 7.

[22] Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (USA: Basic Books, 1977), 107.

[23] “CIA Factbook,” from the CIA Factbook homepage, accessed 18 November 1999. Available from http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/bk.html#people. Internet.

[24] “Kurds, ” accessed 18 November 1999. Available at http://www.clark.net/kurd/. Internet.

[25] Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998), 85.

[26] Ibid., 85.

[27] “Chechnya,” accessed 18 November 1999. Available from http://www.infoplease.com/spot/chechnya1.html. Internet.

[28] Evans, 18.

[29] Nell, Onora, Acting on Principle, An Essay on Kantian Ethic, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 3.

[30] Kant, Immanuel The Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 51.

[31] Nell, 45.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid, 218

[34]Ibid, 226.

[35] Ibid, 239.

[36] Ibid, 246-248.

[37] Haass, Richard N. Intervention (Washington, DC: Jarboe Printing, 1994), 59-60.

[38] Haass, 190.

[39] Robert H. Jackson, “Armed Humanitarianism,” International Journal, 1993, 581.

[40] National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office), January 1992, 2.

[41] Ibid, 15

[42] Nell, preface.