Drawing in Jello: US Obligations Toward Iraqi Police Development
Presentation for the International Symposium for Military Ethics 2007
LTC Tony Pfaff
In September 2006, Reuters reported the
Despite the reasonableness of this response, implementing
this policy would pose ethical difficulties for
clash causes a great deal of friction, not to mention moral confusion, in US
efforts to develop Iraqi security forces.
This moral confusion manifests itself at times in the attitudes
casual dismissal of efforts to improve the Iraqi police forces accurately
captures the “damned if you do and damned if you don’t” response that has
resulted from the failure to successfully resolve the tension between the
obligation to provide basic security needs to the Iraqi people and prevent
ethical and human rights abuses. As of this writing, there are still reports of
detainee abuse, sectarian influence and widespread corruption among police
forces, making it reasonable to question whether the
To fully appreciate these competing obligations, this paper will first describe US obligations toward the Iraqi people in a post bellum environment where the transfer to sovereignty and elections has already occurred. The paper will then explore the political, organizational, and cultural constraints which exist in the Iraqi security forces and inhibit their ethical development and which conflict with US obligations. Finally, this paper will outline a path to resolve these difficulties.
US Obligations to Iraqi Police Force Development
fully understand the nature of the dilemma the
the 1907 Hague Convention stipulates these arrangements should benefit the
citizens of the defeated country, it does not specify what those arrangements
should be. Further, it does not specify what obligations the victor has after
it has restored sovereignty to the defeated nation. Many jus post bellum thinkers will argue that sovereignty is restored
after democratic elections are held for a new government,
which suggests that once the new government is in place, the victor’s moral
obligations are fulfilled. However, the lesson of
But Walzer notes that the just ends of war are “relative in character.” The threat of future aggression need not be eliminated, just reduced. Citizens of the defeated nation need not be invulnerable, just less vulnerable. They need not be safe, just safer. As Walzer states, “Just wars are limited wars; there are moral reasons for statesmen and soldiers who fight them to be prudent and realistic.” Therefore prudence places limits on how relative these criteria can be. It does not do any good to say citizens are less vulnerable or more safe if they are still left vulnerable and unsafe. Thus we need to identify the criteria a minimally just state of affairs must meet if the victor is to fulfill the requirements of a just war.
According to Walzer, the right of a government to claim political sovereignty and territorial integrity rests on its ability to guarantee the rights of life and liberty of its citizens. This does not mean it will always be successful, but it does mean that in general the security institutions which support the government will be capable of defending its citizens from external aggression, internal threats to its sovereignty, and crime. Brian Orend, in The Morality of War, further argues that a government is minimally just if it is: “1) generally recognized as such by their own people and the international community; 2) avoids violating the rights of other countries 3) makes every reasonable effort to satisfy the human rights of their own citizens, even if they lack the resources to achieve the standard perfectly.” The advantage of Orend’s framework is it allows us to take into consideration cultural and political realities without betraying the fundamental moral ideal. It does not matter how rights to life and liberty are understood, or if honest efforts to uphold those rights are always successful, as long as the government maintains the consent of the governed.
despite the successful election in December 2005, where more than 76% of the
articulating US obligations to
This leads to an important question. If a deep, patterned, and genuinely widespread resistance has developed, is it appropriate to call the current government legitimate? If the government is not legitimate, would it then be permissible to continue supporting police force development, in the hopes a legitimate government will emerge?
trouble with rejecting the legitimacy of the current Iraqi government based on
the level of resistance to it, is that there is no one resistance opposing one
political process or entity. The Sunni resistance, which is the greatest threat
to the current Shia-dominated government, opposes the Coalition and the
Shia-dominated government. Some Shia militant groups, on the other hand, oppose
the Sunnis and the government, despite holding key positions within that
government. In addition, the various Shia and Sunni militant groups often
conflict with each other as they attempt to establish their power bases in
there is no broad consensus on how to increase government functionality and
boost its legitimacy among all elements of the Iraqi population. As the Iraq
Study Group’s findings noted, it is not clear that any strategy will lead to
This has caused many in the
important criterion for a just war is a reasonable chance for success. Even in
a just cause, it makes no moral or practical sense to continue to risk lives
and property to continue to fight if there is no chance of victory.
Whether this is the case in
If Dr Cole is correct, then it also makes no sense, to continue to provide support for Iraqi security forces or even to substitute US forces in their place. It does not do any good to say the
However, as Charles Beitz pointed out in Political Theory and International Relations, the ideal cannot be undermined simply by pointing out that it cannot be achieved at present. He points out that one needs to distinguish between two classes of reasons for which it is impossible to implement an ideal. One class includes obstacles that can be, in theory at least, modified over time. The other includes impediments that are unalterable and unavoidable. Only in the second case can one appeal to the claim of impossibility in arguing against fulfilling an ideal.  This paper will argue that while political, organizational, and cultural impediments to establishing a functioning, democratic police force are immense, and perhaps unavoidable, with culturally sensitive engagement, they are, in principle, alterable.
is beyond the scope of this paper, however, to determine whether efforts in
can argue that continued involvement of US forces sufficiently conforms with
utilitarian requirements to do more good than harm. As long as the prospect for
a minimally just government exists, it will always be easy to argue that Iraqi
forces are owed
the bright line of withholding support if certain ethical and humanitarian
standards are not met is unsatisfying as well.
This absolutist position allows the
we accept that the
Understanding Iraqi Police Forces
to understanding the complexity of this problem is how political, cultural, and
operational factors contribute to the climate of abuse and corruption. The
factions that compose
Political and Cultural Constraints:
fractured government coupled with complex cultural factors has created a
difficult environment in which even dedicated Iraqi security officers and
government officials find it difficult to make progress in building a capable
police force. As each party attempts to expand its power and political
influence, it does so by attempting to increase its influence in
The Ministry’s ability to deal with this corruption is further complicated by the decentralized nature of the new Iraqi police system, where hiring and firing of individual police and their leadership is largely in the hands of the provincial government, rather than the Ministry of Interior. This new political reality, coupled with influence by outside sectarian forces, has made it difficult for reforms at the top to have significant impact at lower levels. In fact, it has set up parallel reform and reconstruction efforts, where ministry development—including improvements in the ability of the ministry to support police operations are filtered through provincial governments which have their own interests and agendas.
Hobbes, when authority breaks down and a society collapses into a state of
nature, “men will do anything to avoid being poor and solitary.”
According to Thomas Friedman,
describing the situation in
This values and considerations will impact the moral decision making of Iraqi police and their leaders, especially as long as it is unclear that the government that will emerge will be one to which they will consent. In the current security and political environment, this means Iraqis at all levels will give greater moral weight to the concerns of those closest to them rather than to civic or even religious duties. In the Iraqi context, this means loyalty to the party, most of which are largely made up of those who share common identities, will often supersede loyalty to the government. This is how the Shia parties can band together to win the national elections, but then resort to violence to establish power bases at the local level, where these otherwise reinforcing bonds conflict.
An example of how these competing loyalties complicate police reform, is the violence which erupted in Amarah, the capital of the Maysan province, after the withdrawal of British forces in October of 2006. The competition between the Badr Organization and its rival Jaysh al Mahdi, both of whom are part of the same Shia Alliance which won January 2006’s national election, resulted in a chaotic struggle which the police were ineffective to quell. According to press reports, the fighting in Amarah began when the head of police intelligence for the Maysan province, Qassim al Tamimi, who was also associated with the Badr Organization was killed by a road side bomb, they believed planted by Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM), the militant faction loyal to Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr. The Badr Organization, which had a significant presence in the police, then retaliated by kidnapping the brother of the JAM commander and demanding the handover of Tamimi’s killers. This led to clashes between the groups – all of whom had representatives in the local police force and provincial government. As a result of these clashes, 22 civilians were killed.
confused political atmosphere also complicated Iraqi police development in
Babil province. There the police chief, whose brother was reportedly a member
of the Dawa Party, was profoundly politically neutral and pro-Coalition. By all
in frustration, the council voted to fire him, which, in accordance with Iraqi
law, it had the right to do. If it had been successful, the council would have
been able to solidify sectarian control over the province and isolate the
Sunnis in the north and increase the likelihood of unrest. In fact, in response
to previous attempts by the council, Sunnis leaders threatened demonstrations
at the police academy had their candidates been displaced. However, the
Minister of Interior at the time, Bayan Jabr, himself a member of SCIRI,
intervened to prevent the police chief’s dismissal.
It is difficult to explain exactly why he did this. It could have been because
he wanted to preserve a competent an experienced police chief, but most likely
it was out of deference to his senior
An interesting story told to the author by advisors to the Babil police department underscores the point that even a just policy force may not always function in accordance with Western norms. In this incident, the police chief’s brother was implicated in the murder of a member of a rival party. But rather than arrest him, the police chief paid “blood money” to the victim’s family, in accordance with Iraqi custom. In a Western setting, this kind of familial favoritism would have resulted in grounds to fire the police chief, if not prosecute him. In the Iraqi context, his actions can be considered skillful keeping of the peace which ultimately upheld both the duty of the police chief to maintain the peace and the deeply seeded communal values of Iraqi society.
Culturally-driven considerations also result in considerable variation in terms of how subordinates, even those accused of violating Iraqi law, are treated. In early 2006, US Advisors confronted the Minister of Interior over allegations that a certain police brigade commander abused detainees. This brigade was considered highly successful as its operations had substantially decreased insurgent activity in its area of operations. Still, the Minister agreed to relieve the commander, but only after US officials threatened to withhold support to the unit. However, a few months later, the commander turned up on the Ministry’s staff.
reappearance of this officer caused many on the
what this absolutist approach failed to consider was how cultural and political
constraints impacted on the way the Iraqi leadership could deal with the
situation. In the West, we tend to view justice in terms of holding individuals
responsible for the rules they break. In determining how to handle violations,
the only considerations Westerners believe typically take into account are
those that pertain to the individual’s ability to understand right and wrong in
that particular case and their ability to avoid that wrong. This may not
eliminate responsibility, but it does tend to mitigate our judgments about the
individual’s liability. This is not true in
As noted above, what will also matter to Iraqis is the relationship of the subordinate to the person in authority. The number and quality of overlapping ties exist between the two individuals will affect how the person in authority punishes the subordinate, if at all. This is large part due to the fact that in many Middle Eastern cultures, one is not viewed as an individual, but rather as a member of a community, whether it be family, clan, or tribe. Thus, when harm comes to the individual, it is felt by the community and the community then is obligated to redress the grievance. When one shares this community with the person being punished, one’s relations with one’s own community can be greatly complicated, especially if other communities or interests benefit. As a result, depriving the brigade commander of his livelihood could create a number of political enemies for the ministry, undermining its effectiveness and putting its members at risk. This last point is important. What Westerners may view as crass favoritism may be justifiable in the Iraqi context as a proper expression of filial loyalties as well as the most efficient means to achieve the larger organizational and even moral goals. It will take an experienced advisor to tell the difference between the simple, destructive sectarian favoritism which does occur in Iraqi security forces from skillful, nuanced moral decision making.
This situation is further complicated by an organizational culture that does not necessarily see the commander’s behavior as wrong, or at least views it as justifiable given the extreme circumstances. From a cultural perspective, the brigade commander’s community would then have a cultural obligation to act, violently if necessarily, in response to the loss of one of their community member’s livelihood. This means that in order to serve a large number of competing interests, Iraqi leaders will seek to find a way to balance them all, giving weight to the interest of those closest to them. This will manifest itself in what will appear to be very inconsistent treatment of those suspected of corruption. But if US advisors attempt to constrain an Iraqi’s options by attempting to impose the same punishment for each offense, they may undermine that person’s ability to affect real change.
is not to say that there will not be times when
Organizational and Leadership Constraints
are numerous examples to illustrate the difficulty in getting a handle on
detainee abuse in
While Islamic law (Sharia) accords confession a special evidentiary status, it does not permit judges to accept confessions which are coerced. However, this reasonable constraint was perverted under Saddam’s regime where torture was frequently resorted to obtain confessions in order to provide a veneer of legitimacy for otherwise unjust legal proceedings. Today, confession is often the only evidence available to the judges of the barely-functional Iraqi courts to help them decide whether to convict a suspect. Poor records maintenance and inexperienced police investigators, coupled with a great deal of distrust between Ministry of Justice investigators and the police has made it difficult provide comprehensive and compelling forensic evidence to the courts. This often means confession will be the most reliable means to a conviction. Given the pressure resulting from the current poor security environment, it is not surprising some interrogators will go to extreme lengths to ensure a conviction. Thus in part, eliminating detainee abuse will be greatly facilitated by increasing the capacity of the Iraqi courts and investigators.
the Iraqi police leadership interpret their duties and responsibilities also
impacts on the efforts to eliminate detainee abuse. The following incident illustrates this
point. When the abuse was uncovered at Site 4, US advisors confronted the
National Police commanders who were responsible for the units which operated
the site. At first, the senior National
Police leadership rejected any responsibility for the incident since they had
not, in fact, authorized the abuse. In fact, while the abusive treatment was
facilitated by members of the National Police, it was actually conducted by
interrogators who belonged to a separate organization, which made them
difficult to identify. Thus in the view of the National Police leadership,
their organization was not responsible for the abuse since they had not ordered
it nor were the personnel under their direct control responsible for it,
despite the fact the detainees remained in National Police custody throughout
the time of the abuse. Therefore, they were slow in taking action against the
perpetrators and facilitators until
From the perspective of the individual guards involved, they were simply following orders, which in Iraqi security services, like the old Soviet military on which they were based, is considered to be the highest duty. This is especially so in the Iraqi context, where failure to follow orders could have severe consequences for one and one’s family. Thus, in an environment where following orders is the highest value, the maxim, “do not torture,” which many will readily accept, does not translate as “do not permit torture” especially when other authority figures are present,
This organizational climate creates a kind of “responsibility vacuum” where those at the top have all the authority, but only consider themselves responsible for what they order others to do, and then only if they were the originator of the order. At the bottom, the individual has all the responsibility for ensuring they accomplish assigned tasks successfully, but no responsibility (or authority) to question or modify those orders. In such an environment, it is not hard to see how persons in intermediate or lateral authority can undermine genuine reforms emanating from the top.
In such a confused situation, the only recourse is to raise the issue to the ministry level. But then any ensuing investigation becomes one more burden for an overly taxed administration to manage. This almost guarantees that despite the best intentions of the investigator, the investigation itself will take a long time to complete. Further, this can also allow those who are guilty of abuse time to cover up evidence.
this point it is worth mentioning some of the difficulties in addressing
specific allegations of abuse. The author once received a phone call from a
member of the
investigating the incident, it was discovered that the
was not an isolated incident. The author received a number of calls to
investigate illegal detention or abuse by MOI forces only to find that the
accusations were baseless. This does not mean there were not a number of times
when the allegations were accurate, but Iraqis are all too quick to cry “Wolf
when confronted with the increasing violence
this confusion between authority and responsibility, it would be wrong to conclude that MOI
leadership does not take eliminating human rights abuses seriously. Jawad al
Bolani, who had just taken over as Minister when the Site 4 incident occurred,
visited the detainees after being briefed by US advisors on the nature and
extent of the abuse. During the visit he apologized to the detainees, spent
time discussing with the detainees their role in a future
When the incident first occurred, National Police leaders did arrest a number of guards and interrogators suspected of participating in the abuse. Yet a few days later, some of those arrested were seen going about their duties. After continued US pressure, including the threat by Ambassador Khalilzad to withhold support, many of the perpetrators were re-arrested and at the time of this writing, are reportedly still in custody. Whether they will be meaningfully punished for the abuse is at this moment a matter for the Iraqis. But Iraqi security force development is full of stories of mixed results where apparent sincerity does not translate into the kind of transformation necessary to rid Iraqi security forces of abuse, corruption, and sectarianism. But what is equally evident is that many in the Iraqi leadership are committed to overcoming this situation and establishing a just and equitable police force.
What may be an important indicator of the potential, as well as the pitfalls of the ethical development of Iraqi police are the results of a survey conducted by the MOI’s Center for Ethics and Human Rights. According to the survey, Iraqi police consistently related themselves high in terms of ethical behavior, but peers and superiors lower. Further, the survey indicated that Iraqi police valued loyalty, service, honor and duty over justice, religious commitment, and trust. This is to be expected in autocratic organizations where initiative is stifled and decisions about right and wrong are only for those at the top. But the fact that this survey was conducted by Iraqi police for the purpose of developing programs to address these shortcomings indicates that there is hope for transformation as well.
Progress in developing an ethical Iraqi police force
It is tempting in the face of such difficulties to abandon support for the Iraqi police forces. The appearance of success without the corresponding improvements on the ground can make working with Iraqi police forces morally analogous to drawing on Jello. The image lasts for a few moments, but it disappears quickly. But it is important as well to acknowledge the measures the Ministry has taken to promote an effective, humane police force. To understand what must count as genuine progress, we must first establish what standards the Ministry should meet if it is said to meet the minimum requirements of justice.
To support a government that meets Orend’s criteria, a minimally just police force will require an institution that is both transparent and capable of policing itself. It will also require the ability to create and sustain a culture of democratic, humane policing, at least to the level of regional standards. To these ends, the ministry has taken some first steps to reduce sectarianism, detainee abuse, and corruption by increasing awareness, transparency, and the capability to police itself.
The Ministry has increased awareness by supporting extensive ethics training for police recruits and has established an ethics center to further institutionalize ethics training not only at the academies, but in the field as well. To this end, the center has produced curriculum specifically aimed at eliminating detainee abuse and even completed an ethical climate survey of the Iraqi police mentioned previously. What is most remarkable is that these events occurred despite the kidnapping and murder of the center’s director, BG Osama Badri. Despite this setback, the center has still been able to recruit qualified Iraqis to serve on the staff.
The Ministry leadership has increased transparency and its ability to police itself by establishing an independent Internal Affairs organization that reports to directly to the Minister. Further, the Ministry has relieved a number of commanders for detainee abuse and corruption. And as in the Babil province case, the Ministry has enforced fair hiring practices, even in the face of political pressure to do otherwise. It is difficult to fully explain all the factors that contribute to this progress or to determine if this progress will be lasting. But what the previous examples demonstrate that at least two things are clear: 1) Iraqis are capable of building such a force, though sometimes they lack the will to stand up to sectarian and criminal pressures and 2) Iraqis are more likely to find the will to stand up to these pressures when they have good relationships with Coalition partners who can provide resources and moral support.
it is important to note that thousands of Iraqis
continue to join the ranks of the police, despite the force suffering
incredible losses, because they realize that their future is wrapped up in the
success of the police force.
They realize that the real battle for
A framework for meeting US moral obligations:
we have described the nature of the difficulties involved, we have also
described reasons for hope that change, over time, is possible. If this
analysis is correct, then Beitz’s condition that it is not permissible to
abandon an ideal if the impediments to it are alterable, is met, and the
obligation to develop
To determine how to resolve potential conflicts, we need to establish the limits of that obligation. So far we have only applied a utilitarian approach to assessing support for Iraqi police, despite evidence of corruption and detainee abuse. But we have not established the limits for this support. It clearly is not permissible to tolerate any injustice simply because there is hope for future benefits, but in the same way, we need to establish limits on the use of methods which can affect police force development.
US efforts to develop an ethical police force have largely focused on institution building and partnering, which are aimed at training the police before they go the field and then to reinforce that training once police are at their stations. Institution building efforts have been largely aimed at developing effective police academies as well as a ministry capable of sustaining and developing the force. This component of Coalition engagement allows for ethics education in entry level classes which will reinforce ethical policing norms as part of the Iraqi police identity. Partnering with police in the field allows for an extra layer of transparency which gives dedicated Iraqis the cover to stand up to corruption, abuse, and sectarian influences. Security concerns as well as limited numbers and resources have made faster progress difficult, but this analysis suggests that continued, if not expanded, engagement on these two levels will be essential to developing an effective and ethical police force.
To establish institutions capable of developing and administering an ethical police force, implementing an approach which is sensitive to the culture and environment is more important than a strict compliance based approach. But as noted above, successful reform of the police force will require sustained will on the part of the Iraqis, increased institutional capacity for administration as well as self-policing, and relatively open access to Iraqi police facilities and operations. This suggests, then, that continued support for this process should be contingent on the possibility of continued reform as evidenced by:
1) Continued support by senior Iraqi leadership for reforming the ethical and human rights culture of the police assessed in terms of willingness to devote resources to enforcing Iraqi law and regulations as well as establishing and maintaining a ethnically and confessional balanced force;
2) Continued development and support for ethics training and education. Despite high-level support, other factors can undermine the developing of the requisite educational and training institutions necessary to acculturate a new generation of Iraqi police to democratic and humane policing. If these factors overwhelm or undermine execution of robust ethical training programs, then support should be withheld until the situation can be rectified. The exception to this would be any efforts by Coalition advisors to get these programs back on track;
3) A functioning, independent internal affairs and inspector general as evidenced by measurable increases in arrests and prosecutions of Iraqi police suspected of sectarianism, abuse, and/or corruption.
4) Access for US partners as well as non-governmental organizations to all levels of Iraqi police and MOI organizations and facilities.
Additionally, this analysis suggests that US advisors and policy makers should establish intermediate sanctions, short of withholding support for the whole ministry, which can motivate, and give cover to, Iraqis who are trying to reform the police forces. This analysis also suggests that use of broad withholding of support is permissible when hope for continued reform has evaporated. But it should only be used with the intent to alter that behavior. This way, application of this measure does not violate US obligations since the obligation is removed when hope evaporates. This analysis also suggests increasing the level of Coalition partnering with police forces in the field should be a part of any continued engagement with Iraqi security forces since only Coalition forces can provide the required oversight to ensure transparency at the local level and prevent sectarian or criminal influences from overwhelming local police forces.
the best indicator of hope is evidenced by a conversation the author had with a
senior MOI official who had a reputation for corruption. During a discussion
about resourcing the ethics center, the official enthusiastically agreed to
support it. This is of course easy to dismiss as bluster for the benefit of the
Coalition members present and would have been dismissed as such had he not
added his reasons for his endorsement. He stated that he had lived in Europe
for over a dozen years after fleeing
Pfaff: The author is a Middle East Foreign Area Officer who has spent two tours
 Reuters, “US Threatens to Cut Back IP Funding,” Sat 30 Sept 2006
 The Leahy Amendment is a part of each appropriations bill and as such is different for each bill. It is not the purpose of this paper to address the legal complexities of the amendment nor to determine if it, as attached to any particular appropriations bill, will interfere (or promote) Iraqi security force development. The language for the Leahy Amendment for 2006 reads as follows: “None of the funds made available by this Act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.”
 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2ed (New York: Basic Books, 1977, 1992) p. 121.
 Ibid. 121-122
 Documents on the Laws of War, Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) pp. 55-57.
Orend, The Morality of War (
 Walzer, p. 122
 Walzer, pp. 53-54
 Orend, The Morality of War, p. 36
 UNSC 1546 (http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement and most recent renewal, UNSC 1723 (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20771&Cr=iraq&Cr1=)
Feldman, What We Owe
A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” ( Vintage Books ,
 See Paul Christopher, “The Ethics of War and Peace,” (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999) p. 85 amd James Turner Johnson, “Morality and Contemporary Warfare,” (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 34. In both accounts, what is being rejected is not a fight against the odds for a just cause, but rather futile or suicidal resistance which has no chance of success.
 Juan Cole, Top Ten Myths About Iraq, in “Informed Comment”, http://www.juancole.com/2006/12/reprint-edn.html
 Charles Beitz, “Political Theory and International Relations,” (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979) p. 156
 Ibid, p. 42-43.
 Jeremty Boissevain, “Values and Interaction in a Conflict Setting,” in Friends of Friends, Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1974) p. 50.
 It is
important to note that the Badr Corps, now called the Badr Organization, and
the Jaysh al Mahdi have different legal statuses in
 For the complete text of CPA 71 (Local Government Powers) see http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/#Orders
has precedent in recent Iraqi history. Saddam exploited family relations to
arrange the assassination of his son-in-law Husayn Kamel, whose defection to
Bobroff-Hajal, “Why Cousin Marriage Matters in
 According to two polls conducted for the Ministries of Defense and Interior by the Multi-National Security Training Command-Iraq, while most Iraqi soldiers and police report they value humanely treating detainees, they rate others in their organizations low regarding whether they believe they hold that value as well. Coalition advisors who participated in the MOD poll rated all Iraqis low in holding this value. The MOD poll was conducted in December 2005. The MOI poll was conducted in November 2006.
 Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial process
in the Sharia (
 This was also reflected in the MOI and MOD polls. In the MOI poll, police consistently rated loyalty and duty higher than justice and religious commitment. This indicates a culture ready and willing to follow orders, but not capable, at least at lower levels , of determining if orders conflict with the demands of justice and morality.
 The Wolf Brigade, later renamed the “Freedom Brigade,” had become closely and publicly associated with detainee and other human rights abuses. Despite the veracity of some of these accusations, there were numerous accounts in the Iraqi press of Wolf Brigade “atrocities” which occurred in areas the brigade did not operate in. These accounts were so widespread that over time, the “Wolf Brigade” became synonymous with the Iraqi police.
 MOI Survey
 Lauren Frayer, “Study: 12,000 Iraqi Police Slain,” Associated Press, 25 December 2006.